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MCP

odek speaks Model Context Protocol in both directions, in one binary:

  • Server — odek mcp exposes odek's built-in tools over stdio to Claude Code, Cursor, or any MCP client.
  • Client — mcp_servers in config spawns external MCP servers and registers their tools on the agent as <server>__<tool>.

The odek-extension/v1 contract is optional on top of plain MCP: per-server limits, artifact refs, events, and budgets. A server that only implements MCP 2025-03-26 still works.

Server (odek mcp)

odek mcp

JSON-RPC 2.0 on stdin/stdout. Logs go to stderr.

Connect a client

Claude Code — user scope in ~/.claude.json, or project scope in .mcp.json at the repo root (not .claude/settings.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "odek": {
      "command": "odek",
      "args": ["mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Cursor — the same mcpServers object in ~/.cursor/mcp.json (all projects) or .cursor/mcp.json (this repo).

Exposed tools

odek mcp exposes the built-in tool set through tools/list / tools/call, after tools.enabled / tools.disabled. Two tools are never served: delegate_tasks and memory. Surface-only tools (clarify, send_message, bg_*) are not on this path either.

Always (default config) Conditional
shell, parallel_shell, patch, batch_patch web_search — only when web_search.base_url is set
read_file, write_file, search_files, batch_read, glob, file_info plan — only when planning is enabled (on by default)
browser, http_batch
multi_grep, diff, tree, head_tail, checksum, base64, json_query, math_eval
session_search, transcribe, vision
skill_load, skill_list, artifact_read, list_subagent_profiles
config_view, list_tools

transcribe and vision always register; a missing binary fails at call time, not at tools/list.

Configured mcp_servers are loaded into odek mcp too, so a client talking to odek also sees those <server>__<tool> names. tools.enabled / tools.disabled apply after that load.

Sandbox

odek mcp --sandbox

Sandbox is opt-in here (--sandbox or config sandbox: true). That is not the same as odek run, which defaults the sandbox on. The project-sandbox approval gate still runs. Shell then uses Docker with --cap-drop ALL, --security-opt no-new-privileges, resource limits, and noexec tmpfs.

Security

Same DangerousConfig as odek run. There is no TTY, so prompt-class operations use non_interactive (built-in default read_only: inspection proceeds, writes / exec / egress deny). "deny" blocks prompted work including reads; "allow" runs everything.

{
  "dangerous": {
    "non_interactive": "read_only"
  }
}

Protocol

Stdio JSON-RPC 2.0. Default version 2026-07-28; also accepts 2025-11-25, 2025-03-26, and 2024-11-05.

Method Role
server/discover Stateless protocol / capability discovery
initialize / initialized Handshake (legacy clients)
tools/list, tools/call Tool catalog and invocation
ping Health check (empty object)
resources/*, prompts/* Compatibility; odek registers none, so lists are empty

Requests are capped at 10 MiB. Malformed JSON-RPC is rejected. Tool-handler panics return tool handler panicked with no panic value on the wire or stderr.

A stateless modern tools/call must send protocol 2026-07-28 and client capabilities in _meta. Metadata-free calls are accepted only after a successful initialize.

Client (mcp_servers)

odek spawns each configured server as a subprocess, sends initialize with protocol 2025-03-26, then tools/list, and registers each tool as <server>__<tool>.

Where it loads

Surface MCP client
odek run, continue, repl, serve, mcp Yes. Connect / discover failure aborts the process.
odek schedule daemon / schedule run Yes. Same fail-closed.
Trusted / capped sub-agents Yes.
Untrusted sub-agents No. Adapters do not danger-classify MCP tools.
odek telegram chat agent No.
Scheduler embedded in odek telegram Yes, but a connect failure is non-fatal (the bot keeps running without those tools).

Configuration

Put mcp_servers in ~/.odek/config.json (operator-trusted) or ./odek.json (project; extra approval). The command / args / env shape matches Claude Code's mcpServers object. odek does not expand ${VAR} in mcp_servers.*.env.

{
  "mcp_servers": {
    "playwright": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["@playwright/mcp"]
    },
    "fetch": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["mcp-server-fetch"],
      "env": { "LOG_LEVEL": "debug" },
      "timeout_seconds": 120,
      "max_response_bytes": 2097152,
      "max_result_chars": 100000,
      "artifact_roots": ["/var/ci-artifacts"]
    }
  }
}
Field Default Notes
command required Executable to spawn.
args []
env {} Overrides; empty string unsets. Secret-looking keys are stripped even here.
timeout_seconds 30 Per-request; clamped to 3600 (warning).
max_response_bytes 10 MiB One JSON-RPC response line. Config above 64 MiB is rejected and the server is not started. Oversized line: drop it and close the connection.
max_result_chars 200000 Model-facing result text; clamped to 1_000_000 (warning). Oversized valid results get a structured truncation notice, never a silent cut.
artifact_roots [] Directories that may host file:// artifact refs. Empty rejects every ref.
auto_approve false Skip server and per-tool prompts. Honored only from ~/.odek/config.json.

