diff --git a/PROGRESS.md b/PROGRESS.md index 24773009..276b962d 100644 --- a/PROGRESS.md +++ b/PROGRESS.md @@ -1,51 +1,1022 @@ -# Lane C5 progress +# PR #227 Astra gate bbd833a9 — round 2 fix lane ## State -- Branch: `be-2025-vintages` from `origin/main` at `5c15bfd`. -- Worktree inputs are staged under `.lane-raw/` and must remain uncommitted. -- Lane C5 is complete, validated, independently reviewed, and ready for handoff. -- The requested staged C2 report is absent, but root `LANE_C2_REPORT.md` is byte-identical - to the sibling lane's staged copy (SHA-256 `4590e0dc...50f06e7`) and is the pattern used. +- Complete. Started detached at `46560bc`; final code commit `dfd3b99` fixes + both findings. Only journal commits follow the tested code. +- Full final pytest passes with direct exit 0: **1,737 passed, 1 skipped, + 42 warnings in 1,461.69 seconds (24:21)**. Repository Ruff lint and formatting + checks for all four changed Python files pass with direct exit 0. +- Report: `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/out.md`; evidence: + `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/bbd833a9-round2/`. Prior report preserved there as + `prior-out.md`; prior journals below remain unchanged. ## Done -- Read the repository Chronicle boundary rules in `AGENTS.md`. -- Read `.lane-raw/SOURCES.md` and confirmed all five named publisher artifacts are present. -- Confirmed the worktree is otherwise clean apart from `.lane-raw/` and the shared `.venv` link. -- Verified all five staged artifact SHA-256 pins exactly. -- Mapped FPB workbook cells: 990 facts across T01/T06/T07/T11/T17/T24, with - 2022–2025 observations and 2026–2031 `source_projection` facts. -- Confirmed PDF boundary evidence: printed page 19 calls 2026 the first projection year; - annex table units appear on printed pages 45, 48, 49, 53, 58, and 65. -- Chosen Eurostat layout: two vintage-specific source-package aliases share new manifest - entries, preserving the prior package YAMLs, raw bytes, and fact outputs unchanged. -- Reproduced the Statbel curator logic: 18 NUTS1 × sex × age-band cells totaling 11,825,551. -- Added the hash-pinned FPB workbook and publication PDF plus the - `fpb-economic-outlook-2026-2031-june-2026` package alias. -- Built 990 line-specific publisher facts (99 per year): 396 observations for - 2022–2025 and 594 `source_projection` facts for 2026–2031. -- Passed FPB `validate-package` and `build-suite`: 990 facts, full cell lineage, - zero acceptance errors, and pinned 2025 cells 320578 / 77771 / 5602 million euro. -- Re-ran the Statbel 2026 curator logic on the 2025 ZIP and added the hash-pinned - raw capture plus its deterministic 18-row curated CSV. -- Passed Statbel 2025 `validate-package` and `build-suite`: 18 facts totaling - 11,825,551, 66 constraints, full lineage, and zero acceptance errors. -- Added the Eurostat `gov_10a_taxag` 2025 and `spr_exp_func` 2024 manifest - entries plus vintage-specific package aliases, without modifying either - prior artifact or prior package specification. -- Passed both new Eurostat package validations and suite builds: 12 tax facts - and 9 ESSPROS facts, full lineage, and zero acceptance errors. -- Extended Belgium and Eurostat regressions for FPB table counts/cells and - assertion boundary, vintage non-overlap, prior-output digests, Statbel pins, - and the declared 0.25% Statbel/FPB population comparison tolerance. -- Passed 43 focused tests and the full merged-bundle regression: 157,177 facts, - 148 packages, zero aggregate-key duplicates, and expected goldens throughout. -- Recorded pins, counts, boundary evidence, curator commands, validation tails, - and consumer fact families in `LANE_C5_REPORT.md`. -- Passed independent `ledger-source-fidelity` and `ledger-boundary` reviews with - no required corrections. +- Committed the initial state/done/next journal in `79ae427`, then committed + each finding's failing regressions before production implementation. +- Finding 1: initial 32 red cases returned bytes or rows despite valid public + microdata sibling aliases; expanded run had 33 failures and 1 distinct-table + control pass. Test commits `9c8738e`, `e543cea`; fix `dfd3b99` classifies + sibling current/archived filenames and digests, including R2-only pins, before + artifact I/O and rechecks observed digests before return/cache mutation. + Unpinned table reads beside microdata require recorded identity before I/O; + known-distinct tables pass. All 106 focused reader/artifact cases pass. +- Finding 2: 10 red cases reached mocked filesystem/replacement sentinels; + 1 agreeing-owner/history control passed. Test commit `883c487`; fix `651571b` + explicitly validates every current/history locator and current identity, + then uses the same effective-owner validator as publication/inventory in both + preparation passes. Registration remains metadata-only; a read sentinel + protects that contract. Final standalone registration suite: 228 passed. +- Exact reproduction commands, observed failures, test names, full commit SHAs, + supplemental runs, and implementation details are in the external report. +- Final `uv run ruff check .`: direct exit 0, `All checks passed!`. + Final `uv run ruff format --check` for four changed Python files: direct + exit 0, `4 files already formatted`. Logs: `final-ruff.log`, `final-format.log`. +- Full `uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider`: direct exit 0, counts above; + log `final-pytest.log`. Used permitted UV cache, offline resolution, cached + real OTS 0.7.2 executable, and removed live Supabase credentials. No pytest + output pipeline and no code or test changes while the full suite ran. +- Independent implementation and report audits pass. Scope/AST audit confirms + exactly the two implementation modules, two test modules, and this journal + changed; all 255 inherited test functions are unchanged. Six new functions + add 46 parametrized cases. Evidence: `scope-audit.json`. +- No protected/data/OTS edits; all 15 UK checksum/size pins unchanged. No + source packages, contract schemas, or publisher facts changed. No GitHub + calls, pushes, branches, stash, or real publication. ## Next -- None; ready for handoff. No push was performed. +- None. Both fixes, required verification, and final report are complete. + Commits remain on detached HEAD. + +# PR #227 Astra gate bbd833a9 — round 1 fix lane + +## State + +- Complete. Started detached at `cb4c7ef`; final code commit `adb030c` fixes + all three findings. Only journal commits follow the tested code. +- Full final pytest passes with direct exit 0: **1,691 passed, 1 skipped, + 42 warnings in 1,280.60 seconds (21:20)**. Repository Ruff lint and formatting + checks for all six changed Python files pass. +- Report: `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/out.md`. Evidence and prior report: + `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/bbd833a9-round1/`. Prior journals below are unchanged. + +## Done + +- Committed this lane's initial state/done/next journal in `7c8e0a7`, then + committed each failing-first reproduction before its implementation. +- Finding 1: six red source-reader cases returned contradictory bytes through + local, cache, fetch, and ZIP paths. Reproduction `4f7aea5`; fix `adb030c` + reuses effective R2 directory validation and the shared owner-agreement + helper with observed digests before return/cache mutation. Four positive + resource controls added; final focused coverage passes (72 tests). +- Finding 2: 13 unsafe publish staging cases reached mocked side effects; + the existing final-file symlink control passed. Reproduction `a164a2b`; + fix `63c6bb9` applies the shared complete staging validator before reads, + locks, or uploads and repeats it in locked publication. All 33 focused + staging/publication/locking tests pass. No unsafe fixture bytes were written. +- Finding 3: four unrelated sibling collisions reached mutation sentinels; + a conflict added during lock acquisition reached replacement. Reproduction + `2040886`; fix `b820b18` validates the complete proposal with effective R2 + digests and archived collision checks in both preparation passes. All 263 + registration/package-directory tests pass. +- Exact failing commands, observations, fix/test names, commit map, and green + commands are in the external report and per-finding evidence files. +- Final `uv run ruff check .`: direct exit 0 (`All checks passed!`). Final + `uv run ruff format --check` on the six changed Python files: direct exit 0 + (`6 files already formatted`). Logs: `final-ruff.log`, `final-format.log`. +- Full `uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider`: direct exit 0; complete counts + above. Log: `final-pytest.log`. Used permitted UV cache, offline resolution, + cached OTS 0.7.2 executable, and removed live Supabase credentials. No pytest + pipeline and no code changes while the suite ran. +- Independent read-only review finds no remaining correctness gap. Scope audit + verifies only the three implementation modules, three test modules, and this + journal changed. AST audit preserves all 250 inherited source/registration + test functions and the existing staging refusal assertion body. +- No protected/data/OTS edits; all 15 UK checksum/size pins unchanged. No + source packages, schemas, publisher facts, or consumer computations changed. + No GitHub/network operations, pushes, branches, stash, or real publication. + +## Next + +- None. All requested fixes and verification are complete. Commits remain on + detached HEAD; final report is in the external output file. + +# PR #227 integration lane — merge current PR #226 head + +## State + +- Integration committed once as `2c71acee53c4904f94c34977e31216e372fc88cb`. + Its second parent is the exact requested local PR #226 head + `d544ffe77ffd0d2cb3551fb6f2ec378979e5fa09`. Both histories are preserved. +- Started detached at `f778161f527c7976421e2096737a1988f93a498a`; initial lane + journal committed as `b6f5f15e515da1f260f8f3f360b326219ee15b53`. +- Required verification finished on unchanged code commit `2c71ace`. Ruff + passes; both requested pytest suites exit 1 on the same nine imported tests. + Their fixtures omit `kind`, conflicting with #227's explicit-kind contract. +- Production kind enforcement and all imported test bodies remain unchanged. + The instruction to pass those tests unchanged cannot also hold for these + kindless fixtures; a concrete fixture-only patch awaits clarification. +- Final report: `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/out.md`. Evidence: + `/tmp/chronicle-227-integration/`; prior report preserved as `prior-out.md`. + +## Done + +- Verified `git cat-file -t d544ffe77ffd0d2cb3551fb6f2ec378979e5fa09` returns + `commit`, then ran the requested `git merge --no-ff` against that object. +- Resolved seven artifact hunks, two registration hunks, and the manifest-test + add/add. The report records both sides, each resolution, and semantics 1–6. +- Retained #226's non-mutating strict YAML loader and five unchanged loader + tests, effective digest resolver, unidentified-owner byte agreement, + initialization exemption, selected-only overrides, legacy derived routes, + and path/vintage matching for YAML-aliased owners. +- Kept #227's kind/access/hash-only/licence contracts, consumer pins, locks, + complete proposal validation, external staging, archived alias refusals, and + repository-origin provenance. Cross-vintage refusal diagnostics still pass. +- Fixed an integration hazard in publish preflight deduplication: all selected + manifests use their eventual override identities even when first encountered + as siblings. Both new regressions reproduced upload-before-refusal, then pass. +- Independent audit verifies all 1,138 starting #227 test functions and all 14 + new #226 test functions unchanged. Only the six expected paths changed; all + protected/data files, 15 UK pins, and the prior journal suffix are preserved. +- Resolved focused integration run: direct exit 1, 620 passed, 9 failed, + 16 warnings in 11.23s (`integration-resolved.log`). Remaining failures all + come from the incoming kindless fixtures. +- Temporary compatibility preview adds exactly six `kind: publisher_table` + declarations and changes no assertion or production code. All 10 imported + artifact cases plus two sweep regressions pass: direct exit 0, 12 passed, + 179 deselected, 12 warnings in 1.22s (`fixture-kinds-focused.log`). The patch + `/tmp/chronicle-227-integration/fixture-kinds.patch` is NOT applied to the repo. +- Final required gates (root commands use `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache` + and `UV_OFFLINE=1`; no pytest output pipeline): + - `uv run ruff check .`: direct exit 0, all checks passed. + - `uv run ruff format --check chronicle/artifacts.py chronicle/registration.py tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py tests/test_chronicle_consumer_contract.py tests/test_chronicle_manifest_reading.py`: + direct exit 0, 5 files already formatted. + - `uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider`: direct exit 1, 1,644 passed, + 9 failed, 7 skipped, 42 warnings in 1,224.25s (20:24). + - Then separately: `uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py tests/test_chronicle_manifest_reading.py tests/test_chronicle_source_package.py tests/test_chronicle_consumer_contract.py tests/test_chronicle_env.py`: + direct exit 1, 541 passed, 9 failed, 37 warnings in 199.97s (3:19). +- Final logs: `final-ruff.log`, `final-format.log`, `final-full-pytest.log`, + `final-requested-focused.log` under the evidence directory. No code changed + between the tested merge commit and this final verification journal. +- No push, branches, stash, rebase, GitHub network, real publication, protected + file edits, tracked `db/data/**` edits, or UK pin changes. + +## Next + +- Resolve the contradictory unchanged-test / required-kind instructions. The + six-declaration fixture patch is concrete and separately proven; applying it + requires allowing that narrow change to the imported fixture data. A green + tracked-suite result is not claimed. +- No further implementation defect was found by the independent audit. If the + fixture exception is accepted, apply the prepared patch as a small named + follow-up commit and repeat the final gates on that commit. + +# PR #227 Astra gate round 3 + +## State + +- Detached lane rebased from `28647088` onto `origin/ops-rename-slice1` + (`ba8147a7`). Integration and the full baseline pass on code commit `426651e`. + All four findings and the scalar-entry integration correction are complete. + Final Ruff and full pytest gates pass on code commit `838ab2c`. +- Evidence report: `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/out.md`. +- Prior PR #227 journal preserved beside the report as `pr227-prior-progress.md`. + The #226 journal below is retained verbatim. + +## Done + +- Replayed the PR #227 commits onto the new base without branches, stash, push, + or GitHub network. Reconciled final module versions against both branch heads. +- Restored shared vintage validation, nonregular manifest refusals, canonical + identities, exact resource spelling, environment aliases, and both test sets. + +- Rebase integration checks passed: 537 artifact/peer/registration/package tests, + 27 source-path tests, and 160 consumer/env/kind/vintage tests. Ruff passes. +- Rebased the exact kindless freeze onto `ba8147a7` (168 publisher manifests), + without editing data files. Both public staged releases and shared table-file + revisions retain their distinct storage behavior. + +- Read-only rebase scope audit passed: all 1,130 inherited test functions, + protected files, 22 timestamp proofs, and 15 UK microdata pins are preserved. +- Source audit found a possible scalar-entry error-handling regression from + integration. Reproduction and any correction are deferred until the baseline + has completed, keeping the tested code fixed throughout that run. + +- Required post-rebase full baseline completed before touching the findings: + `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider` + exited 0 with **1,587 passed, 7 skipped, 42 warnings** in **1,430.28 seconds** + (23:50). Log: `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/baseline-full.log`. + +- Reproduced the rebase scalar-entry concern: six cases fail with uncaught + `AttributeError` before the complete-manifest refusal. Red test committed + before the integration correction; evidence is in `source-entry-red.log`. + +- Finding 1 reproduced red with and without upload: fetch attempted to write + the 2023 table and manifest over the 2022 filename. Both cases failed the + no-write assertion (`finding1-red.log`); fix not yet applied. + +- Finding 3 reproduced red in automatic and explicit commit modes: an unrelated + repository with matching consumer blobs emitted Microcosm provenance. Both + variants incorrectly returned success (`finding3-red.log`). + +- Finding 2 reproduced red: four archived filename/digest variants reached a + filesystem mutation; four corresponding package-validation cases accepted + the conflict. Eight failures recorded in `finding2-red.log`. + +- Fixed the scalar-entry integration regression: filename resolution now only + runs on mapping entries; complete-manifest validation rejects other shapes. + All 33 scalar and inherited source-path cases pass (`source-entry-green.log`). + +- Finding 4 reproduced red in seven containment/symlink variants; fetch reached + the publisher and returned success instead of refusing unsafe staging. + Writes, uploads, and locks were mocked (`finding4-red.log`). + +- Finding 1 fixed: fetch renders and validates the complete proposed package + before any artifact write or upload, including every vintage and locator. + Both regressions and 336 artifact/peer/package tests pass. + +- Finding 2 fixed: current and historical R2 key/URI identities are compared + independently of current entry metadata before registration mutation; package + validation shares that check. Eight regressions and 258 package/registration + cases pass; scoped Ruff lint and formatting pass. + +- Finding 3 fixed: emission verifies the checkout origin as the expected GitHub + repository and writes that verified identity into provenance. Unrelated, + missing, and wrong-host origins refuse; HTTPS/SSH variants pass. All 40 + catalogue tests and scoped Ruff checks pass (`finding3-green.log`). + +- Finding 4 fixed: the complete staging destination is checked for symlinks + and repository/package containment before locking or reading publisher bytes, + then checked again before persistence. Sixteen staging tests and 606 focused + integration tests pass. Independent audits found no remaining gap in findings + 1--3; all changes are ready for the final required gates. + +- Final repository Ruff check passes; format check passes for all 14 Python + files changed in this lane. The exact final full pytest gate is running on + `838ab2c`; `out.md` has the complete evidence and awaits only final counts. + +- Final exact full gate completed with direct exit 0: **1,633 passed, 7 skipped, + 42 warnings** in **1,319.40 seconds (21:59)**. Log: + `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/final-pytest.log`. Repository Ruff lint and all 14 + changed Python format checks pass. No tested code changed after the run began. +- Final scope checks confirm upstream ancestry, a clean worktree before this + journal update, no lane edits to protected/data/proof files, and unchanged + 15 UK pins. Final report: `/tmp/chronicle-227-fix/out.md`. + +## Next + +- None. Work and verification are complete; commits remain on detached HEAD. + No push, branch creation, stash, or GitHub network was performed. + +# Operational rename, slice 1 (chronicle#143, mechanism 3) + +Lane C5's handoff notes previously lived here; its durable record is +`LANE_C5_REPORT.md`. This file now tracks the active lane on this branch. + +## State + +- Branch: `ops-rename-slice1`, cut from `origin/main` at `ff3efd3`. +- Scope: env names, R2 bucket configurability, `ledger.db` -> `chronicle.db`, + and the docs for all three. Code and docs only; no infrastructure changes. +- Out of scope and deliberately untouched: the `ledger` console-script alias, + the Supabase `"ledger"` schema and mirror table names, governance role ids and + concept authorities, hash domains and schema ids, anything under `releases/`. +- This PR does not touch the source-data boundary. No package spec, parser, + selector, manifest, or fact value changes. + +## Done + +- Read `AGENTS.md`, `docs/storage-architecture.md`, + `docs/agent-source-package-harness.md`, and the mechanism-3 migration spec in + the first comment of PolicyEngine/chronicle#143. +- Enumerated every ledger-named env read in tracked Python: the four real + variables (`LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR`, `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH`, + `LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT`, `LEDGER_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT`) plus + `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA`. `LEDGER_MIRROR_TABLES`, + `LEDGER_MIRROR_PRIMARY_KEYS`, and `LEDGER_DB_SCHEMA_VERSION` are module + constants, not env reads, and name out-of-scope surfaces. +- Added `chronicle/env.py`: one shared `env_value`/`env_flag`/`env_names` + helper reading `CHRONICLE_` first, then `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_` and + `LEDGER_` with a once-per-process `ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning` naming + the preferred variable. +- Replaced all three ad-hoc helpers (`db/supabase_client._env`, + `chronicle/source_package._env_value`/`_truthy_env`, + `db/pe_source_inventory._env_value`) with the shared helper. +- Made the R2 bucket names configurable via `CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET` and + `CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET`, plumbed through fetch-artifact, publish-raw, + publish-derived and bootstrap-r2. Defaults unchanged at `ledger-raw` and + `ledger-derived`. Both manifest write paths now preserve a recorded + `storage.r2` block instead of restating it under a renamed bucket. +- Emitted `chronicle.db` for new suite outputs, with `ledger.db` still accepted + on read and on derived-artifact kind inference. +- Added `tests/test_chronicle_env.py` plus artifact tests: 75 hermetic tests + covering the lookup ladder, precedence, the once-per-process warning, and every + real call site. +- Swept the docs. `docs/storage-architecture.md` gained an "Environment Variable + Rename Window" section (the old text stated the fallback direction backwards) + and a "Bucket Cutover" section; `docs/agent-source-package-harness.md` and + `README.md` follow. Verified 186 distinct `ledger-raw` objects across 154 + tracked manifest files, every key content-addressed by sha256. + +## Review fixes (gate round 1) + +The Fable+Sol gate requested changes; both findings are applied on this branch. + +- **[high] `fetch-artifact` could attach a recorded R2 URI to new bytes.** The + preserve rule keyed on the bucket, so a repeated fetch that did not re-upload + into the same bucket kept the recorded `storage.r2` block while rewriting the + entry's `sha256`/`size_bytes`. Reproduced against this branch's parent by + serving two different bodies from one URL: the entry ends up declaring the + fetched bytes' `sha256` under a key addressed by the superseded bytes' one, + both when the fetch only registers the bytes and when the bucket default has + moved. + The rule now keys on identity — the recorded key's `{sha256}/{filename}` tail + against the fetched bytes. Identical preserves the block exactly; different + raises `SourceArtifactRevisionError` before the cached artifact or its + manifest entry is touched, naming recorded and fetched `sha256`/`size_bytes` + and the ADR rule that same vintage plus new bytes is a new release revision. + `--record-revision` opts in: the new bytes get their own content-addressed key + under the configured bucket, never the old key, and the superseded block moves + to `storage.previous_r2`. `publish-raw` applies the same check before treating + a recorded block as history (`recorded_r2_identity_mismatch`, nothing + uploaded). +- **[low] Env isolation was scoped to one module.** The autouse fixture moved to + `tests/conftest.py` and now clears all three prefixes for every test. + `db.supabase_client` resolves `LEDGER_SCHEMA` at import — during collection, + before any fixture — so `tests/test_chronicle_namespace.py` re-imports it + under the cleared environment instead of asserting the constant it bound at + collection time. + +`storage.previous_r2` is a sibling key, chosen because every reader +(`inventory-artifacts`, `publish-raw`, `source_package._artifact_content`, the +suite's raw-R2-link acceptance check) reads `storage.r2` alone, and +`publish-raw` already spreads the rest of the `storage` block when it writes +back, so a revision survives publication untouched. All 180 tracked manifest +entries that carry a `storage.r2` block are content-addressed and agree with +their declared `sha256` and `filename`, so the identity check never fires on +tracked data. + +## Review fixes (gate round 2) + +The second Fable+Sol gate requested changes again. Seven findings, each fixed +with a regression test on this branch. Plan, in dependency order: + +1. **[high] `CHRONICLE_SCHEMA` does not reach the Supabase mirror writer.** + `chronicle/harness.py` and `chronicle/mirror.py` default the schema to the + literal `"ledger"`; only `db.supabase_client` reads the renamed variable. + Resolve through the shared helper whenever no explicit `--schema` is given. +2. **[high] The derived-fact boundary check is not rename-safe.** + `chronicle/consumer_contract.py` matches the `.ledger_derived` suffix only. +3. **[high] `fetch-artifact` cannot address a package's non-default manifest.** + Seven tracked packages keep a `manifest_*_source_package.yaml`; three + directories keep two. A fetch into one of them writes a third manifest and + never sees the recorded block. +4. **[high] Revision protection vanishes when the entry has no `storage.r2`.** +5. **[medium] Recorded-R2 locator fields must be cross-checked**, not read as + key-or-URI, before a block is preserved or published. +6. **[medium] `_read_manifest` must reject a malformed document**, not treat a + non-mapping YAML payload as an absent manifest. +7. **[low] Schema resolution must be lazy** so no legacy variable is read at + collection, before the autouse isolation fixture runs. + +## State (round 2) + +- Read both gate rounds on PolicyEngine/chronicle#226 and the code each finding + names. +- Scanned all 154 tracked manifest files (187 `files` entries, every one + carrying `storage.r2`): every recorded block supplies provider, bucket, key + and uri; every key is content-addressed; every declared `sha256`/`filename` + agrees with its key tail; no `uri` contradicts its `key`. Strict locator + validation therefore refuses nothing that is tracked today. +- All seven findings are applied, each with a regression test, and each + reproduced against this branch's previous head (`34d1d0f`) first. + +### What each fix does + +1. `chronicle/env.py` gains `default_chronicle_schema()`: one home for the + `CHRONICLE_SCHEMA` -> `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA` -> `LEDGER_SCHEMA` -> + `"ledger"` ladder. `load_supabase_mirror`, its harness wrapper and the + `--schema` CLI default all resolve through it when no schema is supplied; + an explicit `--schema` still wins. Defaults unchanged. +2. `chronicle/consumer_contract.py` matches the whole final dot-segment of a + `source_record_id` against both `ledger_derived` and `chronicle_derived`. +3. `fetch-artifact --manifest ` selects which of a package's + manifests the entry belongs to (default `manifest.yaml`); the name must be + a filename inside `--out-dir`. +4. Revision protection now compares against the entry's recorded identity -- + the recorded key's `{sha256}/{filename}` once published, the declared + `sha256` before that -- so a registered-but-unpublished entry, or one whose + upload failed, is protected exactly like a published one. +5. `_validated_recorded_r2` cross-checks every supplied locator field against + every other and against the content-addressed key shape. A contradiction is + `RecordedR2LocatorError` at fetch time and `recorded_r2_locator_invalid` at + publish time, never a preserved block. +6. `_read_manifest` refuses a non-mapping or unparseable document + (`MalformedManifestError`) before the publisher is read at all; + `inventory-artifacts` and `publish-raw` report it instead of crashing. +7. `db.supabase_client` resolves both schemas per call rather than at import, + and `tests/conftest.py` strips the rename window in `pytest_configure`, so + no module can read or warn from an operator's shell during collection. + +All four refusals share a `SourceArtifactManifestError` base, so the +`fetch-artifact` CLI reports every one as exit 1 with nothing written. + +### Reproduced against `34d1d0f` (the round-1 head) + +Running the same operations against a checkout of the previous head: + +1. `load_supabase_mirror` default `schema='ledger'`; with + `CHRONICLE_SCHEMA=chronicle_probe` the load still reports `schema='ledger'`. +2. `'.chronicle_derived'.endswith('.ledger_derived')` is False: the boundary + never fired for the chronicle spelling. +3. `fetch_source_artifact()` rejects `manifest_filename` as an unexpected + keyword; a fetch into `ira_contributions/` writes `manifest.yaml`. +4. A fetch of different bytes over a registered (unpublished) entry was + accepted silently: the entry's `sha256` was rewritten with no refusal. +5. A block whose `key` and `uri` named different objects was preserved + verbatim, key sha `c63744a4...` beside uri sha `1e9b3fdb...`. +6. A list-valued `manifest.yaml` was overwritten by the fetch. +7. Importing `db.supabase_client` under `LEDGER_SCHEMA=zzz` bound + `LEDGER_SCHEMA='zzz'` and emitted a `FutureWarning` at collection. + +## Verification + +- `uv run pytest -q`: green. +- `uv run ruff check .`: clean. +- `uv run ruff format --check .`: clean for every file this branch touches. 13 + files are unformatted on `main` already and are byte-identical here; CI runs + `ruff check` only, so they are pre-existing and out of scope. +- CI's db CLI gate (`chronicle init` / `load all` / `stats`): passes. +- `CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET=zzz CHRONICLE_SCHEMA=zzz uv run pytest -q`: green. + Before the shared fixture it failed five tests — four bucket-default + assertions in `tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py` and the collection-time + schema constant in `tests/test_chronicle_namespace.py`. + +## Next + +- Push and open the PR against `main`. Do not merge. +- Follow-up PR, after Max creates and backfills the new buckets: flip + `DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET` / `DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET` to `chronicle-raw` / + `chronicle-derived`. + +## Review fixes (Sol gate round 3) + +### State + +- Detached HEAD: `fb1bc1df`, the PR #226 head supplied for the ten-finding Sol + gate round. +- Scope: ten operational-rename findings in artifact fetch/publish/inventory, + Supabase compatibility aliases, and the README cutover procedure. No tracked + `db/data/**` manifest will be changed. +- `CLAUDE.md`, one of the requested initial reads, is absent from both this + worktree and `/Users/maxghenis/PolicyEngine/chronicle`; `AGENTS.md` and the + remaining requested guidance/code/tests are present. +- PR #227 is available read-only at + `/Users/maxghenis/PolicyEngine/_worktrees/chronicle-227-fix`. Applicable + non-microdata hunks from `daafac0` and `c0d9d74` will be ported with the same + function names and shapes. + +### Done + +- Re-established the lane state in this committed progress log before making + gate-round code or test changes. +- Read `AGENTS.md`, the Bucket Cutover and Publisher Revisions contracts in + `docs/storage-architecture.md`, the README cutover instructions, and the + named implementation/test surfaces. Confirmed Chronicle must preserve + publisher bytes and provenance, refuse unsafe fetches before I/O, and leave + schema/bucket value cutovers explicit. +- Reproduced findings 1, 4, 5, and 8 with 11 failing cases: mismatched manifest + identity reached the publisher read, quoted year keys bypassed revision + protection, duplicate year spellings and malformed entries reached I/O, and + both refetch and revision discarded entry metadata. +- Ported the non-microdata parts of #227's `_assert_manifest_identifies`, + `_select_vintage_entry`, `_FETCH_OWNED_FIELDS`, and in-place + `_upsert_manifest` flow. Fetch now validates manifest identity and entry + shape before I/O, resolves either year-key spelling while refusing both, + preserves the recorded key spelling, and carries forward every field it does + not own. The 11 focused cases now pass. +- Reproduced finding 2 with both default sweeps reporting only one of four + supported manifest names, and finding 7 with all four falsy non-mapping + `files` values producing `(inventory.valid, publish.valid) == (True, True)`. +- Ported #227's `is_manifest_filename` / `package_manifest_paths` shapes and + made default root sweeps discover `manifest.yaml`, `manifest.yml`, and both + `manifest_` extensions. Both sweeps now share `_manifest_files`, so + only `None` means absent and every other non-mapping value is reported. All + 106 artifact tests pass. +- Reproduced finding 3 as a green preserved-bucket skip for a key routed to the + wrong package/year, and finding 6 as both a fetch reaching I/O and a green + publish skip for a self-consistent `s3://` block under `storage.r2`. +- Raw publish now compares the recorded key with the canonical + source/package/year key before any bucket-change skip. Recorded R2 validation + also requires `provider='r2'` (and therefore an `r2://` effective URI). The + focused canonical-key/provider tests, including the existing URI-only and + stale-country cases, pass without uploads or manifest rewrites on refusal. +- Reproduced finding 9 with the shipped import raising `ImportError` for + `LEDGER_SCHEMA`, then restored `LEDGER_SCHEMA` and `TARGETS_SCHEMA` as + deprecated aliases of the stable defaults. Runtime queries remain on the + lazy functions and still honor post-import environment changes; 55 focused + namespace/env/client cases pass (1 skipped for absent real credentials). +- Reproduced both parts of finding 10: the README did not state that an + unqualified mirror load writes to `ledger`, and it named the absent + `supabase/migrations/20260504_chronicle_bronze.sql` file. +- README now instructs operators to create and apply the deployment migration, + states the `ledger` runtime default, and gives both supported ways to target + `chronicle`. The storage architecture and source-package harness use the same + truthful procedure; no documentation names the absent SQL file. Both README + regression tests pass. +- Adversarial review tightened the same contracts before final verification. + Mixed-case package manifests were reproduced as omissions from both root + sweeps and from the stray-default guard; default discovery now filters every + recursive filename through the case-insensitive #227 helper. Missing + `provider` and missing `uri` locators were each reproduced reaching publisher + I/O; `storage.r2` now requires explicit `provider: r2` and an `r2://` URI. + The artifact file's 112 tests pass. +- Clarified that *all* schema environment overrides, including deprecated + spellings, precede the `ledger` default. The README test now also requires + the create/apply-migration instruction, so deleting the guidance cannot pass + vacuously. All 14 mirror tests pass. +- Completed the remaining non-microdata preflight port from #227. Reproduced + four invalid explicit/inferred artifact filenames reaching `_read_artifact`, + including `filename=manifest.yaml`, which could overwrite the selected + manifest, and reproduced an undiscoverable `custom.yaml` manifest reaching + publisher I/O. Ported `is_bare_filename`, `bare_filename`, + `_infer_artifact_filename` from `daafac0`, and the manifest-like artifact + refusal plus discoverable `_manifest_path` restriction from `c0d9d74`. All + 117 artifact tests pass after the pre-I/O fix. + +### Next + +- None in this lane. All ten Sol findings, the non-microdata #227 port + completeness pass, and adversarial follow-ups are committed and verified. + The final evidence and per-finding commit map are in the runner's external + `-o out.md` report, not a repository-root file. + +### Final verification + +- `uv run ruff check .`: exit 0 (`All checks passed!`). +- `uv run ruff format --check` on all six changed Python files: exit 0 + (`6 files already formatted`). +- Full `uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider`: direct exit 0, 995 passed, + 1 skipped, 18 warnings in 1539.05 seconds. +- A fresh `/tmp` copy of tracked USDA `fy69_to_current` reports two manifests + and two artifacts in inventory. Publish includes both: FY2024 is one safe + preserved-bucket skip and the known misrouted FY2025 package/year key is one + explicit failure, with zero uploads. No tracked manifest was changed. +- The external `-o out.md` report records every failing-first command and + observation, regression test, fix commit, and exact #227 port provenance. + +## Review fixes (Sol gate round 2, eight findings) + +### State + +- Detached HEAD began at `c36f3fc8`, the supplied head of PR #226; base is + `main` at `9da02431`. The worktree was clean at intake. +- Scope is the eight supplied findings: cutover compatibility, shared-file + revision ownership, artifact/manifest path safety, duplicate YAML keys, + malformed revision history, and import-time Supabase alias compatibility. +- No tracked `db/data/**` manifest will be modified. The whole-tree cutover + regression will operate on a temporary copy and use a non-writing uploader. +- PR #227 is available read-only at + `/Users/maxghenis/PolicyEngine/_worktrees/chronicle-227-fix` at `5557cb9e`. + Applicable non-microdata hunks will be ported with the same function names + and shapes so its later rebase stays straightforward. + +### Done + +- Read the existing `PROGRESS.md`, the Bucket Cutover and Publisher Revisions + sections of `docs/storage-architecture.md`, and all six requested code/test + files: `chronicle/artifacts.py`, `chronicle/harness.py`, + `chronicle/source_package.py`, `db/supabase_client.py`, + `tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py`, and `tests/test_chronicle_env.py`. +- Read the GitNexus debugging/refactoring workflow guidance. No GitNexus MCP + graph tools are exposed in this session, so dependency tracing will use + repository search, focused tests, and the stacked PR's committed diffs. +- Confirmed the baseline gaps in the named code: `_read_manifest` still uses + `yaml.safe_load`; `_root_manifest_paths` passes a non-default value to + `rglob`; manifest-declared filenames reach direct path joins and reads; + fetch updates only its selected manifest; `_superseding_storage` converts a + non-list `previous_r2` to an empty history; and the Supabase compatibility + constants are hard-coded defaults. +- **Finding 6 reproduced and fixed.** Red command: + `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p + no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py::test_fetch_refuses_duplicate_manifest_keys_before_publisher_io` + exited 1 with four failures; every duplicate (`source_id`, `package_id`, + `files`, vintage) reached the publisher-read sentinel. Test-only commit: + `56f9ce1`. Ported #227 commit `7f9bfe6`'s `StrictManifestLoader` and + `load_manifest_document` verbatim into `chronicle/registration.py`, switched + artifact manifest reads to it, and shared it with source-package artifact + manifest reads. Fix commit: `77e6fda`. The same focused command now exits 0 + with 4 passed. +- **Findings 3, 4, and 5 reproduced and fixed.** Test-only commit: `264e46e`. + The finding 4 command covering creation beside `manifest.yml`, + `Manifest.yaml`, a mistyped named manifest, and a symlinked manifest exited + 1 with 4 failures, all reaching the publisher-I/O sentinel. The finding 5 + command covering parent traversal plus `*`, `?`, and character-class glob + selectors exited 1 with 4 failures because none raised `ManifestNameError`. + The finding 3 command covering absolute, parent-traversing, and symlinked + artifact paths exited 1 with 3 failures because inventory considered each + path valid (and the local, non-network publisher stub could read it). +- Artifact and manifest inputs are now resolved only as literal package-local + directory entries: unsafe declared filenames return the named + `non_canonical_filename` error, symlinks are refused before reads, sweep + selectors cannot contain separators or glob syntax, and no new manifest + spelling can be created beside an existing registry. Fix commit: `0017520`. + Ported the #227-shaped `is_bare_filename`, `bare_filename`, `filename_key`, + `matching_directory_entry`, and package-manifest helpers from `44e1f8d`, + `7f9bfe6`, and `c2b7722`'s corresponding safety changes; the generalized + registry-creation and exact sweep-selector guards are slice-1 additions. + The focused post-fix command exits 0 with 13 passed, and the complete + artifact module exits 0 with 132 passed. +- **Finding 2 reproduced and fixed.** Red command: + `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p + no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py::test_shared_archive_revision_is_refused_through_an_unregistered_owner + tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py::test_record_revision_updates_every_owner_of_usda_shared_archive + tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py::test_record_revision_updates_every_same_manifest_owner` + exited 1 with 3 failures: the empty selected vintage bypassed a sibling's + recorded identity, the USDA second manifest retained its old checksum, and + the SSA-style second key retained its old checksum. Test-only commit: + `3636395`. +- Fetch now strictly loads every manifest in the package directory before + publisher I/O, establishes one normalized byte identity for every entry + naming the physical file, and applies the revision guard to all owners. An + explicit revision rewrites every owner from payloads rendered before the + first manifest write, preserves owner-specific metadata, and archives each + owner's own R2 provenance. Ported #227's `_package_manifests` and + `_assert_siblings_record_these_bytes` names/shapes from `c0d9d74`, including + the normalized manifest-alias exclusion from `235c616`; the coordinated + all-owner rewrite is slice-1-specific. Fix/docs commit: `7da26a9`. The red + command now exits 0 with 3 passed; the artifact module exits 0 with 135 + passed. +- **Finding 1 reproduced and fixed.** The whole-tree regression copies tracked + `db/data/**` to `tmp_path`, configures `CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET=chronicle-raw`, + and installs a successful non-writing uploader. Red command: + `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p + no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py::test_documented_bucket_cutover_sweep_accepts_the_tracked_registry` + exited 1 with the observed tuple `exit=1`, `valid=false`, 156 manifests, 187 + artifacts, 94 skipped, 93 failed, 94 R2-linked, zero uploaded, and five + report errors. Test-only commit: `7f0f473`. +- A syntactically valid recorded R2 locator whose content-addressed tail + matches the package-local checksum and filename is now preserved and skipped + before reconstructing today's country/source/package/year route. This + accepts 84 pre-country-prefix UK keys, eight explicit Statbel 2023 routes, + the shared USDA route, and five fully recorded Eurostat manifests that omit + package IDs, while locator contradictions and byte mismatches remain errors. + Fix commit: `25deb29`; no #227 hunk applies. The same whole-tree command now + exits 0 with 161 manifests, 194 artifacts, 194 skipped/R2-linked, zero + uploaded or failed, and no errors. The artifact module exits 0 with 136 + passed. +- **Finding 7 reproduced and fixed.** Red command: + `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p + no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py::test_fetch_refuses_non_list_previous_r2_before_publisher_io` + exited 1 with 3 failures: mapping, scalar, and null `previous_r2` values all + reached the publisher-I/O sentinel. Test-only commit: `e418813`. + `_validated_recorded_storage` now rejects every present non-list history + before `_read_artifact`, so `_superseding_storage` cannot replace malformed + provenance. Fix commit: `8b7ab22`; no #227 hunk applies. The focused command + now exits 0 with 3 passed (5 passed including ordinary and shared revision + history controls). +- **Finding 8 reproduced and fixed.** A fresh-process regression sets each of + `CHRONICLE_SCHEMA`, `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA`, and `LEDGER_SCHEMA` before + importing the compatibility constants, alongside + `POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA`. Red command: + `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p + no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_env.py::test_supabase_schema_compatibility_aliases_honor_import_time_environment` + exited 1 with 3 failures; every subprocess returned `ledger` / `targets`. + Test-only commit: `e2ceedf`. +- `LEDGER_SCHEMA` and `TARGETS_SCHEMA` are now import-time snapshots of the + same lazy resolver functions runtime queries use, restoring their original + environment-backed behavior while later environment mutations remain lazy + through `chronicle_schema()` / `targets_schema()`. Fix commit: `f41ad0f`; no + #227 hunk applies. The focused regression now exits 0 with 3 passed; it and + the runtime/default namespace controls exit 0 with 11 passed. +- **Adversarial path-boundary follow-up reproduced and fixed.** Test-only + commit `465a34c` showed normalized manifest aliases and a package-local + artifact symlink reaching the publisher-read sentinel; invalid sweep names + were accepted when the root was absent and escaped the CLI as tracebacks; + manifest-named artifacts were not refused; and publish could upload a valid + first entry before discovering an invalid later entry. The same audit also + reproduced contradictory owners across sibling manifests being ignored by + both sweeps. +- Fix commit `8e766ad` ports #227 commit `235c616`'s corrected + `_package_manifests` normalized-alias guard, validates fetch destinations + before publisher I/O, rejects manifest-named artifacts in publish and + inventory, validates sweep selectors before checking the root, and reports + those refusals cleanly from both CLIs. It also corrects the object-key docs + to describe compatible recorded history. The six focused path/CLI cases now + pass. Complete-package publish preflight and sibling-owner validation remain + the next coherent fix. +- **Source-package reader follow-up reproduced and fixed.** Test-only commits + `92af48c`, `9a51d99`, `3228238`, and `578c8b2` showed that a package spec + could read an absolute or parent-traversing artifact, follow artifact and + manifest symlinks, accept a normalized filename alias or manifest-named + artifact, and select an unsafe/unsupported manifest path before artifact + I/O. `SourceArtifactSpec` now resolves both manifest and artifact resources + through the shared #227 filename-identity helpers before opening either. + The ten focused cases pass, and the full source-package module passes with + 135 tests (13 warnings). Fix/journal commit: `64fe94b`. +- **Residual side-effect ordering reproduced.** The focused command covering + `test_fetch_refuses_invalid_r2_identity_before_publisher_io` and + `test_publish_preflights_entire_root_before_any_upload` exited 1 with three + failures. Both slash-only R2 identity fields reached the publisher-read + sentinel; a root sweep uploaded and rewrote the valid `a_good` package before + reporting the unsafe filename in `z_bad`. +- Fetch now validates the source/package object-key components before reading + publisher bytes. Raw publish now completes one root-wide read/identity/entry + preflight and returns every refusal before its first uploader call or + manifest rewrite. The three red cases plus the existing entry-, sibling-, + and tracked-cutover preflight controls pass (9 tests). Fix commit: + `4991e8f`. The complete artifact module passes with 154 tests (12 warnings). + +### Next + +None. The eight findings, required #227 ports, adversarial preflight follow-ups, +and final verification are complete. The external `-o out.md` report contains +the per-finding reproduction/fix/test/commit/port map. + +### Final verification (eight-finding round) + +- The first bare `uv run` lint invocations exited 2 before Ruff started because + the sandbox denied access to `/Users/maxghenis/.cache/uv`. Re-running through + the permitted existing cache (`UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache`) gave: + `uv run ruff check .` exit 0 (`All checks passed!`) and `uv run ruff format + --check` on the eight changed Python files exit 0 (`8 files already + formatted`). +- `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider`: + direct exit 0, 1,039 passed, 7 skipped, 18 warnings in 1,323.73 seconds. +- Focused artifact module: direct exit 0, 154 passed, 12 warnings in 7.15 + seconds. Focused source-package module: direct exit 0, 135 passed, 13 warnings + in 193.89 seconds. +- `git diff c36f3fc8..HEAD -- db/data` is empty: no tracked source manifest was + modified. + +### Deliberate boundaries + +- Did not add crash-atomic multi-file transactions for an unexpected write or + process failure midway through a coordinated revision. Every deterministic + refusal is preflighted before writes/uploads and the successful path updates + all owners; true cross-file crash atomicity needs a separate staging/rollback + design and is not one of the eight findings. +- Did not port #227's `iter_directory_entries`: its exact implementation depends + on #227's microdata list-entry machinery, which this slice explicitly + excludes. Also retained the current artifact-local `bare_filename` exception + wrapper so filename refusals remain `SourceArtifactManifestError` and the + existing CLI reports them cleanly; #227's later rebase can adopt its broader + exception hierarchy together. +- Did not add a new rule for two physical artifact files whose names normalize + to the same key when the exact requested spelling sorts first. That is + defense-in-depth outside findings 3/4; there are no such collisions in the + tracked tree. Manifest-name collisions are already refused independent of + sort order. + +## Peer round 4 (nine findings) + +### State + +- Started from detached HEAD `fa98993a` with a clean worktree; no branches, + pushes, stashes, GitHub access, or tracked `db/data/**` changes are authorized. +- Scope: the nine supplied provenance, publication preflight, canonical + identity, manifest-vintage, filename, and regular-file findings. +- Preserve the shared helper names used by stacked PR #227; its worktree is + read-only and will not be modified. +- Report path: `/tmp/chronicle-226-round4/out.md` (no explicit runner `-o` + path was provided in the visible request). + +### Done + +- Read the existing journal, storage architecture, role rules, and named code + surfaces. Began reviewing the named test modules and shared registration + helpers. GitNexus debugging guidance is available, but no graph tools are + exposed; use repository search and hermetic regression tests. +- Established this committed state/done/next journal before implementation. + +### Next + +- Add and run failing regressions for each finding before its implementation. +- Fix and commit coherent steps, recording exact red commands and observations + in the external report. +- Run full Ruff lint, formatting checks for changed Python files, and the full + pytest suite with direct exit codes; record counts and final commit map. + +### Round 4 reproduction checkpoint + +- Added publication/tree/identity/alias/sibling regression coverage in + `tests/test_chronicle_artifact_peer4.py` before any associated fix. +- Red command: `UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/chronicle-uv-cache uv run pytest -q -p + no:cacheprovider tests/test_chronicle_artifact_peer4.py` (stdout/stderr saved + to `/tmp/chronicle-226-round4/main-red.log`) exited 1: 60 failed, 12 warnings. +- Finding 3: all 4 non-regular tree cases reached build-ID inference before + refusal. Finding 4: all 24 invalid publication identity cases reached an + artifact read or build-ID inference. Finding 5: all 10 noncanonical manifest + declarations reached the publisher read. Finding 6: all 4 single case/Unicode + aliases reached artifact reads. Finding 8: 12 explicit-selector sibling cases escaped as plain + `ValueError` through the functions and harness; 6 top-level CLI tests had + an invocation error (corrected and verified below). +- Consumer guard, source resolver, and shared vintage regressions are being + developed independently; all implementations remain gated on observed red. + +### Finding 2: source provenance reader + +- Reproduced malformed/contradictory/non-R2 locators and checksum/filename + mismatches with 10 failures and 1 passing control before implementation; + exact command and output are in the external report's source evidence. +- `SourceArtifactSpec` now reuses `_validated_recorded_r2`, checks the manifest + identity, and uses the immutable object's digest to validate local/fetched + bytes even without a separately declared checksum. Invalid metadata is + refused before artifact/cache I/O; bad fetched bytes before cache writes. +- The same focused command now exits 0: 11 passed, 12 warnings. Inventory's + half of finding 2 remains next; no source package or source data was changed. + +### Finding 5: exact manifest declarations + +- Present `source_id` and `package_id` now pass `_require_identity_segment` + without stripping or stringification and must equal the fetch argument. + Absent fields remain eligible for first registration; null/empty fields do + not impersonate absence. +- Focused regressions and existing other-package refusal controls passed: + direct exit 0, 12 passed. The red checkpoint above recorded all 10 new + declaration cases reaching publisher I/O before this fix. + +### Finding 7: shared logical vintage validation + +- Before implementation, the new manifest-vintage tests exited 1: 5 failed, + 1 passed. Duplicate keys `2024` and `"2024"` reached artifact I/O through + publish, inventory, source loading, and fetch of another selected vintage. +- `load_manifest_document` now invokes shared `validate_manifest_vintages` + over the entire manifest, so every consumer refuses a logical duplicate + through its existing controlled YAML error path. Shared names are unchanged. +- Six regressions plus existing quoted-year compatibility tests exit 0: + 8 passed, 12 warnings. Scoped Ruff lint/format checks both pass. + +### Finding 1: configured derived provenance + +- Consumer guard regressions ran red before implementation: direct exit 1, + 35 failed and 1 passed; configured bucket/prefix provenance did not produce + `derived_fact_provenance`. Exact evidence is in the external report. +- The guard resolves derived bucket/prefix configuration lazily, retains exact + archived routes, and checks raw locator fields, source-file locators, and + source URL. Added `default_r2_derived_prefix` with the standard environment + lookup ladder so publication and the guard can share it. +- Full consumer-contract module passes: direct exit 0, 95 passed, 32 warnings; + scoped Ruff checks pass. Wiring configured prefixes into publication and + refusing unrecognizable explicit routes remains a publication follow-up. + +### Finding 9: regular source resources + +- Directory and FIFO manifest/artifact regressions ran red: direct exit 1, + 4 failed, 2 passed. The resolver returned non-regular manifests and reached + artifact-read sentinels; no test opened a FIFO. +- The source resolver now requires an existing selected entry to be a regular + file after symlink and spelling checks. Missing artifact entries still use + the existing checksum-validated cache/fetch path; zip-backed resources work. +- Same focused command exits 0: 6 passed, 12 warnings. The full source-package + module is running. Exact red/green commands are in the external evidence. + +### Finding 8: controlled sibling-manifest refusals + +- `_package_manifests` now translates discovery's `ValueError` into + `MalformedManifestError`, so publish/inventory and both CLI entry points + use the shared controlled refusal path even with an explicit selector. +- The first post-fix command actually exited 1: 12 passed and 6 top-level + CLI cases failed because the test passed argv to a zero-argument entry point. + Corrected the test to set sys.argv and assert SystemExit. The corrected + command exits 0: 18 passed, 12 warnings; no uploads or rewrites occur. + The earlier premature passing-count journal entry is corrected here. + +### Additional round 4 red checkpoint + +- Added inventory locator/identity regressions, explicit raw identity overrides, + root/nested/excluded-registry derived symlinks, and derived prefix publication + integration before fixing those paths. Focused `additional-red.log` command + exited 1: 24 failed, 1 passed, 60 deselected, 14 warnings. +- Finding 2 inventory: six malformed/contradictory identity cases reached + artifact reads; absent separate checksum allowed wrong local bytes as a valid + R2 link. Valid URI-only locator control passed. +- Finding 3 additional tree cases reached upload or silently skipped the link. + Finding 4 explicit overrides reached reads. Finding 1 both-custom explicit + route reached inference; all three prefix environment names were ignored by + publication. Exact command and observations are in the external report. +- Full source-package module completed: direct exit 0, 157 passed, 13 warnings + in 192.07 seconds, including both source-reader fixes. + +### Finding 3: complete derived tree preflight + +- Derived publication now walks the root and every descendant with `lstat`, + allowing only directories and regular files. It refuses symlinks/FIFOs, + including an excluded registry filename, before build-ID inference, file + reads, uploads, or registry writes. +- Both failing-first tree groups now pass: direct exit 0, 7 passed, + 78 deselected, 12 warnings. Safe nested directories remain publishable. + +### Finding 6: exact physical artifact spelling + +- Publish and inventory now turn a single normalized alias with different + physical spelling into `artifact_spelling_mismatch`, and neither reads + bytes after alias errors. Duplicate-alias refusal also stops before reads. +- Case/Unicode regressions plus duplicate/symlink controls exit 0: 6 passed, + 12 warnings. Missing filenames retain their separate missing-name error. + +### Finding 4: canonical identities on new publication paths + +- Derived publication validates source/package identifiers before inference or + artifact reads. Raw publication preserves original argument/declaration types + until new-key validation, rejects noncanonical identifiers and contradictory + declarations before reading artifacts, and retains root-wide preflight. +- Identity regressions plus declaration controls exit 0: 44 passed, + 41 deselected, 12 warnings. Six historical-identity controls and the full + tracked-registry cutover test also pass: 7 passed, 12 warnings. Recorded + objects keep their original routes even when old manifests omit package_id. + +### Finding 2: inventory provenance + +- Inventory now reuses `_validated_recorded_r2` before artifact reads, rejects + contradictory/incomplete/non-R2 locators and mismatched checksum/filename + declarations, and checks actual bytes against the recorded digest even when + a separate checksum is absent. Invalid entries expose no R2 link. +- Seven failing-first defect cases plus the valid URI-only control now pass: + direct exit 0, 8 passed, 83 deselected, 12 warnings. Together with `d5e9952`, + both consumers named in finding 2 now enforce immutable provenance. + +### Finding 1: publication route enforcement + +- Publication and the consumer guard now share `is_derived_r2_route` and the + lazy prefix resolver. Derived key generation honors all three environment + spellings for the configured prefix. +- A both-custom explicit bucket/prefix combination must identify a configured + or archived derived route, otherwise publication refuses it before build + reads. The storage architecture documents the shared route configuration. +- Four failing-first route integration cases now pass: direct exit 0, + 4 passed, 87 deselected, 16 warnings. All nine findings are implemented; + focused integration verification and full final checks remain. + +### Final review follow-ups + +- Focused integration passed: direct exit 0, 409 passed, 40 warnings in 15.10s. + Ruff lint passed and all 8 changed Python files passed formatting checks. +- Interrupted the first full pytest run (direct exit 130) after peer review + found that date/set YAML identity refusals could fail CLI JSON serialization. + It is not a completed full-suite verification and will be restarted. +- Reproduced a remaining configured-route bypass with uppercase `R2://` in + raw URI, source_file, or source URL: 3 failed, 3 lowercase controls passed. + URI scheme matching is now case-insensitive. Full consumer module now passes: + direct exit 0, 101 passed, 32 warnings; scoped Ruff checks pass. +- Additional failing-first checks cover date/set report serialization (8 failed), + vintage namespace escapes and build-ID separators (8 failed), and fetch + vintage namespace escapes. These publication fixes precede the full restart. + +- Committed the publication follow-up regressions before their fixes. Red + commands/logs: `report-identity-red.log` (8 failed), + `namespace-followup-red.log` (8 failed, 99 deselected), and + `fetch-vintage-red.log` (3 failed); all direct exits 1. CLI refusals hit + non-JSON date/set values; malformed vintage/build segments reached reads or + upload sentinels. Exact commands will be included in the final report. + +- Raw publication now keeps original identity values for validation and uses + separate string fields only in reports. Date/set refusals serialize cleanly + through both CLIs; historical skips also retain serializable identity fields. + The regression and history controls exit 0: 14 passed, 12 warnings. + +- New publication vintage segments and derived build-ID segments now pass the + same canonical segment validator, preventing API-provided slashes or '..' + from moving an otherwise recognized route. Fetch applies the vintage check + before publisher I/O; historical raw objects retain their existing routes. + All 11 failing-first namespace cases pass (99 deselected, 12 warnings). + +### Final verification in progress + +- Final focused integration exits 0: 434 passed, 40 warnings in 11.11s. +- Final `uv run ruff check .