diff --git a/internal/oidc/aws_signer.go b/internal/oidc/aws_signer.go
index 3e1b9c435..ebc98dabe 100644
--- a/internal/oidc/aws_signer.go
+++ b/internal/oidc/aws_signer.go
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"fmt"
 	"sync"
@@ -99,6 +100,10 @@ func (s *AWSKMSSigner) resolveOnce(ctx context.Context) {
 			s.err = fmt.Errorf("oidc: kms key is not ECDSA (got %T); key must be ECC_NIST_P256", pub)
 			return
 		}
+		if ecPub.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
+			s.err = fmt.Errorf("oidc: kms key curve is %s; key must be ECC_NIST_P256 (ES256)", ecPub.Curve.Params().Name)
+			return
+		}
 		kid, err := ComputeKeyID(ecPub)
 		if err != nil {
 			s.err = err
diff --git a/internal/oidc/aws_signer_test.go b/internal/oidc/aws_signer_test.go
index 788f213c8..4399b0651 100644
--- a/internal/oidc/aws_signer_test.go
+++ b/internal/oidc/aws_signer_test.go
@@ -75,3 +75,21 @@ func TestAWSKMSSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	// convert it to the RFC 7518 raw R||S form before Mint encodes it.
 	assertRawES256JWS(t, jws, ecPub)
 }
+
+// TestAWSKMSSignerRejectsWrongCurve guards against a misconfigured KMS
+// key (e.g. ECC_NIST_P384 instead of the required ECC_NIST_P256) being
+// accepted silently. resolveOnce must fail fast with a clear error
+// instead of caching a wrong-curve public key that only breaks later
+// at JWKS-publish or signing time.
+func TestAWSKMSSignerRejectsWrongCurve(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("gen p384 key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer := NewAWSKMSSignerFromClient(&fakeKMSClient{key: key}, "alias/wrong-curve")
+
+	if _, err := signer.PublicKey(ctx); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("PublicKey accepted a P-384 KMS key; want an error rejecting the wrong curve")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/oidc/backend_jws_test.go b/internal/oidc/backend_jws_test.go
index ec94f30c6..afa29063b 100644
--- a/internal/oidc/backend_jws_test.go
+++ b/internal/oidc/backend_jws_test.go
@@ -72,6 +72,24 @@ func TestGCPKMSSignerEmitsRawES256(t *testing.T) {
 	assertRawES256JWS(t, jws, &key.PublicKey)
 }
 
+// TestGCPKMSSignerRejectsWrongCurve guards against a misconfigured KMS
+// key (e.g. EC_SIGN_P384_SHA384 instead of the required
+// EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256) being accepted silently. resolveOnce must fail
+// fast instead of caching a wrong-curve public key.
+func TestGCPKMSSignerRejectsWrongCurve(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("gen p384 key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer := NewGCPKMSSignerFromClient(&fakeGCPKMSClient{key: key},
+		"projects/p/locations/global/keyRings/r/cryptoKeys/k/cryptoKeyVersions/1")
+
+	if _, err := signer.PublicKey(ctx); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("PublicKey accepted a P-384 KMS key; want an error rejecting the wrong curve")
+	}
+}
+
 // --- Azure: raw R||S path ---
 
