From d1eafa5d35c09975387f0e7386e81da7d2fae7e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Handuo Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 06:54:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fix(paths): make the path gate binding for in-process writes and shell commands MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Handoff item 4a — the security fixes found while surveying item 4, ahead of the runtime-filesystem-state port: - sandbox_write_file's CurrentSandbox branch is an open() in the harness process, not a sandbox boundary, and its callers reach it precisely when _path_auth refused a local write. It now authorizes the path itself, so a refusal is a denial rather than a detour. Remote backends are untouched. - file_editor (view/create/str_replace), write_file and the Docker branch quote the path before interpolating it into a shell command; an unquoted path containing `;` ran commands that bypassed assess_bash_command. - A workspace root from ExecutionScope metadata can no longer name a system directory: /etc, /usr, / and direct children of /usr and /etc grant nothing. Run directories under /var or /opt still work, which item 4c depends on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- CHANGELOG.md | 14 ++ plugins/tools/_path_auth.py | 48 +++++- plugins/tools/_sandbox.py | 32 +++- plugins/tools/file_editor.py | 23 ++- plugins/tools/write_file.py | 3 +- tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 1255b4d..a157815 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -62,6 +62,20 @@ Initial open-source release of FrontierAgent. ### Fixed +- **A write the path gate refused no longer reaches the host.** `write_file` and + `file_editor_create` fall back to the sandbox when local authorization fails, + and for the in-process `CurrentSandbox` that fallback is an `open()` in the + harness (as root, in container mode), so a refused path was written anyway. + That branch now authorizes the path itself; remote backends are unaffected. +- **Paths are quoted before reaching a sandbox shell.** `file_editor`'s view / + create / str_replace commands, `write_file`'s `mkdir -p`, and the Docker + `mkdir -p` interpolated the path unquoted, so a path containing `;` ran + commands that never passed the bash policy. +- **A system directory named as the workspace root grants nothing.** The root + arrives through `ExecutionScope` metadata (workload input), and + `{"workspace_root": "/etc"}` made `/etc` readable and writable. System roots + and direct children of `/usr` and `/etc` are refused; a run directory deep + under `/var` or `/opt` (a container volume, macOS `$TMPDIR`) still works. - Surface finalize-gate bypasses on the final turn: an answer delivered despite open task-board items now carries an unfinished-work note and a `finalize_gate_bypassed` marker instead of reading as a clean success. diff --git a/plugins/tools/_path_auth.py b/plugins/tools/_path_auth.py index 31041e4..fd50932 100644 --- a/plugins/tools/_path_auth.py +++ b/plugins/tools/_path_auth.py @@ -41,8 +41,48 @@ _WORD_SPLIT = re.compile(r"[^a-z0-9]+") +#: Roots that can never BECOME a workspace: naming one as the workspace root +#: would authorize the whole system tree for reads, and — outside the service +#: checkout, which is the only thing ``_is_isolated_workspace_root`` refuses — +#: for writes too. The workspace root arrives through ExecutionScope metadata, +#: which carries workload input: a benchmark runner's trial directory is a +#: legitimate value, ``/etc`` is not, and this module cannot tell which caller +#: filled the key in. So the VALUE is constrained rather than the caller. +#: +#: A path may still live under one of these (a container's ``/var/lib/...