` exits 0 (`All checks passed!`). Final + `uv run ruff format --check` on the 8 changed Python files exits 0 + (`8 files already formatted`). Both use the permitted UV cache. +- `git diff --check fa98993a..HEAD` and the tracked `db/data` no-change check + both exit 0. Worktree clean before this journal update. +- Restart the full suite at code commit `19d037f` with UV offline, offline + OpenTimestamps client selection, and live Supabase credentials removed from + the child environment. This keeps the required full run free of network. + +### Final state, done, and next (peer round 4) + +**State:** complete. All nine findings and the peer-review follow-ups are fixed +in small detached-HEAD commits. Final code commit: `19d037f`; the completed +full run included the subsequent journal commit `9fa6a1d`. + +**Done:** + +- Full `uv run pytest -q -p no:cacheprovider` returned direct exit 0: + **1,238 passed, 7 skipped, 42 warnings in 1,468.40s (24m 28s)**. + The child environment used the permitted UV cache, `UV_OFFLINE=1`, an offline + OpenTimestamps client command, and no live Supabase URL/service/secret keys. + Exact invocation and output are in `/tmp/chronicle-226-round4/out.md` and + `/tmp/chronicle-226-round4/full-pytest.log`. +- Final whole-repository Ruff lint exited 0. Formatting checks on every changed + Python file exited 0: 8 files already formatted. Final focused integration + also exited 0: 434 passed, 40 warnings. +- No tracked `db/data/**` changes, GitHub/network access, pushes, branches, + stashes, or edits to PR #227's worktree. Shared helper names remain intact. +- The external report contains each finding's red command and observed failure, + fix, regression names, and commit SHA, plus the final verification and + deliberate boundaries. It records the corrected CLI-test invocation and the + interrupted first full run without counting either as passing verification. + +**Next:** none in this fix lane. No push or branch operation is authorized. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f75fe697..68fa2ccc 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -65,10 +65,12 @@ contract that aligns it to another period (see | Microcosm Target Contracts | Selection, measurement bindings, and active subset | Period alignment, support-aware activation, solver inputs, diagnostics | The storage split is documented in -[`docs/storage-architecture.md`](docs/storage-architecture.md): `ledger-raw` -stores immutable source bytes, `ledger-derived` stores reproducible build +[`docs/storage-architecture.md`](docs/storage-architecture.md): a raw R2 archive +stores immutable source bytes, a derived R2 archive stores reproducible build artifacts, and Supabase/Postgres hosts the queryable relational Chronicle registry -mirrored from accepted builds. +mirrored from accepted builds. The bucket names are configuration +(`$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET` and `$CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET`), still defaulting +to the ledger-era `ledger-raw` and `ledger-derived`. ## Repository Model @@ -247,7 +249,7 @@ This writes: source_regions.jsonl facts.jsonl consumer_facts.jsonl - ledger.db + chronicle.db reports/ source_rows.json source_cells.json @@ -349,11 +351,14 @@ needed, even when your Cloudflare user belongs to several accounts: # One-time per machine (opens a browser consent page): bunx wrangler login -# One-time per account (already done for the PolicyEngine account): -uv run chronicle bootstrap-r2 --raw-bucket ledger-raw --derived-bucket ledger-derived +# One-time per account (already done for the PolicyEngine account). The bucket +# flags default to $CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET / $CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET: +uv run chronicle bootstrap-r2 # Fetch/register a source artifact, write db/data/.../manifest.yaml, and upload -# the exact bytes to R2 when Wrangler is authenticated: +# the exact bytes to R2 when Wrangler is authenticated. Pass --manifest when the +# package directory keeps more than one manifest (ira_contributions keeps a +# traditional and a Roth one): uv run chronicle fetch-artifact \ --url https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/23in12ms.xls \ --source-id irs_soi \ @@ -364,12 +369,47 @@ uv run chronicle fetch-artifact \ --table "Publication 1304 Table 1.2" \ --upload-r2 +# Re-fetching is safe: identical bytes keep the recorded storage.r2 block, and +# bytes that disagree with what the entry identifies -- its declared sha256, or +# its recorded content-addressed key once published -- are refused. When a +# publisher has re-published +# under the same URL and vintage, register the revision explicitly — the new +# bytes get their own content-addressed key and the superseded object is kept +# in storage.previous_r2: +uv run chronicle fetch-artifact ... --record-revision + # Audit local manifests and checksums: uv run chronicle inventory-artifacts --root db/data -# Upload all existing manifest-declared local artifacts to ledger-raw and write -# storage.r2 metadata back into the manifests: +# Upload all existing manifest-declared local artifacts to the raw archive and +# write storage.r2 metadata back into the manifests: uv run chronicle publish-raw --root db/data + +# Register a licensed or restricted release by identity alone. No bytes are +# fetched, stored, or uploaded, and no R2 key is recorded. The checksum is the +# consumer's: name the attester and where the pin was read from: +uv run chronicle register-artifact \ + --source-id dwp \ + --package-id dwp-frs-2023-24 \ + --year 2023 \ + --out-dir db/data/dwp/frs_2023_24 \ + --filename adult.tab \ + --sha256 e09f9647d03585c81a528636028b2ed495f8f1fbcf64c5e7b4fe521b67367e06 \ + --size-bytes 35323384 \ + --vintage 2023_24 \ + --licence "UK Data Service End User Licence" \ + --access licensed \ + --doi 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 \ + --hash-source consumer_pin \ + --attested-by PolicyEngine/microcosm \ + --pinned-from-repository PolicyEngine/microcosm \ + --pinned-from-path packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json \ + --pinned-from-commit 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + +# A public microdata release is archived only against a reviewed checksum and +# licence evidence binding the file to an allowlisted term; its bytes are +# staged outside the repository and uploaded from there. See +# docs/agent-source-package-harness.md, "Hash-Only Registrations". ``` To coordinate broad PE source migration without jumping straight to semantic @@ -406,10 +446,10 @@ To prepare the deterministic SQLite artifact for a hosted Supabase/Postgres mirror, export each relational table to JSONL plus a manifest: ```bash -uv run chronicle export-db-tables --db /tmp/chronicle-suite/ledger.db --out /tmp/chronicle-mirror --replace +uv run chronicle export-db-tables --db /tmp/chronicle-suite/chronicle.db --out /tmp/chronicle-mirror --replace ``` -To publish the deterministic build outputs to the `ledger-derived` R2 bucket: +To publish the deterministic build outputs to the derived R2 archive: ```bash uv run chronicle publish-derived \ @@ -420,13 +460,14 @@ uv run chronicle publish-derived \ --build-artifacts-out /tmp/chronicle-build-artifacts.jsonl ``` -The Supabase schema for this mirror lives at -`supabase/migrations/20260504_chronicle_bronze.sql`. Raw government spreadsheets are -mirrored as artifact metadata plus one row per parsed cell, not one tidy table -per sheet. Chronicle does not host raw survey microdata tables. +Before loading, create and apply a Supabase/Postgres migration that creates the +mirror tables in the schema selected for the load, then expose that schema +through the Supabase Data API. Raw government spreadsheets are mirrored as +artifact metadata plus one row per parsed cell, not one tidy table per sheet. +Chronicle does not host raw survey microdata tables. -After the migration is applied and the `chronicle` schema is exposed through the -Supabase Data API, accepted mirror exports can be upserted with: +After that deployment migration is applied, accepted mirror exports can be +upserted with: ```bash uv run chronicle load-supabase-mirror \ @@ -434,9 +475,21 @@ uv run chronicle load-supabase-mirror \ --build-artifacts /tmp/chronicle-build-artifacts.jsonl ``` +With no schema environment override and no `--schema`, this command +writes to `ledger`. To load a migrated `chronicle` schema instead, set +`CHRONICLE_SCHEMA=chronicle` or pass `--schema chronicle`. + Use `--dry-run` first to validate JSONL row counts and file coverage without writing to Supabase. +Chronicle settings are read chronicle-first: `CHRONICLE_X` wins, and the +ledger-era `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_X` and `LEDGER_X` spellings still work behind a +one-time deprecation warning naming the variable to move to. +[`docs/storage-architecture.md`](docs/storage-architecture.md#environment-variable-rename-window) +lists every variable in that window, and +[Bucket Cutover](docs/storage-architecture.md#bucket-cutover) covers the R2 +bucket rename. + Chronicle facts keep source concepts and canonical concepts separately. For example, the SOI Table 1.1 adjusted gross income column is preserved as `irs_soi.adjusted_gross_income`, while the canonical concept is diff --git a/chronicle/__init__.py b/chronicle/__init__.py index 04d50943..e3ddfb06 100644 --- a/chronicle/__init__.py +++ b/chronicle/__init__.py @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ "consumer_contract", "core", "database", + "env", "facts", "harness", "jurisdictions", diff --git a/chronicle/artifacts.py b/chronicle/artifacts.py index fa56d620..ff9a73ad 100644 --- a/chronicle/artifacts.py +++ b/chronicle/artifacts.py @@ -5,12 +5,16 @@ import hashlib import json import mimetypes +from collections.abc import Mapping +from contextlib import ExitStack from dataclasses import dataclass from datetime import UTC, datetime from pathlib import Path import posixpath +import re import shlex import sqlite3 +import stat import subprocess from typing import Any from urllib.parse import unquote, urlparse @@ -18,14 +22,454 @@ import httpx import yaml +from chronicle.database import ( + CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME, + CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAMES, + LEGACY_CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME, +) +from chronicle.env import env_value from chronicle.epoch import EMIT_EPOCH, Epoch, canonicalize_key, hash_domain - - +from chronicle.licences import ( + REDISTRIBUTABLE_LICENCES, + is_redistributable_licence, + licence_evidence_errors, +) +from chronicle.registration import ( + ACCESS_CLASSES, + ACCESS_PUBLIC, + CHRONICLE_ATTESTER, + HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH, + MANIFEST_KINDS, + MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + AmbiguousVintageKeyError, + ArtifactFilenameError as RegistrationArtifactFilenameError, + ListSpecRejected, + ManifestAccessError, + ManifestKindError, + bare_filename as registration_bare_filename, + filename_key, + has_file_entries, + hash_only_registrations, + is_bare_filename, + is_hash_only, + is_manifest_filename, + iter_file_specs, + iter_manifest_entries, + load_manifest_document, + manifest_kind as normalize_manifest_kind, + matching_directory_entry, + normalize_access, + package_manifest_paths, + _assert_registration_target_safe, + _registration_lock, + resolve_vintage_key, + safe_entry_access, + safe_manifest_kind, + validate_file_entry, + validate_manifest_files, + validate_package_directory, +) + + +R2_RAW_BUCKET_ENV = "CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET" +R2_DERIVED_BUCKET_ENV = "CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET" + +# The bucket defaults stay at their ledger-era names. Archived witness records +# pin raw R2 URLs by hash, so ledger-raw and ledger-derived are preserved +# read-only forever and no recorded manifest URI is ever rewritten. The env +# vars exist so the cutover in docs/storage-architecture.md can be rehearsed, +# and so flipping to chronicle-raw/chronicle-derived is a default change rather +# than a code change (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism 3). DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET = "ledger-raw" DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET = "ledger-derived" DEFAULT_R2_PREFIX = "raw" DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX = "derived" +#: ``RawArtifactPublishEntry.skipped`` prefix for a licensed or restricted +#: registration: nothing to upload, because no Chronicle store holds its bytes. +HASH_ONLY_SKIP_PREFIX = "hash_only_access:" + +# Most packages keep one manifest.yaml. Publisher directories that feed several +# source packages keep one manifest each -- db/data/irs_soi/ira_contributions +# holds manifest_traditional_source_package.yaml beside the Roth one -- so the +# name is an input, not a constant, wherever a caller addresses a package. +DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME = "manifest.yaml" + +#: Wrangler invocation used for R2 uploads unless a caller overrides it. +DEFAULT_WRANGLER_COMMAND = "npx wrangler" + +MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR_ENV = "CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR" +#: Where a public microdata release's bytes are staged before upload. Outside +#: the repository by construction: public microdata is archived in R2, never +#: committed beside its manifest (docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md). +DEFAULT_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR = ( + Path.home() / ".cache" / "policyengine-chronicle" / "microdata-staging" +) + + +def default_microdata_staging_dir() -> Path: + """Resolve the staging root: ``$CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR`` or default.""" + return Path( + env_value(MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR_ENV, default=DEFAULT_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR) + ) + + +def microdata_staging_path( + *, + staging_dir: str | Path | None, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: Any, + sha256: str, + filename: str, +) -> Path: + """Return the transient, content-addressed staging path for release bytes. + + Mirrors the raw R2 key shape so a staged file is addressed by the same + identity as the object it becomes. + """ + root = ( + Path(staging_dir) + if staging_dir is not None + else (default_microdata_staging_dir()) + ) + return root / source_id / package_id / str(year) / sha256 / Path(filename).name + + +def _validated_microdata_staging_destination( + destination: Path, *, package_dir: Path +) -> Path: + """Resolve an external staging file before any lock or publisher access. + + The registration path guard walks the original spelling before resolving + it, so a symlink followed by ``..`` cannot disappear from the check. Give + it the full content-addressed destination to cover identity components and + the artifact filename as well as the supplied staging directory. + """ + try: + _assert_registration_target_safe(destination.parent, destination) + resolved = destination.resolve() + package_root = package_dir.resolve() + repository_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] + for root in (package_root, repository_root): + if resolved.is_relative_to(root): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Microdata staging destination {destination} is inside " + f"the repository or package tree {root}. Choose an " + "external staging directory." + ) + for ancestor in resolved.parents: + git_entry = ancestor / ".git" + bare_repository = ( + (ancestor / "HEAD").is_file() + and (ancestor / "objects").is_dir() + and (ancestor / "refs").is_dir() + ) + if git_entry.exists() or git_entry.is_symlink() or bare_repository: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Microdata staging destination {destination} is inside " + f"the Git repository {ancestor}. Choose an external " + "staging directory." + ) + if package_manifest_paths(ancestor): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Microdata staging destination {destination} is inside " + f"the package directory {ancestor}. Choose an external " + "staging directory." + ) + except (OSError, ValueError, ManifestAccessError) as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Microdata staging destination {destination} is unsafe: {exc}" + ) from exc + return resolved + + +def _manifest_path(output: Path, manifest_filename: str) -> Path: + """Return the named manifest inside ``output``. + + The name is a filename, not a path: it selects among the manifests a + package directory keeps, and must not reach outside it. + """ + name = str(manifest_filename) + if not is_bare_filename(name) or any(character in name for character in "*?[]"): + raise ManifestNameError( + "Manifest must name a file inside the package directory, not " + f"{manifest_filename!r}." + ) + if not is_manifest_filename(name): + raise ManifestNameError( + f"Manifest must be named {DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME} or " + f"manifest_.yaml, not {manifest_filename!r}: the sweeps " + "address a package's manifests by those names, and a manifest " + "under any other name is invisible to them." + ) + return output / name + + +def _package_manifests( + output: Path, + manifest_path: Path, + existing_manifest: dict[str, Any], +) -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]: + """Return every manifest the package directory keeps, by path. + + The byte boundary is the file in the directory, not whichever manifest a + fetch selected. A malformed sibling is therefore a pre-I/O refusal: until + Chronicle can read every owner, it cannot safely overwrite shared bytes. + """ + try: + paths = package_manifest_paths(output) + except ValueError as error: + # Explicit sweep selectors still inspect every sibling registry. Keep + # discovery refusals in the shared exception family both CLIs report. + raise MalformedManifestError(str(error)) from error + by_name: dict[str, Path] = {} + for path in paths: + key = filename_key(path.name) + previous = by_name.get(key) + if previous is not None and previous != path: + raise AmbiguousManifestError( + f"{previous} and {path} have the same normalized manifest name " + f"{key!r}. Physically distinct manifest aliases can hide one " + "another's registrations; keep exactly one spelling." + ) + by_name[key] = path + selected_alias = by_name.get(filename_key(manifest_path.name)) + if selected_alias is not None and selected_alias != manifest_path: + raise AmbiguousManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} and existing {selected_alias} have the same " + "normalized manifest name. Selecting one spelling would hide the " + "other's registrations; address the existing manifest or remove " + "the duplicate." + ) + + manifests: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {str(manifest_path): existing_manifest} + for path in paths: + if path == manifest_path: + continue + sibling = _read_manifest(path) + _manifest_files(sibling, path) + manifests[str(path)] = sibling + return manifests + + +def _root_manifest_paths(root: Path, manifest_filename: str) -> list[Path]: + """Return the manifests a root sweep addresses. + + The default is package discovery, not one literal filename: both YAML + extensions and every ``manifest_`` sibling participate. A caller + that supplies another filename keeps the historical exact-name override. + """ + selected_name = _manifest_path(Path(), manifest_filename).name + if selected_name != DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME: + candidates = [path for path in root.rglob("*") if path.name == selected_name] + else: + candidates = [ + path for path in root.rglob("*") if is_manifest_filename(path.name) + ] + for path in candidates: + _require_regular_manifest_file(path) + return sorted(candidates) + + +def _assert_no_hash_only_bytes( + manifests: Mapping[str, dict[str, Any]], + *, + sha256: str, + filename: str, + what: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse to archive bytes any manifest in the directory registers hash-only. + + The same bytes under another name are the same gated artifact. + """ + for name, key, entry in hash_only_registrations(manifests, sha256=sha256): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{name} registers {entry.get('filename')!r} for {key!r} as " + f"access={safe_entry_access(entry)!r} with sha256={sha256}; {what} " + "are those exact bytes. A gated artifact is not archived under " + f"another name ({filename!r}); keep the hash-only registration." + ) + + +def _assert_siblings_record_these_bytes( + manifests: Mapping[str, dict[str, Any]], + *, + manifest_path: Path, + vintage: Any, + filename: str, + sha256: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse a default fetch that would stale another manifest's owner.""" + for owner in _manifest_file_owners( + manifests, filename=filename, initializing=(manifest_path, vintage) + ): + if owner.manifest_path == manifest_path: + continue + identity = owner.identity + assert identity is not None + if identity.sha256 == sha256: + continue + raise SourceArtifactRevisionError( + f"{owner.manifest_path} entry {owner.vintage!r} records " + f"{filename!r} as sha256={identity.sha256}; this fetch would write " + f"sha256={sha256} to the same package-local file. Re-run with " + "--record-revision to update every owner together." + ) + + +def _assert_manifest_identifies( + existing_manifest: dict[str, Any], + manifest_path: Path, + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse to fetch into a manifest that identifies another package. + + The R2 key and registration identity are built from the fetch arguments. + Recording them in a manifest that declares different identifiers would + leave one entry making two incompatible provenance claims. + """ + for field, value in (("source_id", source_id), ("package_id", package_id)): + if field not in existing_manifest: + continue + declared = _require_identity_segment( + existing_manifest[field], what=f"{manifest_path} {field}" + ) + if declared != value: + raise SourceArtifactManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} declares {field}={declared!r}; refusing to " + f"fetch {field}={value!r} into it. Fetch into the package the " + "manifest identifies, or into that package's own directory." + ) + + +def _refuse_a_stray_default_manifest(output: Path, manifest_path: Path) -> None: + """Refuse to create any new manifest beside a package's registry. + + Every supported spelling participates: a missing ``manifest.yaml`` beside + ``manifest.yml`` or ``Manifest.yaml`` is just as ambiguous as one beside a + named manifest, and a mistyped named selector must not create a parallel + registry. Operators may create an intentional empty sibling explicitly, + then select that existing file. + """ + paths = package_manifest_paths(output) + if ( + any(path.name == manifest_path.name for path in paths) + or manifest_path.is_symlink() + ): + return + siblings = [path.name for path in paths] + if not siblings: + return + raise AmbiguousManifestError( + f"{output} already keeps {', '.join(siblings)}; refusing to create " + f"{manifest_path.name} beside that registry. Pass --manifest to name " + "an existing manifest, or create an intentional empty sibling " + "explicitly before fetching into it." + ) + + +def _manifest_files(payload: dict[str, Any], manifest_path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return a manifest's ``files`` block, refusing one that is not a mapping. + + ``inventory-artifacts`` and ``publish-raw`` report the same document as + ``files must be a mapping``; a fetch must refuse it before reading the + publisher, or the write fails only after the local artifact has been + overwritten and any upload has run. + """ + files = payload.get("files") + if files is None: + # A bare ``files:`` line parses as None: no entries, like an absent + # block. The writer normalizes it to a mapping before recording into it. + return {} + if not isinstance(files, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} files must be a mapping; it parses as a " + f"{type(files).__name__}. Chronicle will not overwrite a manifest " + "it cannot read." + ) + return files + + +def default_r2_raw_bucket() -> str: + """Resolve the raw bucket: ``$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET`` or the default.""" + return env_value(R2_RAW_BUCKET_ENV, default=DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET) + + +def default_r2_derived_bucket() -> str: + """Resolve the derived bucket: ``$CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET`` or default.""" + return env_value(R2_DERIVED_BUCKET_ENV, default=DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET) + + +class SourceArtifactManifestError(RuntimeError, ManifestAccessError): + """A manifest refuses the write a fetch is about to make. + + The checks that raise these run before the publisher is read, so an + ordinary refusal costs nothing and leaves the package exactly as it was. + They are repeated immediately before the manifest is rewritten, so no + caller can reach a false-provenance write by another route. + """ + + +class SourceArtifactRevisionError(SourceArtifactManifestError): + """Fetched bytes are not the bytes the manifest entry identifies. + + A manifest entry identifies specific bytes: by its declared ``sha256``, and + -- once published -- by a content-addressed R2 key that repeats them. When + a publisher re-publishes under the same URL and vintage, rewriting that + entry would attach its provenance, and any recorded URI, to bytes it never + described. Chronicle refuses instead: same vintage plus new bytes is a new + release revision (docs/adr-chronicle-fact-identity-v2.md), registered with + ``fetch-artifact --record-revision``. + """ + + +class ManifestNameError(SourceArtifactManifestError, ValueError): + """A manifest name is not a bare filename inside the package directory. + + Also a :class:`ValueError` for callers that validated the name that way + before the CLI learned to report it as an ordinary manifest refusal. + """ + + +class AmbiguousManifestError(SourceArtifactManifestError): + """The default manifest name would create a manifest beside the ones a + package already keeps (PolicyEngine/chronicle#225).""" + + +class MalformedManifestError(SourceArtifactManifestError): + """A manifest document, or a block inside one, is not a mapping. + + Reading such a file as an absent manifest would let a fetch replace it with + a single entry, dropping whatever the unreadable document recorded. + """ + + +class RecordedR2LocatorError(SourceArtifactManifestError): + """A recorded ``storage.r2`` block does not locate exactly one object. + + The provider and URI must explicitly identify R2. ``provider``, ``bucket``, + ``key`` and ``uri`` all describe the same object, so any additional fields + have to agree, and the key has to carry the ``{sha256}/{filename}`` tail + that says which bytes it holds. A block whose fields contradict each other + has no single answer to "which bytes does this entry claim R2 holds", and + preserving or publishing under it would ship whichever field the reader + happened to consult. + """ + + +class ExpectedArtifactIdentityError(SourceArtifactManifestError): + """Fetched bytes are not the bytes a reviewed pin said to expect. + + Distinct from :class:`SourceArtifactRevisionError`: a revision has an + opt-in (``--record-revision`` supersedes what the manifest records), an + expectation has none. The operator re-reviews the release and changes + ``--expected-sha256``; Chronicle never archives an unreviewed reissue. + """ + + # New UK and New Zealand uploads are namespaced by country. US objects predate # the country segment and deliberately keep their legacy ``raw/{source_id}`` # and ``derived/{source_id}`` shapes. Publisher directories are the stable @@ -75,6 +519,60 @@ def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]: } +# A raw key ends in {sha256}/{filename} (see build_r2_key), so the segment +# before the filename is what says which bytes the object holds. +_SHA256_KEY_SEGMENT = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}") + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class RecordedR2Object: + """The R2 object a manifest entry's ``storage.r2`` block claims exists. + + Built only by :func:`_validated_recorded_r2`, so every instance names one + object whose locator fields agree with each other. + """ + + provider: str + bucket: str + key: str + sha256: str + filename: str + + @property + def uri(self) -> str: + """Return the storage URI the recorded fields spell out.""" + return f"{self.provider}://{self.bucket}/{self.key}" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class RecordedIdentity: + """The bytes a manifest entry says its vintage currently holds. + + From the recorded object's content-addressed key once the entry has been + published, and from the entry's own declared ``sha256``/``filename`` before + that. ``r2`` is None in the second case: protection does not wait for an + upload to have happened. + """ + + sha256: str + filename: str + size_bytes: int | None + declared_sha256: str | None + r2: RecordedR2Object | None + + def holds(self, *, sha256: str, filename: str) -> bool: + """Whether this identity is exactly the given bytes under that name. + + The filename participates only when the entry records one: a published + key always carries it, an entry that declares bytes and no name does + not, and inventing a mismatch there would refuse a re-fetch of the very + bytes the entry describes. + """ + if self.sha256 != sha256: + return False + return not self.filename or self.filename == Path(filename).name + + @dataclass(frozen=True) class ArtifactCommandResult: """Result from a storage command.""" @@ -157,10 +655,13 @@ class ArtifactInventoryEntry: source_url: str | None r2: dict[str, Any] | None errors: tuple[str, ...] + access: str = ACCESS_PUBLIC + licence: str | None = None + hash_only: bool = False @property def valid(self) -> bool: - """Whether this artifact is locally available and checksum-valid.""" + """Whether this registration is complete and, if public, available.""" return not self.errors def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: @@ -172,6 +673,9 @@ def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: "filename": self.filename, "local_path": self.local_path, "exists": self.exists, + "access": self.access, + "licence": self.licence, + "hash_only": self.hash_only, "sha256_expected": self.sha256_expected, "sha256_actual": self.sha256_actual, "size_bytes": self.size_bytes, @@ -221,16 +725,32 @@ class RawArtifactPublishEntry: r2_location: ArtifactStorageLocation | None upload: ArtifactCommandResult | None errors: tuple[str, ...] = () + skipped: str | None = None + + @property + def uploaded(self) -> bool: + """Whether this run uploaded the artifact.""" + return self.upload is not None and self.upload.ok + + @property + def hash_only_refused(self) -> bool: + """Whether this entry was left alone because its access is hash-only.""" + return self.skipped is not None and self.skipped.startswith( + HASH_ONLY_SKIP_PREFIX + ) @property def valid(self) -> bool: - """Whether this raw artifact uploaded and was registered.""" - return not self.errors and self.upload is not None and self.upload.ok + """Whether this raw artifact is published or correctly not uploaded: + uploaded now, already held by the recorded object in a preserved + bucket, or skipped as a hash-only registration (``skipped``).""" + return not self.errors and (self.skipped is not None or self.uploaded) def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: """Return a JSON-serializable entry.""" return { "valid": self.valid, + "skipped": self.skipped, "manifest_path": self.manifest_path, "source_id": self.source_id, "package_id": self.package_id, @@ -265,8 +785,14 @@ def counts(self) -> dict[str, int]: return { "manifest_count": len(manifest_paths), "artifact_count": len(self.entries), - "uploaded_count": sum(1 for entry in self.entries if entry.valid), + "uploaded_count": sum(1 for entry in self.entries if entry.uploaded), + "skipped_count": sum( + 1 for entry in self.entries if entry.skipped is not None + ), "failed_count": sum(1 for entry in self.entries if not entry.valid), + "hash_only_refused_count": sum( + 1 for entry in self.entries if entry.hash_only_refused + ), "r2_link_count": sum( 1 for entry in self.entries if entry.r2_location is not None ), @@ -391,32 +917,327 @@ def fetch_source_artifact( source_page: str | None = None, table: str | None = None, filename: str | None = None, + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + access: str = ACCESS_PUBLIC, + licence: str | None = None, + kind: str | None = None, + publisher: str | None = None, + vintage: str | None = None, + expected_sha256: str | None = None, + expected_size_bytes: int | None = None, + licence_evidence: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, upload_r2: bool = False, - r2_bucket: str = DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET, + record_revision: bool = False, + r2_bucket: str | None = None, r2_prefix: str | None = None, - wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", + wrangler_command: str = DEFAULT_WRANGLER_COMMAND, + _manifest_lock_held: bool = False, ) -> ArtifactFetchReport: - """Fetch/register a source artifact and optionally upload it to R2.""" + """Fetch/register a source artifact and optionally upload it to R2. + + ``manifest_filename`` names the manifest inside ``output_dir`` the entry + belongs to. Packages that split one publisher directory across several + source packages keep one manifest each, so a fetch that always wrote + ``manifest.yaml`` would write a fresh manifest beside the real ones and + never see the entry it is revising. + + ``record_revision`` opts into registering a publisher revision: the fetched + bytes get their own content-addressed key under the configured bucket and + the superseded object moves to ``storage.previous_r2``. Without it, bytes + that disagree with the entry's recorded identity raise + :class:`SourceArtifactRevisionError` before anything is overwritten. + + ``expected_sha256`` (and ``expected_size_bytes``) pin the bytes a reviewed + identity says the publisher serves: bytes that hash differently raise + :class:`ExpectedArtifactIdentityError` before anything is written or + uploaded, and ``record_revision`` does not override that. + + Only ``public`` artifacts travel this path: it writes bytes and can upload + them to the raw bucket. A publisher table's bytes land beside its + manifest; a public microdata release (``kind: microdata_release``) is + archived only under an allowlisted ``licence`` with ``licence_evidence`` + bound to ``expected_sha256``, and its bytes are staged in a transient + directory outside the package tree and uploaded from there. Licensed and + restricted artifacts are registered hash-only with + :func:`chronicle.registration.register_hash_only_artifact`. + + Every refusal happens before the publisher is read; the checks that need + the bytes (expected identity, recorded identity) run before anything is + written. + """ + r2_bucket = r2_bucket or default_r2_raw_bucket() output = Path(output_dir) + manifest_path = _manifest_path(output, manifest_filename) + access_class = normalize_access(access) + if is_hash_only(access_class): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"fetch-artifact stores bytes and refuses access={access_class!r}. " + "Register a licensed or restricted artifact by identity with " + "`chronicle register-artifact`." + ) + # The destination name is a pure function of the arguments, so it is + # resolved -- and any alias of a registered name refused -- before the + # publisher is read. Reading first and refusing afterwards would pull + # gated bytes to decide their name. + what = ( + "--filename" if filename is not None else "The filename inferred from the URL" + ) + artifact_filename = bare_filename( + filename if filename is not None else _infer_artifact_filename(source_url), + what=what, + ) + if is_manifest_filename(artifact_filename): + raise ArtifactFilenameError( + f"{what} {artifact_filename!r} is a manifest name. An artifact may " + "not be named like a manifest, which it would overwrite; pass " + "--filename with the publisher's name for the bytes." + ) + _require_identity_segment(source_id, what="source_id") + _require_identity_segment(package_id, what="package_id") + _require_identity_segment(str(year), what="year") + expected = _expected_identity(expected_sha256, expected_size_bytes) resolved_r2_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( prefix=r2_prefix, default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_PREFIX, source_id=source_id, package_path=output, ) - fetched_at = datetime.now(UTC).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - content, inferred_filename = _read_artifact(source_url) - artifact_filename = filename or inferred_filename - if not artifact_filename: - raise ValueError("Could not infer artifact filename; pass --filename.") - output.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - local_path = output / artifact_filename - local_path.write_bytes(content) + # Read and validate the manifest being written before anything is fetched: + # a manifest Chronicle cannot read, a manifest name that would sit beside + # the ones a package keeps, a recorded block that names two different + # objects, or a registration the fetch would overwrite are all refusals + # that need not touch the publisher. + try: + _refuse_a_stray_default_manifest(output, manifest_path) + except SourceArtifactManifestError: + raise + except ValueError as error: + raise MalformedManifestError(str(error)) from error + existing_manifest = _read_manifest(manifest_path) + _manifest_files(existing_manifest, manifest_path) + # The byte boundary is checked first, across every manifest the directory + # keeps: overwriting a hash-only registration with bytes is the more + # serious refusal, and its message is the one the caller needs, not a + # prompt about the manifest's kind or licence. + manifests = _package_manifests(output, manifest_path, existing_manifest) + for sibling_path, sibling in manifests.items(): + if sibling_path == str(manifest_path): + continue + try: + sibling_kind = normalize_manifest_kind( + sibling, manifest_path=Path(sibling_path) + ) + except ManifestAccessError as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{sibling_path} cannot be classified safely: {exc}" + ) from exc + _assert_manifest_valid_for_fetch( + sibling, + Path(sibling_path), + kind=sibling_kind, + package_dir=output, + ) + for sibling_path, sibling in manifests.items(): + _assert_no_hash_only_entry(sibling, Path(sibling_path), artifact_filename) + if expected.sha256: + _assert_no_hash_only_bytes( + manifests, + sha256=expected.sha256, + filename=artifact_filename, + what="the reviewed pin's bytes", + ) + _assert_manifest_identifies( + existing_manifest, + manifest_path, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + ) + manifest_kind_value = _resolve_manifest_kind( + existing_manifest, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + requested_kind=kind, + ) + _assert_manifest_valid_for_fetch( + existing_manifest, + manifest_path, + kind=manifest_kind_value, + package_dir=output, + ) + licence_text = licence.strip() if isinstance(licence, str) else None + release = manifest_kind_value == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + evidence: dict[str, str] | None = None + if release: + evidence = _release_fetch_evidence( + manifest_path, + existing_manifest, + filename=artifact_filename, + package_dir=output, + licence=licence_text, + vintage=vintage, + publisher=publisher, + expected=expected, + licence_evidence=licence_evidence, + ) + _validated_microdata_staging_destination( + microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging_dir, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=expected.sha256, + filename=artifact_filename, + ), + package_dir=output, + ) + + vintage_key, existing_value, selected_spec, _index = _select_vintage_entry( + existing_manifest, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, + filename=artifact_filename, + kind=manifest_kind_value, + ) + recorded_identity = _recorded_identity( + selected_spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=vintage_key, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + bind_registration_identity=release, + ) + _assert_table_vintage_is_revisable( + existing_value, + recorded_identity, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=vintage_key, + filename=artifact_filename, + release=release, + ) + if ( + expected.sha256 + and recorded_identity is not None + and not record_revision + and not recorded_identity.holds( + sha256=expected.sha256, filename=artifact_filename + ) + ): + # The manifest already identifies other bytes: no download can satisfy + # both the recorded identity and the expectation, so refuse before it. + raise ExpectedArtifactIdentityError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {vintage_key!r} already records " + f"sha256={recorded_identity.sha256} " + f"filename={recorded_identity.filename or 'unknown'}, and the " + f"reviewed pin expects sha256={expected.sha256}. Re-review the pin, " + "or pass --record-revision together with the reviewed " + "--expected-sha256 to register the publisher revision." + ) + + if expected.sha256 and not record_revision: + _assert_siblings_record_these_bytes( + manifests, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + vintage=vintage_key, + filename=artifact_filename, + sha256=expected.sha256, + ) + owners = _manifest_file_owners( + manifests, + filename=artifact_filename, + initializing=(manifest_path, vintage_key), + ) + _assert_shared_owner_identities_agree(owners, filename=artifact_filename) + try: + existing_target = matching_directory_entry(output, artifact_filename) + except ValueError as error: + raise ArtifactFilenameError(str(error)) from error + if existing_target is not None: + if existing_target.is_symlink(): + raise ArtifactFilenameError( + f"{existing_target} is a symbolic link (symlink)." + ) + if existing_target.name != artifact_filename: + raise ArtifactFilenameError( + f"{existing_target} has a different spelling from {artifact_filename!r}." + ) + if not existing_target.is_file(): + raise ArtifactFilenameError(f"{existing_target} is not a regular file.") + + if not _manifest_lock_held: + # The first pass above is side-effect-free. Repeat it after acquiring + # the registration lock, then keep that lock through publisher access, + # local/staging persistence, upload, and every manifest rewrite. + with _registration_lock(output): + return fetch_source_artifact( + source_url, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + output_dir=output, + dataset=dataset, + source_page=source_page, + table=table, + filename=filename, + manifest_filename=manifest_filename, + access=access, + licence=licence, + kind=kind, + publisher=publisher, + vintage=vintage, + expected_sha256=expected_sha256, + expected_size_bytes=expected_size_bytes, + licence_evidence=licence_evidence, + staging_dir=staging_dir, + upload_r2=upload_r2, + record_revision=record_revision, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + r2_prefix=r2_prefix, + wrangler_command=wrangler_command, + _manifest_lock_held=True, + ) + + fetched_at = datetime.now(UTC).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() + content, _inferred_filename = _read_artifact(source_url) sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() size_bytes = len(content) - manifest_path = output / "manifest.yaml" + + # Guard before the cached artifact is touched. A rejected fetch must leave + # the recorded bytes and their manifest entry exactly as they were. + _assert_expected_identity( + expected, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=vintage_key, + filename=artifact_filename, + source_url=source_url, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + ) + _assert_recorded_identity_holds_these_bytes( + recorded_identity, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=vintage_key, + filename=artifact_filename, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + _assert_no_hash_only_bytes( + manifests, + sha256=sha256, + filename=artifact_filename, + what=f"the bytes served by {source_url}", + ) + if not record_revision: + _assert_siblings_record_these_bytes( + manifests, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + vintage=vintage_key, + filename=artifact_filename, + sha256=sha256, + ) r2_location = ArtifactStorageLocation( provider="r2", @@ -431,6 +1252,73 @@ def fetch_source_artifact( package_path=output, ), ) + manifest_update = dict( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + dataset=dataset or f"{source_id}_{package_id}", + source_page=source_page, + table=table, + publisher=publisher, + year=year, + filename=artifact_filename, + source_url=source_url, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + fetched_at=fetched_at, + access=access_class, + licence=licence_text, + kind=manifest_kind_value, + vintage=vintage, + licence_evidence=evidence, + expected=expected, + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + _upsert_manifest( + manifest_path, + **manifest_update, + r2_location=r2_location if upload_r2 else None, + _preflight_only=True, + ) + + for owner in owners: + # The selected owner is (manifest, vintage key): a YAML anchor can make + # two vintages share one dict object, and object identity would skip + # both. + if owner.manifest_path == manifest_path and str(owner.vintage) == str( + vintage_key + ): + continue + _assert_recorded_identity_holds_these_bytes( + owner.identity, + manifest_path=owner.manifest_path, + year=owner.vintage, + filename=artifact_filename, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + + if release: + # Public microdata never lands in the package tree: it is staged in an + # untracked, transient directory and uploaded from there. + local_path = _validated_microdata_staging_destination( + microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging_dir, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=sha256, + filename=artifact_filename, + ), + package_dir=output, + ) + local_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + else: + output.