 type fakeAzureKVClient struct {
diff --git a/internal/oidc/gcp_signer.go b/internal/oidc/gcp_signer.go
index 554d09835..a132f8a87 100644
--- a/internal/oidc/gcp_signer.go
+++ b/internal/oidc/gcp_signer.go
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
@@ -125,6 +126,10 @@ func (s *GCPKMSSigner) resolveOnce(ctx context.Context) {
 			s.err = fmt.Errorf("oidc: gcp kms key is not ECDSA (got %T); key must be EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256", pub)
 			return
 		}
+		if ecPub.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
+			s.err = fmt.Errorf("oidc: gcp kms key curve is %s; key must be EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256 (ES256)", ecPub.Curve.Params().Name)
+			return
+		}
 		kid, err := ComputeKeyID(ecPub)
 		if err != nil {
 			s.err = err
diff --git a/internal/oidc/jwks.go b/internal/oidc/jwks.go
index 91a0d9f51..20398bf94 100644
--- a/internal/oidc/jwks.go
+++ b/internal/oidc/jwks.go
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"fmt"
 )
@@ -38,6 +39,14 @@ func PublicJWK(pub crypto.PublicKey, kid string) (JWK, error) {
 	if !ok || ecPub == nil {
 		return JWK{}, fmt.Errorf("oidc: PublicJWK requires *ecdsa.PublicKey, got %T", pub)
 	}
+	// Fail loud on a wrong-curve key instead of publishing a corrupt JWK:
+	// the Crv/Alg fields below are hardcoded to "P-256"/ES256, so a
+	// misconfigured P-384 (or other) key would otherwise be mislabeled
+	// as P-256 with coordinates of the wrong length, and only surface as
+	// a KMS signing failure far from the actual misconfiguration.
+	if ecPub.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
+		return JWK{}, fmt.Errorf("oidc: PublicJWK requires a P-256 key (ES256), got curve %s", ecPub.Curve.Params().Name)
+	}
 	byteLen := (ecPub.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
 	// Derive the fixed-width, already left-padded coordinates from the
 	// uncompressed SEC 1 point (0x04 || X || Y) via crypto/ecdh, matching
diff --git a/internal/oidc/signer_test.go b/internal/oidc/signer_test.go
index 2759c7be6..2bc51d0e9 100644
--- a/internal/oidc/signer_test.go
+++ b/internal/oidc/signer_test.go
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package oidc
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
@@ -157,6 +159,23 @@ func TestBuildJWKS(t *testing.T) {
 	// RSA fields are structurally absent from the EC JWK type.
 }
 
+// TestPublicJWKRejectsWrongCurve guards against a misconfigured
+// non-P-256 KMS/Key Vault key (e.g. P-384) silently producing a
+// corrupt JWK: pre-fix, PublicJWK hardcoded Crv/Alg to "P-256"/ES256
+// regardless of ecPub.Curve, so a P-384 key would be published as a
+// mislabeled P-256 JWK with 48-byte (not 32-byte) coordinates, and the
+// misconfiguration would only surface later as an opaque KMS signing
+// failure. Post-fix, PublicJWK must reject it immediately.
+func TestPublicJWKRejectsWrongCurve(t *testing.T) {
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("gen p384 key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := PublicJWK(&key.PublicKey, "some-kid"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("PublicJWK accepted a P-384 key; want an error rejecting the wrong curve")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestBuildDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
 	d := BuildDiscovery("https://cudly.example.com")
 	if d.Issuer != "https://cudly.example.com" {
diff --git a/specs/azure-wif-redesign.md b/specs/azure-wif-redesign.md
index 27019dbe5..b2732781d 100644
--- a/specs/azure-wif-redesign.md
+++ b/specs/azure-wif-redesign.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ True Azure federation, where CUDly stores **no** Azure-specific secret:
 1. CUDly's own AWS Lambda exposes OIDC discovery + JWKS endpoints
    (`/.well-known/openid-configuration`, `/.well-known/jwks.json`) on its
    Function URL. The JWKS publishes the public half of an AWS KMS asymmetric
-   signing key (RSA_2048, SIGN_VERIFY). The private half never leaves KMS.
+   signing key (ECC_NIST_P256, SIGN_VERIFY). The private half never leaves KMS.
 2. The Azure AD App Registration gets a **federated identity credential**
    (`az ad app federated-credential create`) pointing at CUDly's OIDC issuer
    with `subject=cudly-controller` and `audience=api://AzureADTokenExchange`.
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ No PEMs, no passwords, no symmetric secrets.
  │                                                                      │
  │  ┌────────────────────┐   kms:Sign    ┌────────────────────────┐     │
  │  │ CUDly Lambda       │◀─────────────▶│ KMS asymmetric         │     │
- │  │ (api handler)      │  GetPublicKey │ (RSA_2048 SIGN_VERIFY) │     │
+ │  │ (api handler)      │  GetPublicKey │ (ECC_NIST_P256 SIGN)   │     │
  │  └────────────────────┘               └────────────────────────┘     │
  │          │                                                           │
  │          │  serves on Function URL:                                  │
@@ -92,19 +92,20 @@ One commit per layer, each independently reviewable.
    asymmetric key, alias, IAM policy on the Lambda role for `kms:Sign` /
    `kms:GetPublicKey`, new Lambda env var `CUDLY_SIGNING_KEY_ID`. **DONE**.
 3. **`internal/oidc/signer.go`** — cloud-agnostic `Signer` interface:
-   - `Sign(ctx, digest []byte) ([]byte, error)` — raw RSA-PKCS1v15 over
-     SHA-256 digest. Called by the JWT minter.
-   - `PublicKey(ctx) (*rsa.PublicKey, error)` — used to build the JWK and
-     to compute a stable `kid`.
-   - `Algorithm() string` — currently always `RS256`.
+   - `Sign(ctx, digest []byte) ([]byte, error)` — raw ECDSA over a
+     SHA-256 digest, converted to the RFC 7518 section 3.4 raw R||S
+     form. Called by the JWT minter.
+   - `PublicKey(ctx) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error)` — used to build the JWK
+     and to compute a stable `kid`.
+   - `Algorithm() string` — currently always `ES256`.
    Backed by three implementations:
    - `AWSKMSSigner` — `aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms`, `kms:Sign` with
-     `RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA_256`, `kms:GetPublicKey` once at startup.
-   - `AzureKeyVaultSigner` — `azkeys.Client.Sign` with `RS256`,
+     `ECDSA_SHA_256`, `kms:GetPublicKey` once at startup.
+   - `AzureKeyVaultSigner` — `azkeys.Client.Sign` with `ES256`,
      `GetKey` to read the public half.
    - `GCPKMSSigner` — `cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1`, `AsymmetricSign`
      with digest SHA-256, `GetPublicKey` once at startup.
-   Plus a `LocalSigner` (in-process RSA key) used only in tests.
+   Plus a `LocalSigner` (in-process P-256 ECDSA key) used only in tests.
 4. **`internal/oidc/jwt.go`** — cloud-agnostic JWT minter that takes a
    `Signer` and a `jwt.MapClaims`, builds the header (with the Signer's
    `kid`), composes `base64url(header).base64url(claims)`, hashes it,
diff --git a/terraform/modules/compute/aws/lambda/signing-key.tf b/terraform/modules/compute/aws/lambda/signing-key.tf
index ffba769c9..8e5d7dec7 100644
--- a/terraform/modules/compute/aws/lambda/signing-key.tf
+++ b/terraform/modules/compute/aws/lambda/signing-key.tf
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 # without CUDly holding any long-lived secret.
 