`` +#: volume, ``/opt/app/run-17``): only naming the root itself, or a direct +#: system subdirectory of it, is refused. ``/tmp`` is absent — a scratch +#: workspace under it is ordinary — and so is ``/home``, whose per-user +#: subdirectories are where a local CLI run actually lives. +_NEVER_A_WORKSPACE_ROOT = frozenset({ + "/", "/etc", "/usr", "/bin", "/sbin", "/lib", "/lib64", "/boot", "/dev", + "/proc", "/sys", "/var", "/root", "/opt", "/home", +}) + + +#: Roots whose direct children are no more suitable than the root itself: +#: ``/usr/local`` and ``/etc/cron.d`` grant exactly the writes that make naming +#: them an escalation. ``/var`` and ``/opt`` are deliberately absent — a +#: container volume at ``/var/lib/app/run`` and macOS ``$TMPDIR`` under +#: ``/var/folders/...`` are real run directories, and refusing them is the +#: over-denial that loses a run's deliverables. +_NEVER_A_WORKSPACE_PARENT = frozenset({"/usr", "/etc", "/bin", "/sbin", "/boot", "/proc", "/sys"}) + + +def _is_system_root(candidate: Path) -> bool: + """Whether ``candidate`` is a system root, or a direct child of a system + directory whose children are equally unsuitable.""" + return ( + str(candidate) in _NEVER_A_WORKSPACE_ROOT + or str(candidate.parent) in _NEVER_A_WORKSPACE_PARENT + ) + + def _configured_workspace_root() -> Path | None: - """Return the explicit workspace root, if one was configured for this task.""" + """Return the explicit workspace root, if one was configured for this task. + + The value is checked, not its source: see ``_NEVER_A_WORKSPACE_ROOT``. + """ scope = get_current_execution_scope() metadata = scope.metadata if scope else {} raw_root = ( @@ -56,6 +96,12 @@ def _configured_workspace_root() -> Path | None: if not workspace_root.is_dir(): logger.warning("Ignoring invalid CODING_WORKSPACE_ROOT '%s'", raw_root) return None + if _is_system_root(workspace_root): + logger.warning( + "Refusing workspace root '%s': a system directory cannot be a " + "workspace, so it grants no filesystem access", raw_root, + ) + return None return workspace_root diff --git a/plugins/tools/_sandbox.py b/plugins/tools/_sandbox.py index 5e23b86..0e5c548 100644 --- a/plugins/tools/_sandbox.py +++ b/plugins/tools/_sandbox.py @@ -2974,6 +2974,22 @@ def shell_quote(s: str) -> str: return "'" + s.replace("'", "'\\''") + "'" +def _local_write_refusal(path: str) -> str: + """Why the path gate refuses writing ``path`` on this host, or "". + + Only consulted for the in-process write branch below. Imported lazily: + ``_path_auth`` imports this module. + """ + try: + from plugins.tools._path_auth import _is_path_allowed + except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - broken install + return f"path authorization unavailable: {exc}" + allowed, reason = _is_path_allowed(path, write_access=True) + if allowed: + return "" + return reason or f"write to {path!r} is not authorized" + + def sandbox_write_file( sandbox: Any, path: str, content: str, *, mode: str = "w", ) -> tuple[bool, str]: @@ -2995,9 +3011,19 @@ def sandbox_write_file( # (128 KB), so routing deliverables through it fails with E2BIG somewhere # around 96 KB of content — and container mode has no /tmp fallback, so the # write becomes a hard error. The harness process already has the mount - # bound read-write and the path has passed ``_path_auth``; writing it - # directly is both unlimited and cheaper (no bwrap + python3 spawn). + # bound read-write, so writing it directly is both unlimited and cheaper + # (no bwrap + python3 spawn). + # + # This branch is an ordinary ``open()`` in the harness process — as root, in + # container mode — so it is NOT a sandbox boundary, and the path has to be + # authorized HERE. Its callers (``write_file``, ``file_editor_create``) + # reach the sandbox precisely when ``_path_auth`` refused a local write, and + # for a CurrentSandbox that made the refusal a detour rather than a denial: + # a path the gate rejected was written to the host anyway. if isinstance(sandbox, CurrentSandbox): + reason = _local_write_refusal(path) + if reason: + return False, reason try: p = Path(path) new_parent = not p.parent.exists() @@ -3025,7 +3051,7 @@ def sandbox_write_file( if mode == "w" and isinstance(sandbox, DockerSandbox): parent = os.path.dirname(path) if parent: - sandbox.commands.run(f"mkdir -p {parent}", timeout=10) + sandbox.commands.run(f"mkdir -p {shell_quote(parent)}", timeout=10) with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile( mode="w", encoding="utf-8", delete=False, suffix=".tmp", ) as f: diff --git a/plugins/tools/file_editor.py b/plugins/tools/file_editor.py index 9789b9f..a492e16 100644 --- a/plugins/tools/file_editor.py +++ b/plugins/tools/file_editor.