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + local_path = output / artifact_filename + local_path.write_bytes(content) + r2_upload = None errors: list[str] = [] if upload_r2: @@ -444,17 +1332,7 @@ def fetch_source_artifact( _upsert_manifest( manifest_path, - source_id=source_id, - package_id=package_id, - dataset=dataset or f"{source_id}_{package_id}", - source_page=source_page or source_url, - table=table or package_id, - year=year, - filename=artifact_filename, - source_url=source_url, - sha256=sha256, - size_bytes=size_bytes, - fetched_at=fetched_at, + **manifest_update, r2_location=(r2_location if upload_r2 and r2_upload and r2_upload.ok else None), ) @@ -469,7 +1347,7 @@ def fetch_source_artifact( sha256=sha256, size_bytes=size_bytes, fetched_at=fetched_at, - r2_location=r2_location if upload_r2 and r2_upload and r2_upload.ok else None, + r2_location=r2_location if upload_r2 else None, r2_upload=r2_upload, errors=tuple(errors), ) @@ -482,13 +1360,55 @@ def publish_derived_artifacts( package_id: str, year: int, build_id: str | None = None, - r2_bucket: str = DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, + r2_bucket: str | None = None, r2_prefix: str | None = None, wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", build_artifacts_output: str | Path | None = None, ) -> DerivedArtifactPublishReport: """Upload a deterministic build output directory to the derived R2 bucket.""" + r2_bucket = r2_bucket or default_r2_derived_bucket() input_path = Path(input_dir) + try: + _require_identity_segment(source_id, what="source_id") + _require_identity_segment(package_id, what="package_id") + _require_identity_segment(str(year), what="year") + except SourceArtifactManifestError as error: + return DerivedArtifactPublishReport( + input_dir=str(input_path), + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + build_id=build_id or "", + entries=(), + build_artifacts_path=str(build_artifacts_output) + if build_artifacts_output + else None, + errors=(f"r2_identity_invalid:{error}",), + ) + try: + resolved_r2_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( + prefix=r2_prefix, + default_prefix=default_r2_derived_prefix(), + source_id=source_id, + ) + if not is_derived_r2_route(r2_bucket, resolved_r2_prefix): + raise ValueError( + "Set CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET or CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX " + "to identify a custom derived route before publishing to it." + ) + except ValueError as error: + return DerivedArtifactPublishReport( + input_dir=str(input_path), + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + build_id=build_id or "", + entries=(), + build_artifacts_path=str(build_artifacts_output) + if build_artifacts_output + else None, + errors=(f"derived_route_invalid:{error}",), + ) if not input_path.exists(): return DerivedArtifactPublishReport( input_dir=str(input_path), @@ -516,6 +1436,22 @@ def publish_derived_artifacts( errors=(f"input_dir_is_not_directory:{input_path}",), ) + try: + artifact_paths = _derived_artifact_paths(input_path) + except (OSError, ValueError) as error: + return DerivedArtifactPublishReport( + input_dir=str(input_path), + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + build_id=build_id or "", + entries=(), + build_artifacts_path=str(build_artifacts_output) + if build_artifacts_output + else None, + errors=(str(error),), + ) + resolved_build_id = build_id or infer_build_id(input_path) if not resolved_build_id: return DerivedArtifactPublishReport( @@ -536,6 +1472,7 @@ def publish_derived_artifacts( # input failure like the ones above, reported rather than raised. try: canonicalize_key("build", resolved_build_id) + _require_identity_segment(resolved_build_id, what="build_id") except ValueError: return DerivedArtifactPublishReport( input_dir=str(input_path), @@ -550,14 +1487,8 @@ def publish_derived_artifacts( errors=("malformed_build_id",), ) - resolved_r2_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( - prefix=r2_prefix, - default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX, - source_id=source_id, - ) entries: list[DerivedArtifactUploadEntry] = [] errors: list[str] = [] - artifact_paths = sorted(path for path in input_path.rglob("*") if path.is_file()) for artifact_path in artifact_paths: relative_path = artifact_path.relative_to(input_path).as_posix() if relative_path == "build_artifacts.jsonl": @@ -614,84 +1545,54 @@ def publish_derived_artifacts( def publish_source_artifacts( root: str | Path, *, - manifest_filename: str = "manifest.yaml", + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, source_id: str | None = None, package_id: str | None = None, - r2_bucket: str = DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET, + r2_bucket: str | None = None, r2_prefix: str | None = None, - wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", + wrangler_command: str = DEFAULT_WRANGLER_COMMAND, + skip_hash_only: bool = False, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, + _selected_manifest_path: Path | None = None, + _manifest_lock_held: bool = False, ) -> RawArtifactPublishReport: - """Upload manifest-declared raw source artifacts and record R2 locations.""" - root_path = Path(root) - if not root_path.exists(): - return RawArtifactPublishReport( - root=str(root_path), - entries=(), - errors=(f"Root does not exist: {root_path}",), - ) - - entries: list[RawArtifactPublishEntry] = [] - errors: list[str] = [] - for manifest_path in sorted(root_path.rglob(manifest_filename)): - try: - manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) or {} - except (OSError, yaml.YAMLError) as exc: - errors.append(f"Could not read {manifest_path}: {exc}") - continue - - manifest_source_id = source_id or manifest.get("source_id") - manifest_package_id = package_id or manifest.get("package_id") - files = manifest.get("files") or {} - if not manifest_source_id: - errors.append(f"Manifest missing source_id: {manifest_path}") - continue - if not manifest_package_id: - errors.append(f"Manifest missing package_id: {manifest_path}") - continue - if not isinstance(files, dict): - errors.append(f"Manifest files must be a mapping: {manifest_path}") - continue - - try: - resolved_r2_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( - prefix=r2_prefix, - default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_PREFIX, - source_id=str(manifest_source_id), - package_path=manifest_path, - ) - except ValueError as exc: - errors.append(f"Could not resolve R2 prefix for {manifest_path}: {exc}") - continue + """Preflight a complete raw publication, then publish under package locks. - updated = False - for year, spec in files.items(): - entry, updated_spec = _publish_raw_manifest_entry( - manifest_path, - manifest_source_id, - manifest_package_id, - year, - spec, - r2_bucket=r2_bucket, - r2_prefix=resolved_r2_prefix, - wrangler_command=wrangler_command, - ) - entries.append(entry) - if updated_spec is not None and isinstance(spec, dict): - spec.update(updated_spec) - updated = True - if updated: - manifest.setdefault("source_id", manifest_source_id) - manifest.setdefault("package_id", manifest_package_id) - manifest_path.write_text( - yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False), - encoding="utf-8", - ) - - return RawArtifactPublishReport( - root=str(root_path), - entries=tuple(entries), - errors=tuple(errors), + Licensed and restricted registrations remain identity only. Public release + bytes come from external staging, and every selected package and its sibling + manifests are validated before the first upload or manifest rewrite. + """ + arguments = { + "manifest_filename": manifest_filename, + "source_id": source_id, + "package_id": package_id, + "r2_bucket": r2_bucket, + "r2_prefix": r2_prefix, + "wrangler_command": wrangler_command, + "skip_hash_only": skip_hash_only, + "staging_dir": staging_dir, + "_selected_manifest_path": _selected_manifest_path, + } + if _manifest_lock_held: + return _publish_source_artifacts_unlocked(root, **arguments) + preflight = _publish_source_artifacts_unlocked( + root, **arguments, _preflight_only=True + ) + if preflight.errors or any(entry.errors for entry in preflight.entries): + return preflight + root_path = Path(root) + paths = ( + [_selected_manifest_path] + if _selected_manifest_path is not None + else _root_manifest_paths(root_path, manifest_filename) ) + # Keep every participating package locked while re-reading the complete + # operation. A registration cannot change the access boundary between a + # successful preflight and any of this operation's uploads. + with ExitStack() as locks: + for directory in sorted({path.parent for path in paths}): + locks.enter_context(_registration_lock(directory)) + return _publish_source_artifacts_unlocked(root, **arguments) def build_artifact_rows( @@ -738,10 +1639,18 @@ def write_build_artifacts_jsonl( def inventory_source_artifacts( root: str | Path, *, - manifest_filename: str = "manifest.yaml", + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, ) -> ArtifactInventoryReport: - """Inventory manifest-declared source artifacts under a root directory.""" + """Inventory manifest-declared source artifacts under a root directory. + + Reports every manifest-level defect (a missing or unknown kind, a vintage + under two key spellings, filename collisions) alongside the per-entry + codes, and treats a public microdata release's bytes as staged outside + the tree: a copy beside the manifest is an error, not an artifact. + """ root_path = Path(root) + _manifest_path(Path(), manifest_filename) errors: list[str] = [] entries: list[ArtifactInventoryEntry] = [] if not root_path.exists(): @@ -752,33 +1661,93 @@ def inventory_source_artifacts( "artifact_count": 0, "missing_count": 0, "checksum_mismatch_count": 0, + "hash_only_count": 0, "r2_link_count": 0, }, entries=(), errors=(f"Root does not exist: {root_path}",), ) - manifests = sorted(root_path.rglob(manifest_filename)) + manifests = _root_manifest_paths(root_path, manifest_filename) for manifest_path in manifests: try: - manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) or {} - files = manifest.get("files") or {} - except (OSError, yaml.YAMLError) as exc: + manifest = _read_manifest(manifest_path) + except (OSError, SourceArtifactManifestError) as exc: errors.append(f"Could not read {manifest_path}: {exc}") continue - if not isinstance(files, dict): - errors.append(f"Manifest files must be a mapping: {manifest_path}") + try: + files = _manifest_files(manifest, manifest_path) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + errors.append(f"Could not read {manifest_path}: {exc}") continue + kind, _kind_error = safe_manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path) + package_errors: list[str] = [] + package_manifests = None + try: + package_manifests = _package_manifests( + manifest_path.parent, manifest_path, manifest + ) + except (OSError, SourceArtifactManifestError) as exc: + package_errors.append( + f"Could not read a manifest beside {manifest_path}: {exc}" + ) + else: + for package_manifest_name, package_manifest in package_manifests.items(): + package_manifest_path = Path(package_manifest_name) + package_kind, package_kind_error = safe_manifest_kind( + package_manifest, + manifest_path=package_manifest_path, + ) + if package_kind_error: + package_errors.append( + f"{package_kind_error}: {package_manifest_path}" + ) + package_errors.extend( + f"{code}: {package_manifest_path}" + for code in validate_manifest_files(package_manifest) + ) + package_errors.extend( + f"{code}: {package_manifest_path}" + for code in _manifest_entry_validation_errors( + package_manifest, + kind=package_kind, + package_dir=package_manifest_path.parent, + ) + ) + package_errors.extend( + f"{code}: {manifest_path}" + for code in validate_package_directory( + package_manifests, entry_digest=_effective_recorded_digest + ) + ) + if package_manifests is not None: + try: + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree(package_manifests) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + package_errors.append(str(exc)) + errors.extend(package_errors) for year, spec in files.items(): - entries.append(_inventory_entry(manifest_path, year, spec)) + for file_spec in iter_file_specs(spec, kind=kind): + entries.append( + _inventory_entry( + manifest_path, + year, + file_spec, + manifest=manifest, + kind=kind, + staging_dir=staging_dir, + inspect_bytes=not package_errors, + ) + ) counts = { "manifest_count": len(manifests), "artifact_count": len(entries), - "missing_count": sum(1 for entry in entries if not entry.exists), + "missing_count": sum(1 for entry in entries if "missing_file" in entry.errors), "checksum_mismatch_count": sum( 1 for entry in entries if "checksum_mismatch" in entry.errors ), + "hash_only_count": sum(1 for entry in entries if entry.hash_only), "r2_link_count": sum(1 for entry in entries if entry.r2 is not None), } return ArtifactInventoryReport( @@ -791,12 +1760,15 @@ def inventory_source_artifacts( def bootstrap_r2_buckets( *, - raw_bucket: str = DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET, - derived_bucket: str = DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, + raw_bucket: str | None = None, + derived_bucket: str | None = None, wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", ) -> R2BootstrapReport: """Create the R2 buckets Chronicle expects, if Wrangler is authenticated.""" - buckets = (raw_bucket, derived_bucket) + buckets = ( + raw_bucket or default_r2_raw_bucket(), + derived_bucket or default_r2_derived_bucket(), + ) commands: list[ArtifactCommandResult] = [] errors: list[str] = [] @@ -959,7 +1931,7 @@ def build_derived_r2_key( """Build the canonical R2 key for a derived build artifact.""" resolved_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( prefix=prefix, - default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX, + default_prefix=default_r2_derived_prefix(), source_id=source_id, ) return posixpath.join( @@ -1010,9 +1982,9 @@ def infer_build_id(input_dir: str | Path) -> str | None: if build_id: return str(build_id) - db_path = input_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = input_path / CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME if not db_path.exists(): - db_path = input_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = input_path / LEGACY_CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME if db_path.exists(): with sqlite3.connect(db_path) as connection: row = connection.execute( @@ -1043,222 +2015,1899 @@ def _filename_from_url(source_url: str) -> str: return Path(unquote(parsed.path)).name -def _upsert_manifest( - manifest_path: Path, +def _read_manifest(manifest_path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return a manifest's parsed payload, refusing a document it cannot read. + + An absent or empty manifest reads as an empty mapping: ``fetch-artifact`` + writes the first entry into a package that has none. A document that parses + as anything else -- a list, a scalar, a truncated or half-merged file -- is + not an absent manifest, and treating it as one would let the fetch replace + it with a single entry and drop everything it recorded. + """ + if manifest_path.is_symlink(): + _require_regular_manifest_file(manifest_path) + if not manifest_path.exists(): + return {} + _require_regular_manifest_file(manifest_path) + try: + payload = load_manifest_document(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} is not valid YAML: {exc}" + ) from exc + if payload is None: + return {} + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} must be a YAML mapping; it parses as a " + f"{type(payload).__name__}. Chronicle will not overwrite a manifest " + "it cannot read." + ) + return payload + + +def _infer_artifact_filename(source_url: str) -> str: + """Return the filename :func:`_read_artifact` would report, without I/O. + + The name is a pure function of the URL: the last path segment for http(s) + and ``file://`` URLs, the basename for a bare path. Resolving it before + the read lets every filename guard run before the publisher is touched. + """ + parsed = urlparse(source_url) + if parsed.scheme in ("http", "https"): + return _filename_from_url(source_url) + if parsed.scheme == "file": + return Path(unquote(parsed.path)).name + if not parsed.scheme: + return Path(source_url).name + raise ValueError(f"Unsupported source URL scheme: {parsed.scheme}") + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ExpectedIdentity: + """The bytes a reviewed pin says the publisher serves, if any.""" + + sha256: str | None + size_bytes: int | None + + +def _expected_identity( + expected_sha256: str | None, + expected_size_bytes: int | None, +) -> ExpectedIdentity: + """Validate the expected-identity arguments before any I/O.""" + sha256 = expected_sha256.strip() if isinstance(expected_sha256, str) else None + if expected_sha256 is not None and ( + not sha256 or not _SHA256_KEY_SEGMENT.fullmatch(sha256) + ): + raise ExpectedArtifactIdentityError( + "--expected-sha256 must be a lowercase 64-character SHA-256 taken " + f"from a reviewed pin, not {expected_sha256!r}. Never invent a hash." + ) + if expected_size_bytes is not None and ( + isinstance(expected_size_bytes, bool) + or not isinstance(expected_size_bytes, int) + or expected_size_bytes <= 0 + ): + raise ExpectedArtifactIdentityError( + "--expected-size-bytes must be a positive integer, not " + f"{expected_size_bytes!r}." + ) + return ExpectedIdentity(sha256=sha256, size_bytes=expected_size_bytes) + + +def _assert_expected_identity( + expected: ExpectedIdentity, *, - source_id: str, - package_id: str, - dataset: str, - source_page: str, - table: str, - year: int, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, filename: str, source_url: str, sha256: str, size_bytes: int, - fetched_at: str, - r2_location: ArtifactStorageLocation | None, ) -> None: - if manifest_path.exists(): - payload = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) or {} - else: - payload = {} - payload.setdefault("source_id", source_id) - payload.setdefault("package_id", package_id) - payload.setdefault("dataset", dataset) - payload.setdefault("source_page", source_page) - payload.setdefault("table", table) - payload.setdefault("files", {}) - file_entry: dict[str, Any] = { - "filename": filename, - "source_url": source_url, - "sha256": sha256, - "size_bytes": size_bytes, - "fetched_at": fetched_at, - } - if r2_location is not None: - file_entry["storage"] = {"r2": r2_location.to_dict()} - payload["files"][year] = file_entry - manifest_path.write_text( - yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False), - encoding="utf-8", + """Refuse fetched bytes the reviewed pin does not cover. + + ``--record-revision`` does not override this: it governs what the manifest + records about bytes Chronicle chose to archive, and an expectation is the + statement that only reviewed bytes are archived at all. + """ + if expected.sha256 is None and expected.size_bytes is None: + return + if (expected.sha256 is None or expected.sha256 == sha256) and ( + expected.size_bytes is None or expected.size_bytes == size_bytes + ): + return + raise ExpectedArtifactIdentityError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} {filename}: the bytes served by " + f"{source_url} are not the bytes the reviewed pin covers. Expected " + f"sha256={expected.sha256 or 'unspecified'} " + f"size_bytes={expected.size_bytes or 'unspecified'}; fetched " + f"sha256={sha256} size_bytes={size_bytes}. The publisher is serving " + "bytes the pin does not describe. Chronicle will not archive an " + "unreviewed reissue; re-review the release and re-run with the pin you " + "reviewed." ) -def _upload_r2_object( - location: ArtifactStorageLocation, - local_path: Path, +def _resolve_manifest_kind( + existing_manifest: dict[str, Any], *, - wrangler_command: str, -) -> ArtifactCommandResult: - content_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(local_path.name) - command = [ - *shlex.split(wrangler_command), - "r2", - "object", - "put", - f"{location.bucket}/{location.key}", - "--file", - str(local_path), - "--remote", + manifest_path: Path, + requested_kind: str | None, +) -> str: + """Return the kind a fetch writes, refusing a conflict with the manifest. + + A manifest's kind is fixed once declared: an explicit ``--kind`` that + differs from it would reclassify every entry the manifest holds as a side + effect of one fetch. A kindless manifest with content is refused unless it + is frozen kindless byte for byte, and a stored kind Chronicle does not + recognise is never masked by the command line. + """ + requested = ( + normalize_manifest_kind({"kind": requested_kind}) + if requested_kind is not None + else None + ) + try: + stored = normalize_manifest_kind(existing_manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path) + except ManifestKindError as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{exc} fetch-artifact will not add to a manifest whose kind it " + "cannot read; declare the kind by editing the manifest deliberately." + ) from exc + except ManifestAccessError as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} declares an unknown manifest kind " + f"{existing_manifest.get('kind')!r}; expected one of " + f"{list(MANIFEST_KINDS)}. Fix the manifest before fetching into it." + ) from exc + if requested is None: + return stored + if requested != stored and ( + existing_manifest.get("kind") is not None or has_file_entries(existing_manifest) + ): + # A declared kind is fixed, and a frozen kindless manifest with + # entries is a publisher table. A manifest with neither is declared + # by this fetch. + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} is a {stored} manifest; refusing to fetch into it " + f"as a {requested}. A manifest's kind is fixed once declared: " + f"register a {requested} in its own package directory, or migrate " + "this manifest deliberately." + ) + return requested + + +def _complete_manifest_validation_errors( + manifest: dict[str, Any], + *, + kind: str, + package_dir: Path, +) -> list[str]: + """Return all manifest- and entry-level validation errors.""" + return [ + *validate_manifest_files(manifest), + *_manifest_entry_validation_errors( + manifest, + kind=kind, + package_dir=package_dir, + ), ] - if content_type: - command.extend(["--content-type", content_type]) - return _run_command(command) -def _publish_raw_manifest_entry( +def _manifest_entry_validation_errors( + manifest: dict[str, Any], + *, + kind: str, + package_dir: Path, +) -> list[str]: + """Return entry-level validation errors for a complete manifest.""" + codes: list[str] = [] + files = manifest.get("files") or {} + if isinstance(files, dict): + for key, spec in files.items(): + for file_spec in iter_file_specs(spec, kind=kind): + name = ( + file_spec.get("filename") if isinstance(file_spec, dict) else None + ) + try: + exists = matching_directory_entry(package_dir, name) is not None + except ValueError: + codes.append(f"duplicate_artifact_spellings:{name}") + continue + for code in validate_file_entry( + file_spec, + kind=kind, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=exists, + ): + codes.append(f"{key!r}/{name}: {code}") + return codes + + +def _assert_manifest_valid_for_fetch( + manifest: dict[str, Any], manifest_path: Path, - source_id: str, - package_id: str, - year: Any, - spec: Any, *, - r2_bucket: str, - r2_prefix: str, - wrangler_command: str, -) -> tuple[RawArtifactPublishEntry, dict[str, Any] | None]: - errors: list[str] = [] - if not isinstance(spec, dict): - spec = {} - errors.append("malformed_file_spec") - filename = str(spec.get("filename") or "") - artifact_path = manifest_path.parent / filename - sha256_expected = spec.get("sha256") - sha256_actual = None - size_bytes = None - if not filename: - errors.append("missing_filename") - elif not artifact_path.exists(): - errors.append("missing_file") - else: - content = artifact_path.read_bytes() - sha256_actual = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() - size_bytes = len(content) - if sha256_expected and sha256_actual != sha256_expected: - errors.append("checksum_mismatch") + kind: str, + package_dir: Path, +) -> None: + """Refuse to fetch into a manifest inventory would report as invalid. - if errors: - return ( - RawArtifactPublishEntry( - manifest_path=str(manifest_path), - source_id=source_id, - package_id=package_id, - year=str(year), - filename=filename, - local_path=str(artifact_path), - sha256=sha256_actual, - size_bytes=size_bytes, - r2_location=None, - upload=None, - errors=tuple(errors), - ), - None, + Uses the exact vocabulary ``inventory-artifacts`` and ``publish-raw`` + report, so a fetch never carries an invalid registration forward -- or + conceals one under a rewrite. + """ + if kind != MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + for year, entry in _manifest_files(manifest, manifest_path).items(): + if not isinstance(entry, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} must be a mapping; " + f"it is a {type(entry).__name__}." + ) + codes = _complete_manifest_validation_errors( + manifest, + kind=kind, + package_dir=package_dir, + ) + if codes: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} is not a valid {kind} manifest: " + f"{'; '.join(codes)}. fetch-artifact rewrites this manifest and " + "will not carry an invalid registration forward; " + "inventory-artifacts reports the same codes." ) - location = ArtifactStorageLocation( - provider="r2", - bucket=r2_bucket, - key=build_r2_key( - source_id=source_id, - package_id=package_id, - year=year, - sha256=sha256_actual or "", - filename=filename, - prefix=r2_prefix, - package_path=manifest_path, - ), - ) - storage = spec.get("storage") if isinstance(spec.get("storage"), dict) else {} - recorded_r2 = storage.get("r2") if isinstance(storage.get("r2"), dict) else {} - recorded_key = recorded_r2.get("key") - if recorded_key and recorded_key != location.key: - errors.append( - "recorded_r2_key_disagrees_with_country_prefix:" - f"recorded={recorded_key}:expected={location.key}" + +def _release_fetch_evidence( + manifest_path: Path, + existing_manifest: dict[str, Any], + *, + filename: str, + package_dir: Path, + licence: str | None, + vintage: str | None, + publisher: str | None, + expected: ExpectedIdentity, + licence_evidence: Mapping[str, Any] | None, +) -> dict[str, str]: + """Return the ``licence_evidence`` block a public release fetch records. + + Bytes only with artifact-bound redistribution evidence: the licence must + be on the allowlist, the evidence must bind this artifact (by the reviewed + SHA-256) to that term, and the release must carry its publisher and + vintage. Public microdata is staged outside the package tree, so a file of + that name beside the manifest is refused as tracked microdata bytes. + """ + if not licence: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} registers a microdata release, so every entry " + "must record its publisher licence; pass --licence." ) - return ( - RawArtifactPublishEntry( - manifest_path=str(manifest_path), - source_id=source_id, - package_id=package_id, - year=str(year), - filename=filename, - local_path=str(artifact_path), - sha256=sha256_actual, - size_bytes=size_bytes, - r2_location=None, - upload=None, - errors=tuple(errors), - ), - None, + if not (vintage and vintage.strip()): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} registers a microdata release, so every entry " + "must record its publisher vintage; pass --vintage." ) - upload = _upload_r2_object( - location, - artifact_path, - wrangler_command=wrangler_command, - ) - if not upload.ok: - errors.append("r2_upload_failed") + if not (publisher or existing_manifest.get("publisher")): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} registers a microdata release, so it must name " + "the publisher; pass --publisher." + ) + if expected.sha256 is None: + raise ManifestAccessError( + "A public microdata release is archived only against a reviewed " + "checksum that its licence evidence covers; pass --expected-sha256." + ) + if not is_redistributable_licence(licence): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"licence {licence!r} is not on Chronicle's allowlist of " + f"redistributable terms {sorted(REDISTRIBUTABLE_LICENCES)}. A " + "public-download file without redistribution evidence is classed " + "licensed: register it hash-only with `chronicle register-artifact`." + ) + supplied = dict(licence_evidence or {}) + evidence = { + "issuer": str(supplied.get("issuer") or "").strip(), + "licence": licence, + "scope": str(supplied.get("scope") or "").strip(), + "url": str(supplied.get("url") or "").strip(), + "sha256": expected.sha256, + } + codes = licence_evidence_errors(evidence, licence=licence, sha256=expected.sha256) + if codes: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path}: archiving {filename!r} needs licence evidence " + f"binding it to {licence!r}: {', '.join(codes)}. Pass " + "--licence-evidence-issuer, --licence-evidence-scope and a durable " + "--licence-evidence-url; the evidence covers --expected-sha256." + ) + local_entry = matching_directory_entry(package_dir, filename) + if local_entry is not None: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{local_entry} exists beside the manifest. Public " + "microdata bytes are staged outside the package tree and uploaded " + "from there; a repository never holds them. Remove the file first." + ) + return evidence - updated_spec: dict[str, Any] | None = None - if upload.ok: - updated_spec = { - "sha256": sha256_actual, - "size_bytes": size_bytes, - "storage": { - **( - spec.get("storage") if isinstance(spec.get("storage"), dict) else {} + +def _select_vintage_entry( + payload: dict[str, Any], + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + filename: str, + kind: str, +) -> tuple[Any, Any, dict[str, Any], int | None]: + """Locate the entry a fetch revises: ``(key, files[key], entry, index)``. + + The vintage key is whichever spelling the manifest already uses for + ``year`` (``2023`` and ``'2023'`` are one vintage). A publisher table's + vintage is one mapping, and that entry is its identity whatever filename + it records. A microdata release lists several files under one vintage, and + the entry is the one whose bare filename matches. ``index`` is the entry's + position in that list, or None. + """ + files = payload.get("files") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None + if files is None: + return year, None, {}, None + if not isinstance(files, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} files must be a mapping; it is a " + f"{type(files).__name__}. Chronicle will not write into a manifest " + "it cannot read." + ) + try: + key = resolve_vintage_key(files, year) + except AmbiguousVintageKeyError as exc: + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path}: {exc} Chronicle will not choose which entry is " + "the record." + ) from exc + if key is None: + return year, None, {}, None + existing = files[key] + if isinstance(existing, dict): + return key, existing, existing, None + if isinstance(existing, list): + if kind != MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {key!r} lists {len(existing)} files, but " + f"the manifest is a {kind} manifest. Only a kind: " + "microdata_release manifest may list several files under one " + "vintage (list_file_spec_requires_microdata_release_kind); " + "Chronicle will not add to or revise a vintage it cannot " + "validate." + ) + wanted = filename_key(filename) + matches = [ + (index, entry) + for index, entry in enumerate(existing) + if isinstance(entry, dict) and filename_key(entry.get("filename")) == wanted + ] + if len(matches) > 1: + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {key!r} lists {len(matches)} entries " + f"named {filename!r}; a fetch can revise exactly one, and " + "Chronicle will not guess which." + ) + if matches: + return key, existing, matches[0][1], matches[0][0] + return key, existing, {}, None + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {key!r} must be a mapping or a list of " + f"mappings; it is a {type(existing).__name__}." + ) + + +def _assert_table_vintage_is_revisable( + existing_value: Any, + recorded_identity: RecordedIdentity | None, + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + filename: str, + release: bool, +) -> None: + """Refuse a second filename in a publisher-table vintage with no identity. + + A publisher table holds one file per vintage. When its entry identifies + bytes, a fetch under another name is judged by the recorded identity (and + ``--record-revision`` supersedes the entry). An entry that identifies + nothing -- no ``sha256``, no recorded object -- cannot be superseded, and + adding a second file would turn the mapping into a list every reader + refuses. + """ + if release or not isinstance(existing_value, dict) or recorded_identity: + return + recorded_name = existing_value.get("filename") + if recorded_name is None or filename_key(recorded_name) == filename_key(filename): + return + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} records {recorded_name!r} without a " + f"sha256; a publisher table holds one file per vintage, so {filename!r} " + "cannot be added and there is no recorded identity to supersede. " + "Register the vintage's bytes first or fix the entry by hand." + ) + + +def _recorded_storage(spec: Any) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return a manifest file spec's recorded ``storage`` block, if any.""" + if not isinstance(spec, dict): + return {} + storage = spec.get("storage") + return storage if isinstance(storage, dict) else {} + + +def _recorded_r2(spec: Any) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the recorded ``storage.r2`` block verbatim, if any. + + Raw access, for callers that carry the block forward as history. Callers + that reason about which object it names go through + :func:`_validated_recorded_r2` instead. + """ + recorded = _recorded_storage(spec).get("r2") + return recorded if isinstance(recorded, dict) else {} + + +def _split_r2_uri(uri: str) -> tuple[str, str, str] | None: + """Split ``provider://bucket/key`` into its three parts, or None.""" + provider, separator, remainder = uri.partition("://") + if not separator or not provider: + return None + bucket, separator, key = remainder.partition("/") + if not separator or not bucket or not key: + return None + return (provider, bucket, key) + + +def _validated_recorded_storage( + spec: Any, + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the entry's ``storage`` mapping, refusing a malformed one.""" + if not isinstance(spec, dict) or "storage" not in spec: + return {} + storage = spec["storage"] + if not isinstance(storage, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} storage must be a mapping; it is a " + f"{type(storage).__name__}." + ) + if "previous_r2" in storage and not isinstance(storage["previous_r2"], list): + previous = storage["previous_r2"] + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} storage.previous_r2 must be a " + f"list; it is a {type(previous).__name__}. Chronicle will not " + "discard malformed archived provenance." + ) + return storage + + +def _validated_recorded_r2( + spec: Any, + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + source_id: str = "", + package_id: str = "", + bind_registration_identity: bool = False, +) -> RecordedR2Object | None: + """Return the object a recorded ``storage.r2`` block names, or None. + + Every locator field the block supplies is cross-checked against every + other: ``key`` against the URI's path, ``bucket`` against its authority, + ``provider`` against its scheme, and the resulting key against the + canonical content-addressed shape :func:`build_r2_key` writes. Reading one + field and trusting the rest is what lets a block that says two different + things survive a preserve or a publish. + """ + storage = _validated_recorded_storage(spec, manifest_path=manifest_path, year=year) + if "r2" not in storage: + return None + block = storage["r2"] + where = f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} storage.r2" + if not isinstance(block, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{where} must be a mapping; it is a {type(block).__name__}." + ) + + supplied: dict[str, str] = {} + for field in ("provider", "bucket", "key", "uri"): + value = block.get(field) + if value is None: + continue + if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip(): + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: {field} must be a non-empty string, not {value!r}." + ) + supplied[field] = value + + provider = supplied.get("provider") + bucket = supplied.get("bucket") + key = supplied.get("key") + uri = supplied.get("uri") + missing_required = [ + field for field in ("provider", "uri") if not supplied.get(field) + ] + if missing_required: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: records no {', '.join(missing_required)}. A block under " + "storage.r2 must explicitly record provider='r2' and an r2:// URI." + ) + if provider != "r2": + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: provider={provider!r} does not identify R2. A block " + "under storage.r2 must use provider='r2' and an r2:// URI, not " + f"{provider}://." + ) + if uri is not None: + parts = _split_r2_uri(uri) + if parts is None: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: uri {uri!r} is not provider://bucket/key." + ) + for field, value, from_uri in zip( + ("provider", "bucket", "key"), (provider, bucket, key), parts + ): + if value is not None and value != from_uri: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: {field}={value!r} contradicts uri {uri!r}, which " + f"names {from_uri!r}. The block records two different " + "objects, so Chronicle cannot say which bytes it claims." + ) + provider, bucket, key = ( + provider or parts[0], + bucket or parts[1], + key or parts[2], + ) + + missing = [ + field + for field, value in ( + ("provider", provider), + ("bucket", bucket), + ("key", key), + ) + if not value + ] + if missing: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: records no {', '.join(missing)}. A recorded block has to " + "locate its object: provider, bucket and key, or a uri that " + "supplies them." + ) + if provider != "r2": + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: provider must be 'r2', not {provider!r}. A block under " + "storage.r2 cannot record another storage service." + ) + + segments = key.split("/") + if ( + len(segments) < 2 + or not all(segments) + or not _SHA256_KEY_SEGMENT.fullmatch(segments[-2]) + ): + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: key {key!r} is not content-addressed. A raw key ends in " + "{sha256}/{filename}, which is what says the object holds the " + "entry's bytes; Chronicle will not guess for a key that does not." + ) + if bind_registration_identity: + try: + expected_release = ( + _clean_key_part(source_id), + _clean_key_part(package_id), + str(year), + ) + except ValueError as exc: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: cannot bind the locator to source_id={source_id!r}, " + f"package_id={package_id!r}, year={year!r}: {exc}" + ) from exc + recorded_release = tuple(segments[-5:-2]) + if recorded_release != expected_release: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{where}: key {key!r} is bound to source/package/year " + f"{recorded_release!r}, not {expected_release!r}. A recorded " + "release object must carry the complete registration identity." + ) + return RecordedR2Object( + provider=provider, + bucket=bucket, + key=key, + sha256=segments[-2], + filename=segments[-1], + ) + + +def _recorded_identity( + spec: Any, + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + source_id: str = "", + package_id: str = "", + bind_registration_identity: bool = False, +) -> RecordedIdentity | None: + """Return what a manifest entry says its vintage holds, if anything. + + A published entry is identified by its recorded object's content-addressed + key. An entry that has not been published yet -- registered without an + upload, or left behind by a failed one -- is identified by its own declared + ``sha256`` and ``filename``. Both are recorded identities, and a fetch of + different bytes over either one is a publisher revision. + """ + recorded_r2 = _validated_recorded_r2( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + bind_registration_identity=bind_registration_identity, + ) + declared_sha256 = spec.get("sha256") if isinstance(spec, dict) else None + declared_sha256 = declared_sha256 if isinstance(declared_sha256, str) else None + declared_filename = spec.get("filename") if isinstance(spec, dict) else None + declared_filename = ( + declared_filename if isinstance(declared_filename, str) else None + ) + size_bytes = spec.get("size_bytes") if isinstance(spec, dict) else None + size_bytes = size_bytes if isinstance(size_bytes, int) else None + if recorded_r2 is not None: + return RecordedIdentity( + sha256=recorded_r2.sha256, + filename=recorded_r2.filename, + # Only report a size the recorded key agrees with: an entry can + # arrive here already describing the new bytes. + size_bytes=size_bytes if declared_sha256 == recorded_r2.sha256 else None, + declared_sha256=declared_sha256, + r2=recorded_r2, + ) + if not declared_sha256: + return None + return RecordedIdentity( + sha256=declared_sha256, + filename=Path(declared_filename).name if declared_filename else "", + size_bytes=size_bytes, + declared_sha256=declared_sha256, + r2=None, + ) + + +def _revision_error_message( + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + filename: str, + identity: RecordedIdentity, + sha256: str, + size_bytes: int, + r2_bucket: str, +) -> str: + """Explain a refused fetch: recorded identity, fetched identity, next step.""" + records = ( + f"already records the R2 object {identity.r2.uri}, which holds" + if identity.r2 is not None + else "already records" + ) + message = ( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} {records} " + f"sha256={identity.sha256} " + f"filename={identity.filename or 'unknown'} " + f"size_bytes=" + f"{identity.size_bytes if identity.size_bytes is not None else 'unknown'}. " + f"The fetched bytes are sha256={sha256} filename={Path(filename).name} " + f"size_bytes={size_bytes}. Chronicle will not rewrite a vintage that " + "identifies specific bytes to describe bytes it never identified." + ) + if identity.r2 is not None and identity.declared_sha256 not in ( + None, + identity.sha256, + ): + message += ( + f" (The entry also declares sha256={identity.declared_sha256}, which " + "its own R2 key contradicts: an earlier fetch rewrote the hash " + "without moving the object.)" + ) + return message + ( + " The same vintage with new bytes is a new release revision " + "(docs/adr-chronicle-fact-identity-v2.md). Re-run with " + "--record-revision to store the fetched bytes under their own " + f"content-addressed key in {r2_bucket} and keep the superseded object " + "in storage.previous_r2." + ) + + +def _assert_recorded_identity_holds_these_bytes( + identity: RecordedIdentity | None, + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + filename: str, + sha256: str, + size_bytes: int, + r2_bucket: str, + record_revision: bool, +) -> None: + """Refuse a publisher revision that has not been opted into.""" + if identity is None or identity.holds(sha256=sha256, filename=filename): + return + if identity.sha256 == sha256: + # The recorded object holds exactly these bytes under another name. A + # rename is not a publisher revision, so --record-revision does not + # apply, and silently adopting the new name would leave the entry's + # filename disagreeing with the key its own storage block records. + raise SourceArtifactRevisionError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {year!r} already records these exact bytes " + f"(sha256={sha256}) as filename={identity.filename}; this fetch " + f"names them {Path(filename).name}. A rename is not a release " + "revision, so --record-revision does not apply. Re-run with " + f"--filename {identity.filename} to keep the recorded identity." + ) + if record_revision: + return + raise SourceArtifactRevisionError( + _revision_error_message( + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, + filename=filename, + identity=identity, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + ) + ) + + +def _superseding_storage( + recorded_spec: dict[str, Any], + *, + recorded_r2: RecordedR2Object | None, + new_r2: dict[str, Any] | None, + superseded_at: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return a storage block in which the recorded object becomes history. + + ``storage.r2`` only ever names the object that holds the entry's current + bytes. The superseded block is appended, oldest first, to + ``storage.previous_r2`` so the earlier bytes stay addressable by the URI + archived witness records already pin. An entry that was never published has + no object to supersede, and gets no ``previous_r2`` key. + """ + storage = dict(_recorded_storage(recorded_spec)) + previous = storage.get("previous_r2") + entries = list(previous) if isinstance(previous, list) else [] + if recorded_r2 is not None: + entry = dict(_recorded_r2(recorded_spec)) + entry["sha256"] = recorded_r2.sha256 + if recorded_spec.get("sha256") == recorded_r2.sha256: + # Only carry metadata the superseded key agrees with: a manifest + # can arrive here already describing the new bytes. + for field in ("size_bytes", "fetched_at", "source_url"): + value = recorded_spec.get(field) + if value is not None: + entry[field] = value + entry["superseded_at"] = superseded_at + entries.append(entry) + if entries: + storage["previous_r2"] = entries + if new_r2 is None: + storage.pop("r2", None) + else: + storage["r2"] = new_r2 + return storage + + +#: Entry fields a fetch owns. Everything else an entry already records -- +#: notes, doi, study, access_route, a vintage the fetch did not restate -- is +#: carried forward when the fetch replaces that entry, so a re-fetch is never a +#: silent de-registration. +_FETCH_OWNED_FIELDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset( + { + "filename", + "source_url", + "access", + "licence", + "licence_evidence", + "sha256", + "size_bytes", + "fetched_at", + "verified_at", + "hash_source", + "attested_by", + "storage", + } +) + + +def _upsert_manifest( + manifest_path: Path, + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + dataset: str, + source_page: str | None, + table: str | None, + publisher: str | None, + year: int, + filename: str, + source_url: str, + sha256: str, + size_bytes: int, + fetched_at: str, + access: str, + licence: str | None, + kind: str, + vintage: str | None, + licence_evidence: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + expected: ExpectedIdentity, + r2_location: ArtifactStorageLocation | None, + record_revision: bool = False, + _preflight_only: bool = False, +) -> None: + """Prepare and validate a complete package update before persisting it. + + ``_preflight_only`` performs the identical proposal and validation without + creating directories or writing manifests, so fetch can refuse the update + before staging or uploading publisher bytes. + + The guards fetch_source_artifact ran are repeated against the freshly + re-read manifest, so no caller can reach a false-provenance write by + another route. The entry the fetch revises is located by vintage key and + bare filename and replaced where it sits; a publisher-table vintage stays + one mapping and a release vintage stays a list, and every manifest this + command touches declares its kind. + """ + payload = _read_manifest(manifest_path) + kind = _resolve_manifest_kind( + payload, manifest_path=manifest_path, requested_kind=kind + ) + _assert_manifest_identifies( + payload, manifest_path, source_id=source_id, package_id=package_id + ) + manifests = _package_manifests(manifest_path.parent, manifest_path, payload) + for sibling_path, sibling in manifests.items(): + _assert_no_hash_only_entry(sibling, Path(sibling_path), filename) + _assert_no_hash_only_bytes( + manifests, sha256=sha256, filename=filename, what="the fetched bytes" + ) + owners = _manifest_file_owners( + manifests, filename=filename, initializing=(manifest_path, year) + ) + _assert_shared_owner_identities_agree(owners, filename=filename) + if not record_revision: + _assert_siblings_record_these_bytes( + manifests, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + vintage=year, + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + ) + payload.setdefault("source_id", source_id) + payload.setdefault("package_id", package_id) + payload = _with_declared_kind(payload, kind) + payload.setdefault("dataset", dataset) + if publisher: + payload.setdefault("publisher", publisher) + payload.setdefault("source_page", source_page) + payload.setdefault("table", table) + if payload.get("files") is None: + # setdefault keeps an explicit null (a bare ``files:`` line); the + # entry below needs a mapping to record into. + payload["files"] = {} + release = kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + + key, existing_value, recorded_spec, index = _select_vintage_entry( + payload, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, + filename=filename, + kind=kind, + ) + recorded_storage = _recorded_storage(recorded_spec) + identity = _recorded_identity( + recorded_spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=key, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + bind_registration_identity=release, + ) + _assert_expected_identity( + expected, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=key, + filename=filename, + source_url=source_url, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + ) + new_r2 = r2_location.to_dict() if r2_location is not None else None + # Different bytes under the same vintage, or the same bytes under another + # name: fetch_source_artifact refuses both before the read; the guard is + # repeated here so no caller can reach a false-provenance write. + _assert_recorded_identity_holds_these_bytes( + identity, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=key, + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_bucket=(new_r2 or {}).get("bucket") or default_r2_raw_bucket(), + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + holds = identity is not None and identity.holds(sha256=sha256, filename=filename) + if holds and identity.r2 is not None: + # A recorded storage.r2 block for these exact bytes is historical + # truth: archived witness records pin raw R2 URLs by hash. Re-fetching + # under a renamed bucket copies bytes; it does not restate where the + # bytes were first published (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism 3). + storage = {**recorded_storage, "r2": _recorded_r2(recorded_spec)} + elif identity is not None and not holds: + storage = _superseding_storage( + recorded_spec, + recorded_r2=identity.r2, + new_r2=new_r2, + superseded_at=fetched_at, + ) + elif new_r2 is not None: + storage = {**recorded_storage, "r2": new_r2} + else: + storage = dict(recorded_storage) + + # Access is written explicitly on every entry this command touches, so a + # manifest never relies on the inferred ``public`` default once rewritten. + file_entry: dict[str, Any] = {"filename": filename} + if release: + file_entry["access"] = access + file_entry["licence"] = licence + if licence_evidence: + file_entry["licence_evidence"] = dict(licence_evidence) + file_entry["vintage"] = vintage or recorded_spec.get("vintage") + file_entry["sha256"] = sha256 + file_entry["size_bytes"] = size_bytes + file_entry["source_url"] = source_url + file_entry["fetched_at"] = fetched_at + # Chronicle fetched and hashed these bytes itself. + file_entry["verified_at"] = fetched_at[:10] + file_entry["hash_source"] = HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH + file_entry["attested_by"] = CHRONICLE_ATTESTER + else: + file_entry["source_url"] = source_url + file_entry["access"] = access + if licence: + file_entry["licence"] = licence + if vintage: + file_entry["vintage"] = vintage + file_entry["sha256"] = sha256 + file_entry["size_bytes"] = size_bytes + file_entry["fetched_at"] = fetched_at + for field, value in recorded_spec.items(): + if field not in _FETCH_OWNED_FIELDS and field not in file_entry: + file_entry[field] = value + # An entry that has no storage to record carries no empty block: a + # revision over a never-published entry supersedes nothing. + if storage: + file_entry["storage"] = storage + + if existing_value is None: + payload["files"][key] = [file_entry] if release else file_entry + elif isinstance(existing_value, dict): + if not release: + # A publisher table holds one file per vintage; a rename under + # --record-revision supersedes that one entry, and the superseded + # key in storage.previous_r2 keeps the old name. + payload["files"][key] = file_entry + elif filename_key(existing_value.get("filename")) == filename_key(filename): + payload["files"][key] = [file_entry] + else: + payload["files"][key] = [existing_value, file_entry] + else: + entries = list(existing_value) + if index is not None: + entries[index] = file_entry + else: + entries.append(file_entry) + payload["files"][key] = entries + manifests[str(manifest_path)] = payload + revision = any( + owner.identity is not None + and not owner.identity.holds(sha256=sha256, filename=filename) + for owner in owners + ) or (identity is not None and not identity.holds(sha256=sha256, filename=filename)) + changed_paths = {manifest_path} + if record_revision and revision: + for owner in owners: + if owner.manifest_path == manifest_path and str(owner.vintage) == str(key): + continue + revised_entry = dict(owner.spec) + revised_entry.update( + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + fetched_at=fetched_at, + ) + owner_storage = _storage_for_fetched_identity( + owner.spec, + identity=owner.identity, + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + new_r2=new_r2, + fetched_at=fetched_at, + ) + if owner_storage: + revised_entry["storage"] = owner_storage + else: + revised_entry.pop("storage", None) + owner_payload = manifests[str(owner.manifest_path)] + owner_payload = _with_declared_kind( + owner_payload, + normalize_manifest_kind( + owner_payload, manifest_path=owner.manifest_path ), - "r2": location.to_dict(), - }, - } + ) + manifests[str(owner.manifest_path)] = owner_payload + owner_value = owner_payload["files"][owner.vintage] + if isinstance(owner_value, list): + owner_payload["files"][owner.vintage] = [ + revised_entry if entry is owner.spec else entry + for entry in owner_value + ] + else: + owner_payload["files"][owner.vintage] = revised_entry + changed_paths.add(owner.manifest_path) + for proposed_path, proposed in manifests.items(): + path = Path(proposed_path) + proposed_kind = normalize_manifest_kind(proposed, manifest_path=path) + _assert_manifest_valid_for_fetch( + proposed, path, kind=proposed_kind, package_dir=path.parent + ) + for proposed_year, _index, entry in iter_manifest_entries(proposed): + locator = _validated_recorded_r2( + entry, + manifest_path=path, + year=proposed_year, + source_id=proposed.get("source_id"), + package_id=proposed.get("package_id"), + bind_registration_identity=proposed_kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + ) + if locator is not None and ( + locator.filename != entry.get("filename") + or ( + entry.get("sha256") is not None + and locator.sha256 != entry["sha256"] + ) + ): + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{path} entry {proposed_year!r}: recorded_r2_identity_mismatch" + ) + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree(manifests) + + for owner in owners: + if owner.manifest_path == manifest_path and str(owner.vintage) == str(key): + continue + _assert_recorded_identity_holds_these_bytes( + owner.identity, + manifest_path=owner.manifest_path, + year=owner.vintage, + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_bucket=(new_r2 or {}).get("bucket") or default_r2_raw_bucket(), + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + rendered = { + path: yaml.safe_dump(manifests[str(path)], sort_keys=False, allow_unicode=True) + for path in changed_paths + } + if _preflight_only: + return + manifest_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + for path, text in sorted(rendered.items(), key=lambda item: str(item[0])): + path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8") + + +def _with_declared_kind(payload: dict[str, Any], kind: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return ``payload`` declaring ``kind``, placed after its identity keys.""" + if "kind" in payload: + payload["kind"] = kind + return payload + ordered: dict[str, Any] = {} + inserted = False + for field, value in payload.items(): + ordered[field] = value + if field == "package_id" and not inserted: + ordered["kind"] = kind + inserted = True + if not inserted: + ordered["kind"] = kind + return ordered + + +def _assert_no_hash_only_entry( + manifest: dict[str, Any], + manifest_path: Path, + filename: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse to fetch bytes over an existing hash-only registration. + + The write target is a path in the package directory, so the search spans + every vintage rather than the requested one: a licensed release registered + under one year must not be fetched into the tree under another. Names are + compared as resolved, case-folded bare filenames, so no alias of a + registered name -- ``./adult.tab``, ``ADULT.TAB`` -- slips past. + """ + wanted = filename_key(filename) + for key, _index, spec in iter_manifest_entries(manifest): + if not isinstance(spec, dict) or spec.get("filename") is None: + continue + if filename_key(spec.get("filename")) != wanted: + continue + declared = spec.get("access") + if declared is None: + # A release entry without an access class is reported by the + # strict manifest validation that follows; it is never read as + # public here. + continue + try: + access = normalize_access(declared) + except ManifestAccessError: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} registers {spec.get('filename')!r} for " + f"{key!r} with access={declared!r}, which is not one of " + f"{list(ACCESS_CLASSES)}. Its bytes must not enter a Chronicle " + "store until the registration is fixed." + ) from None + if is_hash_only(access): + requested = ( + f" (requested as {filename!r})" + if spec.get("filename") != filename + else "" + ) + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} registers {spec.get('filename')!r}{requested} " + f"for {key!r} as access={access!r}. Its bytes must not enter a " + "Chronicle store; keep the hash-only registration." + ) + + +def _upload_r2_object( + location: ArtifactStorageLocation, + local_path: Path, + *, + wrangler_command: str, +) -> ArtifactCommandResult: + content_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(local_path.name) + command = [ + *shlex.split(wrangler_command), + "r2", + "object", + "put", + f"{location.bucket}/{location.key}", + "--file", + str(local_path), + "--remote", + ] + if content_type: + command.extend(["--content-type", content_type]) + return _run_command(command) + + +def _legacy_raw_r2_key( + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: Any, + sha256: str, + filename: str, + resolved_prefix: str, + package_path: Path, +) -> str | None: + """Return the compatible pre-country raw key, when this route has one.""" + country = infer_r2_country(source_id=source_id, package_path=package_path) + prefix, separator, suffix = resolved_prefix.rpartition("/") + if country is None or not separator or suffix != country or not prefix: + return None + return posixpath.join( + prefix, + _clean_key_part(source_id), + _clean_key_part(package_id), + str(year), + sha256, + Path(filename).name, + ) + + +def _raw_r2_route_keys( + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: Any, + sha256: str, + filename: str, + resolved_prefix: str, + package_path: Path, +) -> set[str]: + """Return the exact current and pre-country keys for one declared route.""" + keys = { + build_r2_key( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=package_path, + ) + } + legacy = _legacy_raw_r2_key( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + resolved_prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=package_path, + ) + if legacy is not None: + keys.add(legacy) + return keys + + +def _entry_records_one_of_raw_routes( + spec: dict[str, Any], + *, + manifest_path: Path, + year: Any, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + route_keys: set[str], +) -> bool: + """Whether an entry witnesses one exact canonical or legacy route.""" + try: + recorded = _validated_recorded_r2( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError: + return False + return recorded is not None and recorded.key in route_keys + + +def _compatible_recorded_raw_keys( + *, + manifest_path: Path, + manifest: dict[str, Any] | None, + package_manifests: Mapping[str, dict[str, Any]] | None, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: Any, + sha256: str, + filename: str, + resolved_prefix: str, +) -> set[str]: + """Return exact raw routes established by current or package history. + + Besides the entry's current/pre-country route, two recorded legacy shapes + are evidence-backed: another public sibling owns the same bytes at its own + canonical route, or multiple nonnumeric table labels use the numeric + release year anchored by this manifest and its package ID. Merely sharing + a digest/name tail, or having one unrelated numeric anchor, is never enough. + """ + allowed = _raw_r2_route_keys( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + resolved_prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + + for owner_manifest_name, owner_manifest in (package_manifests or {}).items(): + owner_source_id = owner_manifest.get("source_id") + owner_package_id = owner_manifest.get("package_id") + if not isinstance(owner_source_id, str) or not owner_source_id.strip(): + continue + if not isinstance(owner_package_id, str) or not owner_package_id.strip(): + continue + owner_manifest_path = Path(owner_manifest_name) + for owner_year, _index, owner_spec in iter_manifest_entries(owner_manifest): + if not isinstance(owner_spec, dict): + continue + if is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(owner_spec)): + continue + if owner_spec.get("sha256") != sha256 or filename_key( + owner_spec.get("filename") + ) != filename_key(filename): + continue + try: + owner_routes = _raw_r2_route_keys( + source_id=owner_source_id, + package_id=owner_package_id, + year=owner_year, + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + resolved_prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=owner_manifest_path, + ) + except ValueError: + continue + if _entry_records_one_of_raw_routes( + owner_spec, + manifest_path=owner_manifest_path, + year=owner_year, + source_id=owner_source_id, + package_id=owner_package_id, + route_keys=owner_routes, + ): + allowed.update(owner_routes) + + year_text = str(year) + release_match = re.search(r"(?:^|[-_])(\d{4})$", package_id) + if manifest is None or year_text.isdecimal() or release_match is None: + return allowed + release_year = release_match.group(1) + labelled_peer_witnessed = False + for peer_year, _index, peer_spec in iter_manifest_entries(manifest): + peer_year_text = str(peer_year) + if ( + peer_year_text == year_text + or peer_year_text.isdecimal() + or not isinstance(peer_spec, dict) + or is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(peer_spec)) + ): + continue + peer_sha256 = peer_spec.get("sha256") + peer_filename = peer_spec.get("filename") + if not isinstance(peer_sha256, str) or not isinstance(peer_filename, str): + continue + if (peer_sha256, filename_key(peer_filename)) == ( + sha256, + filename_key(filename), + ): + continue + try: + peer_release_routes = _raw_r2_route_keys( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=release_year, + sha256=peer_sha256, + filename=peer_filename, + resolved_prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + except ValueError: + continue + if _entry_records_one_of_raw_routes( + peer_spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=peer_year, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + route_keys=peer_release_routes, + ): + labelled_peer_witnessed = True + break + if not labelled_peer_witnessed: + return allowed + + for anchor_year, _index, anchor_spec in iter_manifest_entries(manifest): + if str(anchor_year) != release_year or not isinstance(anchor_spec, dict): + continue + if is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(anchor_spec)): + continue + try: + anchor_routes = _raw_r2_route_keys( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=anchor_year, + sha256=str(anchor_spec.get("sha256") or ""), + filename=str(anchor_spec.get("filename") or ""), + resolved_prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + except ValueError: + continue + if not _entry_records_one_of_raw_routes( + anchor_spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=anchor_year, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + route_keys=anchor_routes, + ): + continue + allowed.update( + _raw_r2_route_keys( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=release_year, + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + resolved_prefix=resolved_prefix, + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + ) + break + return allowed + + +def _publish_raw_manifest_entry( + manifest_path: Path, + source_id: Any, + package_id: Any, + year: Any, + spec: Any, + *, + manifest: dict[str, Any] | None = None, + kind: str | None = None, + r2_bucket: str, + r2_prefix: str | None, + wrangler_command: str, + skip_hash_only: bool = False, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, + package_manifests: Mapping[str, dict[str, Any]] | None = None, + preflight_only: bool = False, + manifest_identity: dict[str, Any] | None = None, +) -> tuple[RawArtifactPublishEntry, dict[str, Any] | None]: + errors: list[str] = [] + reported_source_id = str(source_id) if source_id is not None else "" + reported_package_id = str(package_id) if package_id is not None else "" + artifact_path = manifest_path.parent + filename = "" + sha256_actual = None + size_bytes = None - return ( - RawArtifactPublishEntry( + def refuse(reason: str | None = None) -> tuple[RawArtifactPublishEntry, None]: + if reason is not None: + errors.append(reason) + return RawArtifactPublishEntry( + manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + source_id=reported_source_id, + package_id=reported_package_id, + year=str(year), + filename=filename, + local_path=str(artifact_path), + sha256=sha256_actual, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_location=None, + upload=None, + errors=tuple(errors), + ), None + + if isinstance(spec, ListSpecRejected): + return refuse("list_file_spec_requires_microdata_release_kind") + if not isinstance(spec, dict): + spec = {} + errors.append("malformed_file_spec") + filename = str(spec.get("filename") or "") + if filename and not is_bare_filename(filename): + return refuse(f"non_canonical_filename:{filename}") + if is_manifest_filename(filename): + return refuse(f"manifest_named_filename:{filename}") + kind = kind or safe_manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path)[0] + access = safe_entry_access(spec) + release = kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + try: + local_entry = matching_directory_entry(manifest_path.parent, filename) + except ValueError: + return refuse(f"duplicate_artifact_spellings:{filename}") + if is_hash_only(access): + hash_only_errors = list( + validate_file_entry( + spec, + kind=kind, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=local_entry is not None, + ) + ) + if not skip_hash_only: + hash_only_errors.insert(0, f"hash_only_access_refuses_bytes:{access}") + return RawArtifactPublishEntry( manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + source_id=reported_source_id, + package_id=reported_package_id, + year=str(year), + filename=filename, + local_path=str(local_entry or manifest_path.parent / filename), + sha256=spec.get("sha256"), + size_bytes=spec.get("size_bytes"), + r2_location=None, + upload=None, + errors=tuple(dict.fromkeys(hash_only_errors)), + skipped=f"{HASH_ONLY_SKIP_PREFIX}{access}", + ), None + if local_entry is not None and local_entry.name != filename: + return refuse(f"artifact_spelling_mismatch:{filename}:{local_entry.name}") + errors.extend( + validate_file_entry( + spec, + kind=kind, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=local_entry is not None, + ) + ) + if errors: + return refuse() + try: + recorded_object = _validated_recorded_r2( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, source_id=source_id, package_id=package_id, + bind_registration_identity=release, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as error: + return refuse(f"recorded_r2_locator_invalid:{error}") + # Recorded table objects retain their historical routes and declarations. + # Validate uncoerced values before constructing any new publication key. + if recorded_object is None: + try: + _require_identity_segment(source_id, what="source_id") + _require_identity_segment(package_id, what="package_id") + _require_identity_segment(str(year), what="year") + _assert_manifest_identifies( + manifest_identity or manifest or {}, + manifest_path, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + ) + resolved_r2_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( + prefix=r2_prefix, + default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_PREFIX, + source_id=source_id, + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + except (SourceArtifactManifestError, ValueError) as error: + return refuse(f"r2_identity_invalid:{error}") + sha256_expected = spec.get("sha256") + if recorded_object is not None and not release: + # A standard raw route still states its publisher and country. Keep + # numeric historical package/vintage routes and opaque archived paths, + # while requiring evidence for remapping semantic table labels. + segments = recorded_object.key.split("/") + if segments[0] == "raw" and len(segments) in (6, 7): + recorded_source, _recorded_package, recorded_year = segments[-5:-2] + country = segments[1] if len(segments) == 7 else None + declared_source = str(source_id) if source_id is not None else "" + expected_country = infer_r2_country( + source_id=declared_source, package_path=manifest_path + ) + matching_publisher = ( + recorded_source == _clean_key_part(declared_source) + if declared_source.strip() + else True + ) + # Some archived manifests used source_id for the table's package + # identity and omitted package_id. Their publisher directory and + # recorded package establish the older source/package split. + if ( + not matching_publisher + and package_id is None + and _recorded_package == declared_source + ): + path_parts = manifest_path.parts + for index in range(len(path_parts) - 3, -1, -1): + if path_parts[index : index + 2] == ("db", "data"): + matching_publisher = path_parts[index + 2] == recorded_source + break + if path_parts[index] == "packages": + matching_publisher = path_parts[index + 1] == recorded_source + break + matching_country = country is None or country == expected_country + compatible_route = matching_publisher and matching_country + if compatible_route and not str(year).isdecimal(): + try: + historical_prefix = resolve_r2_prefix( + prefix=r2_prefix, + default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_PREFIX, + source_id=declared_source, + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + compatible_route = ( + recorded_object.key + in _compatible_recorded_raw_keys( + manifest_path=manifest_path, + manifest=manifest, + package_manifests=package_manifests, + source_id=declared_source, + package_id=str(package_id or ""), + year=year, + sha256=recorded_object.sha256, + filename=filename, + resolved_prefix=historical_prefix, + ) + ) + except ValueError: + compatible_route = False + elif compatible_route: + compatible_route = recorded_year.isdecimal() + if not compatible_route: + return refuse( + "recorded_r2_key_disagrees_with_country_prefix:" + f"recorded={recorded_object.key}" + ) + if release and filename and sha256_expected: + try: + artifact_path = _validated_microdata_staging_destination( + microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging_dir, + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=str(sha256_expected), + filename=filename, + ), + package_dir=manifest_path.parent, + ) + except ManifestAccessError as error: + return refuse(f"unsafe_microdata_staging:{error}") + else: + artifact_path = local_entry or manifest_path.parent / filename + if not filename: + return refuse("missing_filename") + if artifact_path.is_symlink(): + return refuse(f"artifact_path_is_symlink:{filename}") + if not artifact_path.is_file(): + return refuse("staged_bytes_missing" if release else "missing_file") + content = artifact_path.read_bytes() + sha256_actual = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + size_bytes = len(content) + if sha256_expected and sha256_actual != sha256_expected: + errors.append("checksum_mismatch") + if package_manifests is not None: + try: + _assert_no_hash_only_bytes( + package_manifests, + sha256=sha256_actual, + filename=filename, + what="the local artifact's bytes", + ) + except ManifestAccessError: + errors.append(f"sha256_collision_across_manifests:{sha256_actual}") + if recorded_object is not None and ( + recorded_object.sha256 != sha256_actual or recorded_object.filename != filename + ): + errors.append( + "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch:" + f"recorded_sha256={recorded_object.sha256}:" + f"recorded_filename={recorded_object.filename}:" + f"local_sha256={sha256_actual}:local_filename={filename}" + ) + if errors: + return refuse() + if recorded_object is not None: + skipped = "recorded_r2_already_published" + if recorded_object.bucket != r2_bucket: + skipped = ( + "recorded_r2_bucket_is_preserved_history:" + f"recorded={recorded_object.bucket}:requested={r2_bucket}" + ) + return RawArtifactPublishEntry( + manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + source_id=reported_source_id, + package_id=reported_package_id, year=str(year), filename=filename, local_path=str(artifact_path), sha256=sha256_actual, size_bytes=size_bytes, - r2_location=location if upload.ok else None, - upload=upload, - errors=tuple(errors), + r2_location=ArtifactStorageLocation( + provider="r2", + bucket=recorded_object.bucket, + key=recorded_object.key, + ), + upload=None, + errors=(), + skipped=skipped, + ), None + location = ArtifactStorageLocation( + provider="r2", + bucket=r2_bucket, + key=build_r2_key( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + sha256=sha256_actual, + filename=filename, + prefix=resolved_r2_prefix, + package_path=manifest_path, ), - updated_spec, ) + if preflight_only: + return RawArtifactPublishEntry( + manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + source_id=reported_source_id, + package_id=reported_package_id, + year=str(year), + filename=filename, + local_path=str(artifact_path), + sha256=sha256_actual, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_location=location, + upload=None, + errors=(), + ), None + upload = _upload_r2_object( + location, artifact_path, wrangler_command=wrangler_command + ) + updated_spec = None + if upload.ok: + updated_spec = { + "sha256": sha256_actual, + "size_bytes": size_bytes, + "storage": { + **( + spec.get("storage") if isinstance(spec.get("storage"), dict) else {} + ), + "r2": location.to_dict(), + }, + } + else: + errors.append("r2_upload_failed") + return RawArtifactPublishEntry( + manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + source_id=reported_source_id, + package_id=reported_package_id, + year=str(year), + filename=filename, + local_path=str(artifact_path), + sha256=sha256_actual, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + r2_location=location if upload.ok else None, + upload=upload, + errors=tuple(errors), + ), updated_spec def _inventory_entry( manifest_path: Path, year: Any, spec: Any, + *, + manifest: dict[str, Any] | None = None, + kind: str | None = None, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, + inspect_bytes: bool = True, ) -> ArtifactInventoryEntry: errors: list[str] = [] + original_spec = spec + if isinstance(spec, ListSpecRejected): + return ArtifactInventoryEntry( + manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + year=str(year), + filename="", + local_path=str(manifest_path.parent), + exists=False, + sha256_expected=None, + sha256_actual=None, + size_bytes=None, + source_url=None, + r2=None, + errors=("list_file_spec_requires_microdata_release_kind",), + ) if not isinstance(spec, dict): spec = {} errors.append("malformed_file_spec") filename = str(spec.get("filename") or "") - artifact_path = manifest_path.parent / filename - exists = bool(filename) and artifact_path.exists() + kind = kind or safe_manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path)[0] + bare = bool(filename) and is_bare_filename(filename) + local_entry = None + if bare: + try: + local_entry = matching_directory_entry(manifest_path.parent, filename) + if local_entry is not None and local_entry.name != filename: + errors.append( + f"artifact_spelling_mismatch:{filename}:{local_entry.name}" + ) + except ValueError: + errors.append(f"duplicate_artifact_spellings:{filename}") + in_tree = local_entry is not None + access = safe_entry_access(spec) + hash_only = is_hash_only(access) + release = kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + errors.extend( + validate_file_entry( + original_spec, + kind=kind, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=in_tree, + ) + ) + if is_manifest_filename(filename): + errors.append(f"manifest_named_filename:{filename}") sha256_expected = spec.get("sha256") + validated_r2 = None + try: + validated_r2 = _validated_recorded_r2( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=year, + source_id=(manifest or {}).get("source_id"), + package_id=(manifest or {}).get("package_id"), + bind_registration_identity=release, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as error: + errors.append(f"recorded_r2_locator_invalid:{error}") + if validated_r2 is not None and ( + validated_r2.filename != filename + or (sha256_expected is not None and validated_r2.sha256 != sha256_expected) + ): + errors.append( + "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch:" + f"recorded_sha256={validated_r2.sha256}:" + f"recorded_filename={validated_r2.filename}:" + f"declared_sha256={sha256_expected}:declared_filename={filename}" + if release + else "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch" + ) + validated_r2 = None + if release and not hash_only and validated_r2 is None: + errors.append("r2_object_not_recorded") + if release and not hash_only and bare and sha256_expected: + artifact_path = microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging_dir, + source_id=str((manifest or {}).get("source_id") or ""), + package_id=str((manifest or {}).get("package_id") or ""), + year=year, + sha256=str(sha256_expected), + filename=filename, + ) + else: + artifact_path = local_entry or ( + manifest_path.parent / filename if bare else manifest_path.parent + ) + symlink = bare and artifact_path.is_symlink() + exists = bool(bare and not symlink and not errors and artifact_path.is_file()) sha256_actual = None - size_bytes = None + size_bytes = spec.get("size_bytes") if hash_only or release else None if not filename: errors.append("missing_filename") + elif not bare or hash_only: + pass + elif symlink: + errors.append(f"artifact_path_is_symlink:{filename}") + elif errors: + pass + elif release: + if validated_r2 is None: + errors.append("r2_object_not_recorded") + if exists and inspect_bytes and not errors: + content = artifact_path.read_bytes() + sha256_actual = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + size_bytes = len(content) + if sha256_expected and sha256_actual != sha256_expected: + errors.append("checksum_mismatch") elif not exists: errors.append("missing_file") - else: + elif inspect_bytes: content = artifact_path.read_bytes() sha256_actual = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() size_bytes = len(content) if sha256_expected and sha256_actual != sha256_expected: errors.append("checksum_mismatch") - storage = spec.get("storage") if isinstance(spec, dict) else None - r2 = storage.get("r2") if isinstance(storage, dict) else None + r2 = None + if validated_r2 is not None: + if sha256_actual is not None and sha256_actual != validated_r2.sha256: + errors.append("recorded_r2_identity_mismatch") + if not errors: + r2 = { + "provider": validated_r2.provider, + "bucket": validated_r2.bucket, + "key": validated_r2.key, + "uri": validated_r2.uri, + } return ArtifactInventoryEntry( manifest_path=str(manifest_path), year=str(year), @@ -1270,12 +3919,15 @@ def _inventory_entry( size_bytes=size_bytes, source_url=spec.get("source_url"), r2=r2, - errors=tuple(errors), + errors=tuple(dict.fromkeys(errors)), + access=access, + licence=spec.get("licence"), + hash_only=hash_only, ) def _derived_artifact_kind(artifact_name: str) -> str: - if artifact_name in {"ledger.db", "ledger.db"}: + if artifact_name in CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAMES: return "sqlite_database" if artifact_name.endswith(".jsonl"): return "jsonl" @@ -1316,3 +3968,645 @@ def _clean_relative_key_parts(value: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: if not parts or any(part == ".." for part in parts): raise ValueError("R2 artifact paths cannot be empty or contain '..'.") return parts + + +def _require_regular_manifest_file(path: Path) -> None: + """Refuse a manifest-named entry that is not a regular, non-symlink file. + + ``is_file`` follows symlinks, so a dangling symlink, a symlink to a + directory, or any other non-regular entry would silently vanish from a + sweep and from sibling-registry checks; a registry entry that cannot be + read as a manifest is a defect to surface, never to skip. + """ + if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file(): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{path} carries a manifest name but is not a regular file; " + "Chronicle will not sweep past it or register beside it." + ) + + +def default_r2_derived_prefix() -> str: + """Resolve the derived route shared by publication and fact refusals.""" + return env_value("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", default=DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX) + + +def is_derived_r2_route(bucket: str, key: str) -> bool: + """Whether an R2 bucket/key pair addresses derived build output. + + Resolve publication configuration at validation time: an operator may use + a bucket or prefix with no ``derived`` marker in its spelling. Archived + rename-window routes remain derived after the active destination changes. + """ + derived_buckets = { + "ledger-derived", + "chronicle-derived", + DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, + default_r2_derived_bucket(), + } + derived_prefixes = { + "derived", + resolve_r2_prefix( + prefix=None, + default_prefix=DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX, + ), + resolve_r2_prefix( + prefix=None, + default_prefix=default_r2_derived_prefix(), + ), + } + # Configured routes extend the boundary; they never narrow it. A bucket + # ending in ``-derived`` (any case) or a ``derived/`` key was derived + # before routes became configurable, and archived facts still cite such + # routes, so the legacy spelling rule stays alongside the configured set. + return ( + bucket in derived_buckets + or bucket.casefold().endswith("-derived") + or any( + key == prefix or key.startswith(f"{prefix}/") for prefix in derived_prefixes + ) + ) + + +class IdentitySegmentError(SourceArtifactManifestError, ValueError): + """A registration identity (source_id / package_id) is not one canonical + R2 key segment.""" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class _ManifestFileOwner: + """One manifest entry that names a package-local artifact.""" + + manifest_path: Path + vintage: Any + spec: dict[str, Any] + identity: RecordedIdentity | None + + +def _derived_artifact_paths(input_path: Path) -> list[Path]: + """Preflight every build-tree entry before reading or publishing any file.""" + if not stat.S_ISDIR(input_path.lstat().st_mode): + raise ValueError(f"derived_root_not_regular_directory:{input_path}") + artifacts: list[Path] = [] + + def visit(directory: Path) -> None: + for path in sorted(directory.iterdir()): + mode = path.lstat().st_mode + if stat.S_ISDIR(mode): + visit(path) + elif stat.S_ISREG(mode): + artifacts.append(path) + else: + raise ValueError(f"derived_entry_not_regular_file:{path}") + + visit(input_path) + return sorted(artifacts) + + +def _manifest_file_owners( + manifests: Mapping[str, dict[str, Any]], + *, + filename: str, + initializing: tuple[Path, Any] | None = None, +) -> list[_ManifestFileOwner]: + """Return every entry in a package directory that names ``filename``. + + ``initializing`` names the ``(manifest_path, vintage)`` entry the calling + command is about to identify -- a predeclared entry (``filename`` and + ``source_url`` only) on its first fetch. That entry has no identity yet + and is not an owner; every other entry naming the file must already + record one, because Chronicle cannot tell whether overwriting the shared + bytes would change what an unidentified sibling means. + """ + wanted = filename_key(filename) + owners: list[_ManifestFileOwner] = [] + for name, payload in manifests.items(): + manifest_path = Path(name) + if ( + safe_manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=manifest_path)[0] + == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + ): + # Release vintages use distinct content-addressed staging paths. + # Only publisher tables share a package-local artifact to rewrite. + continue + for vintage, _index, spec in iter_manifest_entries(payload): + if not isinstance(spec, dict): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {vintage!r} must be a mapping; it " + f"is a {type(spec).__name__}. Chronicle cannot decide " + "whether it owns a shared package-local file." + ) + recorded_name = spec.get("filename") + if recorded_name is None: + continue + if not is_bare_filename(recorded_name): + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {vintage!r} filename must be a " + f"bare package-local name, not {recorded_name!r}." + ) + if filename_key(recorded_name) != wanted: + continue + identity = _recorded_identity( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=vintage, + ) + if identity is None: + if ( + initializing is not None + and manifest_path == initializing[0] + and str(vintage) == str(initializing[1]) + ): + # The entry this command identifies: not an owner yet. + continue + raise MalformedManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {vintage!r} names " + f"{recorded_name!r} but records no sha256 identity. " + "Chronicle cannot safely overwrite an unidentifiable " + "shared file." + ) + owners.append( + _ManifestFileOwner( + manifest_path=manifest_path, + vintage=vintage, + spec=spec, + identity=identity, + ) + ) + return owners + + +def _assert_shared_owner_identities_agree( + owners: list[_ManifestFileOwner], + *, + filename: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse an already-contradictory set of owners before publisher I/O.""" + if not owners: + return + first = owners[0] + first_identity = first.identity + assert first_identity is not None + for owner in owners[1:]: + identity = owner.identity + assert identity is not None + if identity.sha256 == first_identity.sha256 and filename_key( + identity.filename + ) == filename_key(first_identity.filename): + continue + raise SourceArtifactManifestError( + f"{first.manifest_path} entry {first.vintage!r} and " + f"{owner.manifest_path} entry {owner.vintage!r} both name " + f"{filename!r} but identify different bytes. One package-local " + "file must have one recorded identity; reconcile the manifests " + "before fetching it again." + ) + + +def _effective_recorded_digest( + manifest_name: str, vintage: Any, entry: Mapping[str, Any] +) -> str | None: + """Return the digest an entry's recorded R2 key encodes, if it has one. + + Two manifests may identify one package-local file through identical + content-addressed R2 locators without declaring ``sha256``; refetching + those bytes records ``sha256`` on the selected manifest only. The + directory-level collision check must compare the identities the entries + *effectively* record -- the same identity :func:`_recorded_identity` + resolves -- so a sibling that only carries the locator does not read as + an empty digest. A malformed locator is the per-entry preflight's error, + not a collision: return None and let directory validation use the declared + field. + """ + try: + recorded = _validated_recorded_r2( + entry, manifest_path=Path(manifest_name), year=vintage + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError: + return None + return None if recorded is None else recorded.sha256 + + +def _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree( + manifests: Mapping[str, dict[str, Any]], + *, + observed_sha256: Mapping[str, str] | None = None, + check_local_files: bool = True, +) -> None: + """Refuse contradictory identities for any package-local filename. + + Publish and inventory sweep a manifest at a time, but the physical byte is + shared by every manifest in its directory. Validate every identified owner + as one package boundary before a selected manifest can upload anything. + Entry-shape and local-file errors remain the per-entry preflight's job. + + Resource readers supply observed digests by filename and disable local + filesystem reads: their bytes may come from ZIP resources, cache, or a + publisher response, and must agree before they are returned or cached. + """ + collision_codes = validate_package_directory( + manifests, entry_digest=_effective_recorded_digest + ) + if collision_codes: + raise SourceArtifactManifestError( + "Package manifests identify different bytes for one package-local " + f"filename: {', '.join(collision_codes)}. Reconcile the manifests " + "before publishing or inventorying that directory." + ) + + owners_by_filename: dict[str, list[_ManifestFileOwner]] = {} + display_names: dict[str, str] = {} + unidentified: dict[str, list[tuple[Path, Any, str]]] = {} + for name, payload in manifests.items(): + manifest_path = Path(name) + if ( + safe_manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=manifest_path)[0] + == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + ): + # Release vintages use distinct content-addressed staging paths. + # Only publisher tables share a package-local artifact to rewrite. + continue + for vintage, _index, spec in iter_manifest_entries(payload): + if not isinstance(spec, dict): + continue + recorded_name = spec.get("filename") + if not is_bare_filename(recorded_name): + continue + try: + identity = _recorded_identity( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=vintage, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError: + # The complete per-entry preflight reports the precise locator + # or history error without letting another entry upload first. + continue + key = filename_key(recorded_name) + display_names.setdefault(key, str(recorded_name)) + if identity is None: + unidentified.setdefault(key, []).append( + (manifest_path, vintage, str(recorded_name)) + ) + continue + owners_by_filename.setdefault(key, []).append( + _ManifestFileOwner( + manifest_path=manifest_path, + vintage=vintage, + spec=spec, + identity=identity, + ) + ) + for key, owners in owners_by_filename.items(): + _assert_shared_owner_identities_agree( + owners, + filename=display_names[key], + ) + # An entry that records no identity yet is not a collision (nothing to + # contradict), but the command that identifies it will hash the shared + # bytes. Those bytes must already be what the identified owners record, + # otherwise identifying it would split one package-local file into two + # identities. Check before any upload or manifest rewrite. + observed_by_filename = { + filename_key(name): digest for name, digest in (observed_sha256 or {}).items() + } + for key, pending in unidentified.items(): + owners = owners_by_filename.get(key) + if not owners: + continue + expected = owners[0].identity + assert expected is not None + for manifest_path, vintage, recorded_name in pending: + actual = observed_by_filename.get(key) + if actual is None: + if not check_local_files: + continue + try: + local = matching_directory_entry( + manifest_path.parent, recorded_name + ) + except ValueError: + # Conflicting spellings are the per-entry preflight's refusal. + continue + if local is None or local.is_symlink() or not local.is_file(): + continue + actual = hashlib.sha256(local.read_bytes()).hexdigest() + if actual == expected.sha256: + continue + raise SourceArtifactManifestError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {vintage!r} names {recorded_name!r} " + f"without a recorded identity, and the package-local bytes " + f"(sha256={actual}) are not what {owners[0].manifest_path} entry " + f"{owners[0].vintage!r} records for it (sha256=" + f"{expected.sha256}). Identifying this entry would give one " + "package-local file two identities; reconcile the manifests " + "or the file before publishing or inventorying the directory." + ) + + +def _storage_for_fetched_identity( + recorded_spec: dict[str, Any], + *, + identity: RecordedIdentity | None, + filename: str, + sha256: str, + new_r2: dict[str, Any] | None, + fetched_at: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return one owner's storage after a refetch or explicit revision.""" + recorded_storage = _recorded_storage(recorded_spec) + holds = identity is not None and identity.holds( + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + ) + if holds and identity.r2 is not None: + # A same-byte copy does not replace the object's recorded history. + return {**recorded_storage, "r2": _recorded_r2(recorded_spec)} + if identity is not None and not holds: + return _superseding_storage( + recorded_spec, + recorded_r2=identity.r2, + new_r2=new_r2, + superseded_at=fetched_at, + ) + if new_r2 is not None: + return {**recorded_storage, "r2": new_r2} + return dict(recorded_storage) + + +def _require_identity_segment(value: Any, *, what: str) -> str: + """Require a registration identity to be one canonical key segment. + + ``_clean_key_part`` normalizes what it is given (strips, folds spaces to + underscores) because it also renders legacy recorded values; a NEW + registration identity must already be canonical, or two spellings such as + ``foo bar`` and ``foo_bar`` would collide in one R2 namespace and a + separator would shift the key's path shape. + """ + if ( + not isinstance(value, str) + or not value + or value in (".", "..") + or value != value.strip() + or any(character.isspace() for character in value) + or "/" in value + or "\\" in value + or _clean_key_part(value) != value + ): + raise IdentitySegmentError( + f"{what} must be one canonical R2 key segment (no whitespace, " + f"slashes, or '..'), not {value!r}; R2 key parts cannot be empty " + "or rewritten." + ) + return value + + +class ArtifactFilenameError( + SourceArtifactManifestError, RegistrationArtifactFilenameError +): + """An unsafe artifact destination, reported by both command contracts.""" + + +def bare_filename(value: Any, *, what: str = "filename") -> str: + """Validate an artifact name using the shared registration contract.""" + try: + return registration_bare_filename(value, what=what) + except RegistrationArtifactFilenameError as error: + raise ArtifactFilenameError(str(error)) from error + + +def _publish_source_artifacts_unlocked( + root: str | Path, + *, + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + source_id: str | None = None, + package_id: str | None = None, + r2_bucket: str | None = None, + r2_prefix: str | None = None, + wrangler_command: str = DEFAULT_WRANGLER_COMMAND, + skip_hash_only: bool = False, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, + _selected_manifest_path: Path | None = None, + _preflight_only: bool = False, +) -> RawArtifactPublishReport: + """Validate the full operation in memory before any publication mutation.""" + r2_bucket = r2_bucket or default_r2_raw_bucket() + root_path = Path(root) + _manifest_path(Path(), manifest_filename) + if not root_path.exists(): + return RawArtifactPublishReport( + root=str(root_path), + entries=(), + errors=(f"Root does not exist: {root_path}",), + ) + entries: list[RawArtifactPublishEntry] = [] + errors: list[str] = [] + prepared: list[tuple[Any, ...]] = [] + manifest_paths = ( + [_selected_manifest_path] + if _selected_manifest_path is not None + else _root_manifest_paths(root_path, manifest_filename) + ) + checked_entries: set[tuple[str, str, int]] = set() + for manifest_path in manifest_paths: + try: + manifest = _read_manifest(manifest_path) + files = _manifest_files(manifest, manifest_path) + package_manifests = _package_manifests( + manifest_path.parent, manifest_path, manifest + ) + except (OSError, SourceArtifactManifestError) as exc: + errors.append(f"Could not read {manifest_path}: {exc}") + continue + manifest_source_id = ( + source_id if source_id is not None else manifest.get("source_id") + ) + manifest_package_id = ( + package_id if package_id is not None else manifest.get("package_id") + ) + kind, _kind_error = safe_manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path) + structural_errors: list[str] = [] + entry_errors: list[str] = [] + selected_entry_errors: list[str] = [] + for package_name, package_manifest in package_manifests.items(): + package_path = Path(package_name) + package_kind, package_kind_error = safe_manifest_kind( + package_manifest, manifest_path=package_path + ) + if package_kind_error: + structural_errors.append(f"{package_kind_error}: {package_path}") + structural_errors.extend( + f"{code}: {package_path}" + for code in validate_manifest_files(package_manifest) + ) + package_entry_errors = _manifest_entry_validation_errors( + package_manifest, kind=package_kind, package_dir=package_path.parent + ) + entry_errors.extend( + f"{code}: {package_path}" for code in package_entry_errors + ) + if package_path == manifest_path: + selected_entry_errors = package_entry_errors + structural_errors.extend( + f"{code}: {manifest_path}" + for code in validate_package_directory( + package_manifests, entry_digest=_effective_recorded_digest + ) + ) + try: + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree(package_manifests) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + structural_errors.append(str(exc)) + if structural_errors or entry_errors: + errors.extend((*structural_errors, *entry_errors)) + if selected_entry_errors and ( + not structural_errors + or all( + code.startswith("non_canonical_filename:") + for code in structural_errors + ) + ): + for year, spec in files.items(): + for file_spec in iter_file_specs(spec, kind=kind): + name = ( + file_spec.get("filename") + if isinstance(file_spec, dict) + else None + ) + alias_error = False + try: + local_exists = ( + matching_directory_entry(manifest_path.parent, name) + is not None + ) + except ValueError: + local_exists = True + alias_error = True + if not alias_error and not validate_file_entry( + file_spec, + kind=kind, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=local_exists, + ): + continue + entry, _ = _publish_raw_manifest_entry( + manifest_path, + manifest_source_id, + manifest_package_id, + year, + file_spec, + manifest=manifest, + kind=kind, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + r2_prefix=r2_prefix, + wrangler_command=wrangler_command, + skip_hash_only=skip_hash_only, + staging_dir=staging_dir, + package_manifests=package_manifests, + preflight_only=True, + ) + entries.append(entry) + continue + # Explicit selectors still validate every public owner in the package. + # Unselected gated siblings require valid metadata, never byte access. + for package_name, package_manifest in package_manifests.items(): + package_path = Path(package_name) + package_kind, _ = safe_manifest_kind( + package_manifest, manifest_path=package_path + ) + # Preflight every selected manifest with the identity publication + # will use, even if it is first encountered as another's sibling. + # Unselected siblings retain their own identifiers. + package_source_id = ( + source_id + if source_id is not None and package_path in manifest_paths + else package_manifest.get("source_id") + ) + package_id_value = ( + package_id + if package_id is not None and package_path in manifest_paths + else package_manifest.get("package_id") + ) + for year, spec in _manifest_files(package_manifest, package_path).items(): + for index, file_spec in enumerate( + iter_file_specs(spec, kind=package_kind) + ): + check_key = (str(package_path), str(year), index) + is_selected = package_path in manifest_paths + if check_key in checked_entries: + continue + checked_entries.add(check_key) + entry, _ = _publish_raw_manifest_entry( + package_path, + package_source_id, + package_id_value, + year, + file_spec, + manifest=package_manifest, + kind=package_kind, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + r2_prefix=r2_prefix, + wrangler_command=wrangler_command, + skip_hash_only=skip_hash_only or not is_selected, + staging_dir=staging_dir, + package_manifests=package_manifests, + preflight_only=True, + ) + if entry.errors or (is_selected and _preflight_only): + entries.append(entry) + prepared.append( + ( + manifest_path, + manifest, + files, + kind, + manifest_source_id, + manifest_package_id, + package_manifests, + ) + ) + if errors or any(entry.errors for entry in entries) or _preflight_only: + return RawArtifactPublishReport( + root=str(root_path), entries=tuple(entries), errors=tuple(errors) + ) + for ( + manifest_path, + manifest, + files, + kind, + manifest_source_id, + manifest_package_id, + package_manifests, + ) in prepared: + updated = False + for year, spec in files.items(): + for file_spec in iter_file_specs(spec, kind=kind): + entry, updated_spec = _publish_raw_manifest_entry( + manifest_path, + manifest_source_id, + manifest_package_id, + year, + file_spec, + manifest=manifest, + kind=kind, + r2_bucket=r2_bucket, + r2_prefix=r2_prefix, + wrangler_command=wrangler_command, + skip_hash_only=skip_hash_only, + staging_dir=staging_dir, + package_manifests=package_manifests, + ) + entries.append(entry) + if updated_spec is not None and isinstance(file_spec, dict): + file_spec.update(updated_spec) + updated = True + if updated: + if manifest_source_id: + manifest.setdefault("source_id", manifest_source_id) + if manifest_package_id: + manifest.setdefault("package_id", manifest_package_id) + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False), encoding="utf-8" + ) + return RawArtifactPublishReport( + root=str(root_path), entries=tuple(entries), errors=tuple(errors) + ) diff --git a/chronicle/cli.py b/chronicle/cli.py index b9098d7f..bf032e5f 100644 --- a/chronicle/cli.py +++ b/chronicle/cli.py @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ def main() -> None: ["plan-pe-sources"], ["publish-derived"], ["publish-raw"], + ["register-artifact"], ["scaffold-package"], ["validate-concept-alignments"], ["validate-package"], diff --git a/chronicle/consumer_contract.py b/chronicle/consumer_contract.py index a1c78325..a98256d8 100644 --- a/chronicle/consumer_contract.py +++ b/chronicle/consumer_contract.py @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from pathlib import Path from typing import Any +from chronicle import artifacts from chronicle.core import ( ALLOWED_PROVENANCE_CLASSES, DEFAULT_ASSERTION, @@ -468,6 +469,33 @@ def validate_consumer_fact_contract( ) +def _r2_uri_parts(uri: str) -> tuple[str, str]: + """Split an ``r2://bucket/key`` URI into its bucket and key.""" + if uri[: len("r2://")].lower() != "r2://": + return "", "" + bucket, _, key = uri[len("r2://") :].partition("/") + return bucket, key + + +# The marker a downstream target row carries in its source_record_id. It moves +# with the rename window: producers write `ledger_derived` today and +# `chronicle_derived` once they migrate (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism +# 3), so the boundary has to reject both spellings identically or the guard +# stops firing the moment a producer renames. +DERIVED_SOURCE_RECORD_SUFFIXES = frozenset({"ledger_derived", "chronicle_derived"}) + + +def _is_derived_source_record_id(source_record_id: str) -> bool: + """Whether a source_record_id marks a downstream derived target row.""" + _, separator, suffix = source_record_id.rpartition(".") + return bool(separator) and suffix in DERIVED_SOURCE_RECORD_SUFFIXES + + +def _points_at_derived(bucket: str, key: str) -> bool: + """Use the same derived routes publication is permitted to address.""" + return artifacts.is_derived_r2_route(bucket, key) + + def _derived_source_provenance_issue(fact: AggregateFact) -> str | None: """Return a boundary error if a fact is a downstream target derivation.""" source = fact.source @@ -489,26 +517,29 @@ def _derived_source_provenance_issue(fact: AggregateFact) -> str | None: "itself. Target construction, aging, and reconciliation belong in " "Microcosm." ) - if source_file.startswith("ledger-derived:"): + if source_file[: len("r2://")].lower() == "r2://": + source_file_bucket, source_file_key = _r2_uri_parts(source_file) + else: + source_file_bucket, bucket_separator, source_file_key = source_file.partition( + ":" + ) + if not bucket_separator: + source_file_bucket = source_file_key = "" + if _points_at_derived(source_file_bucket, source_file_key): return ( "Chronicle consumer facts must cite raw publisher artifacts. Derived " "target-construction artifacts belong in Microcosm." ) if ( - raw_r2_bucket.endswith("-derived") - or raw_r2_key.startswith("derived/") - or raw_r2_uri.startswith( - ( - "r2://ledger-derived/", - "r2://ledger-raw/derived/", - ) - ) + _points_at_derived(raw_r2_bucket, raw_r2_key) + or _points_at_derived(*_r2_uri_parts(raw_r2_uri)) + or _points_at_derived(*_r2_uri_parts(source.url or "")) ): return ( "Chronicle consumer facts must point at raw source artifacts, not " "derived build artifacts." ) - if source_record_id.endswith(".ledger_derived"): + if _is_derived_source_record_id(source_record_id): return ( "Chronicle source_record_id must identify a publisher-backed row, not " "a downstream derived target row." diff --git a/chronicle/database.py b/chronicle/database.py index 3f18ef78..5297db16 100644 --- a/chronicle/database.py +++ b/chronicle/database.py @@ -42,6 +42,15 @@ LEDGER_DB_SCHEMA_VERSION = schema_id("relational", Epoch.LEDGER) +# New suite outputs write chronicle.db. Existing builds wrote ledger.db and are +# still read and published unchanged, so the legacy name stays accepted for +# inference and artifact classification (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, +# mechanism 3). The relational schema id above is a frozen machine surface that +# migrates with the epoch lane, not with this rename. +CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME = "chronicle.db" +LEGACY_CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME = "ledger.db" +CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAMES = (CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME, LEGACY_CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME) + @dataclass(frozen=True) class ChronicleDbBuildReport: diff --git a/chronicle/env.py b/chronicle/env.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d4bbbad --- /dev/null +++ b/chronicle/env.py @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +"""Environment configuration for the Chronicle rename window. + +Chronicle's operational stores migrate by dual-run (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, +mechanism 3): every configuration variable gets a ``CHRONICLE_``-prefixed name +that is read first, while the ledger-era ``LEDGER_`` and +``POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_`` names keep working behind a deprecation warning. That +window lets downstream publish flows migrate on their own schedule instead of +breaking the moment Chronicle ships a rename. + +Names that carry none of those three prefixes are read literally: this helper +renames the ledger-era surface, not every PolicyEngine variable. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +from typing import TypeVar +import warnings + +__all__ = [ + "CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX", + "CHRONICLE_SCHEMA_ENV", + "ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning", + "DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", + "LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES", + "default_chronicle_schema", + "env_flag", + "env_names", + "env_value", + "reset_env_deprecation_state", +] + +CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX = "CHRONICLE_" + +# Ordered most specific first so prefix stripping is unambiguous. +LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES = ("POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_", "LEDGER_") + +TRUTHY_ENV_VALUES = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"}) + +CHRONICLE_SCHEMA_ENV = "CHRONICLE_SCHEMA" + +# The hosted Postgres schema is still named "ledger". Renaming the schema value +# is a later slice of PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, coordinated with the CI +# writers that already target it; only the variable that overrides the name has +# moved to the chronicle prefix. +DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA = "ledger" + + +class ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning(FutureWarning): + """A ledger-era environment variable supplied a Chronicle setting. + + Subclasses :class:`FutureWarning` rather than :class:`DeprecationWarning` + so the notice reaches operators running the CLI, who are the people who + have to move the variable. ``DeprecationWarning`` is silenced by default + outside ``__main__``. + """ + + +_Default = TypeVar("_Default") + +_WARNED_LEGACY_NAMES: set[str] = set() + + +def _env_suffix(name: str) -> str | None: + """Return the rename-window suffix of ``name``, or None if it has none.""" + for prefix in (CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX, *LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES): + if name.startswith(prefix) and len(name) > len(prefix): + return name[len(prefix) :] + return None + + +def env_names(name: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Return the lookup order for ``name``. + + The chronicle-preferred name comes first, then the ledger-era names that + remain accepted during the migration window. A name outside the rename + window is returned unchanged, as its own single-element lookup order. + """ + suffix = _env_suffix(name) + if suffix is None: + return (name,) + return ( + f"{CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX}{suffix}", + *(f"{prefix}{suffix}" for prefix in LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES), + ) + + +def _warn_legacy(found: str, preferred: str) -> None: + """Warn once per process that a ledger-era variable supplied a value. + + ``stacklevel=4`` walks out through :func:`_first_set` and its public + wrapper so the notice points at the code that asked for the setting. + """ + if found in _WARNED_LEGACY_NAMES: + return + _WARNED_LEGACY_NAMES.add(found) + warnings.warn( + f"{found} is a ledger-era Chronicle environment variable; " + f"set {preferred} instead. The old name is still honored during the " + "Chronicle rename window and will be removed once consumers migrate.", + ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning, + stacklevel=4, + ) + + +def reset_env_deprecation_state() -> None: + """Forget which legacy names have already warned. Test-support hook.""" + _WARNED_LEGACY_NAMES.clear() + + +def _first_set(names: tuple[str, ...]) -> str | None: + """Return the first set value across ``names``, warning on a legacy hit. + + Both public readers call this at the same stack depth so the deprecation + warning is always attributed to their caller, not to this module. + """ + for name in names: + candidates = env_names(name) + preferred = candidates[0] + for candidate in candidates: + value = os.environ.get(candidate) + if value: + if candidate != preferred: + _warn_legacy(candidate, preferred) + return value + return None + + +def env_value(*names: str, default: _Default = None) -> str | _Default: + """Read the first set value across ``names``, chronicle-preferred first. + + Each name is expanded through :func:`env_names`, so a caller can pass the + chronicle name and still pick up a value set under a ledger-era name. + Empty values are treated as unset, matching the helpers this replaces. + """ + value = _first_set(names) + return default if value is None else value + + +def default_chronicle_schema() -> str: + """Resolve the Chronicle schema: ``$CHRONICLE_SCHEMA``, else the default. + + Every reader of the setting goes through this function so the lookup ladder + and the default have one home. It resolves at call time rather than at + import: a module-level constant binds whatever the shell held when the + module was first imported, which for a library means an arbitrary moment + the caller cannot control, and for the test suite means collection. + """ + return env_value(CHRONICLE_SCHEMA_ENV, default=DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA) + + +def env_flag(*names: str) -> bool: + """Return whether the first set value across ``names`` reads as true. + + The chronicle-preferred name wins even when it reads false, so an operator + who has migrated can turn a flag off without unsetting the legacy name. + """ + value = _first_set(names) + if value is None: + return False + return value.strip().lower() in TRUTHY_ENV_VALUES diff --git a/chronicle/grandfathered_manifests.py b/chronicle/grandfathered_manifests.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a6dcc5d --- /dev/null +++ b/chronicle/grandfathered_manifests.py @@ -0,0 +1,578 @@ +"""Manifests that predate the explicit-kind rule, frozen at their pre-rule bytes. + +Every manifest created or modified after ``docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata- +identity.md`` declares ``kind``: ``publisher_table`` or ``microdata_release``. +The manifests listed here existed before that rule and declare none. They read +as ``publisher_table`` only while their bytes still match the digest frozen +here: a grandfathered manifest that is modified in any way -- by +``fetch-artifact``, which always writes ``kind``, or by hand -- leaves the +freeze and must declare its kind. A kindless manifest that is not on this list +is an error, never a publisher table by default. + +The pre-rule snapshot is the rebased parent ``ba8147a7``: its 168 kindless +publisher manifests are frozen using their exact Git blob bytes. This includes +upstream publisher packages inherited when the explicit-kind rule was rebased. +After that snapshot, entries are removed once a manifest declares its kind, +and never added. ``tests/test_chronicle_manifest_kind.py`` checks that every +kindless manifest in the tree is listed here with its frozen digest, so a new +kindless manifest cannot land. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +from collections.abc import Mapping +from pathlib import PurePosixPath +from types import MappingProxyType +from typing import Any + +__all__ = [ + "GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS", + "grandfathered_manifest_key", + "is_grandfathered_manifest", + "manifest_digest", +] + +#: Repository-relative manifest path -> SHA-256 of the manifest bytes at the +#: freeze. +GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS: Mapping[str, str] = MappingProxyType( + { + "db/data/bea/nipa_total_wages_salaries/manifest.yaml": ( + "765f391487a698506647a2bb60823f6742046abae0b8bed62874c6f98bd50d93" + ), + "db/data/bea/regional_personal_income_state/manifest.yaml": ( + "a1283e1ccc574fbeb9710abd409d41c4b735b75c674a34bcc58e6df755278e56" + ), + "db/data/bfp/economic_outlook_2026_06/manifest.yaml": ( + "0a46d70e52cb8ea3a51af5e104e378e257ee1bc8e7c03aabf5a2286b09024e7c" + ), + "db/data/cbo/individual_income_tax_receipts_2026_02/manifest.yaml": ( + "c24431df9284fef70334e51b0d9eaa03a47553f777de0f78d6430db6d7e79954" + ), + "db/data/cbo/revenue_projections_income_by_source_2026_02/manifest.yaml": ( + "acbd1ff5577b638cea9dcbceba6a3fce7911169ffce661410b4e72adcc0d5b76" + ), + "db/data/census/acs_s0101_district_2024/manifest.yaml": ( + "41f1df4f9e5377993ef8bc6be27f26a690d6d9bee2bb73a4c0b5212bd9e9fdb1" + ), + "db/data/census/acs_s0101_national_2024/manifest.yaml": ( + "a5bce23e75ec58ca86247a52ac03ff793924a66513b1c8f04cec45da001e1037" + ), + "db/data/census/acs_s0101_state_2024/manifest.yaml": ( + "d38f64b5ad62b05ed6c3e3c6b4d803f03a4543611d0a5f9bb4459f17785713e7" + ), + 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"db/data/statbel/fiscal_income_distribution_2023/manifest.yaml": ( + "612a5debce569635dfabc7df48747c938388ad4e624f32eb02de6f2b0d7ac1e5" + ), + "db/data/statbel/nis_2025_commune_crosswalk/manifest.yaml": ( + "d38cc3252396c9f343b5acca1f1537d8b128a05d8c6acb4846e49a25ae680cef" + ), + "db/data/statbel/population_structure_nuts1_2025/manifest.yaml": ( + "1ee3c24db3c24feb887225ef7565a3e8443d53666fbcbf8328fae57c902cb8fb" + ), + "db/data/statbel/population_structure_nuts1_2026/manifest.yaml": ( + "e21a51518842e591c535145bbbe8e6e2ff7cb33fa53513d8d17a1443a405139a" + ), + "db/data/usda_snap/fy69_to_current/manifest.yaml": ( + "e735895977bfb23c2a2a7d36b4b255be4fcd7b2712b06468de7d936dcf841830" + ), + "db/data/usda_snap/fy69_to_current/manifest_fy2025_monthly_source_package.yaml": ( + "ed366f4d02e86356abce8c30ee54b341154b48deb615819c5e71e538df3851c8" + ), + "db/data/voa/council_tax_bands_2025/manifest.yaml": ( + "1e5d497ad917eb0c0c17003d915eb37b1a8def303c065378e785e59afbaf3ca4" + ), + "db/data/voa/council_tax_stock_by_lad_2025/manifest.yaml": ( + "4b2da68c429bb75ea915f753dc8c66d401d9858a92f4cdd403a9107cc3ececfd" + ), + "db/data/welshgov/council_tax_collection_2024_25/manifest.yaml": ( + "2b6bee77282acc6bee952161d432684e0fde6f66a4dd4d59e0fe8aa8d964fcff" + ), + "db/data/welshgov/council_tax_collection_2025_26/manifest.yaml": ( + "769dd2f8f7178f4df2290316eb2034ffbdb4850fc25e71b4ebf5c319d8be94d2" + ), + "db/data/welshgov/council_tax_levels_2026_27/manifest.yaml": ( + "36021ed92e559233d7442685df4e04331b11fd320fe13f40ac9b1e9afc0f2850" + ), + "db/data/welshgov/ctrs_annual_report_2024_25/manifest.yaml": ( + "e3836e875eaf9656e296e66e7017086161a3f76303697ff0d132640bd99dfd70" + ), + "db/data/welshgov/ctrs_annual_report_2025_26/manifest.yaml": ( + "dcbcd60d7ff2775827205dcbde03a3479cc8c53f030dc1943b9a2ba5e9609455" + ), + } +) + + +def manifest_digest(manifest_path: Any) -> str: + """Return the SHA-256 of a manifest file's bytes.""" + return hashlib.sha256(manifest_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() + + +def grandfathered_manifest_key(manifest_path: Any) -> str | None: + """Return the frozen-list key ``manifest_path`` addresses, if any. + + Manifests are addressed by their repository-relative path, so the lookup + matches the longest trailing run of path segments that is a key. A path + outside the repository can only match by carrying the same segments, and + then only counts once its bytes match too. + """ + parts = PurePosixPath(str(manifest_path).replace("\\", "/")).parts + for start in range(len(parts)): + candidate = "/".join(parts[start:]) + if candidate in GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS: + return candidate + return None + + +def is_grandfathered_manifest(manifest_path: Any) -> bool: + """Whether the file at ``manifest_path`` is frozen kindless, byte for byte.""" + key = grandfathered_manifest_key(manifest_path) + if key is None: + return False + try: + digest = manifest_digest(manifest_path) + except (OSError, AttributeError): + return False + return digest == GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS[key] diff --git a/chronicle/harness.py b/chronicle/harness.py index 298a1380..da0445fd 100644 --- a/chronicle/harness.py +++ b/chronicle/harness.py @@ -5,14 +5,19 @@ import argparse import json import shlex +import sys from pathlib import Path from chronicle.artifacts import ( + DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, + DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET, ArtifactFetchReport, ArtifactInventoryReport, DerivedArtifactPublishReport, R2BootstrapReport, RawArtifactPublishReport, + SourceArtifactManifestError, bootstrap_r2_buckets, fetch_source_artifact, inventory_source_artifacts, @@ -33,6 +38,7 @@ ) from chronicle.core import AggregateFact, ValidationReport, validate_facts from chronicle.database import ChronicleDbBuildReport, build_chronicle_db +from chronicle.env import DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA from chronicle.mirror import ( ChronicleMirrorExportReport, SupabaseMirrorLoadReport, @@ -45,6 +51,16 @@ write_pe_source_plan_json, write_pe_source_plan_markdown, ) +from chronicle.registration import ( + ACCESS_CLASSES, + HASH_ONLY_HASH_SOURCES, + MANIFEST_KINDS, + ArtifactRegistrationReport, + HashOnlyRegistrationError, + ManifestAccessError, + MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError, + register_hash_only_artifact, +) from chronicle.sources.cells import ( SourceCell, SourceCellReport, @@ -334,12 +350,29 @@ def fetch_artifact_file( source_page: str | None = None, table: str | None = None, filename: str | None = None, + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + access: str = "public", + licence: str | None = None, + kind: str | None = None, + publisher: str | None = None, + vintage: str | None = None, + expected_sha256: str | None = None, + expected_size_bytes: int | None = None, + licence_evidence: dict[str, str] | None = None, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, upload_r2: bool = False, - r2_bucket: str = "ledger-raw", + record_revision: bool = False, + r2_bucket: str | None = None, r2_prefix: str | None = None, wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", ) -> ArtifactFetchReport: - """Fetch/register a raw source artifact and optionally upload it to R2.""" + """Fetch/register a raw source artifact and optionally upload it to R2. + + ``manifest_filename`` selects which of the package directory's manifests + the entry belongs to. Raises :class:`SourceArtifactRevisionError` when the + fetched bytes are not the bytes that manifest's entry identifies, unless + ``record_revision`` opts into registering the publisher revision. + """ return fetch_source_artifact( source_url, source_id=source_id, @@ -350,20 +383,98 @@ def fetch_artifact_file( source_page=source_page, table=table, filename=filename, + manifest_filename=manifest_filename, + access=access, + licence=licence, + kind=kind, + publisher=publisher, + vintage=vintage, + expected_sha256=expected_sha256, + expected_size_bytes=expected_size_bytes, + licence_evidence=licence_evidence, + staging_dir=staging_dir, upload_r2=upload_r2, + record_revision=record_revision, r2_bucket=r2_bucket, r2_prefix=r2_prefix, wrangler_command=wrangler_command, ) +def register_artifact_file( + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: int, + output_dir: str | Path, + filename: str, + sha256: str, + licence: str, + access: str, + vintage: str, + hash_source: str, + attested_by: str, + attestation_evidence: str | None = None, + pinned_from: dict[str, str] | None = None, + verified_at: str | None = None, + size_bytes: int | None = None, + source_page: str | None = None, + source_url: str | None = None, + access_route: str | None = None, + doi: str | None = None, + study: str | None = None, + dataset: str | None = None, + table: str | None = None, + publisher: str | None = None, + fetched_at: str | None = None, + notes: str | None = None, + allow_reissue: bool = False, + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, +) -> ArtifactRegistrationReport: + """Register a licensed or restricted artifact by identity, without bytes.""" + return register_hash_only_artifact( + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=year, + output_dir=output_dir, + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + licence=licence, + access=access, + vintage=vintage, + hash_source=hash_source, + attested_by=attested_by, + attestation_evidence=attestation_evidence, + pinned_from=pinned_from, + verified_at=verified_at, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + source_page=source_page, + source_url=source_url, + access_route=access_route, + doi=doi, + study=study, + dataset=dataset, + table=table, + publisher=publisher, + fetched_at=fetched_at, + notes=notes, + allow_reissue=allow_reissue, + manifest_filename=manifest_filename, + ) + + def inventory_artifact_files( root: str | Path, *, manifest_filename: str = "manifest.yaml", + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, ) -> ArtifactInventoryReport: """Inventory local manifest-declared source artifacts.""" - return inventory_source_artifacts(root, manifest_filename=manifest_filename) + return inventory_source_artifacts( + root, + manifest_filename=manifest_filename, + staging_dir=staging_dir, + ) def publish_raw_artifact_files( @@ -372,9 +483,11 @@ def publish_raw_artifact_files( manifest_filename: str = "manifest.yaml", source_id: str | None = None, package_id: str | None = None, - r2_bucket: str = "ledger-raw", + r2_bucket: str | None = None, r2_prefix: str | None = None, wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", + skip_hash_only: bool = False, + staging_dir: str | Path | None = None, ) -> RawArtifactPublishReport: """Publish manifest-declared raw source artifacts to R2.""" return publish_source_artifacts( @@ -385,13 +498,15 @@ def publish_raw_artifact_files( r2_bucket=r2_bucket, r2_prefix=r2_prefix, wrangler_command=wrangler_command, + skip_hash_only=skip_hash_only, + staging_dir=staging_dir, ) def bootstrap_r2_storage( *, - raw_bucket: str = "ledger-raw", - derived_bucket: str = "ledger-derived", + raw_bucket: str | None = None, + derived_bucket: str | None = None, wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", ) -> R2BootstrapReport: """Create Chronicle R2 buckets when Wrangler is authenticated.""" @@ -409,7 +524,7 @@ def publish_derived_artifact_files( package_id: str, year: int, build_id: str | None = None, - r2_bucket: str = "ledger-derived", + r2_bucket: str | None = None, r2_prefix: str | None = None, wrangler_command: str = "npx wrangler", build_artifacts_output: str | Path | None = None, @@ -441,12 +556,16 @@ def export_chronicle_db_table_files( def load_supabase_mirror_files( input_dir: str | Path, *, - schema: str = "ledger", + schema: str | None = None, batch_size: int = 500, dry_run: bool = False, build_artifacts_path: str | Path | None = None, ) -> SupabaseMirrorLoadReport: - """Load exported Chronicle JSONL mirror files into Supabase/Postgres.""" + """Load exported Chronicle JSONL mirror files into Supabase/Postgres. + + ``schema`` of None resolves to ``$CHRONICLE_SCHEMA``, else the default + schema, so the hosted mirror writer answers to the renamed variable. + """ table_paths = ( {"build_artifacts": Path(build_artifacts_path)} if build_artifacts_path is not None @@ -484,6 +603,30 @@ def plan_pe_source_files( return report +def _licence_evidence_arguments(args: argparse.Namespace) -> dict[str, str] | None: + """Collect the licence-evidence flags, or None when none was passed.""" + evidence = { + "issuer": args.licence_evidence_issuer, + "scope": args.licence_evidence_scope, + "url": args.licence_evidence_url, + } + if all(value is None for value in evidence.values()): + return None + return {key: value for key, value in evidence.items() if value is not None} + + +def _pinned_from_arguments(args: argparse.Namespace) -> dict[str, str] | None: + """Collect the pinned-from flags, or None when none was passed.""" + pinned = { + "repository": args.pinned_from_repository, + "path": args.pinned_from_path, + "commit": args.pinned_from_commit, + } + if all(value is None for value in pinned.values()): + return None + return {key: value for key, value in pinned.items() if value is not None} + + def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: """Run the harness CLI.""" parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Chronicle fact validation harness") @@ -836,7 +979,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: artifact_parser = subparsers.add_parser( "fetch-artifact", - help="Fetch/register a raw source artifact and update manifest.yaml", + help="Fetch/register a raw source artifact and update its manifest", ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--url", @@ -857,13 +1000,23 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: "--year", type=int, required=True, - help="Artifact vintage year to record in manifest.yaml", + help="Artifact vintage year to record in the manifest", ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--out-dir", type=Path, required=True, - help="Directory where the raw artifact and manifest.yaml should live", + help="Directory where the raw artifact and its manifest should live", + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--manifest", + default=DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + help=( + "Manifest filename inside --out-dir. A publisher directory that " + "feeds several source packages keeps one manifest each, and the " + "entry being revised lives in exactly one of them. Defaults to " + f"{DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME}." + ), ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--dataset", @@ -879,17 +1032,118 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--filename", - help="Override artifact filename inferred from URL/path.", + help=( + "Override the artifact filename inferred from the URL. Must be a " + "bare filename; the artifact always lands under that name." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--access", + default="public", + choices=list(ACCESS_CLASSES), + help=( + "Publisher access class. Only public artifacts may be fetched; " + "licensed and restricted artifacts are registered hash-only with " + "`chronicle register-artifact`." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--licence", + help=( + "Publisher terms identifier or URL. Required for entries in a " + "microdata-release manifest." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--kind", + choices=list(MANIFEST_KINDS), + help=( + "Manifest kind to declare. Pass microdata_release to archive a " + "public-use microdata release, which may hold several files under " + "one vintage and is never parsed by a source package. Must match " + "the existing manifest's kind; a conflicting kind is refused. " + "Omit to inherit it (publisher_table for a new manifest)." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--publisher", + help="Publishing body. Required for a microdata release.", + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--vintage", + help="Publisher vintage label. Required for a microdata release.", + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--expected-sha256", + help=( + "Lowercase 64-character SHA-256 the fetched bytes must have, from " + "a reviewed pin. The fetch refuses, before writing or uploading, " + "bytes that hash differently; --record-revision does not override " + "it. Required for a microdata release: the licence evidence covers " + "this checksum. Never invent one." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--expected-size-bytes", + type=int, + help="Size the fetched bytes must have, from the same reviewed pin.", + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--licence-evidence-issuer", + help=( + "Who issued the file under the allowlisted --licence. Required " + "for a microdata release." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--licence-evidence-scope", + help=( + "Statement of what the evidence covers, such as 'public-use file " + "of a federal agency'. Required for a microdata release." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--licence-evidence-url", + help=( + "Durable http(s) URL of the publisher's evidence that this file is " + "issued under --licence. Required for a microdata release." + ), + ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--staging-dir", + type=Path, + default=None, + help=( + "Transient directory where a microdata release's bytes are staged " + "before upload, outside the repository. Defaults to " + "$CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR, else " + "~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/microdata-staging." + ), ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--upload-r2", action="store_true", help="Upload the artifact to R2 after local checksum capture.", ) + artifact_parser.add_argument( + "--record-revision", + action="store_true", + help=( + "Register a publisher revision: the fetched bytes get their own " + "content-addressed key under the configured bucket and the " + "superseded object moves to storage.previous_r2. Without this " + "flag, bytes that disagree with what the entry identifies -- its " + "declared sha256, or its recorded content-addressed key once " + "published -- are refused." + ), + ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--r2-bucket", - default="ledger-raw", - help="R2 bucket for raw artifacts when --upload-r2 is set.", + default=None, + help=( + "R2 bucket for raw artifacts when --upload-r2 is set. Defaults to " + f"$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET, else {DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET}." + ), ) artifact_parser.add_argument( "--r2-prefix", @@ -905,6 +1159,169 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: help="Wrangler command prefix to use for R2 uploads.", ) + registration_parser = subparsers.add_parser( + "register-artifact", + help="Register a licensed or restricted artifact by identity, no bytes", + description=( + "Register a raw artifact Chronicle may not redistribute. The " + "manifest records the checksum, size, vintage, licence, and access " + "route; no bytes are fetched, stored, or uploaded, and no R2 key " + "is recorded." + ), + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--source-id", + required=True, + help="Stable source ID, such as dwp.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--package-id", + required=True, + help="Stable package ID, such as dwp-frs-2023-24.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--year", + type=int, + required=True, + help="Artifact vintage year to record in manifest.yaml", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--out-dir", + type=Path, + required=True, + help="Directory where manifest.yaml should live. No bytes are written.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--manifest", + default=DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, + help=( + "Manifest filename inside --out-dir to record into, for a " + "directory that keeps one manifest_.yaml per package. " + "Must be manifest.yaml or manifest_.yaml; the default " + "name is refused beside named manifests." + ), + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--filename", + required=True, + help="Publisher filename this registration identifies.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--sha256", + required=True, + help="Lowercase 64-character SHA-256 of the publisher bytes.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--size-bytes", + type=int, + help="Size of the publisher bytes, when known.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--vintage", + required=True, + help="Publisher vintage label, such as 2023_24.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--licence", + required=True, + help="Publisher terms identifier or URL, such as a UKDS licence.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--access", + required=True, + choices=["licensed", "restricted"], + help="Access class. Public artifacts are registered with fetch-artifact.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--source-page", + help="Publisher or archive landing page for the release.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--source-url", + help="Direct publisher URL, when the release has one behind its licence.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--access-route", + help="How an authorized consumer obtains the bytes.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--doi", + help="Persistent identifier for the study, such as a UKDS DOI.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--study", + help="Archive study reference, such as a UK Data Service study number.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--dataset", + help="Manifest dataset ID. Defaults to _.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--table", + help="Human-readable release title.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--publisher", + help="Publishing body, when it differs from the source ID.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--fetched-at", + help="When the authorized environment fetched the bytes, if known.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--hash-source", + required=True, + choices=list(HASH_ONLY_HASH_SOURCES), + help=( + "How the checksum is known: consumer_attested (the consumer " + "verified it against bytes it holds; pass --attested-by, " + "--attestation-evidence and --verified-at) or consumer_pin (it is " + "transcribed from a reviewed pin in the consumer's repository; pass " + "--attested-by and the three --pinned-from-* fields, and no " + "--verified-at)." + ), + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--attested-by", + required=True, + help="The consumer that attests the checksum, such as PolicyEngine/microcosm.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--attestation-evidence", + help="The consumer's evidence for a consumer_attested checksum.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--verified-at", + help=( + "When the consumer verified the checksum against the bytes " + "(consumer_attested only)." + ), + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--pinned-from-repository", + help="Repository holding the consumer's pin, such as PolicyEngine/microcosm.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--pinned-from-path", + help="Path of the pin inside that repository.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--pinned-from-commit", + help="40-hex commit the pin was read from.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--notes", + help="Free-text provenance notes for the registration.", + ) + registration_parser.add_argument( + "--allow-reissue", + action="store_true", + help=( + "Register different bytes for a filename already registered in " + "this year, keeping both registrations." + ), + ) + artifact_inventory_parser = subparsers.add_parser( "inventory-artifacts", help="Inventory local manifest-declared source artifacts", @@ -920,10 +1337,20 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: default="manifest.yaml", help="Manifest filename to scan for.", ) + artifact_inventory_parser.add_argument( + "--staging-dir", + type=Path, + default=None, + help=( + "Where public microdata releases are staged. Defaults to " + "$CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR, else " + "~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/microdata-staging." + ), + ) raw_publish_parser = subparsers.add_parser( "publish-raw", - help="Upload manifest-declared raw source artifacts to ledger-raw R2", + help="Upload manifest-declared raw source artifacts to the raw R2 bucket", ) raw_publish_parser.add_argument( "--root", @@ -936,6 +1363,25 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: default="manifest.yaml", help="Manifest filename to scan for.", ) + raw_publish_parser.add_argument( + "--skip-hash-only", + action="store_true", + help=( + "Treat licensed and restricted registrations as deliberately " + "skipped rather than refused, so a mixed tree can be published." + ), + ) + raw_publish_parser.add_argument( + "--staging-dir", + type=Path, + default=None, + help=( + "Where public microdata releases are staged; their bytes are read " + "from there, never from beside the manifest. Defaults to " + "$CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR, else " + "~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/microdata-staging." + ), + ) raw_publish_parser.add_argument( "--source-id", help="Override manifest source_id for scanned artifacts.", @@ -946,8 +1392,11 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: ) raw_publish_parser.add_argument( "--r2-bucket", - default="ledger-raw", - help="R2 bucket for immutable raw artifacts.", + default=None, + help=( + "R2 bucket for immutable raw artifacts. Defaults to " + f"$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET, else {DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET}." + ), ) raw_publish_parser.add_argument( "--r2-prefix", @@ -969,13 +1418,19 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: ) r2_parser.add_argument( "--raw-bucket", - default="ledger-raw", - help="R2 bucket name for immutable raw source artifacts.", + default=None, + help=( + "R2 bucket name for immutable raw source artifacts. Defaults to " + f"$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET, else {DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET}." + ), ) r2_parser.add_argument( "--derived-bucket", - default="ledger-derived", - help="R2 bucket name for derived Chronicle build artifacts.", + default=None, + help=( + "R2 bucket name for derived Chronicle build artifacts. Defaults to " + f"$CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, else {DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET}." + ), ) r2_parser.add_argument( "--wrangler-command", @@ -985,7 +1440,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: derived_publish_parser = subparsers.add_parser( "publish-derived", - help="Upload deterministic Chronicle build outputs to ledger-derived R2", + help="Upload deterministic Chronicle build outputs to the derived R2 bucket", ) derived_publish_parser.add_argument( "--dir", @@ -1014,13 +1469,16 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: help=( "Build ID under an accepted epoch prefix, ledger.build.v1: or " "chronicle.build.v2:; any other form is refused. Defaults to " - "the ID inferred from reports or ledger.db." + "the ID inferred from reports, chronicle.db, or a legacy ledger.db." ), ) derived_publish_parser.add_argument( "--r2-bucket", - default="ledger-derived", - help="R2 bucket for derived build artifacts.", + default=None, + help=( + "R2 bucket for derived build artifacts. Defaults to " + f"$CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, else {DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET}." + ), ) derived_publish_parser.add_argument( "--r2-prefix", @@ -1075,8 +1533,11 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: ) mirror_load_parser.add_argument( "--schema", - default="ledger", - help="Supabase/Postgres schema to load into.", + default=None, + help=( + "Supabase/Postgres schema to load into. Defaults to " + f"$CHRONICLE_SCHEMA, else {DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA}." + ), ) mirror_load_parser.add_argument( "--batch-size", @@ -1252,15 +1713,21 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: return 0 if args.command == "build-suite": axiom_command = shlex.split(args.axiom_cli) if args.axiom_cli else None - report = build_source_suite_dir( - args.source, - args.out, - year=args.year, - axiom_command=axiom_command, - axiom_roots=args.axiom_root, - require_axiom_validation=args.require_axiom_validation, - replace=args.replace, - ) + try: + report = build_source_suite_dir( + args.source, + args.out, + year=args.year, + axiom_command=axiom_command, + axiom_roots=args.axiom_root, + require_axiom_validation=args.require_axiom_validation, + replace=args.replace, + ) + except (ManifestAccessError, MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError) as error: + # Refused before the output directory was touched: no source + # package parses a microdata release or a hash-only entry. + print(f"error: {error}", file=sys.stderr) + return 1 print(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True)) return 0 if report.valid else 1 if args.command == "build-bundle": @@ -1305,40 +1772,102 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: print(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True)) return 0 if args.command == "fetch-artifact": - report = fetch_artifact_file( - args.url, - source_id=args.source_id, - package_id=args.package_id, - year=args.year, - output_dir=args.out_dir, - dataset=args.dataset, - source_page=args.source_page, - table=args.table, - filename=args.filename, - upload_r2=args.upload_r2, - r2_bucket=args.r2_bucket, - r2_prefix=args.r2_prefix, - wrangler_command=args.wrangler_command, - ) + try: + report = fetch_artifact_file( + args.url, + source_id=args.source_id, + package_id=args.package_id, + year=args.year, + output_dir=args.out_dir, + dataset=args.dataset, + source_page=args.source_page, + table=args.table, + filename=args.filename, + manifest_filename=args.manifest, + access=args.access, + licence=args.licence, + kind=args.kind, + publisher=args.publisher, + vintage=args.vintage, + expected_sha256=args.expected_sha256, + expected_size_bytes=args.expected_size_bytes, + licence_evidence=_licence_evidence_arguments(args), + staging_dir=args.staging_dir, + upload_r2=args.upload_r2, + record_revision=args.record_revision, + r2_bucket=args.r2_bucket, + r2_prefix=args.r2_prefix, + wrangler_command=args.wrangler_command, + ) + except (SourceArtifactManifestError, ManifestAccessError, ValueError) as error: + print(f"error: {error}", file=sys.stderr) + return 1 print(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True)) return 0 if report.valid else 1 + if args.command == "register-artifact": + try: + registration = register_artifact_file( + source_id=args.source_id, + package_id=args.package_id, + year=args.year, + output_dir=args.out_dir, + filename=args.filename, + sha256=args.sha256, + licence=args.licence, + access=args.access, + vintage=args.vintage, + hash_source=args.hash_source, + attested_by=args.attested_by, + attestation_evidence=args.attestation_evidence, + pinned_from=_pinned_from_arguments(args), + verified_at=args.verified_at, + size_bytes=args.size_bytes, + source_page=args.source_page, + source_url=args.source_url, + access_route=args.access_route, + doi=args.doi, + study=args.study, + dataset=args.dataset, + table=args.table, + publisher=args.publisher, + fetched_at=args.fetched_at, + notes=args.notes, + allow_reissue=args.allow_reissue, + manifest_filename=args.manifest, + ) + except (HashOnlyRegistrationError, ManifestAccessError) as error: + print(f"error: {error}", file=sys.stderr) + return 1 + print(json.dumps(registration.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True)) + return 0 if registration.valid else 1 if args.command == "inventory-artifacts": - report = inventory_artifact_files( - args.root, - manifest_filename=args.manifest, - ) + try: + report = inventory_artifact_files( + args.root, + manifest_filename=args.manifest, + staging_dir=args.staging_dir, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as error: + print(f"error: {error}", file=sys.stderr) + return 1 print(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True)) return 0 if report.valid else 1 if args.command == "publish-raw": - report = publish_raw_artifact_files( - args.root, - manifest_filename=args.manifest, - source_id=args.source_id, - package_id=args.package_id, - r2_bucket=args.r2_bucket, - r2_prefix=args.r2_prefix, - wrangler_command=args.wrangler_command, - ) + try: + report = publish_raw_artifact_files( + args.root, + manifest_filename=args.manifest, + staging_dir=args.staging_dir, + source_id=args.source_id, + package_id=args.package_id, + r2_bucket=args.r2_bucket, + r2_prefix=args.r2_prefix, + wrangler_command=args.wrangler_command, + skip_hash_only=args.skip_hash_only, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as error: + print(f"error: {error}", file=sys.stderr) + return 1 print(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2, sort_keys=True)) return 0 if report.valid else 1 if args.command == "bootstrap-r2": diff --git a/chronicle/licences.py b/chronicle/licences.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c14c76c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/chronicle/licences.py @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +"""Redistributable licence terms Chronicle may archive microdata bytes under. + +Being downloadable is not a licence, and a licence *name* on a manifest entry +is not evidence that a particular file was issued under it. Chronicle archives +a microdata release's bytes only when the entry's ``licence`` is one of the +terms below and the entry carries ``licence_evidence`` binding the artifact to +that term (``docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md``). This module is +the allowlist, kept in code so every term carries the evidence for why +redistribution is permitted. + +Adding a term is a reviewed code change: give it a stable identifier (SPDX +where one exists), the legal basis, and a durable URL to the terms. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from collections.abc import Mapping +from dataclasses import dataclass +from types import MappingProxyType +from typing import Any +from urllib.parse import urlparse + +__all__ = [ + "LICENCE_EVIDENCE_FIELDS", + "REDISTRIBUTABLE_LICENCES", + "RedistributableLicence", + "is_durable_url", + "is_redistributable_licence", + "licence_evidence_errors", +] + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class RedistributableLicence: + """One term under which Chronicle may hold and re-serve publisher bytes.""" + + identifier: str + name: str + basis: str + evidence_url: str + + +REDISTRIBUTABLE_LICENCES: Mapping[str, RedistributableLicence] = MappingProxyType( + { + "US-Government-Work": RedistributableLicence( + identifier="US-Government-Work", + name="Work of the United States Government", + basis=( + "17 U.S.C. §105: copyright protection is not available for any " + "work of the United States Government, so a federal statistical " + "agency's public-use file may be copied and redistributed." + ), + evidence_url=( + "https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-" + "title17-section105" + ), + ), + "OGL-UK-3.0": RedistributableLicence( + identifier="OGL-UK-3.0", + name="Open Government Licence v3.0", + basis=( + "The licence grants a worldwide, royalty-free, perpetual, " + "non-exclusive licence to copy, publish, distribute and transmit " + "the information, subject to attribution." + ), + evidence_url=( + "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/" + "version/3/" + ), + ), + "CC0-1.0": RedistributableLicence( + identifier="CC0-1.0", + name="Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal", + basis=( + "The affirmer waives all copyright and related rights, so the " + "work may be copied and redistributed without restriction." + ), + evidence_url="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode", + ), + "CC-BY-4.0": RedistributableLicence( + identifier="CC-BY-4.0", + name="Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International", + basis=( + "Section 2(a)(1) grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive " + "licence to reproduce and share the licensed material, subject to " + "attribution." + ), + evidence_url="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode", + ), + } +) + +#: Fields a ``licence_evidence`` block must carry to bind an artifact to a term. +LICENCE_EVIDENCE_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = ( + "issuer", + "licence", + "scope", + "url", + "sha256", +) + + +def is_redistributable_licence(licence: Any) -> bool: + """Whether ``licence`` names a term on the allowlist.""" + return isinstance(licence, str) and licence.strip() in REDISTRIBUTABLE_LICENCES + + +def licence_evidence_errors( + evidence: Any, + *, + licence: Any, + sha256: Any, +) -> list[str]: + """Return error codes for a ``licence_evidence`` block. + + The block binds one artifact to one allowlisted term: its ``licence`` must + be the entry's own (allowlisted) licence, its ``sha256`` the entry's own + checksum, and its ``url`` a durable http(s) location of the evidence. + """ + if evidence is None: + return ["missing_licence_evidence"] + if not isinstance(evidence, Mapping): + return ["malformed_licence_evidence"] + errors: list[str] = [] + for field in LICENCE_EVIDENCE_FIELDS: + value = evidence.get(field) + if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip(): + errors.append(f"licence_evidence_missing_field:{field}") + if errors: + return errors + if evidence["licence"].strip() != str(licence).strip(): + errors.append("licence_evidence_licence_mismatch") + if not is_redistributable_licence(evidence["licence"]): + errors.append(f"licence_not_redistributable:{evidence['licence'].strip()}") + if evidence["sha256"].strip() != str(sha256 or "").strip(): + errors.append("licence_evidence_sha256_mismatch") + if not is_durable_url(evidence["url"]): + errors.append("licence_evidence_url_not_durable") + return errors + + +def is_durable_url(value: Any) -> bool: + """Whether ``value`` is an http(s) URL with a host and no whitespace. + + A bare scheme, a padded string, or a URL with a space is not a location + a reviewer can follow back to the publisher's statement. + """ + if not isinstance(value, str) or value != value.strip() or not value: + return False + if any(character.isspace() for character in value): + return False + parsed = urlparse(value) + return parsed.scheme in ("http", "https") and bool(parsed.netloc) diff --git a/chronicle/mirror.py b/chronicle/mirror.py index 7a3ccaf3..f9c95dc2 100644 --- a/chronicle/mirror.py +++ b/chronicle/mirror.py @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ from pathlib import Path from typing import Any +from chronicle.env import default_chronicle_schema + LEDGER_MIRROR_TABLES = ( "ledger_builds", "build_artifacts", @@ -200,15 +202,22 @@ def export_chronicle_db_tables( def load_supabase_mirror( input_dir: str | Path, *, - schema: str = "ledger", + schema: str | None = None, batch_size: int = 500, dry_run: bool = False, table_paths: dict[str, str | Path] | None = None, client: Any | None = None, ) -> SupabaseMirrorLoadReport: - """Load exported Chronicle JSONL mirror files into Supabase/Postgres.""" + """Load exported Chronicle JSONL mirror files into Supabase/Postgres. + + ``schema`` defaults to :func:`chronicle.env.default_chronicle_schema`, so + the writer that owns the hosted mirror answers to ``CHRONICLE_SCHEMA`` (and + the ledger-era names behind it) exactly like every other reader of the + setting. The resolved name is reported back in the load report. + """ if batch_size < 1: raise ValueError("batch_size must be at least 1.") + schema = schema or default_chronicle_schema() input_path = Path(input_dir) tables: list[SupabaseTableLoad] = [] errors: list[str] = [] diff --git a/chronicle/registration.py b/chronicle/registration.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c24a9776 --- /dev/null +++ b/chronicle/registration.py @@ -0,0 +1,2149 @@ +"""Access classification and hash-only registration for Chronicle artifacts. + +Chronicle registers every raw artifact its consumers build from and stores the +bytes of only those the publisher permits it to redistribute. Manifest fields +carry that split: + +``kind`` + Manifest-level: ``publisher_table`` or ``microdata_release``. Every + manifest created or modified after + ``docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md`` declares it. Manifests + that predate the rule are read as publisher tables only while they match + the frozen list in :mod:`chronicle.grandfathered_manifests`; any other + kindless manifest is an error, never a publisher table by default. + +``licence`` + The publisher's terms. For a public microdata release this is an + identifier from the allowlist in :mod:`chronicle.licences`, and the entry + also carries ``licence_evidence`` binding this artifact to that term. + +``access`` + A closed class: ``public``, ``licensed``, or ``restricted``. + +``hash_source`` and its attester + Who asserts the checksum: ``chronicle_fetch`` (``attested_by: chronicle``, + ``verified_at`` = fetch date), ``consumer_attested`` (``attested_by`` = the + consumer, ``attestation_evidence``, ``verified_at``), or ``consumer_pin`` + (``attested_by`` = the consumer, ``pinned_from`` = repository, path and + commit, no ``verified_at``). + +``public`` artifacts keep the fetch/publish path: bytes are archived in the raw +R2 bucket under the content-addressed key +``raw/{source_id}/{package_id}/{year}/{sha256}/{filename}``. ``licensed`` and +``restricted`` artifacts are registered *hash-only*: the manifest records the +checksum, vintage, licence, access route and attestation, and no Chronicle +store ever holds the bytes. That key exists only for ``public`` artifacts. + +A registration is identified by ``{source_id, package_id, year, sha256, +filename}``. Consumers reference a registration by exactly that tuple. The +filename is a bare name inside the package directory, compared case-folded, +and ``2023`` and ``'2023'`` are one vintage key. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from collections.abc import Callable, Iterable, Iterator, Mapping +from contextlib import contextmanager +from dataclasses import dataclass +import fcntl +import hashlib +import os +from pathlib import Path +import re +import stat +import tempfile +from typing import Any +import unicodedata +from urllib.parse import urlsplit + +import yaml + +from chronicle.grandfathered_manifests import is_grandfathered_manifest +from chronicle.licences import is_redistributable_licence, licence_evidence_errors + + +ACCESS_PUBLIC = "public" +ACCESS_LICENSED = "licensed" +ACCESS_RESTRICTED = "restricted" +#: The closed set of access classes a manifest file entry may declare. +ACCESS_CLASSES: tuple[str, ...] = (ACCESS_PUBLIC, ACCESS_LICENSED, ACCESS_RESTRICTED) +#: Access class inferred for a publisher-table entry that does not declare one. +DEFAULT_ACCESS = ACCESS_PUBLIC + +#: The manifest a package directory keeps unless it feeds several packages. +DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME = "manifest.yaml" + +PUBLISHER_TABLE_KIND = "publisher_table" +MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND = "microdata_release" +#: The closed set of manifest kinds. +MANIFEST_KINDS: tuple[str, ...] = (PUBLISHER_TABLE_KIND, MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND) +#: Kind of a manifest that does not exist yet, and of a frozen kindless one. +DEFAULT_MANIFEST_KIND = PUBLISHER_TABLE_KIND + +HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH = "chronicle_fetch" +HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_ATTESTED = "consumer_attested" +HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_PIN = "consumer_pin" +#: The closed set of checksum provenances a registration may declare. +HASH_SOURCES: tuple[str, ...] = ( + HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH, + HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_ATTESTED, + HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_PIN, +) +#: Provenances a hash-only registration may declare: Chronicle never fetched +#: the bytes, so the checksum is always the consumer's. +HASH_ONLY_HASH_SOURCES: tuple[str, ...] = ( + HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_ATTESTED, + HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_PIN, +) +#: The attester of a ``chronicle_fetch`` checksum. +CHRONICLE_ATTESTER = "chronicle" +#: Fields a ``pinned_from`` block carries: where the consumer's pin was read. +PINNED_FROM_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = ("repository", "path", "commit") + +_SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$") +_COMMIT_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$") + +# Registration entry key order, so emitted manifests are byte-stable. +_REGISTRATION_FIELD_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = ( + "filename", + "access", + "licence", + "licence_evidence", + "vintage", + "sha256", + "size_bytes", + "source_url", + "access_route", + "doi", + "study", + "fetched_at", + "verified_at", + "hash_source", + "attested_by", + "attestation_evidence", + "pinned_from", + "notes", +) + + +#: Legacy publisher-table extensions that remain part of the accepted entry +#: schema. They are read by table-specific consumers rather than the generic +#: artifact commands, but are explicit so an ordinary typo is never silently +#: treated as an extension. +_ENTRY_EXTENSION_FIELDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset( + { + "archive_member", + "csv_member", + "download_url", + "source_table", + "source_urls", + "year", + "years", + } +) + +#: Every field a manifest file entry may carry. This is a closed top-level +#: schema: writers may add a field only by adding it to the registration +#: contract or the explicit legacy extension allowlist above. +_ENTRY_FIELDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset( + { + *_REGISTRATION_FIELD_ORDER, + *_ENTRY_EXTENSION_FIELDS, + "storage", + "size_bytes", + "source_url", + } +) + + +class StrictManifestLoader(yaml.SafeLoader): + """A YAML loader that refuses a mapping with duplicate keys. + + PyYAML keeps the last of two equal keys, so ``files:`` recorded twice, or + a vintage recorded as ``2023`` and again as ``2_023`` (the same integer), + would read as one entry and the shadowed entry would be dropped by the + next write. A manifest is the record the byte boundary is decided from, + so a document the loader cannot represent faithfully is malformed. + + ``<<`` merges are honoured with YAML precedence (an explicit key overrides + a merged one) but never by mutating a node: PyYAML's ``flatten_mapping`` + rewrites the node in place, and because construction is lazy a later + merge of an anchored entry would turn that entry's inherited keys into + apparent explicit duplicates. Merge sources are expanded into a fresh + pair list instead, and every mapping reached through a merge gets the + same duplicate check as a mapping the document spells out directly. + """ + + _MERGE_TAG = "tag:yaml.org,2002:merge" + + def _explicit_pairs(self, node: Any, deep: bool) -> tuple[list[Any], list[Any]]: + """Split a mapping node into merge sources and its explicit pairs. + + Refuses duplicate explicit keys on the node's own pair list, before any + merge is consulted. + """ + merge_sources: list[Any] = [] + explicit_pairs: list[Any] = [] + seen: set[Any] = set() + for key_node, value_node in node.value: + if key_node.tag == self._MERGE_TAG: + merge_sources.append(value_node) + continue + key = self.construct_object(key_node, deep=deep) + try: + hash(key) + except TypeError as exc: + raise yaml.constructor.ConstructorError( + "while constructing a mapping", + node.start_mark, + f"found unhashable key ({exc})", + key_node.start_mark, + ) from exc + if key in seen: + raise yaml.constructor.ConstructorError( + "while constructing a mapping", + node.start_mark, + f"found duplicate key {key!r}", + key_node.start_mark, + ) + seen.add(key) + explicit_pairs.append((key_node, value_node)) + return merge_sources, explicit_pairs + + def _merged_pairs( + self, source: Any, deep: bool, active: tuple[int, ...] + ) -> list[Any]: + """Return the pairs a ``<<`` source contributes, validated, unmutated. + + ``active`` holds the mappings whose merges are being expanded on the + way to ``source``. A source that is already active merges itself, + directly or through nested merges, which has no expansion: refuse it + as a ``ConstructorError`` (a ``yaml.YAMLError`` every manifest reader + handles) rather than recursing until the interpreter gives up. + """ + if isinstance(source, yaml.MappingNode): + if id(source) in active: + raise yaml.constructor.ConstructorError( + "while constructing a mapping", + source.start_mark, + "found a recursive merge: a mapping merges itself", + source.start_mark, + ) + nested_sources, explicit = self._explicit_pairs(source, deep) + nested_active = (*active, id(source)) + pairs: list[Any] = [] + for nested in nested_sources: + pairs.extend(self._merged_pairs(nested, deep, nested_active)) + pairs.extend(explicit) + return pairs + if isinstance(source, yaml.SequenceNode): + for subnode in source.value: + if not isinstance(subnode, yaml.MappingNode): + raise yaml.constructor.ConstructorError( + "while constructing a mapping", + source.start_mark, + f"expected a mapping for merging, but found {subnode.id}", + subnode.start_mark, + ) + # YAML merge-key precedence: earlier mappings in a ``<<`` sequence + # win over later ones. Pairs are assigned last-wins, so contribute + # the later mappings first and the first mapping last. + pairs = [] + for subnode in reversed(source.value): + pairs.extend(self._merged_pairs(subnode, deep, active)) + return pairs + raise yaml.constructor.ConstructorError( + "while constructing a mapping", + source.start_mark, + f"expected a mapping or list of mappings for merging, but found {source.id}", + source.start_mark, + ) + + def construct_mapping(self, node: Any, deep: bool = False) -> dict[Any, Any]: + if not isinstance(node, yaml.MappingNode): + raise yaml.constructor.ConstructorError( + None, + None, + f"expected a mapping node, but found {node.id}", + node.start_mark, + ) + merge_sources, explicit_pairs = self._explicit_pairs(node, deep) + merged_pairs: list[Any] = [] + for source in merge_sources: + merged_pairs.extend(self._merged_pairs(source, deep, (id(node),))) + mapping: dict[Any, Any] = {} + # Merged pairs first, explicit pairs last: YAML precedence, last wins. + for key_node, value_node in [*merged_pairs, *explicit_pairs]: + key = self.construct_object(key_node, deep=deep) + mapping[key] = self.construct_object(value_node, deep=deep) + return mapping + + +def validate_manifest_vintages(payload: Any) -> None: + """Refuse different keys that identify one logical ``files`` vintage. + + YAML distinguishes integer ``2024`` from quoted ``"2024"``, but manifest + consumers select or report them as the same vintage. Validate the entire + manifest, including vintages other than the one a caller requested, before + any consumer can read artifact bytes or construct publication routes. + + Leave non-mapping documents and ``files`` blocks to the consumers' existing + shape checks. Labels retain their spelling, including leading zeroes. + """ + files = payload.get("files") if isinstance(payload, Mapping) else None + if not isinstance(files, Mapping): + return + seen: dict[str, Any] = {} + for vintage in files: + identity = str(vintage) + if identity in seen: + raise yaml.YAMLError( + f"duplicate_vintage_key:{identity}: Vintage {identity!r} is recorded under both keys " + f"{seen[identity]!r} and {vintage!r}; one vintage has one key. " + "Merge the entries by hand first. Chronicle will not choose " + "which entry is the record." + ) + seen[identity] = vintage + + +def load_manifest_document(text: str) -> Any: + """Parse a manifest document, refusing duplicate keys and vintages. + + Raises :class:`yaml.YAMLError` for keys YAML would silently collapse or + for distinct YAML keys that manifest consumers treat as one vintage. + """ + payload = yaml.load(text, Loader=StrictManifestLoader) # noqa: S506 + validate_manifest_vintages(payload) + return payload + + +class ManifestAccessError(ValueError): + """Raised when a manifest declares an unusable access class or kind.""" + + +class ManifestKindError(ManifestAccessError): + """Raised when a manifest declares no kind and is not frozen kindless.""" + + +class ArtifactFilenameError(ManifestAccessError): + """Raised when a filename is not a bare name inside the package directory.""" + + +class AmbiguousVintageKeyError(ManifestAccessError): + """Raised when a manifest records one vintage under both key spellings.""" + + +class HashOnlyRegistrationError(ValueError): + """Raised when a hash-only registration is malformed or would store bytes.""" + + +class MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError(ValueError): + """Raised when a source package points at a registered microdata release. + + Registration is manifest-level: no source package parses a microdata + release, and no microdata row, cell, or fact enters Chronicle. + """ + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ListSpecRejected: + """Marker for a list ``files[year]`` value outside a microdata release.""" + + spec: Any + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Manifest kind +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def manifest_kind( + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + *, + manifest_path: Any = None, +) -> str: + """Return a manifest's declared kind. + + An absent or empty manifest has the default kind: the command creating it + declares one. So does a manifest that declares no file entry (a bare + ``files:`` line or an empty mapping): there is nothing in it that could be + read as a publisher table, and the command writing its first entry + declares the kind. A manifest with entries must declare ``kind`` itself, + unless ``manifest_path`` names a file frozen kindless before the rule and + its bytes still match the freeze. + """ + if not isinstance(manifest, Mapping) or not manifest: + return DEFAULT_MANIFEST_KIND + declared = manifest.get("kind") + if declared is None: + if not has_file_entries(manifest): + return DEFAULT_MANIFEST_KIND + if manifest_path is not None and is_grandfathered_manifest(manifest_path): + return PUBLISHER_TABLE_KIND + where = str(manifest_path) if manifest_path is not None else "Manifest" + raise ManifestKindError( + f"{where} declares no kind. Every manifest created or modified " + f"after the microdata-identity ADR declares kind: one of " + f"{list(MANIFEST_KINDS)}; a kindless manifest is read as a " + "publisher table only while it matches the frozen list in " + "chronicle/grandfathered_manifests.py byte for byte." + ) + kind = str(declared) + if kind not in MANIFEST_KINDS: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Unknown manifest kind {kind!r}; expected one of {list(MANIFEST_KINDS)}." + ) + return kind + + +def safe_manifest_kind( + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + *, + manifest_path: Any = None, +) -> tuple[str, str | None]: + """Return ``(kind, error_code)`` without raising. + + The reporting commands use this so a manifest with a missing or unknown + kind is still walked and reported. The returned kind is only what the + entries are read *as* for that report; the error code says the manifest + itself is invalid. + """ + try: + return manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path), None + except ManifestKindError: + return DEFAULT_MANIFEST_KIND, "manifest_kind_missing" + except ManifestAccessError: + declared = manifest.get("kind") if isinstance(manifest, Mapping) else None + return DEFAULT_MANIFEST_KIND, f"unknown_manifest_kind:{declared}" + + +def is_microdata_release( + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + *, + manifest_path: Any = None, +) -> bool: + """Whether a manifest registers a microdata release rather than a table.""" + return manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path) == ( + MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + ) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Access +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def normalize_access(access: str | None) -> str: + """Return a validated access class, defaulting to ``public``.""" + if access is None: + return DEFAULT_ACCESS + value = str(access) + if value not in ACCESS_CLASSES: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Unknown access class {value!r}; expected one of {list(ACCESS_CLASSES)}." + ) + return value + + +def entry_access(spec: Any) -> str: + """Return the access class a manifest file entry declares or inherits.""" + if not isinstance(spec, Mapping): + return DEFAULT_ACCESS + return normalize_access(spec.get("access")) + + +def safe_entry_access(spec: Any) -> str: + """Return an entry's access class, falling back to ``public`` if unknown. + + An unparseable class is reported by :func:`validate_file_entry`; treating it + as ``public`` here would be unsafe, so it is treated as ``restricted`` and + therefore never uploaded. + """ + if not isinstance(spec, Mapping): + return DEFAULT_ACCESS + try: + return normalize_access(spec.get("access")) + except ManifestAccessError: + return ACCESS_RESTRICTED + + +def strict_entry_access(spec: Any, *, kind: str) -> str: + """Return an entry's access class, refusing to infer one for a release. + + A publisher-table entry that omits ``access`` is public; a microdata + release entry must say what it is, and an unknown class is refused with + the value the manifest actually declares. + """ + if not isinstance(spec, Mapping): + return DEFAULT_ACCESS + declared = spec.get("access") + if declared is None: + if kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Entry {spec.get('filename')!r} declares no access class. A " + "microdata release entry must declare access; Chronicle will " + "not infer public for it." + ) + return DEFAULT_ACCESS + return normalize_access(declared) + + +def stores_bytes(access: str) -> bool: + """Whether Chronicle may hold this access class's bytes.""" + return normalize_access(access) == ACCESS_PUBLIC + + +def is_hash_only(access: str) -> bool: + """Whether this access class must be registered without bytes.""" + return not stores_bytes(access) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Filenames and vintage keys +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def is_bare_filename(value: Any) -> bool: + """Whether ``value`` names a file inside a directory, with no path.""" + text = _text(value) + if text is None or text != str(value) or text in (".", ".."): + return False + if "/" in text or "\\" in text or "\x00" in text: + return False + return Path(text).name == text + + +def bare_filename(value: Any, *, what: str = "filename") -> str: + """Return ``value`` as a bare filename, refusing any other spelling. + + ``./adult.tab``, ``sub/../adult.tab``, ``adult.tab/`` and an absolute path + all resolve to the same file as ``adult.tab`` once joined under the package + directory, so the manifest and every guard use one spelling. + """ + if not is_bare_filename(value): + raise ArtifactFilenameError( + f"{what} must be a bare filename inside the package directory, not " + f"{value!r}; it may not carry a directory, '.', '..', a trailing " + "slash, surrounding whitespace, or an absolute path." + ) + return str(value) + + +def filename_key(value: Any) -> str: + """Return the comparison key for a filename. + + Case-folded and Unicode-normalised (NFC), because the package directories + these commands run in are as often as not on a filesystem that folds + both: ``ADULT.TAB`` and ``adult.tab`` are one file, and so are the + composed and decomposed spellings of an accented name. Treating them as + one artifact path is the safe rule everywhere. + """ + return unicodedata.normalize("NFC", Path(str(value)).name).casefold() + + +#: The names a package directory's manifests may carry: ``manifest.yaml`` or +#: ``manifest_.yaml`` (``.yml`` accepted), matched case-insensitively +#: because the directory is as often as not on a case-insensitive filesystem. +_MANIFEST_FILENAME_RE = re.compile(r"^manifest(?:_[^/\\]+)?