The four limit fields are odek-extension/v1; semantics live in EXTENSIONS.md.

Environment. Children get a small allowlist (PATH, HOME, USER, LOGNAME, SHELL, TMPDIR, LANG, the listed LC_* locale variables, TZ, TERM) plus env overrides. Names matching secret patterns (APIKEY, TOKEN, SECRET, PASSWORD, CREDENTIAL, CREDS, PRIVATEKEY, ACCESSKEY after uppercasing and stripping -/_) are removed even from env. Pass auth via the server's own config file or argv, not the parent environment. Child stderr is inherited, so server crashes show up in odek's log. Details: SECURITY.md — MCP hardening.

Naming

Registered name is <server>__<tool> (playwright__navigate). Server and tool names must be 1–64 ASCII letters, digits, _, or -, and must not contain __. Invalid names or a collision with a built-in tool (shell, clarify, …) abort startup — they are not skipped with a warning.

Approvals

Two layers, both fail closed when no TTY and nothing else grants trust.

1. Server spawn — project-level servers only (./odek.json). Global servers in ~/.odek/config.json skip this. Stored in ~/.odek/mcp_approvals.json (0600). The key hashes project directory, server name, command, args, env, and the four extension limit fields (timeout_seconds, max_response_bytes, max_result_chars, artifact_roots). Schema and description are not in this key.

2. Per-tool register — every server, including global. Stored in ~/.odek/mcp_tool_approvals.json (0600). The key hashes project directory, server name, tool name, command, args, env, the four limit fields, the canonical-JSON SHA-256 of inputSchema, and the full description. The TTY prompt shows the (sanitized) description plus schema: sha256:… (N bytes) — not the env map. Env values are shown on the server prompt.

Ways to approve:

  1. Interactive Approve? [y/N] on a TTY.
  2. ODEK_APPROVE_MCP=1 for that invocation (all project servers and all tools).
  3. A matching persisted key (any hashed field change re-prompts; older odek keys that omitted the limit fields re-prompt once after upgrade).
  4. auto_approve: true in the global config (see below).

Declining a single tool skips that tool; the rest still load. If server approval is required and cannot be obtained, odek aborts before spawning any MCP server.

auto_approve

Removes both prompts. Schema scans, size caps, name checks, env sanitization, and artifact-ref validation still run.

  • ~/.odek/config.json — honored, and only when the execution fingerprint matches: same command, args, env, timeout, response/result caps, and artifact_roots.
  • ./odek.json — stripped with a warning. A cloned repo cannot pre-approve its own servers.
  • A command-less global { "auto_approve": true } is not a name wildcard. It is dropped (not a connectable server) and does not bless a project-defined command of the same name. If a project entry swaps command/args/env/limits, global auto_approve does not follow.

Tool schemas

Before a tool is registered, every string in inputSchema is injection-scanned (mcp_schema scope). A hit skips the tool (stderr warning). Serialized schemas over 256 KiB are skipped. Description hits withhold the description (placeholder) but keep the tool callable by name. Passing descriptions are still wrapped as untrusted data.

Lifecycle

On startup: spawn → initialize (2025-03-26) → tools/list → approve → register. On exit, stdin is closed, the process is given 5s, then killed. Default per-request timeout is 30s when neither the caller nor timeout_seconds sets one.

Connect or discover errors are fatal on run / continue / repl / serve / mcp / standalone schedule — odek shuts down servers already started and aborts rather than running with a partial set. The Telegram-embedded scheduler is the exception (soft-fail).

Stderr from MCP children is shown on odek's stderr. There is no odek: connected MCP server "…" success line.

Artifacts

A server can return an odek.tool-result/v1 envelope with file:// refs instead of bulk content. Validation is fail-closed (schema, absolute path, symlink-resolved containment in artifact_roots, hash/size, 64 MiB / 64 refs). The model sees metadata only — never the path or file bytes. Empty artifact_roots rejects every ref. See EXTENSIONS.md.

Any stdio MCP server that implements tools/list and tools/call works (Playwright, Fetch, GitHub, filesystem, …).