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ aget_sandbox, arun_sandbox_cmd, asandbox_write_file, + shell_quote, ) logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) @@ -78,17 +79,21 @@ async def file_editor_view(path: str, view_range: str = "") -> str: except RuntimeError as e: return f"Error: {e}" + # Every path below is interpolated into a shell command, so it is quoted + # once here: an unquoted path containing ``;`` or ``$(…)`` would run + # arbitrary commands in the sandbox without passing the bash policy. + q = shell_quote(path) try: check = await arun_sandbox_cmd( sandbox, - f"test -d {path} && echo DIR || echo FILE", timeout=10, + f"test -d {q} && echo DIR || echo FILE", timeout=10, ) is_dir = "DIR" in check.stdout if is_dir: result = await arun_sandbox_cmd( sandbox, - f"find {path} -maxdepth 2 -not -path '*/.git/*' " + f"find {q} -maxdepth 2 -not -path '*/.git/*' " f"-not -path '*/node_modules/*' -not -path '*/__pycache__/*' " f"| head -100 | sort", timeout=15, @@ -100,11 +105,11 @@ async def file_editor_view(path: str, view_range: str = "") -> str: parts = view_range.split("-") if len(parts) == 2: start, end = parts[0].strip(), parts[1].strip() - cmd = f"sed -n '{start},{end}p' {path} | cat -n" + cmd = f"sed -n '{start},{end}p' {q} | cat -n" else: - cmd = f"cat -n {path}" + cmd = f"cat -n {q}" else: - cmd = f"cat -n {path}" + cmd = f"cat -n {q}" result = await arun_sandbox_cmd(sandbox, cmd, timeout=15) @@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ async def file_editor_create(path: str, content: str) -> str: parent = os.path.dirname(path) if parent: await arun_sandbox_cmd( - sandbox, f"mkdir -p {parent}", timeout=10, + sandbox, f"mkdir -p {shell_quote(parent)}", timeout=10, ) # Write via python in sandbox (avoids files.write permission issues) @@ -165,7 +170,7 @@ async def file_editor_create(path: str, content: str) -> str: return f"Error creating {path}: {err}" result = await arun_sandbox_cmd( - sandbox, f"wc -l < {path}", timeout=5, + sandbox, f"wc -l < {shell_quote(path)}", timeout=5, ) lines = result.stdout.strip() if result.stdout else "?" @@ -232,7 +237,9 @@ async def file_editor_str_replace(path: str, old_str: str, new_str: str) -> str: try: # Read current content via cat (more reliable than files.read for all paths) - result = await arun_sandbox_cmd(sandbox, f"cat {path}", timeout=10) + result = await arun_sandbox_cmd( + sandbox, f"cat -- {shell_quote(path)}", timeout=10, + ) if result.exit_code != 0: return f"Error: Cannot read {path}: {result.stderr or 'file not found'}" content = result.stdout diff --git a/plugins/tools/write_file.py b/plugins/tools/write_file.py index c0f51d4..b65c81e 100644 --- a/plugins/tools/write_file.py +++ b/plugins/tools/write_file.py @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ resolve_runtime_path, resolve_sandbox_mode, sandbox_available, + shell_quote, ) logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ async def write_file(path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> str: parent = os.path.dirname(path) if parent: await arun_sandbox_cmd( - sandbox, f"mkdir -p {parent}", timeout=10, + sandbox, f"mkdir -p {shell_quote(parent)}", timeout=10, ) mode = "a" if append else "w" diff --git a/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py b/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b8ae8f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +"""The path gate is a denial, not a detour (handoff item 4a). + +Three ways a refused write reached the host anyway, or a refusal was never +asked for: + +* ``write_file`` / ``file_editor_create`` fall back to the sandbox when + ``_path_auth`` refuses a local write, and for a ``CurrentSandbox`` that + fallback is an ``open()`` in this process — as root, in container mode; +* a path interpolated unquoted into a sandbox shell command runs whatever it + contains, without passing ``assess_bash_command``; +* a workspace root arriving through ExecutionScope metadata was trusted + whatever it named, so ``{"workspace_root": "/etc"}`` authorized ``/etc``. + +Nothing here executes a dangerous command: the shell-injection cases assert on +the command STRING that would have been sent. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import asyncio +import importlib +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from frontier_agent.core.execution_context import ( + ExecutionScope, + reset_current_execution_scope, + set_current_execution_scope, +) +from plugins.tools import _sandbox +from plugins.tools._path_auth import _configured_workspace_root, _is_path_allowed + + +class _scoped: + def __init__(self, **metadata: object) -> None: + self.metadata = metadata + + def __enter__(self) -> None: + self._token = set_current_execution_scope( + ExecutionScope(task_id="t", metadata=dict(self.metadata)), + ) + + def __exit__(self, *exc: object) -> None: + reset_current_execution_scope(self._token) + + +# ── the in-process write branch must honour the gate ───────────────────── + + +@pytest.fixture +def container(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + """A CurrentSandbox over a workspace, as container/native mode has.""" + workspace = tmp_path / "ws" + workspace.mkdir() + monkeypatch.setenv("SANDBOX_BACKEND", "native") + monkeypatch.setenv("FRONTIER_AGENT_WORKSPACE_DIR", str(workspace)) + sandbox = _sandbox.CurrentSandbox(workspace) + token = _sandbox.set_task_sandbox(sandbox) + try: + yield workspace + finally: + _sandbox.clear_task_sandbox(token) + + +def test_sandbox_write_refuses_what_the_path_gate_refused(container) -> None: + target = container.parent / "not_authorized" / "x.txt" + with _scoped(workspace_root=str(container)): + assert not _is_path_allowed(str(target), write_access=True)[0] + ok, reason = _sandbox.sandbox_write_file( + _sandbox.get_existing_sandbox(), str(target), "payload", + ) + assert not ok + assert reason + assert not target.exists(), "a refused path was written to the host" + + +def test_write_file_does_not_route_a_refused_path_through_the_sandbox(container) -> None: + write_file = importlib.import_module("plugins.tools.write_file").write_file + + target = container.parent / "not_authorized" / "x.txt" + with _scoped(workspace_root=str(container)): + out = asyncio.run(write_file.func(path=str(target), content="payload")) + assert "File written" not in out or str(target) not in out + assert not target.exists() + + +def test_file_editor_create_does_not_route_a_refused_path_through_the_sandbox( + container, +) -> None: + editor = importlib.import_module("plugins.tools.file_editor") + + target = container.parent / "not_authorized" / "y.txt" + with _scoped(workspace_root=str(container)): + out = asyncio.run( + editor.file_editor_create.func(path=str(target), content="payload"), + ) + assert "File created" not in out + assert not target.exists() + + +def test_an_authorized_write_still_succeeds_in_process(container) -> None: + target = container / "report.md" + with _scoped(workspace_root=str(container)): + ok, reason = _sandbox.sandbox_write_file( + _sandbox.get_existing_sandbox(), str(target), "body", + ) + assert ok, reason + assert target.read_text() == "body" + + +def test_a_remote_backend_is_not_gated_on_host_authorization() -> None: + """The in-process branch is the only one that writes here; an E2B write + targets a path that does not exist on this host and must not be judged by + this host's gate.""" + written: dict[str, str] = {} + + class FakeFiles: + def write(self, path: str, content: str) -> None: + written[path] = content + + remote = type("Remote", (), {"files": FakeFiles()})() + ok, reason = _sandbox.sandbox_write_file(remote, "/home/user/out.md", "body") + assert ok, reason + assert written == {"/home/user/out.md": "body"} + + +# ── paths interpolated into sandbox shell commands ─────────────────────── + + +_INJECTION = "/workspace/a.txt; touch /tmp/pwned-by-path" + + +@pytest.fixture +def recorded(monkeypatch): + """Record the command strings tools would run, and run none of them.""" + seen: list[str] = [] + + class Result: + exit_code = 0 + stdout = "FILE" + stderr = "" + + async def fake_run(sandbox, command, **kwargs): + seen.append(command) + return Result() + + async def fake_sandbox(*_a, **_k): + return object() + + async def fake_write(*_a, **_k): + return True, "" + + for module in ("file_editor", "write_file", "read_file"): + # ``plugins.tools.