\.ya?ml$", re.IGNORECASE) + + +def is_manifest_filename(value: Any) -> bool: + """Whether ``value`` is a package-manifest filename.""" + return is_bare_filename(value) and bool(_MANIFEST_FILENAME_RE.fullmatch(str(value))) + + +def package_manifest_paths(package_dir: Path) -> list[Path]: + """Return every manifest file a package directory keeps, sorted by name.""" + directory = Path(package_dir) + if not directory.is_dir(): + return [] + manifests = [] + for path in sorted(directory.iterdir()): + if not is_manifest_filename(path.name): + continue + if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file(): + raise ValueError( + f"{path} carries a manifest name but is not a regular file; " + "Chronicle will not register beside it or sweep past it." + ) + manifests.append(path) + return manifests + + +def iter_directory_entries( + manifests: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any] | None], +) -> Iterator[tuple[str, Any, int | None, Any]]: + """Yield ``(manifest_name, key, index, entry)`` across a directory's manifests.""" + for name, manifest in manifests.items(): + for key, index, entry in iter_manifest_entries(manifest): + yield name, key, index, entry + + +def hash_only_registrations( + manifests: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any] | None], + *, + filename: Any = None, + sha256: Any = None, +) -> list[tuple[str, Any, Mapping[str, Any]]]: + """Return the hash-only entries across ``manifests`` matching a name or digest. + + A match by case-folded bare filename is the same path in the package + directory; a match by digest is the same bytes under another name. Both + identify the gated artifact, whichever manifest registers it. An entry + whose access class cannot be read is treated as hash-only (never public). + """ + wanted_name = filename_key(filename) if filename else None + wanted_digest = _text(sha256) + matches: list[tuple[str, Any, Mapping[str, Any]]] = [] + for name, key, _index, entry in iter_directory_entries(manifests): + if not isinstance(entry, Mapping): + continue + if not is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(entry)): + continue + entry_name = entry.get("filename") + same_name = ( + wanted_name is not None + and entry_name is not None + and filename_key(entry_name) == wanted_name + ) + same_bytes = wanted_digest is not None and _text(entry.get("sha256")) == ( + wanted_digest + ) + if same_name or same_bytes: + matches.append((name, key, entry)) + return matches + + +def validate_package_directory( + manifests: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any] | None], + *, + entry_digest: Callable[[str, Any, Mapping[str, Any]], str | None] | None = None, +) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Return the collision codes across every manifest a directory keeps. + + Two manifests may record one public file only as the same bytes (the + tracked shape: ``manifest.yaml`` beside ``manifest_.yaml`` both + recording one publisher zip with one digest). A name held public in one + manifest and hash-only in another, public under two digests, or a digest + held public in one and hash-only in another, is one file that two records + disagree about, and no command may act through either record. + + A public entry without a recorded digest cannot contradict an identified + public owner: the command that first identifies it checks the shared bytes. + Its filename still participates in public/hash-only access conflicts. + + ``entry_digest(manifest_name, vintage, entry)`` resolves an entry's effective + recorded digest, such as the digest encoded in its content-addressed R2 key. + Returning ``None`` falls back to the declared ``sha256`` field; without a + resolver only that field is compared. Archived identities are checked + independently, including historical locators whose entry metadata changed. + """ + by_name: dict[str, list[tuple[str, bool, str]]] = {} + by_digest: dict[str, list[tuple[str, bool]]] = {} + archived_names: set[str] = set() + archived_digests: set[str] = set() + for name, vintage, _index, entry in iter_directory_entries(manifests): + if not isinstance(entry, Mapping): + continue + hash_only = is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(entry)) + digest = entry_digest(name, vintage, entry) if entry_digest else None + if digest is None: + digest = entry.get("sha256") + digest = _text(digest) or "" + filename = entry.get("filename") + if filename is not None: + by_name.setdefault(filename_key(filename), []).append( + (name, hash_only, digest) + ) + if digest: + by_digest.setdefault(digest, []).append((name, hash_only)) + for archived_name, archived_digest, _locator in _recorded_object_identities( + entry + ): + if archived_name is not None: + archived_names.add(archived_name) + if archived_digest is not None: + archived_digests.add(archived_digest) + + errors: list[str] = [] + for key, records in by_name.items(): + if len({name for name, _hash_only, _digest in records}) < 2: + continue + classes = {hash_only for _name, hash_only, _digest in records} + digests = {digest for _name, _hash_only, digest in records if digest} + if len(classes) > 1 or (not classes.pop() and len(digests) > 1): + errors.append(f"filename_collision_across_manifests:{key}") + for digest, records in by_digest.items(): + if len({name for name, _hash_only in records}) < 2: + continue + if len({hash_only for _name, hash_only in records}) > 1: + errors.append(f"sha256_collision_across_manifests:{digest}") + # An immutable object remains archived after its current entry changes + # filename or checksum. Compare gated registrations with every recorded + # object, including history in the same manifest as the registration. + for key in sorted(archived_names.intersection(by_name)): + if any(hash_only for _name, hash_only, _digest in by_name[key]): + errors.append(f"archived_filename_collision:{key}") + for digest in sorted(archived_digests.intersection(by_digest)): + if any(hash_only for _name, hash_only in by_digest[digest]): + errors.append(f"archived_sha256_collision:{digest}") + return tuple(_dedupe(errors)) + + +def vintage_key_forms(year: Any) -> tuple[Any, ...]: + """Return the key spellings that address the same vintage as ``year``. + + ``2023`` and ``'2023'`` are one vintage: every identity Chronicle derives + from a year (registration ids, R2 keys) renders it as text, and the + source-package reader accepts both. Label keys such as ``'A_1'`` have no + other spelling. + """ + if isinstance(year, bool): + return (year,) + if isinstance(year, int): + return (year, str(year)) + text = str(year) + if text.isdecimal() and (text == "0" or not text.startswith("0")): + return (text, int(text)) + return (year,) + + +def resolve_vintage_key(files: Mapping[Any, Any], year: Any) -> Any | None: + """Return the key ``files`` already uses for ``year``'s vintage, or None. + + Refuses a mapping that records the vintage under both spellings: one + vintage has one key, and Chronicle will not choose which entry is the + record. + """ + present = [form for form in vintage_key_forms(year) if form in files] + if len(present) > 1: + raise AmbiguousVintageKeyError( + f"Vintage {year!r} is recorded under both keys {present!r}; one " + "vintage has one key. Merge the entries by hand first." + ) + return present[0] if present else None + + +def iter_manifest_entries( + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, +) -> Iterator[tuple[Any, int | None, Any]]: + """Yield every ``(key, index, entry)`` a manifest declares, whatever shape. + + Deliberately not gated on the manifest ``kind``: a guard must see the + entries a manifest actually holds, including a list under a manifest whose + kind is absent or misspelled. ``index`` is the entry's position in a list + value and None for a single mapping. + """ + if not isinstance(manifest, Mapping): + return + files = manifest.get("files") + if not isinstance(files, Mapping): + return + for key, spec in files.items(): + if isinstance(spec, list): + for index, entry in enumerate(spec): + yield key, index, entry + else: + yield key, None, spec + + +def has_file_entries(manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> bool: + """Whether a manifest declares any file entry at all. + + A ``files`` block that is absent, an explicit null (a bare ``files:`` + line) or an empty mapping declares nothing; a vintage key holding an empty + list declares nothing either. A ``files`` value that is not a mapping is + content Chronicle cannot read, and counts as entries so that the kind rule + and the ``files_not_a_mapping`` refusal both fire on it. + """ + if not isinstance(manifest, Mapping): + return False + files = manifest.get("files") + if files is None: + return False + if not isinstance(files, Mapping): + return True + return any(True for _entry in iter_manifest_entries(manifest)) + + +def registration_id( + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: Any, + sha256: str, + filename: str, +) -> str: + """Return the registration identity tuple as a stable string.""" + return f"{source_id}/{package_id}/{year}/{sha256}/{filename}" + + +def iter_file_specs(spec: Any, *, kind: str) -> tuple[Any, ...]: + """Expand one ``files[year]`` value into individual file entries. + + A microdata release registers many files under one vintage — the 14 FRS + 2023-24 tabs share ``{source_id, package_id, year}`` and differ only by + ``filename`` and ``sha256`` — so its ``files[year]`` value may be a list. + Publisher-table manifests keep the single-mapping shape, and a list there is + surfaced as a rejected entry rather than silently expanded. + """ + if isinstance(spec, list): + if kind != MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + return (ListSpecRejected(spec),) + return tuple(spec) + return (spec,) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Validation vocabulary +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def validate_manifest_files(manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Return manifest-level error codes: shape, key and filename collisions. + + These are properties of the ``files`` mapping as a whole, which no single + entry can see: a vintage recorded under two key spellings, a filename that + is not a bare name, and two entries that resolve to one file in the + package directory while disagreeing about what it holds. + """ + if not isinstance(manifest, Mapping): + return () + files = manifest.get("files") + if files is None: + return () + if not isinstance(files, Mapping): + return ("files_not_a_mapping",) + + errors: list[str] = [] + for key in files: + for other in vintage_key_forms(key): + if other != key and other in files: + errors.append(f"duplicate_vintage_key:{key}") + + release = manifest.get("kind") == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + # Same file, one package directory: group every entry by its resolved name. + by_name: dict[str, list[tuple[Any, Mapping[str, Any]]]] = {} + for key, _index, entry in iter_manifest_entries(manifest): + if not isinstance(entry, Mapping): + continue + filename = entry.get("filename") + if filename is None: + continue + if not is_bare_filename(filename): + errors.append(f"non_canonical_filename:{filename}") + by_name.setdefault(filename_key(filename), []).append((key, entry)) + + by_digest: dict[str, set[bool]] = {} + for _key, _index, entry in iter_manifest_entries(manifest): + if not isinstance(entry, Mapping): + continue + digest = _text(entry.get("sha256")) + if digest: + by_digest.setdefault(digest, set()).add( + is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(entry)) + ) + for digest, classes in by_digest.items(): + if len(classes) > 1: + # The same bytes are the same artifact whatever name they carry: + # a digest is not both bytes Chronicle holds and bytes it must + # never hold. + errors.append(f"sha256_collision:{digest}") + + for name, entries in by_name.items(): + if len(entries) < 2: + continue + classes = {is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(entry)) for _key, entry in entries} + if len(classes) > 1: + # One path cannot be both bytes Chronicle holds and bytes it must + # never hold. + errors.append(f"filename_collision:{name}") + continue + hash_only = classes.pop() + seen: dict[Any, set[str]] = {} + for key, entry in entries: + digest = _text(entry.get("sha256")) or "" + vintage = seen.setdefault(key, set()) + if digest in vintage: + errors.append(f"duplicate_filename_in_vintage:{name}") + vintage.add(digest) + if hash_only: + # Several vintages, or an explicit reissue, may register the same + # filename with different bytes: no file exists to collide. + continue + if release: + # A public release's bytes are staged content-addressed outside + # the tree, so one filename may hold different bytes under + # different vintages; under one vintage a revision is recorded in + # storage.previous_r2, not as a second entry. + for digests in seen.values(): + if len(digests) > 1: + errors.append(f"filename_collision:{name}") + continue + digests = {_text(entry.get("sha256")) or "" for _key, entry in entries} + if len(digests) > 1: + # Public entries share one path in the tree and one current object + # per name; a revision is recorded in storage.previous_r2, not as a + # second entry. + errors.append(f"filename_collision:{name}") + return tuple(_dedupe(errors)) + + +def validate_file_entry( + spec: Any, + *, + kind: str, + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + local_file_exists: bool, +) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Return stable error codes for one manifest file entry. + + The codes are the refusal vocabulary shared by ``inventory-artifacts``, + ``publish-raw``, ``fetch-artifact`` and ``register-artifact``. + ``local_file_exists`` says whether the entry's filename exists beside the + manifest, in the package directory. + """ + if isinstance(spec, ListSpecRejected): + return ("list_file_spec_requires_microdata_release_kind",) + if not isinstance(spec, Mapping): + return ("malformed_file_spec",) + + errors: list[str] = [] + for field in spec: + if field in _ENTRY_FIELDS: + continue + if isinstance(field, str) and field.strip().casefold() in _ENTRY_FIELDS: + # A field the writer meant but the reader would ignore: ``Access`` + # is not ``access``, and an entry whose access class sits under + # the wrong key is not public by omission. + errors.append(f"misspelled_field:{field}") + else: + # The schema is closed. Treating an arbitrary key as an extension + # would make ordinary typos such as ``acess`` indistinguishable + # from intentional metadata, allowing missing ``access`` to fall + # through to the publisher-table public default. + errors.append(f"unknown_field:{field}") + filename = spec.get("filename") + if not _text(filename): + errors.append("missing_filename") + elif not is_bare_filename(filename): + errors.append(f"non_canonical_filename:{filename}") + elif is_manifest_filename(filename): + errors.append(f"manifest_named_filename:{filename}") + + declared_sha256 = spec.get("sha256") + if declared_sha256 is not None and not ( + isinstance(declared_sha256, str) and _SHA256_RE.fullmatch(declared_sha256) + ): + errors.append("malformed_sha256") + + declared_access = spec.get("access") + if declared_access is None: + if kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + errors.append("missing_access") + access = DEFAULT_ACCESS + else: + try: + access = normalize_access(declared_access) + except ManifestAccessError: + return (*errors, f"unknown_access_class:{declared_access}") + + if kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND and not _text(spec.get("licence")): + errors.append("missing_licence") + + if is_hash_only(access): + errors.extend( + _hash_only_entry_errors( + spec, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=local_file_exists, + ) + ) + elif kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + errors.extend( + _public_release_entry_errors(spec, local_file_exists=local_file_exists) + ) + if is_hash_only(access) or kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND: + errors.extend(_attestation_errors(spec)) + return tuple(_dedupe(errors)) + + +def _checksum_errors(spec: Mapping[str, Any]) -> list[str]: + sha256 = _text(spec.get("sha256")) + if not sha256: + return ["missing_sha256"] + if not _SHA256_RE.match(sha256): + return ["malformed_sha256"] + return [] + + +def _hash_only_entry_errors( + spec: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + local_file_exists: bool, +) -> list[str]: + """Return refusal codes for a licensed or restricted registration.""" + errors: list[str] = [] + if not _text(spec.get("licence")): + errors.append("missing_licence") + errors.extend(_checksum_errors(spec)) + if not _text(spec.get("vintage")): + errors.append("missing_vintage") + if not _access_route(spec, manifest): + errors.append("missing_access_route") + if local_file_exists: + errors.append("bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry") + if recorded_r2(spec): + errors.append("r2_location_for_hash_only_entry") + if recorded_previous_r2(spec): + errors.append("r2_history_for_hash_only_entry") + storage = spec.get("storage") + if storage is not None and storage != {}: + # No Chronicle store holds these bytes, so there is nothing a storage + # block could truthfully record, whatever its shape. + errors.append("storage_for_hash_only_entry") + hash_source = _text(spec.get("hash_source")) + if hash_source in HASH_SOURCES and hash_source not in HASH_ONLY_HASH_SOURCES: + # Chronicle never fetched a hash-only entry's bytes: its checksum is + # always the consumer's. + errors.append(f"hash_source_not_allowed_for_hash_only_entry:{hash_source}") + return errors + + +def _public_release_entry_errors( + spec: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + local_file_exists: bool, +) -> list[str]: + """Return refusal codes for a public microdata release entry. + + Bytes are archived only under an allowlisted licence with evidence that + binds this artifact to it, and never inside the package directory: public + microdata is staged outside ``db/data`` and uploaded from there. + """ + errors: list[str] = [] + errors.extend(_checksum_errors(spec)) + if not _text(spec.get("vintage")): + errors.append("missing_vintage") + licence = _text(spec.get("licence")) + if licence and not is_redistributable_licence(licence): + errors.append(f"licence_not_redistributable:{licence}") + errors.extend( + licence_evidence_errors( + spec.get("licence_evidence"), + licence=licence, + sha256=_text(spec.get("sha256")), + ) + ) + if local_file_exists: + errors.append("bytes_present_for_microdata_release_entry") + return errors + + +def _attestation_errors(spec: Mapping[str, Any]) -> list[str]: + """Return refusal codes for an entry's ``hash_source`` and attester.""" + errors: list[str] = [] + hash_source = _text(spec.get("hash_source")) + if not hash_source: + return ["missing_hash_source"] + if hash_source not in HASH_SOURCES: + return [f"unknown_hash_source:{hash_source}"] + attested_by = _text(spec.get("attested_by")) + if not attested_by: + errors.append("missing_attested_by") + verified_at = _text(spec.get("verified_at")) + if hash_source == HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH: + if attested_by and attested_by != CHRONICLE_ATTESTER: + errors.append("attested_by_not_chronicle") + if not verified_at: + errors.append("missing_verified_at") + elif hash_source == HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_ATTESTED: + if not _text(spec.get("attestation_evidence")): + errors.append("missing_attestation_evidence") + if not verified_at: + errors.append("missing_verified_at") + else: + errors.extend(_pinned_from_errors(spec.get("pinned_from"))) + if verified_at: + errors.append("verified_at_forbidden_for_consumer_pin") + if hash_source != HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH and _is_chronicle(attested_by): + # A consumer's checksum is attested by the consumer; Chronicle only + # attests what it fetched and hashed itself. + errors.append("attested_by_chronicle_for_consumer_hash_source") + return errors + + +def _is_chronicle(attester: str | None) -> bool: + return bool(attester) and attester.strip().casefold() == CHRONICLE_ATTESTER + + +def _pinned_from_errors(pinned_from: Any) -> list[str]: + if pinned_from is None: + return ["missing_pinned_from"] + if not isinstance(pinned_from, Mapping): + return ["malformed_pinned_from"] + errors = [ + f"pinned_from_missing_field:{field}" + for field in PINNED_FROM_FIELDS + if not _text(pinned_from.get(field)) + ] + commit = _text(pinned_from.get("commit")) + if commit and not _COMMIT_RE.match(commit): + errors.append("malformed_pinned_from_commit") + return errors + + +def _access_route( + spec: Mapping[str, Any], + manifest: Mapping[str, Any] | None, +) -> str | None: + """Return the recorded route to the bytes, from the entry or the manifest.""" + for key in ("access_route", "source_url", "source_page", "doi"): + value = _text(spec.get(key)) + if value: + return value + if isinstance(manifest, Mapping): + for key in ("source_page", "access_route"): + value = _text(manifest.get(key)) + if value: + return value + return None + + +def recorded_r2(spec: Any) -> Mapping[str, Any] | None: + """Return a recorded ``storage.r2`` mapping, if the entry carries one.""" + if not isinstance(spec, Mapping): + return None + storage = spec.get("storage") + if not isinstance(storage, Mapping): + return None + r2 = storage.get("r2") + return r2 if isinstance(r2, Mapping) else None + + +def recorded_previous_r2(spec: Any) -> tuple[Any, ...]: + """Return the entry's ``storage.previous_r2`` history, if it carries one.""" + if not isinstance(spec, Mapping): + return () + storage = spec.get("storage") + if not isinstance(storage, Mapping): + return () + previous = storage.get("previous_r2") + if isinstance(previous, list): + return tuple(previous) + return (previous,) if previous else () + + +def _recorded_object_identities( + spec: Any, +) -> Iterator[tuple[str | None, str | None, str]]: + """Yield filename/checksum identities from every current and archived object. + + Read both locator fields independently: a conflicting or incomplete block + must not hide an archived identity simply because another field was chosen. + Locator validity remains the artifact reader's separate responsibility. + """ + for block in (recorded_r2(spec), *recorded_previous_r2(spec)): + if not isinstance(block, Mapping): + continue + for field in ("key", "uri"): + locator = block.get(field) + if not isinstance(locator, str) or not locator: + continue + if field == "uri": + try: + key = urlsplit(locator).path + except ValueError: + continue + else: + key = locator + segments = key.rsplit("/", 2) + filename = ( + filename_key(segments[-1]) if is_bare_filename(segments[-1]) else None + ) + digest = ( + segments[-2] + if len(segments) >= 2 and _SHA256_RE.fullmatch(segments[-2]) + else None + ) + if filename is not None or digest is not None: + yield filename, digest, locator + + +def records_r2_object(spec: Any) -> bool: + """Whether an entry names any object in the raw bucket, current or past.""" + return recorded_r2(spec) is not None or bool(recorded_previous_r2(spec)) + + +def normalize_hash_source(value: Any, *, allowed: Iterable[str] = HASH_SOURCES) -> str: + """Return a validated ``hash_source`` value.""" + text = _text(value) + allowed = tuple(allowed) + if text is None or text not in allowed: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Unknown hash_source {value!r}; expected one of {list(allowed)}." + ) + return text + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Hash-only registration +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ArtifactRegistrationReport: + """Report from registering one hash-only source artifact.""" + + manifest_path: str + source_id: str + package_id: str + year: int + filename: str + sha256: str + size_bytes: int | None + vintage: str + licence: str + access: str + registration: str + replaced: bool + hash_source: str + attested_by: str + errors: tuple[str, ...] = () + + @property + def valid(self) -> bool: + """Whether the registration was written without refusals.""" + return not self.errors + + def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return a JSON-serializable report.""" + return { + "valid": self.valid, + "manifest_path": self.manifest_path, + "source_id": self.source_id, + "package_id": self.package_id, + "year": self.year, + "filename": self.filename, + "sha256": self.sha256, + "size_bytes": self.size_bytes, + "vintage": self.vintage, + "licence": self.licence, + "access": self.access, + "registration": self.registration, + "replaced": self.replaced, + "hash_source": self.hash_source, + "attested_by": self.attested_by, + "r2_location": None, + "errors": list(self.errors), + } + + +def register_hash_only_artifact( + *, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: int, + output_dir: str | Path, + filename: str, + sha256: str, + licence: str, + access: str, + vintage: str, + hash_source: str, + attested_by: str, + attestation_evidence: str | None = None, + pinned_from: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + verified_at: str | None = None, + size_bytes: int | None = None, + source_page: str | None = None, + source_url: str | None = None, + access_route: str | None = None, + doi: str | None = None, + study: str | None = None, + dataset: str | None = None, + table: str | None = None, + publisher: str | None = None, + fetched_at: str | None = None, + notes: str | None = None, + allow_reissue: bool = False, + manifest_filename: str = DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME, +) -> ArtifactRegistrationReport: + """Register a licensed or restricted artifact by identity, without bytes. + + Writes (or updates) a ``kind: microdata_release`` manifest entry carrying the + checksum, size, vintage, licence, access route, and the attestation of who + asserts the checksum. No bytes are read, written, or uploaded, and no R2 + key is recorded. Every refusal below happens before the manifest is + touched. + + ``manifest_filename`` names the manifest inside ``output_dir`` the entry + belongs to, exactly as ``fetch-artifact --manifest`` does: a directory + that keeps ``manifest_.yaml`` files and no ``manifest.yaml`` is + refused the default name rather than given a stray third manifest. + """ + source_id_text = _text(source_id) + package_id_text = _text(package_id) + if source_id_text is None or package_id_text is None: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A registration needs non-empty source_id and package_id values; " + f"got source_id={source_id!r}, package_id={package_id!r}." + ) + access_class = normalize_access(access) + if stores_bytes(access_class): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "register-artifact records identity without bytes and refuses " + f"access={ACCESS_PUBLIC!r}. Register a public artifact with its " + "bytes using fetch-artifact." + ) + checksum = _text(sha256) + if not checksum or not _SHA256_RE.match(checksum): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A registration needs a lowercase 64-character SHA-256; refusing to " + f"register {filename!r} with sha256={sha256!r}. Never invent a hash." + ) + if not _text(licence): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"A {access_class} registration must record the publisher licence." + ) + if not _text(vintage): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"A {access_class} registration must record the artifact vintage." + ) + if not is_bare_filename(filename): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Registration filename must be a bare filename; got {filename!r}." + ) + if is_manifest_filename(filename): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Registration filename {filename!r} is a manifest name; an " + "artifact may not be named like a manifest." + ) + artifact_name = str(filename) + provenance = _hash_only_attestation( + hash_source=hash_source, + attested_by=attested_by, + attestation_evidence=attestation_evidence, + pinned_from=pinned_from, + verified_at=verified_at, + access_class=access_class, + ) + + entry = _registration_entry( + filename=artifact_name, + access=access_class, + licence=str(licence), + vintage=str(vintage), + sha256=checksum, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + source_url=source_url, + access_route=access_route, + doi=doi, + study=study, + fetched_at=fetched_at, + notes=notes, + **provenance, + ) + output = Path(output_dir) + manifest_path = _registration_manifest_path(output, manifest_filename) + preparation = { + "output": output, + "manifest_path": manifest_path, + "source_id": source_id_text, + "package_id": package_id_text, + "year": year, + "artifact_name": artifact_name, + "checksum": checksum, + "access_class": access_class, + "entry": entry, + "source_page": source_page, + "dataset": dataset, + "publisher": publisher, + "table": table, + "allow_reissue": allow_reissue, + } + # Complete the read/validate/mutate calculation once before creating the + # output directory or lock file. Ordinary refusals therefore have no + # filesystem side effect. Repeat it under the package-wide lock so a + # concurrent registration cannot be lost between read and replacement. + _prepare_registration_payload(**preparation) + output.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + with _registration_lock(output): + payload, replaced = _prepare_registration_payload(**preparation) + document = yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False, allow_unicode=True) + _atomic_replace_manifest(manifest_path, document) + + return ArtifactRegistrationReport( + manifest_path=str(manifest_path), + source_id=source_id_text, + package_id=package_id_text, + year=year, + filename=artifact_name, + sha256=checksum, + size_bytes=size_bytes, + vintage=str(vintage), + licence=str(licence), + access=access_class, + registration=registration_id( + source_id=source_id_text, + package_id=package_id_text, + year=year, + sha256=checksum, + filename=artifact_name, + ), + replaced=replaced, + hash_source=provenance["hash_source"], + attested_by=provenance["attested_by"], + ) + + +def _prepare_registration_payload( + *, + output: Path, + manifest_path: Path, + source_id: str, + package_id: str, + year: int, + artifact_name: str, + checksum: str, + access_class: str, + entry: dict[str, Any], + source_page: str | None, + dataset: str | None, + publisher: str | None, + table: str | None, + allow_reissue: bool, +) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]: + """Return the complete registration write after validating current state. + + This function has no filesystem side effects. The caller runs it once as a + preflight and again while holding the package lock, so ordinary refusals + precede even lock creation while concurrent registrations still serialize + their read/modify/replace sequence. + """ + _assert_registration_target_safe(output, manifest_path) + _assert_no_local_artifact_bytes(output, artifact_name, access_class) + payload = _load_manifest(manifest_path) + siblings = _registration_sibling_manifests(output, manifest_path) + try: + existing_kind = manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=manifest_path) + except ManifestAccessError as exc: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError(str(exc)) from exc + if existing_kind != MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND and ( + payload.get("kind") is not None or has_file_entries(payload) + ): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} is a {existing_kind} manifest; hash-only " + "registrations belong in a kind: microdata_release manifest." + ) + + route_context = dict(payload) + if _text(source_page): + route_context["source_page"] = source_page + if not _access_route(entry, route_context): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A hash-only registration must record how the bytes are reached; " + "pass --access-route, --source-url, --doi, or --source-page." + ) + + _assert_manifest_identity(payload, manifest_path, "source_id", source_id) + _assert_manifest_identity(payload, manifest_path, "package_id", package_id) + files = payload.get("files") + if files is not None and not isinstance(files, dict): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} files must be a mapping; it is a " + f"{type(files).__name__}. Chronicle will not write into a manifest " + "it cannot read." + ) + _assert_registration_manifest_valid( + payload, + manifest_path, + output=output, + kind=existing_kind, + ) + for sibling_path, sibling in siblings.items(): + try: + sibling_kind = manifest_kind(sibling, manifest_path=sibling_path) + except ManifestAccessError as exc: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError(str(exc)) from exc + _assert_registration_manifest_valid( + sibling, + sibling_path, + output=output, + kind=sibling_kind, + ) + + _assert_no_archived_identity( + payload, manifest_path, artifact_name, access_class, sha256=checksum + ) + for sibling_path, sibling in siblings.items(): + _assert_no_archived_identity( + sibling, sibling_path, artifact_name, access_class, sha256=checksum + ) + + try: + vintage_key = resolve_vintage_key(files or {}, year) + except AmbiguousVintageKeyError as exc: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError(f"{manifest_path}: {exc}") from exc + key = vintage_key if vintage_key is not None else year + + _replace_blank_manifest_text(payload, "source_id", source_id) + _replace_blank_manifest_text(payload, "package_id", package_id) + payload["kind"] = MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND + _replace_blank_manifest_text( + payload, "dataset", _text(dataset) or f"{source_id}_{package_id}" + ) + if _text(publisher): + _replace_blank_manifest_text(payload, "publisher", publisher) + if _text(source_page): + _replace_blank_manifest_text(payload, "source_page", source_page) + if _text(table): + _replace_blank_manifest_text(payload, "table", table) + if payload.get("files") is None: + payload["files"] = {} + + entries = _existing_entries(payload["files"], key) + wanted = filename_key(artifact_name) + # Two passes keep re-registering an existing pin idempotent after a reissue + # added another entry for the same filename. + replaced = False + for index, existing in enumerate(entries): + if not isinstance(existing, Mapping): + continue + if filename_key(existing.get("filename")) != wanted: + continue + if _text(existing.get("sha256")) == checksum: + entries[index] = entry + replaced = True + break + if not replaced: + superseded = [ + existing + for existing in entries + if isinstance(existing, Mapping) + and filename_key(existing.get("filename")) == wanted + ] + if superseded and not allow_reissue: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} already registers {artifact_name!r} for " + f"{key!r} with sha256={superseded[0].get('sha256')!r}. Different " + "bytes are a new publisher release, not a pin replacement; " + "pass --allow-reissue to register both." + ) + entries.append(entry) + + payload["files"][key] = sorted(entries, key=_entry_sort_key) + for field, expected in (("source_id", source_id), ("package_id", package_id)): + if _text(payload.get(field)) != expected: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Refusing to persist {manifest_path}: final {field} is " + f"{payload.get(field)!r}, expected {expected!r}." + ) + _assert_registration_manifest_valid( + payload, + manifest_path, + output=output, + kind=MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + final=True, + ) + # Import lazily: artifact commands also depend on this module. Their owner + # validator compares effective identities both within and across manifests. + from chronicle.artifacts import ( + RecordedR2LocatorError, + SourceArtifactManifestError, + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree, + _validated_recorded_r2, + ) + + proposed_manifests = {str(path): sibling for path, sibling in siblings.items()} + proposed_manifests[str(manifest_path)] = payload + try: + # Effective-digest resolution deliberately leaves malformed locators + # to per-entry validation. Validate each one explicitly so its fallback + # cannot conceal contradictory or incomplete recorded provenance. + for name, proposed in proposed_manifests.items(): + path = Path(name) + kind, _error = safe_manifest_kind(proposed, manifest_path=path) + for vintage, _index, spec in iter_manifest_entries(proposed): + locator_arguments = { + "manifest_path": path, + "year": vintage, + "source_id": proposed.get("source_id"), + "package_id": proposed.get("package_id"), + "bind_registration_identity": kind == MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + } + locator = _validated_recorded_r2(spec, **locator_arguments) + if locator is not None and ( + locator.filename != spec.get("filename") + or ( + spec.get("sha256") is not None + and locator.sha256 != spec["sha256"] + ) + ): + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{path} entry {vintage!r}: recorded_r2_identity_mismatch" + ) + # Historical objects may have different filenames and digests, + # but each archived block must still locate one valid object. + for index, previous in enumerate(recorded_previous_r2(spec)): + try: + _validated_recorded_r2( + {"storage": {"r2": previous}}, **locator_arguments + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + raise RecordedR2LocatorError( + f"{path} entry {vintage!r} " + f"storage.previous_r2[{index}]: {exc}" + ) from exc + # Registration checks recorded identities without opening artifacts. + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree( + proposed_manifests, check_local_files=False + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{output} is not a valid package directory; refusing to persist " + f"{manifest_path}: {exc}. Fix the manifests " + "before registering into that directory." + ) from exc + return payload, replaced + + +def matching_directory_entry(directory: Any, filename: Any) -> Any | None: + """Return the actual directory entry matching a bare filename's safe key. + + Scanning real entries makes the identity rule the same on case-sensitive + and case-folding filesystems, including Unicode-normalized aliases. + """ + if not is_bare_filename(filename) or not directory.is_dir(): + return None + wanted = filename_key(filename) + matches = [ + path + for path in sorted(directory.iterdir(), key=lambda item: item.name) + if filename_key(path.name) == wanted + ] + if len(matches) > 1: + names = ", ".join(repr(path.name) for path in matches) + raise ValueError( + f"{filename!r} matches more than one physical entry ({names}); " + "the package holds conflicting spellings of one artifact identity " + "and must be repaired by hand." + ) + return matches[0] if matches else None + + +def _assert_no_local_artifact_bytes( + output: Path, + artifact_name: str, + access_class: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse any actual path alias of a hash-only artifact filename.""" + local_path = matching_directory_entry(output, artifact_name) + if local_path is None: + return + requested = "" if local_path.name == artifact_name else f" ({artifact_name!r})" + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Refusing to register {local_path.name!r}{requested} hash-only while " + f"its bytes are present at {local_path}. A {access_class} artifact's " + "bytes must not live in a Chronicle store." + ) + + +def _registration_manifest_errors( + payload: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + output: Path, + kind: str, +) -> list[str]: + """Return complete entry and manifest-level validation errors.""" + errors = list(validate_manifest_files(payload)) + for existing_key, _index, existing in iter_manifest_entries(payload): + existing_name = ( + existing.get("filename") if isinstance(existing, Mapping) else None + ) + exists = ( + is_bare_filename(existing_name) + and matching_directory_entry(output, existing_name) is not None + ) + errors.extend( + f"{existing_key!r}/{existing_name}: {code}" + for code in validate_file_entry( + existing, + kind=kind, + manifest=payload, + local_file_exists=exists, + ) + ) + return errors + + +def _assert_registration_manifest_valid( + payload: Mapping[str, Any], + manifest_path: Path, + *, + output: Path, + kind: str, + final: bool = False, +) -> None: + errors = _registration_manifest_errors(payload, output=output, kind=kind) + if not errors: + return + action = "persist" if final else "register into" + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} is not a valid {kind} manifest; refusing to {action} " + f"it: {'; '.join(errors)}. Fix it by hand before registering; " + "inventory-artifacts reports the same codes." + ) + + +def _replace_blank_manifest_text(payload: dict[str, Any], key: str, value: Any) -> None: + """Fill a missing, null, empty, or whitespace-only manifest field.""" + replacement = _text(value) + if _text(payload.get(key)) is None and replacement is not None: + payload[key] = replacement + + +def _registration_sibling_manifests( + output: Path, manifest_path: Path +) -> dict[Path, dict[str, Any]]: + """Load every physically distinct sibling after alias validation.""" + _assert_registration_target_safe(output, manifest_path) + return { + path: _load_manifest(path) + for path in package_manifest_paths(output) + if path != manifest_path + } + + +def _assert_registration_target_safe(output: Path, manifest_path: Path) -> None: + """Refuse symlinked targets and normalized aliases before reading them.""" + lexical_output = output if output.is_absolute() else Path.cwd() / output + current = Path(lexical_output.anchor) + symlink_component = None + for component in lexical_output.parts[1:]: + if component == "..": + current = current.parent + continue + current /= component + if current.is_symlink(): + symlink_component = current + break + if symlink_component is not None: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Refusing registration output {output}: path component " + f"{symlink_component} is a symbolic link. Registration writes only " + "through a physical package-directory path." + ) + if manifest_path.is_symlink(): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Refusing manifest target {manifest_path}: it is a symbolic link. " + "Registration never follows a manifest target outside its package." + ) + by_name: dict[str, Path] = {} + for path in package_manifest_paths(output): + key = filename_key(path.name) + previous = by_name.get(key) + if previous is not None and previous != path: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{previous} and {path} have the same normalized manifest " + "name. Keep exactly one physical spelling before registering." + ) + by_name[key] = path + alias = by_name.get(filename_key(manifest_path.name)) + if alias is not None and alias != manifest_path: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"Refusing manifest target {manifest_path}: existing {alias} has " + "the same normalized manifest name. Selecting one spelling would " + "hide the other." + ) + + +def _registration_lock_path(output: Path) -> Path: + """Return the persistent package-wide lock file outside the package tree.""" + # Use one identity before and after the package directory exists. NFC plus + # case-folding models the most restrictive supported filesystem, so paths + # that may be one directory on macOS/Windows always serialize; distinct + # case-sensitive paths may harmlessly share a lock. ``resolve`` still + # collapses existing symlink/parent aliases to their physical route. + canonical = unicodedata.normalize( + "NFC", str(output.resolve(strict=False)) + ).casefold() + identity = os.fsencode(canonical) + digest = hashlib.sha256(identity).hexdigest() + return ( + Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) + / "policyengine-chronicle-manifest-locks" + / f"{digest}.lock" + ) + + +@contextmanager +def _registration_lock(output: Path) -> Iterator[None]: + """Hold the package-wide manifest lock for one read/modify/replace.""" + lock_path = _registration_lock_path(output) + lock_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + with lock_path.open("a+b") as lock_file: + fcntl.flock(lock_file.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX) + try: + yield + finally: + fcntl.flock(lock_file.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN) + + +def _atomic_replace_manifest(manifest_path: Path, document: str) -> None: + """Durably replace a manifest from a same-directory temporary file.""" + _assert_registration_target_safe(manifest_path.parent, manifest_path) + mode = ( + stat.S_IMODE(manifest_path.stat().st_mode) if manifest_path.exists() else 0o644 + ) + descriptor, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp( + dir=manifest_path.parent, + prefix=f".{manifest_path.name}.", + suffix=".tmp", + ) + temporary_exists = True + try: + os.fchmod(descriptor, mode) + with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="") as temporary: + descriptor = -1 + temporary.write(document) + temporary.flush() + os.fsync(temporary.fileno()) + _assert_registration_target_safe(manifest_path.parent, manifest_path) + os.replace(temporary_name, manifest_path) + temporary_exists = False + directory_fd = os.open(manifest_path.parent, os.O_RDONLY) + try: + os.fsync(directory_fd) + finally: + os.close(directory_fd) + finally: + if descriptor >= 0: + os.close(descriptor) + if temporary_exists: + try: + os.unlink(temporary_name) + except FileNotFoundError: + pass + + +def _hash_only_attestation( + *, + hash_source: Any, + attested_by: Any, + attestation_evidence: Any, + pinned_from: Any, + verified_at: Any, + access_class: str, +) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Validate and return the attestation fields of a hash-only registration. + + Chronicle never fetched the bytes, so the checksum is always the + consumer's: attested against bytes it holds (``consumer_attested``, with + evidence and a date) or transcribed from a reviewed pin in its repository + (``consumer_pin``, with the repository, path and commit and no + verification date). + """ + try: + source = normalize_hash_source(hash_source, allowed=HASH_ONLY_HASH_SOURCES) + except ManifestAccessError as exc: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"A {access_class} registration must record how its checksum is " + f"known: {exc} Chronicle holds no bytes for it, so " + f"{HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH!r} does not apply." + ) from exc + attester = _text(attested_by) + if not attester: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"A {source} registration must name the consumer that attests the " + "checksum; pass --attested-by." + ) + if _is_chronicle(attester): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"A {source} registration is attested by the consumer whose pin it " + f"transcribes, never by {CHRONICLE_ATTESTER!r}: Chronicle holds no " + "bytes for it and verified nothing. Pass --attested-by with the " + "consumer's name." + ) + fields: dict[str, Any] = {"hash_source": source, "attested_by": attester} + if source == HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_ATTESTED: + if not _text(attestation_evidence): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A consumer_attested registration must record the consumer's " + "attestation evidence; pass --attestation-evidence." + ) + if not _text(verified_at): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A consumer_attested registration must record when the checksum " + "was verified against the bytes; pass --verified-at." + ) + fields["attestation_evidence"] = str(attestation_evidence) + fields["verified_at"] = str(verified_at) + return fields + if pinned_from is None or not isinstance(pinned_from, Mapping): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A consumer_pin registration must record where the pin was read: " + "pass --pinned-from-repository, --pinned-from-path and " + "--pinned-from-commit." + ) + errors = _pinned_from_errors(pinned_from) + if errors: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A consumer_pin registration's pinned_from must carry the " + f"repository, path and a 40-hex commit: {', '.join(errors)}." + ) + if _text(verified_at): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + "A consumer_pin registration carries no verified_at: Chronicle did " + "not verify the checksum against bytes, it transcribed the " + "consumer's pin. Record the pin's commit instead." + ) + fields["pinned_from"] = { + field: str(pinned_from[field]).strip() for field in PINNED_FROM_FIELDS + } + return fields + + +def _assert_no_archived_identity( + payload: Mapping[str, Any], + manifest_path: Path, + artifact_name: str, + access_class: str, + *, + sha256: str | None = None, +) -> None: + """Refuse to register hash-only an identity the manifest holds as public. + + A public entry may have been archived: its object sits in the raw bucket + under ``storage.r2`` (or in ``storage.previous_r2`` once revised). + Replacing that entry with a hash-only one would leave the bytes in a + Chronicle store with nothing recording them, and inventory would report + the tree clean. The transition is refused until the public entry, and the + object it names, have been explicitly removed. The identity is matched by + case-folded bare filename and by digest: the same bytes archived under + another name are the same artifact. + """ + wanted = filename_key(artifact_name) + for key, _index, existing in iter_manifest_entries(payload): + if not isinstance(existing, Mapping): + continue + existing_name = existing.get("filename") + same_name = existing_name is not None and filename_key(existing_name) == wanted + same_bytes = sha256 is not None and _text(existing.get("sha256")) == sha256 + archived_matches = [ + locator + for name, digest, locator in _recorded_object_identities(existing) + if name == wanted or (sha256 is not None and digest == sha256) + ] + if not (same_name or same_bytes or archived_matches): + continue + recorded = [ + str(block.get("uri") or block.get("key") or block) + for block in (recorded_r2(existing), *recorded_previous_r2(existing)) + if isinstance(block, Mapping) + ] + if same_name: + how = "" + elif same_bytes: + how = f" (the same bytes as {artifact_name!r})" + else: + how = f" (whose archived filename or checksum matches {artifact_name!r})" + if recorded: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} records the R2 object(s) {recorded} for " + f"{existing_name!r}{how} ({key!r}, " + f"access={safe_entry_access(existing)!r}). Registering it " + f"{access_class} would leave those bytes in a Chronicle store " + "with nothing recording them. Remove the object and its " + "storage record explicitly first; Chronicle will not reclassify " + "an archived release in place." + ) + if not is_hash_only(safe_entry_access(existing)): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} already registers {existing_name!r}{how} " + f"({key!r}) as access={safe_entry_access(existing)!r}. A change " + f"of access class to {access_class!r} is an explicit decision: " + "remove the public entry by hand, then register the release." + ) + + +def _registration_manifest_path(output: Path, manifest_filename: Any) -> Path: + """Return the manifest a registration records into, refusing a stray one. + + Mirrors ``fetch-artifact --manifest``: the name is a bare manifest name + inside the package directory, and the default name is refused beside a + package's named manifests (PolicyEngine/chronicle#225), so a + registration never creates a manifest no sweep or package reads. + """ + name = str(manifest_filename).strip() if manifest_filename is not None else "" + if not is_manifest_filename(name): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"--manifest must name {DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME} or " + f"manifest_.yaml inside the package directory, not " + f"{manifest_filename!r}." + ) + manifest_path = output / name + _assert_registration_target_safe(output, manifest_path) + if name == DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME and not manifest_path.exists(): + siblings = [ + path.name for path in package_manifest_paths(output) if path.name != name + ] + if siblings: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{output} keeps {', '.join(siblings)} and no " + f"{DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME}; pass --manifest to name the " + "manifest this registration records into rather than creating " + f"{DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME} beside them." + ) + return manifest_path + + +def _assert_manifest_identity( + payload: Mapping[str, Any], + manifest_path: Path, + key: str, + value: str, +) -> None: + """Refuse to register into a manifest that identifies a different source.""" + existing = _text(payload.get(key)) + if existing is not None and existing != value: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} declares {key}={existing!r}; refusing to register " + f"{key}={value!r} into it." + ) + + +def _entry_sort_key(entry: Any) -> tuple[str, str]: + """Return a deterministic sort key for a registration entry.""" + if not isinstance(entry, Mapping): + return ("", "") + return (_text(entry.get("filename")) or "", _text(entry.get("sha256")) or "") + + +def _registration_entry(**values: Any) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Build a deterministic, field-ordered registration entry.""" + entry: dict[str, Any] = {} + for key in _REGISTRATION_FIELD_ORDER: + value = values.get(key) + if value is None: + continue + if isinstance(value, str) and not value.strip(): + continue + entry[key] = value + return entry + + +def _existing_entries(files: Any, key: Any) -> list[Any]: + """Return the existing file entries under a vintage key as a mutable list.""" + if not isinstance(files, dict): + return [] + spec = files.get(key) + if spec is None: + return [] + if isinstance(spec, list): + return list(spec) + return [spec] + + +def _load_manifest(manifest_path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Load a manifest mapping, or an empty mapping when absent. + + Read strictly: a document with duplicate keys, or one that is not a + mapping, is a refusal rather than something to record into. + """ + if not manifest_path.exists(): + return {} + try: + payload = load_manifest_document(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError( + f"{manifest_path} is not valid YAML: {exc}" + ) from exc + if payload is None: + payload = {} + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + raise HashOnlyRegistrationError(f"Manifest must be a mapping: {manifest_path}") + return payload + + +def _text(value: Any) -> str | None: + """Return a non-empty stripped string, or None.""" + if not isinstance(value, str): + return None + text = value.strip() + return text or None + + +def _dedupe(values: Iterable[str]) -> list[str]: + """Return values with duplicates removed, preserving order.""" + seen: set[str] = set() + ordered: list[str] = [] + for value in values: + if value not in seen: + seen.add(value) + ordered.append(value) + return ordered + + +__all__ = [ + "ACCESS_CLASSES", + "ACCESS_LICENSED", + "ACCESS_PUBLIC", + "ACCESS_RESTRICTED", + "AmbiguousVintageKeyError", + "ArtifactFilenameError", + "ArtifactRegistrationReport", + "CHRONICLE_ATTESTER", + "DEFAULT_ACCESS", + "DEFAULT_MANIFEST_FILENAME", + "DEFAULT_MANIFEST_KIND", + "HASH_ONLY_HASH_SOURCES", + "HASH_SOURCES", + "HASH_SOURCE_CHRONICLE_FETCH", + "HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_ATTESTED", + "HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_PIN", + "HashOnlyRegistrationError", + "ListSpecRejected", + "MANIFEST_KINDS", + "StrictManifestLoader", + "load_manifest_document", + "MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND", + "ManifestAccessError", + "ManifestKindError", + "MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError", + "PINNED_FROM_FIELDS", + "PUBLISHER_TABLE_KIND", + "bare_filename", + "entry_access", + "filename_key", + "has_file_entries", + "hash_only_registrations", + "is_bare_filename", + "is_hash_only", + "is_manifest_filename", + "is_microdata_release", + "iter_directory_entries", + "iter_file_specs", + "iter_manifest_entries", + "matching_directory_entry", + "manifest_kind", + "normalize_access", + "normalize_hash_source", + "package_manifest_paths", + "recorded_previous_r2", + "recorded_r2", + "records_r2_object", + "register_hash_only_artifact", + "registration_id", + "resolve_vintage_key", + "safe_entry_access", + "safe_manifest_kind", + "stores_bytes", + "strict_entry_access", + "validate_file_entry", + "validate_manifest_files", + "validate_manifest_vintages", + "validate_package_directory", + "vintage_key_forms", +] diff --git a/chronicle/source_package.py b/chronicle/source_package.py index 5f6a5709..72e9dcc1 100644 --- a/chronicle/source_package.py +++ b/chronicle/source_package.py @@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations +from collections.abc import Callable import hashlib -import os from dataclasses import dataclass, replace from importlib.resources import files from io import BytesIO @@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ import httpx import yaml +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + SourceArtifactManifestError, + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree, + _effective_recorded_digest, + _validated_recorded_r2, +) from chronicle.core import ( ALLOWED_AGGREGATIONS, ALLOWED_ASSERTIONS, @@ -32,7 +38,34 @@ AggregateFact, build_label, ) +from chronicle.env import env_flag, env_value from chronicle.epoch import SCHEMA_IDS, schema_id +from chronicle.registration import ( + MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + AmbiguousVintageKeyError, + ManifestAccessError, + ManifestKindError, + MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError, + _recorded_object_identities, + entry_access, + filename_key, + hash_only_registrations, + is_bare_filename, + is_hash_only, + is_manifest_filename, + is_microdata_release, + iter_directory_entries, + iter_file_specs, + iter_manifest_entries, + load_manifest_document, + manifest_kind, + matching_directory_entry, + resolve_vintage_key, + safe_manifest_kind, + validate_file_entry, + validate_manifest_files, + validate_package_directory, +) from chronicle.sources.cells import ( SourceArtifactMetadata, SourceCell, @@ -392,8 +425,8 @@ "usda_snap/fy2025_monthly_state_caseloads" ), } -SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV = "LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR" -SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV = "LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH" +SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV = "CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR" +SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV = "CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH" DEFAULT_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR = ( Path.home() / ".cache" / "policyengine-chronicle" / "source-artifacts" ) @@ -868,31 +901,429 @@ def _source_artifact_metadata( raw_r2_uri=raw_r2.get("uri"), ) - def _artifact_content( + def _resource_root(self) -> Any: + """Resolve the resource directory, refusing an escape from the package. + + ``resource_directory`` is joined under ``files(resource_package)``; an + absolute value would discard that root entirely, a ``..`` or ``.`` + component would step outside it, and a symlinked ancestor would follow + the link out of the package tree. Every byte and manifest read goes + through here, so the containment check runs before any I/O. + """ + raw = self.resource_directory + parts = str(raw).split("/") + if ( + not isinstance(raw, str) + or not raw + or raw.startswith("/") + or "\\" in raw + or any( + not part or part in (".", "..") or part != part.strip() + for part in parts + ) + ): + raise ValueError( + f"resource_directory must be a relative path of plain segments " + f"inside the resource package, not {raw!r}." + ) + root = files(self.resource_package) + directory = root.joinpath(raw) + if isinstance(root, Path): + current = root + for part in parts: + current = current / part + if current.is_symlink(): + raise ValueError( + f"resource_directory component {current} is a symbolic " + "link. Chronicle will not read source-package data " + "through it." + ) + resolved_root = root.resolve() + if not Path(directory).resolve().is_relative_to(resolved_root): + raise ValueError( + f"resource_directory {raw!r} escapes the resource package " + f"root {resolved_root}." + ) + return directory + + def _resource_entry( self, - year: int, - ) -> tuple[bytes, str, str, dict[str, str]]: - manifest_path = files(self.resource_package).joinpath( - self.resource_directory, + value: Any, + *, + what: str, + require_manifest_name: bool = False, + forbid_manifest_name: bool = False, + ) -> Any: + """Resolve one safe file entry under the package resource directory.""" + if not is_bare_filename(value): + raise ValueError( + f"{what} must be a bare filename inside " + f"{self.resource_directory}, not {value!r}." + ) + name = str(value) + if require_manifest_name and not is_manifest_filename(name): + raise ValueError( + f"{what} must be named manifest.yaml or " + f"manifest_.yaml, not {name!r}." + ) + if forbid_manifest_name and is_manifest_filename(name): + raise ValueError( + f"{what} {name!r} is a manifest name and cannot be read as " + "source artifact bytes." + ) + + directory = self._resource_root() + existing = matching_directory_entry(directory, name) + if existing is None: + return directory.joinpath(name) + is_symlink = getattr(existing, "is_symlink", None) + if callable(is_symlink) and is_symlink(): + raise ValueError( + f"{what} {existing} is a symbolic link. Chronicle will not " + "read source-package data through it." + ) + if existing.name != name: + raise ValueError( + f"{what} {existing} has the same normalized filename as " + f"{name!r}. Keep exactly one spelling in the package." + ) + if not existing.is_file(): + raise ValueError( + f"{what} {existing} is not a regular file. Chronicle will " + "not open non-regular source-package resources." + ) + return existing + + def manifest_resource(self) -> Any: + """Return the validated manifest file this package spec points at.""" + return self._resource_entry( self.manifest, + what="Source artifact manifest", + require_manifest_name=True, ) - with manifest_path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as file: - manifest = yaml.safe_load(file) + + def manifest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Load the artifact manifest strictly as a YAML mapping.""" + with self.manifest_resource().open("r", encoding="utf-8") as file: + text = file.read() + try: + payload = load_manifest_document(text) + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + raise ValueError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{self.manifest} is not valid YAML: {exc}" + ) from exc + if payload is None: + return {} + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + raise ValueError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{self.manifest} must be a YAML " + f"mapping; it parses as a {type(payload).