 resource "aws_kms_key" "signing" {
-  description              = "CUDly ${var.stack_name} OIDC issuer signing key (RSA_2048, RS256)"
-  customer_master_key_spec = "RSA_2048"
+  description              = "CUDly ${var.stack_name} OIDC issuer signing key (ECC_NIST_P256, ES256)"
+  customer_master_key_spec = "ECC_NIST_P256"
   key_usage                = "SIGN_VERIFY"
   deletion_window_in_days  = 7
   enable_key_rotation      = false # KMS asymmetric keys do not support automatic rotation
diff --git a/terraform/modules/compute/gcp/cloud-run/signing-key.tf b/terraform/modules/compute/gcp/cloud-run/signing-key.tf
index 33965cc2d..1f31809c1 100644
--- a/terraform/modules/compute/gcp/cloud-run/signing-key.tf
+++ b/terraform/modules/compute/gcp/cloud-run/signing-key.tf
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ resource "google_kms_crypto_key" "signing" {
   destroy_scheduled_duration = "86400s" # 1 day — tests redeploy often
 
   version_template {
-    algorithm        = "RSA_SIGN_PKCS1_2048_SHA256"
+    algorithm        = "EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256"
     protection_level = "SOFTWARE"
   }
 
diff --git a/terraform/modules/secrets/azure/signing-key.tf b/terraform/modules/secrets/azure/signing-key.tf
index d903c5e64..a23fe77e5 100644
--- a/terraform/modules/secrets/azure/signing-key.tf
+++ b/terraform/modules/secrets/azure/signing-key.tf
@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ resource "azurerm_role_assignment" "current_user_crypto_officer" {
 resource "azurerm_key_vault_key" "signing" {
   name         = "cudly-oidc-signing"
   key_vault_id = azurerm_key_vault.main.id
-  key_type     = "RSA"
-  key_size     = 2048
+  key_type     = "EC"
+  curve        = "P-256"
 
   # Only the operations the Signer actually needs. Sign covers the
   # kms-equivalent signing op; get is consulted at Signer startup to
   # derive the JWK. verify is a no-op for CUDly but is conventional
-  # for RSA signing keys.
+  # for EC signing keys.
   key_opts = [
     "sign",
     "verify",