__init__`` re-exports the Tool objects under the same + # names as their modules, so the module has to be fetched explicitly. + mod = importlib.import_module(f"plugins.tools.{module}") + for name, fn in ( + ("arun_sandbox_cmd", fake_run), + ("aget_sandbox", fake_sandbox), + ("asandbox_write_file", fake_write), + ): + if hasattr(mod, name): + monkeypatch.setattr(mod, name, fn) + return seen + + +def _assert_no_second_command(commands: list[str]) -> None: + for command in commands: + payload = command.split("touch", 1) + assert len(payload) == 1 or "'" in command, ( + f"path reached the shell unquoted: {command!r}" + ) + # The injected separator must sit inside quotes, never as shell syntax. + for marker in ("; touch", "&& touch", "$(", "`"): + if marker in command: + before = command.split(marker, 1)[0] + assert before.count("'") % 2 == 1, ( + f"unquoted shell metacharacter in: {command!r}" + ) + + +def test_file_editor_view_quotes_the_path(recorded) -> None: + editor = importlib.import_module("plugins.tools.file_editor") + + asyncio.run(editor.file_editor_view.func(path=_INJECTION)) + assert recorded + _assert_no_second_command(recorded) + + +def test_file_editor_create_quotes_the_path(recorded) -> None: + editor = importlib.import_module("plugins.tools.file_editor") + + asyncio.run(editor.file_editor_create.func(path=_INJECTION, content="x")) + _assert_no_second_command(recorded) + + +def test_file_editor_str_replace_quotes_the_path(recorded) -> None: + editor = importlib.import_module("plugins.tools.file_editor") + + asyncio.run( + editor.file_editor_str_replace.func(path=_INJECTION, old_str="a", new_str="b"), + ) + _assert_no_second_command(recorded) + + +def test_write_file_quotes_the_parent_directory(recorded, monkeypatch) -> None: + module = importlib.import_module("plugins.tools.write_file") + + monkeypatch.setattr(module, "sandbox_available", lambda: True) + monkeypatch.setattr(module, "resolve_sandbox_mode", lambda *a, **k: "container") + asyncio.run(module.write_file.func(path=_INJECTION, content="x")) + _assert_no_second_command(recorded) + + +def test_injection_marker_was_never_created() -> None: + assert not Path("/tmp/pwned-by-path").exists() + + +# ── scope metadata cannot name a system directory as the workspace ─────── + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("root", [ + "/", "/etc", "/usr", "/var", "/opt", "/home", "/root", "/boot", + "/usr/local", "/usr/bin", "/etc/cron.d", +]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("key", ["workspace_root", "coding_workspace_root"]) +def test_a_system_directory_grants_nothing(root: str, key: str) -> None: + if not Path(root).is_dir(): + pytest.skip(f"{root} does not exist here") + with _scoped(**{key: root}): + assert _configured_workspace_root() is None + assert not _is_path_allowed(f"{root.rstrip('/')}/probe", write_access=True)[0] + with _scoped(**{key: root}): + assert not _is_path_allowed("/etc/hostname")[0] + + +def test_the_environment_variable_is_checked_the_same_way(monkeypatch) -> None: + monkeypatch.setenv("CODING_WORKSPACE_ROOT", "/etc") + with _scoped(): + assert _configured_workspace_root() is None + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("key", ["workspace_root", "coding_workspace_root"]) +def test_a_real_run_directory_is_still_accepted(tmp_path, key: str) -> None: + # The shape a benchmark runner passes, and macOS $TMPDIR / a container + # volume: deep under a protected-looking prefix, but the run's own. + run_dir = tmp_path / "var" / "folders" / "ab" / "T" / "run-17" / "workspace" + run_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + with _scoped(**{key: str(run_dir)}): + assert _configured_workspace_root() == run_dir + assert _is_path_allowed(str(run_dir / "src.py"), write_access=True)[0] + + +def test_an_unset_root_is_unchanged(monkeypatch) -> None: + monkeypatch.delenv("CODING_WORKSPACE_ROOT", raising=False) + with _scoped(): + assert _configured_workspace_root() is None From bc124df84d044ae6e9e8ddbf465872f636083978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhanghanduo Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 15:02:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Consult the live sandbox class before creating directories --- plugins/tools/file_editor.py | 4 ++-- plugins/tools/write_file.py | 4 ++-- tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/plugins/tools/file_editor.py b/plugins/tools/file_editor.py index a53e370..8e0a98a 100644 --- a/plugins/tools/file_editor.py +++ b/plugins/tools/file_editor.py @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ import re from frontier_agent.core.tool import tool +from plugins.tools import _sandbox from plugins.tools._deliverable_policy import output_write_error from plugins.tools._path_auth import _authorized_local_path from plugins.tools._sandbox import ( - CurrentSandbox, aget_sandbox, arun_sandbox_cmd, asandbox_write_file, @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ async def file_editor_create(path: str, content: str) -> str: try: import os parent = os.path.dirname(path) - if parent and not isinstance(sandbox, CurrentSandbox): + if parent and not isinstance(sandbox, _sandbox.CurrentSandbox): await arun_sandbox_cmd( sandbox, f"mkdir -p {shell_quote(parent)}", timeout=10, ) diff --git a/plugins/tools/write_file.py b/plugins/tools/write_file.py index fd25a83..310fbd7 100644 --- a/plugins/tools/write_file.py +++ b/plugins/tools/write_file.py @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ import os from frontier_agent.core.tool import tool +from plugins.tools import _sandbox from plugins.tools._deliverable_policy import output_write_error from plugins.tools._path_auth import _authorized_local_path from plugins.tools._sandbox import ( - CurrentSandbox, aget_sandbox, arun_sandbox_cmd, asandbox_write_file, @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async def write_file(path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> str: try: sandbox = await aget_sandbox() parent = os.path.dirname(path) - if parent and not isinstance(sandbox, CurrentSandbox): + if parent and not isinstance(sandbox, _sandbox.CurrentSandbox): await arun_sandbox_cmd( sandbox, f"mkdir -p {shell_quote(parent)}", timeout=10, ) diff --git a/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py b/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py index f86c93e..cf35012 100644 --- a/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py +++ b/tests/test_path_gate_is_binding.py @@ -289,3 +289,27 @@ def test_system_directory_alias_is_also_refused(tmp_path, monkeypatch): for root in (system, alias, child): with _scoped(workspace_root=str(root)): assert _configured_workspace_root() is None + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("tool_name", ["write_file", "file_editor_create"]) +def test_refused_write_after_sandbox_class_replacement(container, monkeypatch, tool_name): + # Reloading the runtime recreates its classes. Tools must consult the current + # class rather than retain an import-time snapshot that bypasses the guard. + original = _sandbox.CurrentSandbox + replacement = type(original.__name__, original.__bases__, { + key: value for key, value in vars(original).items() + if key not in {"__dict__", "__weakref__"} + }) + monkeypatch.setattr(_sandbox, "CurrentSandbox", replacement) + sandbox = replacement(container) + assert not isinstance(sandbox, original) + token = _sandbox.set_task_sandbox(sandbox) + target = container.parent / "denied-after-reload" / "x.txt" + module_name = "write_file" if tool_name == "write_file" else "file_editor" + writer = getattr(importlib.import_module(f"plugins.tools.{module_name}"), tool_name) + try: + with _scoped(workspace_root=str(container)): + asyncio.run(writer.func(path=str(target), content="payload")) + finally: + _sandbox.clear_task_sandbox(token) + assert not target.parent.exists()