__name__}." + ) + return payload + + def _assert_manifest_kind_is_parseable(self, manifest: dict[str, Any]) -> None: + """Refuse a release manifest using an already-loaded payload.""" + if is_microdata_release(manifest, manifest_path=self.manifest_resource()): + raise MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{self.manifest} registers a " + "microdata release. Registration is identity only: no source " + "package parses a microdata release and no microdata rows, " + "cells, or facts enter Chronicle." + ) + + def assert_parseable_manifest(self) -> None: + """Refuse to parse a manifest that registers a microdata release. + + Microdata registration is manifest-level identity: no source package + parses a release, and no microdata row, cell, or fact enters Chronicle + (``docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md``). A manifest that + declares no kind and is not frozen kindless is refused too: the reader + never assumes a publisher table. + """ + self._assert_manifest_kind_is_parseable(self.manifest_payload()) + + def _assert_complete_manifest_valid( + self, manifest: dict[str, Any], *, manifest_name: str | None = None + ) -> None: + """Validate every current-manifest entry before selecting one to read.""" + manifest_label = manifest_name or self.manifest + directory = self._resource_root() + manifest_path = directory.joinpath(manifest_label) + kind = manifest_kind(manifest, manifest_path=manifest_path) + codes: list[str] = list(validate_manifest_files(manifest)) + files_by_year = manifest.get("files") + if isinstance(files_by_year, dict): + for key, value in files_by_year.items(): + for entry in iter_file_specs(value, kind=kind): + entry_name = ( + entry.get("filename") if isinstance(entry, dict) else None + ) + exists = matching_directory_entry(directory, entry_name) is not None + codes.extend( + f"{key!r}/{entry_name}: {code}" + for code in validate_file_entry( + entry, + kind=kind, + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=exists, + ) + ) + if codes: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{manifest_label} is not a valid " + f"{kind} manifest: {'; '.join(codes)}. No source artifact " + "bytes will be read until the complete manifest is valid." + ) + + def assert_parseable(self, year: int) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the entry a parse would read, refusing any it must not. + + Two carve-outs, decided from the manifest alone before any byte is + read: the manifest-level microdata-release kind, and the selected + entry's own access class -- a licensed or restricted entry is identity + only whatever manifest it sits in. + """ + _manifest, spec = self._parseable_entry(year) + return spec + + def _parseable_entry(self, year: int) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]: + """Return one validated manifest snapshot and its selected entry.""" + manifest = self.manifest_payload() + self._assert_manifest_kind_is_parseable(manifest) spec = _year_mapping(manifest["files"], self.artifact_year or year) - artifact_path = files(self.resource_package).joinpath( - self.resource_directory, - spec["filename"], + _assert_entry_bytes_readable(spec) + if isinstance(spec, dict): + self._resource_entry( + spec.get("filename"), + what="Source artifact filename", + forbid_manifest_name=True, + ) + self._assert_complete_manifest_valid(manifest) + self._assert_package_identities_parseable(spec, manifest) + return manifest, spec + + def _assert_package_identities_parseable( + self, + spec: Any, + manifest: dict[str, Any], + *, + sha256: str | None = None, + ) -> None: + """Refuse contradictory owners and identities that cannot be parsed. + + The boundary is the file in the package directory, not the manifest + that names it: a name or a digest registered ``licensed`` or + ``restricted`` in a sibling manifest is identity only, whichever + manifest this package reads through. Public microdata is also identity + only for parsers, including its current and archived object aliases. + An unreadable sibling is a refusal because its kind cannot be decided. + """ + if not isinstance(spec, dict): + return + directory = self._resource_root() + manifests: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {self.manifest: manifest} + for item in directory.iterdir(): + if item.name == self.manifest or not is_manifest_filename(item.name): + continue + item = self._resource_entry( + item.name, + what="Sibling source artifact manifest", + require_manifest_name=True, + ) + try: + with item.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as file: + payload = load_manifest_document(file.read()) + except (OSError, yaml.YAMLError) as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{item.name} cannot be read " + f"({exc}), so whether it registers " + f"{spec.get('filename')!r} hash-only cannot be decided; " + "fix the manifest before parsing beside it." + ) from exc + if payload is None: + payload = {} + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{item.name} is not a YAML " + "mapping, so whether it registers " + f"{spec.get('filename')!r} hash-only cannot be decided." + ) + self._assert_complete_manifest_valid(payload, manifest_name=item.name) + manifests[item.name] = payload + for name, key, entry in hash_only_registrations( + manifests, + filename=spec.get("filename"), + sha256=sha256 or spec.get("sha256"), + ): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{name} registers " + f"{entry.get('filename')!r} for {key!r} as " + f"access={entry.get('access')!r}: the same file, or the same " + f"bytes (sha256={sha256 or spec.get('sha256')!s}), as " + f"{spec.get('filename')!r}. A licensed or restricted " + "artifact is identity only, so no source package reads, caches, " + "fetches, or parses it through another manifest " + "(docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md)." + ) + declared_sha256 = spec.get("sha256") + if sha256 is None and not ( + isinstance(declared_sha256, str) and declared_sha256.strip() + ): + for name, payload in manifests.items(): + for key, _index, entry in iter_manifest_entries(payload): + if not isinstance(entry, dict) or not is_hash_only( + entry_access(entry) + ): + continue + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{self.manifest} public entry " + f"{spec.get('filename')!r} omits sha256 while " + f"{self.resource_directory}/{name} registers " + f"{entry.get('filename')!r} for {key!r} hash-only with " + f"sha256={entry.get('sha256')!s}. The public entry must " + "declare its digest before any source bytes may be read, " + "fetched, or cached beside a gated registration." + ) + wanted_name = filename_key(spec.get("filename")) + wanted_digests = { + digest + for digest in ( + sha256, + spec.get("sha256"), + _effective_recorded_digest(self.manifest, self.artifact_year, spec), + ) + if digest + } + for name, key, _index, entry in iter_directory_entries(manifests): + kind, _error = safe_manifest_kind( + manifests[name], manifest_path=directory.joinpath(name) + ) + if kind != MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND or not isinstance(entry, dict): + continue + identities = [ + (filename_key(entry.get("filename")), entry.get("sha256")), + *( + (name, digest) + for name, digest, _ in _recorded_object_identities(entry) + ), + ] + if any( + name == wanted_name or digest in wanted_digests + for name, digest in identities + ): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{name} registers a microdata " + f"release for {key!r} sharing the filename or checksum of " + f"{spec.get('filename')!r}, including recorded R2 history. " + "No source package reads, fetches, caches, or parses " + "microdata through another manifest, even when public." + ) + if not wanted_digests: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory}/{self.manifest} entry " + f"{spec.get('filename')!r} has no recorded digest beside " + f"microdata release {name}. Record its checksum before " + "reading, fetching, or caching bytes whose identity " + "cannot yet exclude that release." + ) + collision_errors = validate_package_directory( + manifests, entry_digest=_effective_recorded_digest ) - content = _read_source_artifact_content(artifact_path, spec) + if collision_errors: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{self.resource_directory} is not a valid package directory: " + f"{'; '.join(collision_errors)}. No source artifact bytes will " + "be read until every manifest agrees on shared filenames and " + "digests." + ) + try: + _assert_package_file_owner_identities_agree( + manifests, + observed_sha256=( + {str(spec["filename"]): sha256} if sha256 is not None else None + ), + check_local_files=False, + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError(str(exc)) from exc + + def _artifact_content( + self, + year: int, + ) -> tuple[bytes, str, str, dict[str, str]]: + manifest, spec = self._parseable_entry(year) + filename = spec.get("filename") + artifact_path = self._resource_entry( + filename, + what="Source artifact filename", + forbid_manifest_name=True, + ) + manifest_path = Path(self.resource_directory) / self.manifest + try: + recorded_r2 = _validated_recorded_r2( + spec, + manifest_path=manifest_path, + year=self.artifact_year or year, + source_id=str(manifest.get("source_id") or ""), + package_id=str(manifest.get("package_id") or ""), + ) + except SourceArtifactManifestError as exc: + raise ManifestAccessError(str(exc)) from exc expected_sha = spec.get("sha256") + if recorded_r2 is not None and ( + recorded_r2.filename != filename + or (expected_sha is not None and recorded_r2.sha256 != expected_sha) + ): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {self.artifact_year or year!r} " + "storage.r2 identifies " + f"sha256={recorded_r2.sha256}, filename={recorded_r2.filename!r}; " + f"the entry identifies sha256={expected_sha!r}, " + f"filename={spec['filename']!r}. No source bytes will be read " + "through a locator for another artifact." + ) + if recorded_r2 is not None: + expected_sha = recorded_r2.sha256 + # The immutable object supplies the checksum when the manifest + # omits it, so a publisher mismatch is refused before cache writes. + spec = {**spec, "sha256": expected_sha} + + def validate_content_owner_identities(content: bytes) -> None: + self._assert_package_identities_parseable( + spec, + manifest, + sha256=hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + ) + + content = _read_source_artifact_content( + artifact_path, + spec, + validate_content=validate_content_owner_identities, + ) + actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() if expected_sha: _validate_source_artifact_sha( content, expected_sha=str(expected_sha), - filename=str(spec["filename"]), + filename=str(filename), ) - storage = spec.get("storage") if isinstance(spec, dict) else None - raw_r2 = storage.get("r2") if isinstance(storage, dict) else {} + if recorded_r2 is not None and recorded_r2.sha256 != actual_sha: + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"{manifest_path} entry {self.artifact_year or year!r} " + f"storage.r2 identifies sha256={recorded_r2.sha256}, but " + f"{spec['filename']!r} contains sha256={actual_sha}. Refusing " + "to emit immutable source provenance for different bytes." + ) + raw_r2 = ( + { + "provider": recorded_r2.provider, + "bucket": recorded_r2.bucket, + "key": recorded_r2.key, + "uri": recorded_r2.uri, + } + if recorded_r2 is not None + else {} + ) return content, spec["filename"], spec["source_url"], raw_r2 or {} def _sheet_name(self, filename: str, *, year: int) -> str: @@ -1230,6 +1661,58 @@ def validate_source_package( errors=tuple(errors), ) + try: + package.artifact.assert_parseable_manifest() + except (MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError, ManifestKindError) as exc: + errors.append( + SourcePackageIssue( + code=( + "microdata_release_not_parseable" + if isinstance(exc, MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError) + else "manifest_kind_missing" + ), + message=str(exc), + ) + ) + return SourcePackageValidationReport( + package_id=package.package_id, + package_path=str(package.package_path), + year=year, + counts=counts, + errors=tuple(errors), + warnings=tuple(warnings), + ) + except (FileNotFoundError, OSError, ValueError) as exc: + errors.append( + SourcePackageIssue( + code="source_artifact_manifest_unreadable", + message=str(exc), + ) + ) + else: + try: + package.artifact.assert_parseable(year) + except ManifestAccessError as exc: + # Decided from the manifest alone: no package tree, cache, or + # publisher is consulted for an entry a parser must never read. + errors.append( + SourcePackageIssue( + code="hash_only_artifact_not_parseable", + message=str(exc), + ) + ) + return SourcePackageValidationReport( + package_id=package.package_id, + package_path=str(package.package_path), + year=year, + counts=counts, + errors=tuple(errors), + warnings=tuple(warnings), + ) + except (FileNotFoundError, KeyError, OSError, ValueError): + # Reported below by the artifact read itself. + pass + try: package.artifact._artifact_content(year) except (FileNotFoundError, KeyError, OSError, ValueError) as exc: @@ -2236,28 +2719,91 @@ def _required(payload: dict[str, Any], key: str, context: str) -> Any: def _year_mapping(files_by_year: dict[Any, Any], year: int) -> dict[str, str]: - if year in files_by_year: - return files_by_year[year] - if str(year) in files_by_year: - return files_by_year[str(year)] - raise ValueError(f"No source artifact for year {year}") + """Return the file spec for ``year``, whichever key spelling records it. + + ``2023`` and ``'2023'`` are one vintage; a manifest that records both is + refused rather than silently read through the integer key, which would + hide whichever entry -- often the one carrying the R2 history -- a writer + left under the other spelling. + """ + try: + key = resolve_vintage_key(files_by_year, year) + except AmbiguousVintageKeyError as exc: + raise ValueError(f"Source artifact for year {year}: {exc}") from exc + if key is None: + raise ValueError(f"No source artifact for year {year}") + return _single_year_spec(files_by_year[key], year) + + +def _assert_entry_bytes_readable(spec: Any) -> None: + """Refuse to read a hash-only entry's bytes from any store. + + This is the lowest byte-reader boundary: it runs before the package tree, + the content-addressed cache, or the publisher is consulted, so a licensed + or restricted entry is never read, cached, fetched, or parsed -- whatever + manifest kind it sits under. An access class Chronicle cannot parse is + refused too, never read as public. + """ + if not isinstance(spec, dict): + return + access = entry_access(spec) + if is_hash_only(access): + raise ManifestAccessError( + f"Source artifact {spec.get('filename')!r} is registered as " + f"access={access!r}. Its bytes must not enter a Chronicle store or " + "a parser: a licensed or restricted artifact is identity only, so " + "no source package reads, caches, fetches, or parses it " + "(docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md)." + ) + + +def _single_year_spec(spec: Any, year: int) -> dict[str, str]: + """Return one file spec, refusing the multi-file microdata-release shape. + + Only a ``kind: microdata_release`` manifest may list several files under one + vintage, and no source package parses one of those, so a list here is a + malformed publisher-table manifest rather than something to index into. + """ + if isinstance(spec, list): + raise ValueError( + f"Source artifact for year {year} is a list of {len(spec)} entries. " + "Only a kind: microdata_release manifest may list several files " + "under one vintage, and no source package parses one." + ) + return spec def _read_source_artifact_content( artifact_path: Any, spec: dict[str, Any], + *, + validate_content: Callable[[bytes], None] | None = None, ) -> bytes: - """Read a source artifact from package data, cache, or explicit fetch.""" + """Read a source artifact from package data, cache, or explicit fetch. + + Refuses a hash-only entry before touching any of the three: none of them + may hold its bytes, and the fetch branch would write them into the cache. + The optional package-owner check runs on every content path before a + return or cache write. + """ + _assert_entry_bytes_readable(spec) try: - return artifact_path.read_bytes() + content = artifact_path.read_bytes() except FileNotFoundError: pass + else: + if validate_content is not None: + validate_content(content) + return content cache_path = _source_artifact_cache_path(spec) if cache_path.exists(): - return cache_path.read_bytes() + content = cache_path.read_bytes() + if validate_content is not None: + validate_content(content) + return content - if not _truthy_env(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV): + if not env_flag(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV): raise FileNotFoundError( f"Source artifact {spec['filename']} is not packaged and was not " f"found in {cache_path}. Set {SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV}=1 to fetch " @@ -2272,6 +2818,8 @@ def _read_source_artifact_content( expected_sha=str(expected_sha), filename=str(spec["filename"]), ) + if validate_content is not None: + validate_content(content) cache_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) cache_path.write_bytes(content) return content @@ -2279,7 +2827,7 @@ def _read_source_artifact_content( def _source_artifact_cache_path(spec: dict[str, Any]) -> Path: cache_root = Path( - _env_value( + env_value( SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, default=DEFAULT_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR, ) @@ -2316,21 +2864,6 @@ def _validate_source_artifact_sha( ) -def _env_value(*names: str, default: str | Path) -> str | Path: - for name in names: - value = os.environ.get(name) - if value: - return value - return default - - -def _truthy_env(*names: str) -> bool: - return any( - os.environ.get(name, "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"} - for name in names - ) - - def _single_archive_member(archive: ZipFile, *, suffixes: tuple[str, ...]) -> str: members = [ name diff --git a/chronicle/suite.py b/chronicle/suite.py index 157b7420..731b553d 100644 --- a/chronicle/suite.py +++ b/chronicle/suite.py @@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ build_fact_key, validate_facts, ) -from chronicle.database import ChronicleDbBuildReport, build_chronicle_db +from chronicle.database import ( + CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME, + ChronicleDbBuildReport, + build_chronicle_db, +) from chronicle.epoch import canonicalize_key from chronicle.sources.cells import ( SourceCell, @@ -285,6 +289,10 @@ def build_source_suite( source_package = try_load_source_package(source) source_id = source_package.package_id if source_package else source output_path = Path(output_dir) + if source_package is not None: + # Validate, then touch: a package whose artifact must not be parsed is + # refused before the output directory is created or replaced. + source_package.artifact.assert_parseable(year) _prepare_output_dir(output_path, replace=replace) reports_path = output_path / "reports" reports_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) @@ -372,7 +380,7 @@ def build_source_suite( concept_report.to_dict(), ) - db_path = output_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = output_path / CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME db_report = build_chronicle_db( facts, db_path, @@ -1675,7 +1683,7 @@ def _write_package_sidecars(output_path: Path, *, source: str, year: int) -> Non output_path / "source_regions.jsonl", output_path / "facts.jsonl", output_path / "consumer_facts.jsonl", - output_path / "ledger.db", + output_path / CHRONICLE_DB_FILENAME, output_path / "reports" / "source_rows.json", output_path / "reports" / "source_cells.json", output_path / "reports" / "source_regions.json", diff --git a/db/cli.py b/db/cli.py index 52257240..66538149 100644 --- a/db/cli.py +++ b/db/cli.py @@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ def cmd_query(args): def _pe_source_root_env_default(jurisdiction: str) -> str | None: + from chronicle.env import env_value + from .pe_source_inventory import ( PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV, PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV, - _env_value, ) env_var = PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV if jurisdiction == "us" else PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV - return _env_value(env_var) + return env_value(env_var) def main(): diff --git a/db/data/dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml b/db/data/dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..604adda3 --- /dev/null +++ b/db/data/dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +source_id: dwp +package_id: dwp-frs-2023-24 +kind: microdata_release +dataset: dwp_dwp-frs-2023-24 +publisher: Department for Work and Pensions +table: Family Resources Survey 2023-24 +files: + 2023: + - filename: accounts.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: c5e31932bfd06087f835d2c83c0984c85a93409bf5ef85b699cb0958abcba1ea + size_bytes: 1807921 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: adult.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: e09f9647d03585c81a528636028b2ed495f8f1fbcf64c5e7b4fe521b67367e06 + size_bytes: 35323384 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: benefits.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: ff30d054cc659bcf23b44c492d98cfd701c0bfdb63e8e9aa9769b490ba9d636b + size_bytes: 4460292 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: benunit.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: 88946815eace8561516d5cbb442c27e319c1e90abc381fb2338f0126e3b9e05b + size_bytes: 21213867 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: child.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: b5dc84fe8b002ee925e61fae23fed27b11537af9fb174f1d07d9cc1748b9702e + size_bytes: 2913156 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: chldcare.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: 566e0ebca1d5e2f3e424e556c91f4cb583d17dadfdfa59feb3841eda7e5976a3 + size_bytes: 273837 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: extchild.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: 8d358d7ee66ee4a7ceab87b4f24fbbf21ac86dc038dc7831e51fb271f96a57ec + size_bytes: 18677 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: househol.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: 5fd26b8b675f33b3b30c9ac789a18da17de734790f77e00ded287d1c3a187b30 + size_bytes: 12387117 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: job.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: 88b77ffe06865f029f713bb1d55ff12bdea8a1234de5bc293e72458fe64f3a74 + size_bytes: 10934873 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: maint.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: f2dc924eb5a51b0c357791693d15b431327dc39c6421011efb313d88bf839695 + size_bytes: 15440 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: mortgage.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: ce36b477d67837c469608a0d68f7ef269ac04758974235f1157d2f6b92cdbfdc + size_bytes: 631783 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: oddjob.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: b4ba3dd3151f73a01422983c60514a3e38458ddfa4fb33ae4ed0326873406305 + size_bytes: 5165 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: penprov.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: ee001461c40306ec24b38b2881e1774121114266a2ee449d606cd0a811c37731 + size_bytes: 522313 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. + - filename: pension.tab + access: licensed + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence + vintage: '2023_24' + sha256: 150d6fad1fce81254fb7aea1526fbb00b63d4027d6e2ac4c26bb90aea3127eb7 + size_bytes: 1225838 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes + stay in the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle + credential grants access to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 + study: UK Data Service SN 9367 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json + commit: 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 + notes: Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; + its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages + cite 'SN 9252' for the same 2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across + all five stages (identical SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference + that also carries a DOI. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed + pin; Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum. diff --git a/db/data/hmrc/spi_public_use_tape_2022_23/manifest.yaml b/db/data/hmrc/spi_public_use_tape_2022_23/manifest.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3080319e --- /dev/null +++ b/db/data/hmrc/spi_public_use_tape_2022_23/manifest.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +source_id: hmrc +package_id: hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23 +kind: microdata_release +dataset: hmrc_hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23 +publisher: HM Revenue and Customs +table: Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape 2022-23 +files: + 2022: + - filename: put2223uk.tab + access: restricted + licence: UK Data Service End User Licence (study SN 9422) + vintage: 2022-23 + sha256: 5ef829461060c91a2a47be59ad541d9b519fc3976d66ca80d4920f711bb96f66 + size_bytes: 141323762 + access_route: UK Data Service study SN 9422. Microcosm reaches the bytes through + PolicyEngine's licensed copy in the private policyengine/policyengine-uk-data-private + Hugging Face repository (spi_2022_23.zip); no Chronicle credential grants access + to them. + doi: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9422-1 + study: UK Data Service SN 9422 + hash_source: consumer_pin + attested_by: PolicyEngine/microcosm + pinned_from: + repository: PolicyEngine/microcosm + path: packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json + commit: de7451bd19ca46d2967e73cdf393908d29e72542 + notes: 'Microcosm classes this artifact kind: private_microdata with access: private_local_input. + Chronicle registers it restricted because the bytes are held only in a private + mirror; if the UKDS terms for SN 9422 are confirmed as End User Licence it can + be reclassified licensed, which changes nothing about storage — both classes + are hash-only. SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer''s reviewed pin; + Chronicle holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum.' diff --git a/db/pe_source_inventory.py b/db/pe_source_inventory.py index a52fff23..f64ed870 100644 --- a/db/pe_source_inventory.py +++ b/db/pe_source_inventory.py @@ -2,14 +2,15 @@ from __future__ import annotations -import os from pathlib import Path +from chronicle.env import env_value + from .schema import Jurisdiction from .source_files import SourceArtifactSpec, make_slug, make_url_slug -PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV = "LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT" -PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV = "LEDGER_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT" +PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV = "CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT" +PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV = "CHRONICLE_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT" SOURCE_SUFFIXES = { ".csv", @@ -272,21 +273,13 @@ ] -def _env_value(*names: str) -> str | None: - for name in names: - value = os.environ.get(name) - if value: - return value - return None - - def _resolve_required_root( root: Path | None, *, flag: str, env_var: str, ) -> Path: - value = root if root is not None else _env_value(env_var) + value = root if root is not None else env_value(env_var) if value is None: raise ValueError(f"{flag} or {env_var} is required.") path = Path(value).expanduser() @@ -612,8 +605,8 @@ def pe_source_specs( ) -> list[SourceArtifactSpec]: """Return source files used by the PE-US and PE-UK calibration pipelines.""" specs: list[SourceArtifactSpec] = [] - us_configured = pe_us_root is not None or _env_value(PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV) - uk_configured = pe_uk_root is not None or _env_value(PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV) + us_configured = pe_us_root is not None or env_value(PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV) + uk_configured = pe_uk_root is not None or env_value(PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV) if include_us and (us_configured or not include_uk or not uk_configured): specs.extend(pe_us_source_specs(pe_us_root)) if include_uk and (uk_configured or not include_us or not us_configured): diff --git a/db/supabase_client.py b/db/supabase_client.py index e14bb5bb..a8c5dbeb 100644 --- a/db/supabase_client.py +++ b/db/supabase_client.py @@ -4,11 +4,15 @@ Provides connection to PolicyEngine Supabase database for: - Source metadata and dataset registries - Target inputs + +``LEDGER_SCHEMA`` and ``TARGETS_SCHEMA`` remain as deprecated compatibility +snapshots of the environment at import time. Runtime code should call +``chronicle_schema()`` and ``targets_schema()`` so environment overrides are +resolved at the time of use. """ from __future__ import annotations -import os from dataclasses import dataclass from functools import lru_cache from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional @@ -16,18 +20,40 @@ from supabase import create_client, Client +from chronicle.env import default_chronicle_schema, env_value + +TARGETS_SCHEMA_ENV = "POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA" +DEFAULT_TARGETS_SCHEMA = "targets" + + +def chronicle_schema() -> str: + """Resolve the hosted Chronicle schema for a query. + + Read at call time, not bound at import: an import-time constant fixes the + schema at whatever the environment held when this module was first + imported, which the caller does not control (in the test suite that moment + is collection, before any fixture has isolated the environment). The + hosted schema is still named "ledger" -- only the variable that overrides + it has moved to the chronicle prefix, and renaming the schema value is a + later slice of PolicyEngine/chronicle#143. + """ + return default_chronicle_schema() + -def _env(*names: str) -> str | None: - """Read PolicyEngine-owned storage config.""" - for name in names: - value = os.environ.get(name) - if value: - return value - return None +def targets_schema() -> str: + """Resolve the hosted targets schema. Read at call time, as above. + ``POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA`` names a surface outside the ledger rename + window, so it is read literally. + """ + return env_value(TARGETS_SCHEMA_ENV, default=DEFAULT_TARGETS_SCHEMA) -LEDGER_SCHEMA = _env("POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA") or "ledger" -TARGETS_SCHEMA = _env("POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA") or "targets" + +# Deprecated import compatibility. Preserve the historical import-time +# environment snapshot for downstream code that still imports these names; +# Chronicle's own query paths use the lazy resolvers above. +LEDGER_SCHEMA = chronicle_schema() +TARGETS_SCHEMA = targets_schema() @dataclass @@ -49,14 +75,14 @@ def from_env(cls) -> "SupabaseConfig": Raises: ValueError: If required environment variables are missing """ - url = _env("POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL") + url = env_value("POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL") if not url: raise ValueError( "POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL not set. " "Set this to your Supabase project URL." ) - secret_key = _env( + secret_key = env_value( "POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY", "POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY", ) @@ -114,7 +140,7 @@ def query_sources( List of source records """ client = get_supabase_client() - query = _table(client, LEDGER_SCHEMA, "sources").select("*") + query = _table(client, chronicle_schema(), "sources").select("*") if jurisdiction: query = query.eq("jurisdiction", jurisdiction) @@ -143,7 +169,9 @@ def query_strata( List of strata records with nested constraints """ client = get_supabase_client() - query = _table(client, TARGETS_SCHEMA, "strata").select("*, stratum_constraints(*)") + query = _table(client, targets_schema(), "strata").select( + "*, stratum_constraints(*)" + ) if jurisdiction: query = query.eq("jurisdiction", jurisdiction) @@ -172,7 +200,7 @@ def query_targets( """ client = get_supabase_client() # Nested join: strata with their stratum_constraints - query = _table(client, TARGETS_SCHEMA, "targets").select( + query = _table(client, targets_schema(), "targets").select( "*, strata(*, stratum_constraints(*)), sources(*)" ) @@ -219,7 +247,7 @@ def insert_targets_batch( for i in range(0, len(targets), chunk_size): chunk = targets[i : i + chunk_size] - _table(client, TARGETS_SCHEMA, "targets").insert(chunk).execute() + _table(client, targets_schema(), "targets").insert(chunk).execute() total += len(chunk) return total diff --git a/docs/agent-source-package-harness.md b/docs/agent-source-package-harness.md index 5f300356..4f396781 100644 --- a/docs/agent-source-package-harness.md +++ b/docs/agent-source-package-harness.md @@ -14,21 +14,189 @@ lineage, provenance, constraints, and a passing `build-suite` report. The first gate for a new package is source-artifact acquisition. Agents should register raw source files with `uv run chronicle fetch-artifact` before authoring selectors. This writes the local artifact, captures checksum and retrieval -metadata in `manifest.yaml`, and can upload the exact bytes to the private -`ledger-raw` R2 bucket when Wrangler is authenticated. Agents can audit the local +metadata in `manifest.yaml`, and can upload the exact bytes to the private raw +R2 bucket (`ledger-raw` today; overridable with `CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET`) when +Wrangler is authenticated. A publisher directory that feeds several source +packages keeps one manifest each, so pass `--manifest ` to address +the right one. Agents can audit the local artifact registry with `uv run chronicle inventory-artifacts --root db/data`. For already-downloaded manifest artifacts, agents should run `uv run chronicle publish-raw --root db/data` to upload checksum-verified bytes to R2 and write `storage.r2` metadata back into each manifest entry. +Both commands treat a manifest entry as a claim about specific bytes: by its +declared `sha256` from the moment it is registered, and by the content-addressed +key of its recorded `storage.r2` block once it is published. Re-fetching or +publishing bytes the entry does not identify is refused; when a publisher has re-published +under the same URL and vintage, register the revision with +`uv run chronicle fetch-artifact ... --record-revision`, which stores the new +bytes under their own key and keeps the superseded object in +`storage.previous_r2`. See +[Publisher Revisions](storage-architecture.md#publisher-revisions). + Builds do not require production raw bytes to be committed to Git. Source packages first read packaged fixture bytes, then -`LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` (defaulting to +`CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` (defaulting to `~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/source-artifacts`). If a manifest artifact is -missing locally, set `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH=1` to fetch it from the +missing locally, set `CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH=1` to fetch it from the manifest `source_url`, verify the declared SHA-256, and write it to that cache. -The old `CHRONICLE_`-prefixed environment variables remain accepted only as -migration fallbacks. +The ledger-era spellings `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` and +`LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH` are still honored during the rename window and +emit a one-time deprecation warning naming the `CHRONICLE_` variable to set +instead; see "Environment Variable Rename Window" in +[`docs/storage-architecture.md`](storage-architecture.md#environment-variable-rename-window). + +## Manifest Kinds + +Every manifest declares `kind`: `publisher_table` (one file per vintage, +parsed by a source package) or `microdata_release` (a registered release, +never parsed). The manifests that predate this rule are frozen, byte for +byte, in `chronicle/grandfathered_manifests.py` and read as publisher tables +only while they still match the freeze; `fetch-artifact` writes `kind` onto +any manifest it touches, so a frozen manifest leaves the freeze the first time +it is modified. A kindless manifest outside that list is an error at every +entry point — `fetch-artifact`, `publish-raw`, `inventory-artifacts`, +`validate-package` and the source-package byte reader — and never a publisher +table by default. A manifest that declares no file entry yet (a bare +`files:` line or an empty mapping) has nothing to classify, and the command +writing its first entry declares the kind. A manifest's kind is fixed once +declared: `fetch-artifact --kind` must match it, and a conflicting kind is +refused before anything is read. + +## Hash-Only Registrations + +Not every raw artifact a build starts from may be redistributed. Every +manifest file entry carries an `access` class from a closed set — `public`, +`licensed`, or `restricted` — and a `licence` naming the publisher's terms. +`public` is inferred when a publisher-table entry omits `access`, and +`fetch-artifact` writes the class explicitly onto every entry it touches. +Both fields are required on a `kind: microdata_release` manifest, as is the +attestation of who asserts the checksum: `hash_source` is one of +`chronicle_fetch` (`attested_by: chronicle`, `verified_at` = fetch date), +`consumer_attested` (`attested_by` = the consumer, `attestation_evidence`, +`verified_at`) or `consumer_pin` (`attested_by` = the consumer, `pinned_from` += repository, path and commit, and no `verified_at`). + +Only `public` bytes enter a Chronicle store. A `licensed` or `restricted` +artifact is registered *hash-only*: the manifest records the checksum, size, +vintage, licence, access route, and attestation, and no bytes are fetched, +written, or uploaded. Chronicle never fetched the bytes, so a hash-only +checksum is always the consumer's. Agents should register one with: + +```bash +uv run chronicle register-artifact \ + --source-id dwp \ + --package-id dwp-frs-2023-24 \ + --year 2023 \ + --out-dir db/data/dwp/frs_2023_24 \ + --filename adult.tab \ + --sha256 e09f9647d03585c81a528636028b2ed495f8f1fbcf64c5e7b4fe521b67367e06 \ + --size-bytes 35323384 \ + --vintage 2023_24 \ + --licence "UK Data Service End User Licence" \ + --access licensed \ + --doi 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2 \ + --hash-source consumer_pin \ + --attested-by PolicyEngine/microcosm \ + --pinned-from-repository PolicyEngine/microcosm \ + --pinned-from-path packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json \ + --pinned-from-commit 2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77 +``` + +Agents should never invent a checksum to satisfy the command: `--sha256` must +be a lowercase 64-character digest taken from a reviewed pin, and a release +whose checksum nobody has published is a blocker to record, not a value to +guess. The command refuses `--access public`, refuses bytes sitting beside the +manifest, refuses to write into a `publisher_table` manifest, and refuses to +reclassify a filename the manifest already holds as `public` — an archived +release's object must be removed, with its `storage` record, before the entry +can become hash-only. + +Filenames are bare names compared case-insensitively: `./adult.tab`, +`ADULT.TAB` and `sub/../adult.tab` are the file `adult.tab`, and a manifest +never holds one path under two access classes. `2023` and `'2023'` are one +vintage key; a manifest that records both is refused rather than read through +one of them. Every command validates the whole manifest with the codes +`inventory-artifacts` reports before reading, writing, or uploading anything. + +The other commands enforce the same boundary from their side. `fetch-artifact` +refuses a `licensed` or `restricted` access class before reading anything, and +refuses to pull bytes over an entry already registered hash-only — including +when the filename is inferred from the URL, which happens before the read. +`publish-raw` refuses such an entry without reading or uploading its bytes; +pass `--skip-hash-only` to publish a tree that deliberately mixes both kinds. +`inventory-artifacts` treats a hash-only entry with no local file as valid — +the absent bytes are the correct state — and reports an error if the bytes +appear. The source-package byte reader refuses a hash-only entry before +consulting the package tree, the content-addressed cache, or the publisher, +whatever manifest kind it sits under; `validate-package` reports it as +`hash_only_artifact_not_parseable`, and `build-suite` refuses before creating +its output directory. + +A `public` microdata release is different: its bytes are redistributable, so +they are archived — but only with artifact-bound evidence. Being downloadable +is not a licence. The `licence` must be one of the allowlisted terms in +`chronicle/licences.py` (`US-Government-Work`, `OGL-UK-3.0`, `CC0-1.0`, +`CC-BY-4.0`), and the entry carries `licence_evidence` binding this file to +that term: the issuer, the licence identifier, a scope statement, a durable +evidence URL, and the reviewed SHA-256. The fetch therefore takes +`--expected-sha256` and refuses, before writing or uploading, bytes that hash +differently; `--record-revision` does not override that. Release bytes are +staged in a transient directory outside the repository +(`$CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR`, default +`~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/microdata-staging`) and uploaded from there; +a file of that name beside the manifest is refused as tracked microdata bytes, +and the test suite guards that no release package tracks anything but its +manifest. Pass `--kind microdata_release` so the manifest declares what it is: + +```bash +uv run chronicle fetch-artifact \ + --url https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2022/1-Year/csv_hus.zip \ + --source-id census_acs \ + --package-id census-acs-pums-2022-1yr \ + --year 2022 \ + --out-dir db/data/census/acs_pums_2022_1yr \ + --publisher "U.S. Census Bureau" \ + --vintage 2022 \ + --access public \ + --licence US-Government-Work \ + --kind microdata_release \ + --expected-sha256 \ + --licence-evidence-issuer "U.S. Census Bureau" \ + --licence-evidence-scope "Public-use file of a federal agency; 17 U.S.C. §105" \ + --licence-evidence-url \ + --upload-r2 +``` + +The entry records `hash_source: chronicle_fetch`, `attested_by: chronicle` +and the fetch date. A public release without licence evidence is classed +`licensed` and registered hash-only instead. + +Because several files can share one vintage, a `kind: microdata_release` +manifest gives `files[year]` as a list of entries rather than a single +mapping — the ACS household and person files above land side by side. A list +under any other manifest kind is an error. A fetch replaces only the entry for +its own filename, in place, so acquiring a second file never drops the first, +and re-fetching different bytes for one of them is a publisher revision under +the same guard as any other entry. + +No source package parses a microdata release. `validate-package` fails with +`microdata_release_not_parseable` if a package spec points at one, and no +microdata row, cell, or fact ever enters Chronicle. Registration is +manifest-level identity; see `docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md`. + +`scripts/register_microdata_releases.py` drives both halves from a read-only +PolicyEngine/microcosm checkout: `emit` writes the hash-only manifests from +Microcosm's reviewed pins as `consumer_pin` registrations (recording the +consumer manifest's path and the last commit that changed it, or the commit +given with `--microcosm-commit [PATH=]COMMIT`), and `plan` prints the +`fetch-artifact` commands to run for public releases from a networked machine +with every reviewed identity as an argument. Anything Microcosm does not pin +prints as a `TODO` the command refuses to run with. The suite exercises the +script against `tests/fixtures/microcosm`, a synthetic snapshot of the +consumer manifests; re-deriving the catalogue means re-snapshotting that +fixture and regenerating `tests/fixtures/microcosm/golden_plan.json` in the +same change. For broad PE source migration, generate the agent queue from the manifest before assigning work: @@ -645,16 +813,19 @@ uv run chronicle build-suite packages/irs_soi/table_1_1 \ --require-axiom-validation ``` -The SQLite `ledger.db` is the source of hosted mirrors. To prepare tables for +The SQLite `chronicle.db` is the source of hosted mirrors. To prepare tables for Supabase/Postgres bulk loading, export the DB artifact rather than inserting cells through the Supabase client: ```bash -uv run chronicle export-db-tables --db /tmp/chronicle-suite/ledger.db --out /tmp/chronicle-mirror --replace +uv run chronicle export-db-tables --db /tmp/chronicle-suite/chronicle.db --out /tmp/chronicle-mirror --replace ``` -Accepted build-suite outputs can be published to the private `ledger-derived` R2 -bucket after validation: +Builds produced before the rename wrote `ledger.db`. That name is still read and +published unchanged, so point `--db` at whichever file the build emitted. + +Accepted build-suite outputs can be published to the private derived R2 bucket +after validation: ```bash uv run chronicle publish-derived \ @@ -665,11 +836,11 @@ uv run chronicle publish-derived \ --build-artifacts-out /tmp/chronicle-build-artifacts.jsonl ``` -The SQL schema is checked in at -`supabase/migrations/20260504_chronicle_bronze.sql`. Spreadsheet publications are -stored as immutable artifact metadata and one parsed-cell row per workbook cell. -Agents should not try to normalize irregular government worksheets into tidy -sheet tables before selector specs interpret them. +Before loading, create and apply a Supabase/Postgres migration that creates the +mirror tables in the selected schema. Spreadsheet publications are stored as +immutable artifact metadata and one parsed-cell row per workbook cell. Agents +should not try to normalize irregular government worksheets into tidy sheet +tables before selector specs interpret them. After the DB export and derived publish, agents can validate and load the hosted mirror: @@ -685,8 +856,11 @@ uv run chronicle load-supabase-mirror \ ``` The live load requires `POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL` and -`POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY`, the Chronicle mirror migration applied, and the -`chronicle` schema exposed by the Supabase Data API. +`POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY`, the deployment migration applied, and the +selected schema exposed by the Supabase Data API. With no schema environment +override and no `--schema`, the selected schema is `ledger`; set +`CHRONICLE_SCHEMA=chronicle` or pass `--schema chronicle` to load a migrated +`chronicle` schema. ## Declarative Authoring Contract diff --git a/docs/data-sources/be-silc-2023-registration-blocker.md b/docs/data-sources/be-silc-2023-registration-blocker.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53ad7ae4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/data-sources/be-silc-2023-registration-blocker.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +# BE-SILC 2023: Registration Blocker + +The Belgian SILC scientific-use files are a `restricted_microdata` root of +Microcosm's Belgian build, so they belong in Chronicle's microdata registry +under `docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md`. They are **not +registered yet**, and this document records why. + +## Blocker + +A registration is identified by `{source_id, package_id, year, sha256, +filename}`. Microcosm's pin carries none of the last two. The whole artifact +entry in `packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/be/source_stages.json` +(stage `silc_load`) is: + +```json +{ + "format": "csv_or_spss", + "kind": "restricted_microdata", + "licence": "Statbel/Eurostat scientific-use; restricted — private artifacts only", + "locator": "Statbel BE-SILC scientific-use files: D (household register), R (personal register), H (household data), P (personal data)", + "vintage": "2023" +} +``` + +There is no `sha256`, no `size_bytes`, and no per-file `filename` — the +locator names four file *roles*, not four files. Every other pinned microdata +artifact in Microcosm carries a reviewed checksum; this one does not. + +`chronicle register-artifact` refuses the release rather than accepting a +placeholder, and `scripts/register_microdata_releases.py` reports it as a +blocker instead of emitting a manifest. No checksum is invented for a file +Chronicle has never seen and may never hold. + +## What The Registration Will Record Once Unblocked + +Everything except the identity is already known and is held in the script's +catalogue entry `statbel-be-silc-2023`: + +| Field | Value | +|-------|-------| +| `source_id` | `statbel` | +| `package_id` | `statbel-be-silc-2023` | +| `year` | 2023 | +| `access` | `restricted` | +| `licence` | Statbel/Eurostat scientific-use | +| `vintage` | 2023 | +| `source_page` | | +| `access_route` | Statbel BE-SILC scientific-use files: D, R, H, P | + +The access class is `restricted`, so the registration is hash-only whatever +the checksums turn out to be: no BE-SILC bytes enter any Chronicle store, and +no `ledger-raw` key exists for them. + +## To Unblock + +1. Microcosm publishes a reviewed SHA-256, size, and exact filename for each of + the four scientific-use files, in `be/source_stages.json` (tracked on the + consumer side in PolicyEngine/microcosm#848). +2. Re-run the emitter, which will pick the pins up with no catalogue change: + + ```bash + uv run python scripts/register_microdata_releases.py \ + --microcosm-root ~/PolicyEngine/microcosm \ + --root db/data \ + --release statbel-be-silc-2023 \ + emit + ``` + + The registration is a `consumer_pin`: it names PolicyEngine/microcosm as + the attester and records the consumer manifest's path and the commit the + pins were read from; it carries no `verified_at` of its own. + +3. Delete the `blocker` field from the `statbel-be-silc-2023` catalogue entry, + and delete this document. + +Until then `uv run chronicle inventory-artifacts --root db/data` reports 15 +hash-only registrations — the 14 DWP Family Resources Survey 2023-24 tabs and +the HMRC Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape 2022-23 — and BE-SILC is +absent by design. diff --git a/docs/storage-architecture.md b/docs/storage-architecture.md index cf898933..ab54db25 100644 --- a/docs/storage-architecture.md +++ b/docs/storage-architecture.md @@ -9,17 +9,24 @@ class of Chronicle data belongs. Chronicle uses three storage layers with different jobs. -`ledger-raw` is the immutable source-byte archive. It stores exact publisher +The raw archive is the immutable source-byte store. It holds exact publisher artifacts as fetched: workbooks, CSVs, PDFs, ZIPs, HTML snapshots, and similar government-statistics release files. Raw objects are content-addressed by checksum and should never be overwritten in place. -`ledger-derived` is the reproducible artifact archive. It stores build outputs +The derived archive is the reproducible artifact store. It holds build outputs that Chronicle can regenerate from raw bytes, package specs, parser code, and build configuration. Examples include parsed-cell or parsed-row Parquet/JSONL files, -source record outputs, `ledger.db`, mirror JSONL exports, QA reports, Data +source record outputs, `chronicle.db`, mirror JSONL exports, QA reports, Data Package metadata, and RO-Crate metadata. +Both bucket names are configuration, not constants. The raw archive is +`$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET` and the derived archive is +`$CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET`; the shipped defaults are still the ledger-era +`ledger-raw` and `ledger-derived`. [Bucket Cutover](#bucket-cutover) records how +those defaults move to `chronicle-raw` and `chronicle-derived` and why the +ledger-era buckets are preserved read-only rather than retired. + Supabase/Postgres is the queryable relational registry for accepted Chronicle builds. It stores rows that applications, agents, and downstream systems need to search and join: source artifacts, source rows/cells, source records, @@ -32,8 +39,8 @@ Hosted tables mirror accepted build outputs and provide a shared query surface. ## Ownership Matrix -| Data class | Git/local package | `ledger-raw` R2 | `ledger-derived` R2 | SQLite `ledger.db` | Supabase/Postgres | -|------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------| +| Data class | Git/local package | Raw R2 | Derived R2 | SQLite `chronicle.db` | Supabase/Postgres | +|------------|-------------------|--------|------------|-----------------------|-------------------| | Source package specs | Authoritative YAML and parser code | No | Optional packaged snapshot | No | Metadata only | | Raw publisher files | Tiny fixtures only | Authoritative bytes | No | Metadata only | Metadata plus R2 pointer | | Source manifests | Authoritative checked metadata | No | Optional snapshot | Metadata loaded into tables | Queryable artifact registry | @@ -62,8 +69,10 @@ raw/nz/ird/ird-working-for-families-statistics-sept-2025/2024/{sha256}/working-f The implemented country segments are `nz` and `uk`. US objects deliberately retain the legacy shape `raw/{source_id}/...`; migrating those keys requires a separate consumer audit. The fetch and raw-publish commands infer the country -from the package publisher directory. Raw publication refuses to replace a -manifest-recorded key that disagrees with the inferred country path. +from the package publisher directory for new objects. A manifest-recorded raw +object is preserved as history when its content-addressed checksum and filename +tail identify the local bytes, including legacy routes that predate the country +prefix and publisher-explicit routes such as Statbel's 2023 snapshots. New UK and New Zealand derived build artifacts use the same country segment and build-scoped keys so different builds can coexist and be audited: @@ -76,14 +85,147 @@ Examples: ```text derived/uk/ons/ons-mye-2024-uk/2024/{build_id}/source_cells.jsonl -derived/nz/ird/ird-working-for-families-statistics-sept-2025/2024/{build_id}/ledger.db +derived/nz/ird/ird-working-for-families-statistics-sept-2025/2024/{build_id}/chronicle.db ``` Legacy US derived keys likewise remain `derived/{source_id}/...`. +The derived prefix defaults to `derived` and can be configured with +`CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX`, using the same legacy environment fallback as +the bucket. Publisher and consumer validation must share this route configuration: +facts citing a configured derived bucket or prefix are refused. The archived +`ledger-derived`, `chronicle-derived`, and `derived/` routes remain derived. +An explicit `publish-derived --r2-bucket ... --r2-prefix ...` combination must +use a recognized derived bucket or prefix; configure a custom route through +the environment before publishing it. This keeps custom build locations +identifiable at the publisher-fact boundary. + Derived artifacts are reproducible and may be replaced by a new build, but a specific `{build_id}` path should be immutable once published. +A registered microdata release uses the same content-addressed key as any +other raw artifact, and it exists only when the release's `access` class is +`public`. A Census public-use file is a US publisher, so it keeps the legacy +shape: + +```text +raw/census_cps/census-cps-asec-2023/2023/{sha256}/asecpub23csv.zip +``` + +A `licensed` or `restricted` release has no key at all. Its registration is +`{source_id, package_id, year, sha256, filename}` recorded in `manifest.yaml`, +and no object is written to either bucket — so the DWP Family Resources Survey +tabs, which would otherwise route to `raw/uk/dwp/...`, occupy no key. See +`docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md`. + +A public release's key exists only once the fetch has verified the bytes +against the reviewed `--expected-sha256` its `licence_evidence` covers. Its +bytes never enter the repository: they are staged under +`$CHRONICLE_MICRODATA_STAGING_DIR` (default +`~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/microdata-staging`), keyed like the R2 object, +and uploaded from there. The source-artifact cache under +`~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/source-artifacts` is a Chronicle store too: +the byte reader refuses a licensed or restricted entry before it would read, +fetch into, or serve from that cache. + +## Publisher Revisions + +A raw key embeds the sha256 of the bytes it holds, so a manifest's recorded +`storage.r2` block is a claim about specific bytes, not a pointer to a file +name. Publishers do not always honor that: on 2026-09-02 the IRS re-published +`22in05ira.xlsx` and `22in06ira.xlsx` under their existing URLs +(PolicyEngine/chronicle#225). + +`fetch-artifact` therefore compares the entry's recorded identity with the +bytes it just fetched, before it writes anything. That identity is the recorded +key's `{sha256}/{filename}` tail once the entry has been published, and the +entry's own declared `sha256` before then — an entry that was registered +without an upload, or whose upload failed, still identifies its bytes, and gets +the same protection: + +- **Identical** — the recorded block is preserved exactly, whichever bucket is + configured now. Re-fetching after the bucket rename copies bytes; it does not + restate where they were first published. +- **Different** — the fetch is refused. Nothing is overwritten: not the cached + artifact, not the manifest entry, and no object is uploaded. The error names + the recorded and the fetched `sha256`/`size_bytes`. Per + `docs/adr-chronicle-fact-identity-v2.md`, the same vintage with new bytes is a + new release revision, so registering it is a decision an operator makes, not a + silent rewrite. + +`--record-revision` makes that decision explicit. The fetched bytes get their +own content-addressed key under the configured bucket — never the recorded key — +and the superseded block moves to `storage.previous_r2`: + +```yaml +files: + 2022: + filename: 22in05ira.xlsx + sha256: + size_bytes: + fetched_at: "2026-09-02T17:04:11+00:00" + storage: + r2: + provider: r2 + bucket: chronicle-raw + key: raw/irs_soi/soi-table-5/2022//22in05ira.xlsx + uri: r2://chronicle-raw/raw/irs_soi/soi-table-5/2022//22in05ira.xlsx + previous_r2: + - provider: r2 + bucket: ledger-raw + key: raw/irs_soi/soi-table-5/2022//22in05ira.xlsx + uri: r2://ledger-raw/raw/irs_soi/soi-table-5/2022//22in05ira.xlsx + sha256: + size_bytes: + fetched_at: "2026-06-11T14:22:05+00:00" + source_url: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/22in05ira.xlsx + superseded_at: "2026-09-02T17:04:11+00:00" +``` + +`storage.r2` only ever names the object that holds the entry's current bytes, +and `previous_r2` lists superseded objects oldest first, so the bytes an +archived witness record pinned stay addressable at the URI it pinned. Every +reader — `inventory-artifacts`, `publish-raw`, source-package artifact loading, +and the suite's raw-R2-link acceptance check — reads `storage.r2` alone, so a +revised entry reads exactly like an unrevised one; `publish-raw` preserves the +rest of the `storage` block when it writes back. + +`publish-raw` applies the same identity check before treating a recorded block +as history. A local file the recorded object does not hold is reported as +`recorded_r2_identity_mismatch` and nothing is uploaded: registering a revision +is a fetch-time decision, not a publish-time rewrite. + +### Which manifest + +Most packages keep one `manifest.yaml`. A publisher directory that feeds +several source packages keeps one manifest each — +`db/data/irs_soi/ira_contributions/` holds +`manifest_traditional_source_package.yaml` beside +`manifest_roth_source_package.yaml`. `fetch-artifact --manifest ` +selects the entry whose publisher metadata the fetch updates; defaulting to +`manifest.yaml` there would write a third manifest neither package reads. A +physical artifact can also be owned by several entries in that directory (the +tracked USDA SNAP archive spans two manifests, and SSA extracts have semantic +aliases within one). Chronicle compares every such owner before overwriting the +file. A changed archive is refused by default; `--record-revision` updates every +owner to the new checksum and preserves each owner's own R2 block in +`storage.previous_r2`. The manifest selector must be a filename inside +`--out-dir`, not a path. + +### What a recorded block has to say + +A `storage.r2` block must explicitly say `provider: r2` and carry an `r2://` +URI. Its `provider`, `bucket`, `key` and `uri` all describe one object, so every +additional field that is present is cross-checked against the URI: the key +against its path, the bucket against its authority, the provider against its +scheme, and the resulting key against the content-addressed +`{sha256}/{filename}` shape. A block whose fields disagree does not answer +"which bytes does this entry claim R2 holds", so it is an error rather than +something to preserve or publish under. Likewise a manifest that parses as +anything other than a mapping is refused rather than treated as absent — +reading it as absent would let the next fetch replace the file with a single +entry. + ## Relational Registry Contract The hosted `chronicle` schema should be the lookup surface for Chronicle, not the place @@ -104,9 +246,10 @@ The registry should expose: authority, legal vintage, and evidence; - build metadata, validation status, and derived artifact R2 bucket/key/URI. -The current Supabase migration mirrors the core relational tables and includes -R2 location fields for raw source artifacts and derived build artifacts, so the -registry can serve as the shared index over both R2 buckets. +A deployment migration for the selected Supabase schema must mirror the core +relational tables and include R2 location fields for raw source artifacts and +derived build artifacts, so the registry can serve as the shared index over +both R2 buckets. ## Build And Publish Flow @@ -114,20 +257,24 @@ The intended flow is: 1. Register raw source artifacts with `uv run chronicle fetch-artifact`, which writes local bytes, records checksums in `manifest.yaml`, and can upload the - exact bytes to `ledger-raw`. Existing manifest-declared artifacts can be + exact bytes to the raw archive. Re-fetching an entry whose bytes the + publisher has changed is refused unless the revision is registered with + `--record-revision`; see [Publisher Revisions](#publisher-revisions). + Existing manifest-declared artifacts can be checksum-validated, uploaded, and linked with `uv run chronicle publish-raw`. Production package specs may omit raw bytes from Git as long as the manifest keeps `source_url` and SHA-256 metadata; builds can fill - `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` by setting - `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH=1`. The old `CHRONICLE_`-prefixed environment - variables remain accepted only as migration fallbacks. + `CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` by setting + `CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH=1`. Ledger-era spellings of both still work; + see [Environment Variable Rename Window](#environment-variable-rename-window). 2. Validate and build a source package with `uv run chronicle validate-package` and `uv run chronicle build-suite`. 3. Produce local deterministic outputs: parsed rows/cells, source records, - aggregate facts, `ledger.db`, QA reports, Data Package metadata, and RO-Crate - metadata. + aggregate facts, `chronicle.db`, QA reports, Data Package metadata, and + RO-Crate metadata. Builds before this rename wrote `ledger.db`; every reader + still accepts that name. 4. Export relational mirror files with `uv run chronicle export-db-tables`. -5. Publish derived build outputs to `ledger-derived`: +5. Publish derived build outputs to the derived archive: ```bash uv run chronicle publish-derived \ @@ -146,9 +293,181 @@ The intended flow is: --build-artifacts /tmp/chronicle-build-artifacts.jsonl ``` -The Supabase project must have the checked migration applied and the `chronicle` -schema exposed in PostgREST/Data API settings before the REST loader can write -to it. Use `--dry-run` to verify local JSONL files without writing. +The Supabase project must have a deployment migration for the selected schema +applied and that schema exposed in PostgREST/Data API settings before the REST +loader can write to it. The load defaults to `ledger`; set +`CHRONICLE_SCHEMA=chronicle` or pass `--schema chronicle` to target a migrated +`chronicle` schema. Use `--dry-run` to verify local JSONL files without writing. + +## Environment Variable Rename Window + +Every Chronicle setting is read chronicle-first by one shared helper, +`chronicle/env.py`. For a setting `X`, the lookup order is: + +1. `CHRONICLE_X` +2. `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_X` +3. `LEDGER_X` + +The first name that holds a non-empty value wins. When that name is a ledger-era +one, the process emits a single `ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning` naming the +`CHRONICLE_`-prefixed variable to set instead. The warning fires once per legacy +name per process, and it subclasses `FutureWarning` rather than +`DeprecationWarning` so it actually reaches operators running the CLI. + +Two consequences are worth stating outright, because both are the reverse of +what a naive fallback would do: + +- The `CHRONICLE_` name wins even when its value reads false. An operator who + has migrated can set `CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH=0` and have the flag + turn off, without first hunting down a stale `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH=1` + somewhere in their profile. +- An empty value counts as unset, so exporting an empty `CHRONICLE_` name does + not mask a set legacy name. + +| Chronicle name | Ledger-era names still accepted | Meaning | +|----------------|--------------------------------|---------| +| `CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` | `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR` | Where fetched raw bytes are cached; defaults to `~/.cache/policyengine-chronicle/source-artifacts` | +| `CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH` | `LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH` | Fetch a missing manifest artifact from its `source_url` during a build | +| `CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT` | `LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT` | Local checkout root for PE US source inventory | +| `CHRONICLE_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT` | `LEDGER_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT` | Local checkout root for PE UK source inventory | +| `CHRONICLE_SCHEMA` | `POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA`, `LEDGER_SCHEMA` | Postgres schema the Supabase client reads and `load-supabase-mirror` writes; defaults to `ledger` | +| `CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET` | `LEDGER_R2_RAW_BUCKET` | Raw R2 archive bucket; defaults to `ledger-raw` | +| `CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET` | `LEDGER_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET` | Derived R2 archive bucket; defaults to `ledger-derived` | + +The two R2 rows are new in this window rather than renamed: those buckets were +hardcoded before, so the ledger-era spellings are accepted for consistency, not +because anything ever set them. + +Variables carrying none of the three prefixes are read literally. This helper +renames the ledger-era surface, not every PolicyEngine variable, so +`POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL`, `POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY` and +`POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA` keep their names and gain no aliases. + +The hosted schema *value* is a separate migration. `CHRONICLE_SCHEMA` renames +the variable that overrides the schema; the schema still defaults to `ledger`, +and the mirror table names are unchanged. Those move in a later slice +coordinated with the CI writers. + +Every reader of the setting resolves it the same way, at call time. That +includes the writer: `load-supabase-mirror` takes its `--schema` default from +`CHRONICLE_SCHEMA`, so setting the variable to rehearse a cutover moves the +mirror load with the client rather than leaving it pointed at `ledger`. An +explicit `--schema` still wins. + +## Bucket Cutover + +Chronicle's operational stores migrate by dual-run +(PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism 3): stand up the chronicle-named home, +backfill it, repoint writers, retire the old home. The R2 buckets take one +exception to the last step. Archived witness records pin raw R2 URLs by hash, so +`ledger-raw` and `ledger-derived` are preserved read-only forever rather than +deleted, and manifests keep the `storage.r2` URIs they already recorded as +historical truth. A backfill copies bytes into the new bucket; it never rewrites +where those bytes were first published. `publish-raw` and `fetch-artifact` +enforce that: a recorded block that addresses the bytes in hand is preserved +whichever bucket is configured, and `publish-raw` reports such an entry as +`skipped` (already published under the recorded bucket) rather than restating +it under a different one, so a sweep over a fully published tree stays green +after the flip. Bytes that the recorded object does not hold are not that +object's history at all; see [Publisher Revisions](#publisher-revisions). + +The cutover therefore has one irreversible-looking step that is in fact additive +(creating and filling the new buckets), one cheap reversible step (flipping the +defaults, which is a one-line change in `chronicle/artifacts.py`), and no +deletion step at all. + +### 1. Create the new buckets + +Bucket creation needs a Cloudflare login carrying R2 permissions, so it is an +operator step rather than something CI can do. `wrangler.toml` already pins the +PolicyEngine account (`account_id = "20d90f557651969925eece96e58e24dc"`), so no +`CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID` is needed even for a user who belongs to several +accounts: + +```bash +bunx wrangler login +uv run chronicle bootstrap-r2 --raw-bucket chronicle-raw --derived-bucket chronicle-derived +``` + +`bootstrap-r2` verifies authentication with `wrangler whoami` before creating +anything, and creating a bucket that already exists is not an error. + +### 2. Enumerate what has to be copied + +Tracked manifests are the authoritative registry of raw objects. Every one of +them points at `ledger-raw` today: + +```bash +git ls-files '*manifest*.yaml' '*manifest*.yml' \ + | xargs grep -ho 'r2://ledger-raw/[^"'"'"' ]*' | sort -u > /tmp/chronicle-raw-objects.txt +wc -l < /tmp/chronicle-raw-objects.txt +``` + +That is 186 distinct objects at `ff3efd3`, spread over 154 manifest files. Recount +rather than trusting the number: source packages land continuously, and each new +package adds objects. + +The derived bucket needs no backfill. Derived artifacts are reproducible by +definition and are already keyed by `{build_id}`, so a rebuild republishes them +into whichever bucket is configured. + +### 3. Backfill-copy the raw objects + +Keys are content-addressed and identical across buckets, so the copy is a +straight get/put per object: + +```bash +mkdir -p /tmp/chronicle-r2-backfill +while read -r uri; do + key=${uri#r2://ledger-raw/} + dest=/tmp/chronicle-r2-backfill/$key + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$dest")" + bunx wrangler r2 object get "ledger-raw/$key" --file "$dest" --remote + bunx wrangler r2 object put "chronicle-raw/$key" --file "$dest" --remote +done < /tmp/chronicle-raw-objects.txt +``` + +### 4. Verify the copy against the keys themselves + +Every raw key ends `.../{sha256}/{filename}`, so the key is its own checksum +witness and verification needs no manifest lookup: + +```bash +while read -r uri; do + key=${uri#r2://ledger-raw/} + expected=$(printf '%s\n' "$key" | awk -F/ '{print $(NF-1)}') + actual=$(shasum -a 256 "/tmp/chronicle-r2-backfill/$key" | cut -d' ' -f1) + [ "$expected" = "$actual" ] || echo "MISMATCH $key" +done < /tmp/chronicle-raw-objects.txt +``` + +Silence means every downloaded object hashes to the checksum its key claims. +That covers the read from `ledger-raw`; to cover the write to `chronicle-raw`, +re-download each key from the new bucket into a second directory and rerun the +same loop against it. + +### 5. Flip the defaults, in a follow-up PR + +Once the new buckets are filled and verified, change `DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET` and +`DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET` in `chronicle/artifacts.py` to `chronicle-raw` and +`chronicle-derived`. Until then, operators can opt in per-shell: + +```bash +export CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET=chronicle-raw +export CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET=chronicle-derived +``` + +New raw publications land in the new bucket from that point. Manifests written +before the flip keep pointing at `ledger-raw`, which is why the old bucket stays +readable. A `publish-raw --root db/data` sweep after the flip reports every +already-published entry as `skipped` with its recorded `ledger-raw` location +(`skipped_count` in the report) and exits 0; only bytes that no recorded object +holds are uploaded, into `chronicle-raw`. + +### 6. Set the ledger-era buckets read-only + +`ledger-raw` and `ledger-derived` keep serving archived witness records after the +flip. They should accept no further writes and should never be deleted. ## Non-Goals diff --git a/scripts/register_microdata_releases.py b/scripts/register_microdata_releases.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9cb25721 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/register_microdata_releases.py @@ -0,0 +1,1299 @@ +"""Register raw microdata releases from a Microcosm source-stages manifest. + +Chronicle registers every raw microdata release its consumers build from and +stores the bytes of only those a publisher permits it to redistribute +(``docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md``). This script drives both +halves of that from the pins Microcosm already reviewed: + +``emit`` + Write hash-only ``kind: microdata_release`` manifests for ``licensed`` and + ``restricted`` releases. Every checksum, size, filename, and vintage is read + verbatim from the Microcosm source-stages JSON; nothing is recomputed and + nothing is invented. Each registration is a ``consumer_pin``: it names the + consumer as the attester and records the repository, path, and commit the + pin was read from, and carries no verification date of its own. A release + Microcosm pins without a checksum is reported as a blocker and never + registered. + +``plan`` + Print the exact ``chronicle fetch-artifact ... --upload-r2`` commands to run + from a networked machine for ``public`` releases, whose bytes Chronicle does + archive. Every command carries the reviewed identity as arguments: the + publisher, the vintage, and -- when Microcosm's pin is of the publisher + bytes -- ``--expected-sha256`` and ``--expected-size-bytes``, so the fetch + refuses a reissue before archiving it. Publisher URLs are copied verbatim + from the Microcosm manifest; a release whose manifest carries no URL, no + publisher-bytes checksum, or no licence-evidence URL prints a ``TODO`` + instead of a guess, and that command cannot run until the TODO is filled. + +The catalogue below is the only authored content: it maps a Microcosm artifact +onto Chronicle's ``{source_id, package_id, year, sha256, filename}`` identity +and records the publisher's terms. Run it read-only against a Microcosm +checkout; this script never writes to that repository. + +Usage:: + + python scripts/register_microdata_releases.py emit \\ + --microcosm-root ~/PolicyEngine/microcosm \\ + --root db/data + + python scripts/register_microdata_releases.py plan \\ + --microcosm-root ~/PolicyEngine/microcosm --root db/data +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +from collections.abc import Iterator, Mapping, Sequence +from dataclasses import dataclass, field +import json +from pathlib import Path +import re +import shlex +import subprocess +import sys +from typing import Any +from urllib.parse import urlsplit + +# Allow `python scripts/register_microdata_releases.py` from a checkout. +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)) + +from chronicle.artifacts import default_r2_raw_bucket # noqa: E402 +from chronicle.registration import ( # noqa: E402 + ACCESS_PUBLIC, + HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_PIN, + MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + HashOnlyRegistrationError, + register_hash_only_artifact, +) + +#: The consumer whose reviewed pins every registration here transcribes. +CONSUMER_REPOSITORY = "PolicyEngine/microcosm" + +#: Placeholders a planned command prints where Microcosm pins nothing. Each is +#: refused by fetch-artifact as written, so a command carrying one cannot run +#: until a reviewer replaces it. +TODO_PUBLISHER_URL = "TODO_PUBLISHER_URL" +TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 = "TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256" +TODO_EVIDENCE_URL = "TODO_EVIDENCE_URL" + +#: Allowlisted licence identifier for a public-use file of a U.S. federal +#: statistical agency (chronicle/licences.py). +US_GOVERNMENT_WORK = "US-Government-Work" + +_COMMIT_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$") + +#: Microcosm's per-artifact ``kind`` mapped onto Chronicle's access class. +#: +#: ``private_microdata`` maps to ``restricted`` rather than ``licensed``: the +#: bytes are held only in a private mirror, and over-classifying is the safe +#: direction because both classes are registered hash-only and neither ever +#: places bytes in a Chronicle store. +ACCESS_BY_MICROCOSM_KIND: dict[str, str] = { + "public_microdata": "public", + "licensed_microdata": "licensed", + "private_microdata": "restricted", + "restricted_microdata": "restricted", +} + +#: Provenance sentence written onto every registration this script emits. +HASH_PROVENANCE = ( + "SHA-256 transcribed verbatim from the consumer's reviewed pin; Chronicle " + "holds no bytes for this release and did not recompute the checksum." +) + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ArtifactSelector: + """Locate one artifact inside a Microcosm source-stages JSON file. + + ``stage`` names the build stage; ``match`` is a set of artifact fields that + must equal the given values. ``compare_across_kinds`` lets a release detect + an access-kind disagreement among otherwise matching cross-stage references + before enforcing ``kind``. A selector that matches nothing, or matches + inconsistent bytes across stages, is a hard error rather than a guess. + """ + + stage: str | None = None + match: Mapping[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict) + kind: str | None = None + compare_across_kinds: bool = False + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class Release: + """One Chronicle registration drawn from a Microcosm pin.""" + + release_id: str + manifest: str + selector: ArtifactSelector + source_id: str + package_id: str + package_dir: str + year: int + table: str + publisher: str + licence: str + access: str + #: Artifact field holding the publisher filename, when not ``filename``. + filename_field: str = "filename" + #: Artifact field holding the publisher URL, for ``public`` releases. + url_field: str = "locator" + study: str | None = None + doi: str | None = None + source_page: str | None = None + access_route: str | None = None + vintage: str | None = None + notes: str | None = None + #: Whether Microcosm's pinned ``sha256`` is of the publisher artifact + #: itself. It is not when the pin covers a derived file or an extracted + #: archive member, and such a hash must never be presented as the checksum + #: a fetch should reproduce. + pinned_sha_is_publisher_bytes: bool = True + #: Licence evidence for a public release: who issued the file under the + #: allowlisted term, the scope statement, and the durable evidence URL. + #: A missing URL prints a TODO in the plan; it is never guessed. + licence_evidence_issuer: str | None = None + licence_evidence_scope: str | None = None + licence_evidence_url: str | None = None + #: Set when Microcosm pins the release without a checksum. + blocker: str | None = None + + +UK_STAGES = "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json" +UK_HMRC_STAGES = ( + "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json" +) +BE_STAGES = "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/be/source_stages.json" +US_STAGES = "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us/source_stages.json" +US_ACS_2024 = ( + "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us_runtime/acs_2024_1yr_sources.json" +) + +#: FRS 2023-24 tabs, in the order Microcosm's ``frs_spine`` stage lists them. +FRS_TABS: tuple[str, ...] = ( + "accounts", + "adult", + "benefits", + "benunit", + "child", + "chldcare", + "extchild", + "househol", + "job", + "maint", + "mortgage", + "oddjob", + "penprov", + "pension", +) + +FRS_LICENCE = "UK Data Service End User Licence" +FRS_STUDY = "UK Data Service SN 9367" +FRS_DOI = "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2" +FRS_ACCESS_ROUTE = ( + "UK Data Service study SN 9367 under its End User Licence. Bytes stay in " + "the licensed environment the consumer already operates; no Chronicle " + "credential grants access to them." +) +FRS_NOTES = ( + "Microcosm's frs_spine stage cites 'UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI " + "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2'; its frs_employment, frs_council_tax, " + "frs_education, and frs_legacy_proxies stages cite 'SN 9252' for the same " + "2023_24 tabs. The tabs are the same bytes across all five stages (identical " + "SHA-256), so the registration carries the study reference that also carries " + "a DOI. " + HASH_PROVENANCE +) + +CENSUS_SCOPE = ( + "Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal " + "agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. §105." +) +FED_SCOPE = ( + "Public data set published by the Board of Governors of the Federal " + "Reserve System, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government " + "under 17 U.S.C. §105." +) + +CATALOGUE: tuple[Release, ...] = ( + *( + Release( + release_id=f"dwp-frs-2023-24:{tab}", + manifest=UK_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + kind="licensed_microdata", + match={"table": tab}, + compare_across_kinds=True, + ), + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + package_dir="dwp/frs_2023_24", + year=2023, + table="Family Resources Survey 2023-24", + publisher="Department for Work and Pensions", + licence=FRS_LICENCE, + access="licensed", + filename_field="locator", + study=FRS_STUDY, + doi=FRS_DOI, + access_route=FRS_ACCESS_ROUTE, + notes=FRS_NOTES, + ) + for tab in FRS_TABS + ), + Release( + release_id="hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23:put2223uk", + manifest=UK_HMRC_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="hmrc_spi_income", + kind="private_microdata", + match={"filename": "put2223uk.tab"}, + ), + source_id="hmrc", + package_id="hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23", + package_dir="hmrc/spi_public_use_tape_2022_23", + year=2022, + table="Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape 2022-23", + publisher="HM Revenue and Customs", + licence="UK Data Service End User Licence (study SN 9422)", + access="restricted", + study="UK Data Service SN 9422", + doi="10.5255/UKDA-SN-9422-1", + access_route=( + "UK Data Service study SN 9422. Microcosm reaches the bytes through " + "PolicyEngine's licensed copy in the private " + "policyengine/policyengine-uk-data-private Hugging Face repository " + "(spi_2022_23.zip); no Chronicle credential grants access to them." + ), + notes=( + "Microcosm classes this artifact kind: private_microdata with " + "access: private_local_input. Chronicle registers it restricted " + "because the bytes are held only in a private mirror; if the UKDS " + "terms for SN 9422 are confirmed as End User Licence it can be " + "reclassified licensed, which changes nothing about storage — both " + "classes are hash-only. " + HASH_PROVENANCE + ), + ), + Release( + release_id="statbel-be-silc-2023", + manifest=BE_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="silc_load", + kind="restricted_microdata", + ), + source_id="statbel", + package_id="statbel-be-silc-2023", + package_dir="statbel/be_silc_2023", + year=2023, + table="BE-SILC 2023 scientific-use files (D, R, H, P)", + publisher="Statbel", + licence="Statbel/Eurostat scientific-use", + access="restricted", + source_page="https://statbel.fgov.be/en/themes/households/poverty-and-living-conditions", + access_route=( + "Statbel BE-SILC scientific-use files: D (household register), " + "R (personal register), H (household data), P (personal data)." + ), + blocker=( + "Microcosm's be/source_stages.json pins the BE-SILC scientific-use " + "files with no sha256, no size_bytes, and no per-file filename — it " + "names only the four file roles. A registration is identified by " + "{source_id, package_id, year, sha256, filename}, so this release " + "cannot be registered until the consumer publishes a reviewed " + "checksum per file. No hash is invented here." + ), + ), + # ---- public releases: bytes are archived, so these are fetch-and-upload ---- + Release( + release_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="weeks_unemployed_input", + kind="public_microdata", + match={"member": "pppub23.csv"}, + ), + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + package_dir="census/cps_asec_2023", + year=2023, + table="CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2023 public-use files", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + source_page="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/data/datasets.html", + ), + Release( + release_id="census-cps-basic-monthly-2024", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="org_wages", + kind="public_microdata", + ), + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-basic-monthly-2024", + package_dir="census/cps_basic_monthly_2024", + year=2024, + table="CPS basic monthly public-use files, January-December 2024", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + source_page="https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2024/basic/", + notes=( + "Microcosm pins the twelve monthly files as the locator string " + "'jan24pub through dec24pub' with no per-file URL, filename " + "extension, or checksum. The publisher directory is the stage " + "source; the twelve filenames must be read off that directory " + "before the fetch commands can be completed." + ), + ), + Release( + release_id="census-acs-pums-2022-household", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="acs_rent", + kind="versioned_derived_microdata", + ), + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + package_dir="census/acs_pums_2022_1yr", + year=2022, + table="ACS 2022 1-Year PUMS household file", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + url_field="official_household_source", + source_page="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs", + pinned_sha_is_publisher_bytes=False, + notes=( + "The Microcosm artifact's own sha256 belongs to the derived " + "acs_2022.h5, not to the publisher zip; only the publisher URL is " + "reused here. The fetch computes the release checksum." + ), + ), + Release( + release_id="census-acs-pums-2022-person", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="acs_rent", + kind="versioned_derived_microdata", + ), + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + package_dir="census/acs_pums_2022_1yr", + year=2022, + table="ACS 2022 1-Year PUMS person file", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + url_field="official_person_source", + source_page="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs", + pinned_sha_is_publisher_bytes=False, + notes=( + "The Microcosm artifact's own sha256 belongs to the derived " + "acs_2022.h5, not to the publisher zip; only the publisher URL is " + "reused here. The fetch computes the release checksum." + ), + ), + Release( + release_id="census-acs-pums-2024-household", + manifest=US_ACS_2024, + selector=ArtifactSelector(match={"role": "household"}), + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2024-1yr", + package_dir="census/acs_pums_2024_1yr", + year=2024, + table="ACS 2024 1-Year PUMS household file", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + url_field="url", + vintage="2024", + source_page="https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/", + ), + Release( + release_id="census-acs-pums-2024-person", + manifest=US_ACS_2024, + selector=ArtifactSelector(match={"role": "person"}), + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2024-1yr", + package_dir="census/acs_pums_2024_1yr", + year=2024, + table="ACS 2024 1-Year PUMS person file", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + url_field="url", + vintage="2024", + source_page="https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/", + ), + Release( + release_id="federal-reserve-scf-2022-summary", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="scf_wealth", + kind="public_microdata", + match={"member": "rscfp2022.dta"}, + ), + source_id="federal_reserve", + package_id="federal-reserve-scf-2022", + package_dir="federal_reserve/scf_2022", + year=2022, + table="Survey of Consumer Finances 2022 summary extract", + publisher="Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", + licence_evidence_scope=FED_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + source_page="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm", + ), + Release( + release_id="federal-reserve-scf-2022-full", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="scf_wealth", + kind="public_microdata", + match={"member": "p22i6.dta"}, + ), + source_id="federal_reserve", + package_id="federal-reserve-scf-2022", + package_dir="federal_reserve/scf_2022", + year=2022, + table="Survey of Consumer Finances 2022 full public data set", + publisher="Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", + licence_evidence_scope=FED_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + source_page="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm", + notes=( + "Microcosm records no checksum for this zip: 'Full-file SHA-256 " + "pending one network-enabled provisioning fetch'. The fetch below " + "computes and registers it." + ), + ), + Release( + release_id="census-sipp-2023", + manifest=US_STAGES, + selector=ArtifactSelector( + stage="scf_wealth", + kind="public_microdata", + match={"member": "pu2023.csv"}, + ), + source_id="census_sipp", + package_id="census-sipp-2023", + package_dir="census/sipp_2023", + year=2023, + table="Survey of Income and Program Participation 2023 public-use file", + publisher="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence=US_GOVERNMENT_WORK, + licence_evidence_issuer="U.S. Census Bureau", + licence_evidence_scope=CENSUS_SCOPE, + access=ACCESS_PUBLIC, + source_page="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp.html", + pinned_sha_is_publisher_bytes=False, + notes=( + "Microcosm reaches this file through an immutable Hugging Face " + "mirror (revision 21280dca5995e978d706740a8a4b9b7860cfd7b6) and " + "records no Census URL, so the publisher URL must be read off the " + "SIPP dataset page before the fetch. Microcosm's pinned sha256 " + "5c30439e365fc26483318ef61d1d8f4bb2f0e9d6bb47c22c06756a7698733ee2 " + "and size 3726010471 are for the mirrored pu2023.csv member, not " + "for whatever archive the Census page serves, so they are not the " + "checksum this fetch should be expected to reproduce." + ), + ), +) + + +class CatalogueError(RuntimeError): + """Raised when the catalogue cannot be resolved against Microcosm.""" + + +def _load_manifest_snapshot( + microcosm_root: Path, relative: str +) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bytes]: + """Read and parse one immutable-in-memory consumer-manifest snapshot.""" + path = microcosm_root / relative + if not path.exists(): + raise CatalogueError(f"Microcosm manifest not found: {path}") + content = path.read_bytes() + payload = json.loads(content) + if not isinstance(payload, dict): + raise CatalogueError(f"Microcosm manifest must be an object: {path}") + return payload, content + + +def load_manifest(microcosm_root: Path, relative: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Load one Microcosm JSON manifest, read-only.""" + payload, _content = _load_manifest_snapshot(microcosm_root, relative) + return payload + + +def iter_manifest_artifacts( + payload: Mapping[str, Any], +) -> Iterator[tuple[Mapping[str, Any], Mapping[str, Any]]]: + """Yield ``(stage, artifact)`` pairs from either Microcosm manifest shape. + + Source-stages manifests nest artifacts under ``stages``; the ACS runtime + manifest carries a flat top-level ``artifacts`` list with no stages. + """ + stages = payload.get("stages") + if isinstance(stages, list): + for stage in stages: + if not isinstance(stage, Mapping): + continue + for artifact in stage.get("artifacts") or (): + if isinstance(artifact, Mapping): + yield stage, artifact + return + for artifact in payload.get("artifacts") or (): + if isinstance(artifact, Mapping): + yield payload, artifact + + +def _artifact_byte_identity(artifact: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[str, str] | None: + """Return the immutable locator/checksum pair used across stage labels.""" + locator = artifact.get("locator") + sha256 = artifact.get("sha256") + if not isinstance(locator, str) or not locator.strip(): + return None + if not isinstance(sha256, str) or not sha256.strip(): + return None + return locator, sha256 + + +def select_artifact( + payload: Mapping[str, Any], + selector: ArtifactSelector, + *, + release_id: str, +) -> tuple[Mapping[str, Any], Mapping[str, Any]]: + """Return the single ``(stage, artifact)`` a selector identifies. + + Several Microcosm stages reference the same bytes. Duplicates are accepted + only when they agree on every field the registration reads; disagreement is + an error, never a silent first-match. + """ + candidates: list[tuple[Mapping[str, Any], Mapping[str, Any]]] = [] + for stage, artifact in iter_manifest_artifacts(payload): + if selector.stage is not None and stage.get("stage") != selector.stage: + continue + candidates.append((stage, artifact)) + + matches: list[tuple[Mapping[str, Any], Mapping[str, Any]]] = [] + for stage, artifact in candidates: + if ( + selector.kind is not None + and artifact.get("kind") != selector.kind + and not selector.compare_across_kinds + ): + continue + if any(artifact.get(key) != value for key, value in selector.match.items()): + continue + matches.append((stage, artifact)) + if selector.compare_across_kinds: + anchor_ids = {id(artifact) for _stage, artifact in matches} + byte_identities = { + identity + for _stage, artifact in matches + if (identity := _artifact_byte_identity(artifact)) is not None + } + matches = [ + (stage, artifact) + for stage, artifact in candidates + if id(artifact) in anchor_ids + or _artifact_byte_identity(artifact) in byte_identities + ] + if not matches: + raise CatalogueError( + f"{release_id}: no Microcosm artifact matches {selector}. The " + "consumer manifest changed; re-derive the catalogue rather than " + "hand-editing a registration." + ) + first_stage, first = matches[0] + for _stage, artifact in matches[1:]: + if dict(artifact) != dict(first): + raise CatalogueError( + f"{release_id}: Microcosm pins conflicting values for this " + "artifact across stages; refusing to choose between them." + ) + if selector.kind is not None and first.get("kind") != selector.kind: + raise CatalogueError( + f"{release_id}: matching Microcosm artifacts declare " + f"kind={first.get('kind')!r}, not {selector.kind!r}. The consumer " + "manifest changed; re-derive the catalogue rather than silently " + "reclassifying its bytes." + ) + return first_stage, first + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ResolvedRelease: + """A catalogue entry resolved against Microcosm's pinned artifact.""" + + release: Release + stage: Mapping[str, Any] + artifact: Mapping[str, Any] + manifest_bytes: bytes = field(repr=False) + + @property + def filename(self) -> str | None: + """Publisher filename, from the release's declared artifact field.""" + value = self.artifact.get(self.release.filename_field) + if not value: + return None + # A locator may be a URL or a bare filename; take the last path segment. + return str(value).rstrip("/").rsplit("/", 1)[-1] + + @property + def url(self) -> str | None: + """Publisher URL, when the Microcosm artifact records one.""" + value = self.artifact.get(self.release.url_field) + text = str(value).strip() if value else "" + return text if text.startswith(("http://", "https://")) else None + + @property + def sha256(self) -> str | None: + """Checksum Microcosm pins for these bytes, if any.""" + value = self.artifact.get("sha256") + return str(value) if value else None + + @property + def size_bytes(self) -> int | None: + """Size Microcosm pins for these bytes, if any.""" + value = self.artifact.get("size_bytes") + return int(value) if isinstance(value, int) else None + + @property + def vintage(self) -> str: + """Publisher vintage label, from the release or the artifact.""" + return str(self.release.vintage or self.artifact.get("vintage") or "") + + +def resolve( + microcosm_root: Path, + releases: Sequence[Release], +) -> list[ResolvedRelease]: + """Resolve every catalogue entry against the Microcosm checkout.""" + snapshots: dict[str, tuple[dict[str, Any], bytes]] = {} + resolved: list[ResolvedRelease] = [] + for release in releases: + if release.manifest not in snapshots: + snapshots[release.manifest] = _load_manifest_snapshot( + microcosm_root, release.manifest + ) + payload, content = snapshots[release.manifest] + stage, artifact = select_artifact( + payload, + release.selector, + release_id=release.release_id, + ) + resolved.append( + ResolvedRelease( + release=release, + stage=stage, + artifact=artifact, + manifest_bytes=content, + ) + ) + return resolved + + +def assert_consumer_repository_root(microcosm_root: Path) -> Path: + """Require the consumer checkout root to be the Git repository root.""" + expected = microcosm_root.resolve() + try: + completed = subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(microcosm_root), "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ) + except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as exc: + raise CatalogueError( + f"Cannot read the Git repository root for {microcosm_root}: {exc}. " + "Pass --microcosm-commit with the reviewed commit after using the " + "actual PolicyEngine/microcosm checkout root." + ) from exc + repository_root = Path(completed.stdout.strip()).resolve() + if repository_root != expected: + raise CatalogueError( + f"Git repository root {repository_root} does not equal " + f"--microcosm-root {expected}. The recorded " + "PolicyEngine/microcosm path must identify the exact blob checked; " + "pass the repository root itself." + ) + return repository_root + + +def verified_consumer_repository(microcosm_root: Path) -> str: + """Read the checkout's origin and require the expected GitHub repository. + + Normalize HTTPS, SSH URL, and SSH scp-style remotes locally; no remote is + contacted. The returned repository identity is the value emission records. + """ + assert_consumer_repository_root(microcosm_root) + try: + origin = subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(microcosm_root), "remote", "get-url", "origin"], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ).stdout.strip() + except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as exc: + raise CatalogueError( + "Cannot verify consumer repository identity: the checkout needs an " + f"origin remote for {CONSUMER_REPOSITORY} on github.com." + ) from exc + + scp_remote = re.fullmatch(r"git@([^/:]+):(.+)", origin) + if scp_remote: + origin = f"ssh://git@{scp_remote[1]}/{scp_remote[2]}" + try: + remote = urlsplit(origin) + repository = remote.path.strip("/").removesuffix(".git") + valid_route = ( + remote.hostname == "github.com" + and remote.scheme in ("https", "ssh") + and remote.port in (None, 443 if remote.scheme == "https" else 22) + and not remote.query + and not remote.fragment + ) + except ValueError as exc: + raise CatalogueError( + "Cannot verify consumer repository identity: origin is not a valid " + f"GitHub remote for {CONSUMER_REPOSITORY}." + ) from exc + if not valid_route or repository.casefold() != CONSUMER_REPOSITORY.casefold(): + # Avoid printing credentials embedded in an HTTPS remote URL. + raise CatalogueError( + f"Consumer repository identity from origin is " + f"{remote.hostname or 'unknown host'}/{repository}; expected " + f"github.com/{CONSUMER_REPOSITORY}. Refusing to emit consumer pins." + ) + return repository + + +def pin_commit(microcosm_root: Path, relative: str) -> str: + """Return the last commit that changed a consumer manifest, read-only. + + The caller separately verifies that this candidate commit's blob is the + exact byte snapshot it parsed. Keeping discovery and verification separate + lets explicit commit overrides pass through the same mandatory check. + """ + assert_consumer_repository_root(microcosm_root) + try: + completed = subprocess.run( + [ + "git", + "-C", + str(microcosm_root), + "log", + "-1", + "--format=%H", + "--", + relative, + ], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ) + except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as exc: + raise CatalogueError( + f"Cannot read the commit of {relative} in {microcosm_root}: {exc}. " + "Pass --microcosm-commit with the reviewed commit." + ) from exc + commit = completed.stdout.strip() + if not _COMMIT_RE.match(commit): + raise CatalogueError( + f"{microcosm_root} records no commit for {relative}; pass " + "--microcosm-commit with the reviewed commit." + ) + return commit + + +def assert_manifest_matches_commit( + microcosm_root: Path, + relative: str, + commit: str, + *, + loaded_bytes: bytes, +) -> None: + """Require ``loaded_bytes`` to equal ``relative``'s blob at ``commit``.""" + relative_path = Path(relative) + if not relative or relative_path.is_absolute() or ".." in relative_path.parts: + raise CatalogueError( + f"Consumer manifest path must stay inside {microcosm_root}: {relative!r}." + ) + try: + object_type = subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(microcosm_root), "cat-file", "-t", commit], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ).stdout.strip() + except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as exc: + detail = "" + if isinstance(exc, subprocess.CalledProcessError) and exc.stderr: + detail = exc.stderr.strip() + suffix = f" ({detail})" if detail else "" + raise CatalogueError( + f"Cannot read consumer manifest {relative} at commit {commit} from " + f"{microcosm_root}{suffix}. The recorded commit must be a readable " + "Git commit containing the exact reviewed blob." + ) from exc + if object_type != "commit": + raise CatalogueError( + f"Consumer manifest pin {commit} names a Git {object_type or 'unknown'} " + "object, not a commit. Refusing to record it as pinned_from.commit." + ) + assert_consumer_repository_root(microcosm_root) + object_name = f"{commit}:./{relative_path.as_posix()}" + try: + completed = subprocess.run( + [ + "git", + "-C", + str(microcosm_root), + "cat-file", + "blob", + object_name, + ], + capture_output=True, + check=True, + ) + except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as exc: + detail = "" + if isinstance(exc, subprocess.CalledProcessError) and exc.stderr: + detail = exc.stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip() + suffix = f" ({detail})" if detail else "" + raise CatalogueError( + f"Cannot read consumer manifest {relative} at commit {commit} from " + f"{microcosm_root}{suffix}. The recorded commit must contain the " + "exact reviewed blob." + ) from exc + if completed.stdout != loaded_bytes: + raise CatalogueError( + f"Consumer manifest bytes loaded from {microcosm_root / relative} do " + f"not match {relative} at commit {commit}. Refusing to record that " + "commit for dirty, staged, or otherwise different bytes." + ) + + +def parse_pin_commits(values: Sequence[str]) -> dict[str, str]: + """Parse ``--microcosm-commit`` values into ``{manifest path or '*': commit}``.""" + commits: dict[str, str] = {} + for value in values: + path, separator, commit = value.rpartition("=") + key = path if separator else "*" + if not _COMMIT_RE.match(commit): + raise CatalogueError( + f"--microcosm-commit must name a 40-hex commit, not {value!r}." + ) + if key in commits and commits[key] != commit: + raise CatalogueError( + f"--microcosm-commit names two commits for {key!r}; pass one." + ) + commits[key] = commit + return commits + + +def pinned_from(release: Release, commit: str, repository: str) -> dict[str, str]: + """Return the ``pinned_from`` block a consumer_pin registration records.""" + return { + "repository": repository, + "path": release.manifest, + "commit": commit, + } + + +def emit( + resolved: Sequence[ResolvedRelease], + *, + root: Path, + pin_commits: Mapping[str, str], + consumer_repository: str, + allow_reissue: bool = False, +) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[dict[str, str]]]: + """Write hash-only manifests for every registrable non-public release. + + ``pin_commits`` maps each consumer manifest path to the verified commit its + pins are read from; ``consumer_repository`` is the verified origin identity. + Returns ``(registrations, blockers)``. A release Microcosm + pins without a checksum is a blocker, not a registration: no hash is ever + invented. + """ + registrations: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] + blockers: list[dict[str, str]] = [] + for item in resolved: + release = item.release + if release.access == ACCESS_PUBLIC: + continue + if release.blocker: + blockers.append({"release": release.release_id, "reason": release.blocker}) + continue + filename = item.filename + checksum = item.sha256 + if not filename or not checksum: + blockers.append( + { + "release": release.release_id, + "reason": ( + "Microcosm pins this release without a " + f"{'filename' if not filename else 'sha256'}; a " + "registration needs both. No value is invented." + ), + } + ) + continue + report = register_hash_only_artifact( + source_id=release.source_id, + package_id=release.package_id, + year=release.year, + output_dir=root / release.package_dir, + filename=filename, + sha256=checksum, + licence=release.licence, + access=release.access, + vintage=item.vintage, + hash_source=HASH_SOURCE_CONSUMER_PIN, + attested_by=consumer_repository, + pinned_from=pinned_from( + release, pin_commits[release.manifest], consumer_repository + ), + size_bytes=item.size_bytes, + source_page=release.source_page, + access_route=release.access_route, + doi=release.doi, + study=release.study, + table=release.table, + publisher=release.publisher, + notes=release.notes or HASH_PROVENANCE, + allow_reissue=allow_reissue, + ) + registrations.append(report.to_dict()) + return registrations, blockers + + +def fetch_command( + item: ResolvedRelease, + *, + root: Path, + r2_bucket: str, +) -> tuple[str, list[str]]: + """Return ``(command, todos)`` for one public release. + + The command is the exact ``chronicle fetch-artifact`` invocation to run from + a networked machine. Anything Microcosm does not pin becomes a TODO rather + than a fabricated value. + """ + release = item.release + todos: list[str] = [] + url = item.url + if url is None: + url = TODO_PUBLISHER_URL + todos.append( + f"{release.release_id}: Microcosm records no publisher URL " + f"(field {release.url_field!r}); read it off {release.source_page}." + ) + argv = [ + "uv", + "run", + "chronicle", + "fetch-artifact", + "--source-id", + release.source_id, + "--package-id", + release.package_id, + "--year", + str(release.year), + "--out-dir", + str(root / release.package_dir), + "--url", + url, + ] + if item.filename: + argv += ["--filename", item.filename] + if release.source_page: + argv += ["--source-page", release.source_page] + vintage = item.vintage + if not vintage: + todos.append( + f"{release.release_id}: Microcosm records no vintage; add " + "Release.vintage to the catalogue before running this command." + ) + argv += [ + "--table", + release.table, + "--publisher", + release.publisher, + "--vintage", + vintage or "TODO_VINTAGE", + "--access", + ACCESS_PUBLIC, + "--licence", + release.licence, + # A public microdata release is archived, but it is still a release: + # several files share one vintage and no source package parses it. + "--kind", + MICRODATA_RELEASE_KIND, + ] + # The reviewed identity travels as arguments, never as a comment: the + # fetch refuses bytes that hash differently before archiving anything. + if item.sha256 and release.pinned_sha_is_publisher_bytes: + argv += ["--expected-sha256", item.sha256] + if item.size_bytes: + argv += ["--expected-size-bytes", str(item.size_bytes)] + else: + argv += ["--expected-sha256", TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256] + if item.sha256: + todos.append( + f"{release.release_id}: Microcosm's pinned sha256 {item.sha256} " + "is NOT the publisher artifact's checksum. A public release is " + "archived only against a reviewed checksum its licence evidence " + "covers; review the publisher bytes and replace " + f"{TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256} before running this command." + ) + else: + todos.append( + f"{release.release_id}: Microcosm pins no checksum for this " + "release. A public release is archived only against a reviewed " + f"checksum; replace {TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256} before running this " + "command." + ) + argv += [ + "--licence-evidence-issuer", + release.licence_evidence_issuer or release.publisher, + "--licence-evidence-scope", + release.licence_evidence_scope or "TODO_EVIDENCE_SCOPE", + "--licence-evidence-url", + release.licence_evidence_url or TODO_EVIDENCE_URL, + ] + if not release.licence_evidence_url: + todos.append( + f"{release.release_id}: no durable licence-evidence URL is " + f"catalogued; replace {TODO_EVIDENCE_URL} with the publisher's " + "statement that this file is issued under " + f"{release.licence} before running this command." + ) + argv += ["--upload-r2", "--r2-bucket", r2_bucket] + if release.notes: + todos.append(f"{release.release_id}: {release.notes}") + return shlex.join(argv), todos + + +def plan( + resolved: Sequence[ResolvedRelease], + *, + root: Path, + r2_bucket: str, +) -> tuple[list[str], list[str]]: + """Return the fetch commands and TODOs for every public release.""" + commands: list[str] = [] + todos: list[str] = [] + for item in resolved: + if item.release.access != ACCESS_PUBLIC: + continue + command, item_todos = fetch_command(item, root=root, r2_bucket=r2_bucket) + commands.append(command) + todos.extend(item_todos) + return commands, todos + + +def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: + """Build the command-line parser.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + description=__doc__, + formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter, + ) + parser.add_argument( + "--microcosm-root", + type=Path, + default=Path.home() / "PolicyEngine" / "microcosm", + help="Read-only path to a PolicyEngine/microcosm checkout.", + ) + parser.add_argument( + "--root", + type=Path, + default=Path("db/data"), + help="Chronicle data root that holds the package directories.", + ) + parser.add_argument( + "--release", + action="append", + default=None, + help="Limit to these release IDs. Repeatable.", + ) + parser.add_argument( + "--json", + action="store_true", + help="Emit machine-readable JSON instead of prose.", + ) + subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True) + + emit_parser = subparsers.add_parser( + "emit", + help="Write hash-only manifests for licensed and restricted releases", + ) + emit_parser.add_argument( + "--microcosm-commit", + action="append", + default=None, + metavar="[PATH=]COMMIT", + help=( + "Commit the consumer pins are read from, recorded as " + "pinned_from.commit on every registration. A bare COMMIT applies " + "to every consumer manifest; PATH=COMMIT (repeatable) names the " + "commit for one manifest path. Defaults to the last commit that " + "changed each consumer manifest, read from the checkout's git " + "history." + ), + ) + emit_parser.add_argument( + "--allow-reissue", + action="store_true", + help="Register different bytes alongside an existing pin for a filename.", + ) + + plan_parser = subparsers.add_parser( + "plan", + help="Print the fetch commands to run for public releases", + ) + plan_parser.add_argument( + "--r2-bucket", + default=None, + help=( + "Raw bucket the fetch should upload to. Defaults to " + "$CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET, else the ledger-era default." + ), + ) + return parser + + +def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int: + """Run the registration script.""" + args = build_parser().parse_args(argv) + releases = CATALOGUE + if args.release: + wanted = set(args.release) + releases = tuple(r for r in CATALOGUE if r.release_id in wanted) + missing = wanted - {r.release_id for r in releases} + if missing: + print(f"Unknown release IDs: {sorted(missing)}", file=sys.stderr) + return 2 + + microcosm_root = args.microcosm_root.expanduser() + try: + resolved = resolve(microcosm_root, releases) + except CatalogueError as exc: + print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr) + return 1 + + if args.command == "emit": + try: + declared = parse_pin_commits(args.microcosm_commit or ()) + except CatalogueError as exc: + print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr) + return 2 + # Only a registrable release needs its pin's commit: a public release + # is fetched, not transcribed, and a blocked one is never registered. + registrable = sorted( + { + item.release.manifest + for item in resolved + if item.release.access != ACCESS_PUBLIC and not item.release.blocker + } + ) + try: + snapshots: dict[str, bytes] = {} + for item in resolved: + manifest = item.release.manifest + if manifest not in registrable: + continue + if manifest in snapshots and snapshots[manifest] != item.manifest_bytes: + raise CatalogueError( + f"Consumer manifest {manifest} changed during resolution." + ) + snapshots[manifest] = item.manifest_bytes + + pin_commits: dict[str, str] = {} + for manifest in registrable: + commit = ( + declared.get(manifest) + or declared.get("*") + or pin_commit(microcosm_root, manifest) + ) + assert_manifest_matches_commit( + microcosm_root, + manifest, + commit, + loaded_bytes=snapshots[manifest], + ) + pin_commits[manifest] = commit + consumer_repository = ( + verified_consumer_repository(microcosm_root) if pin_commits else "" + ) + except CatalogueError as exc: + print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr) + return 1 + try: + registrations, blockers = emit( + resolved, + root=args.root, + pin_commits=pin_commits, + consumer_repository=consumer_repository, + allow_reissue=args.allow_reissue, + ) + except HashOnlyRegistrationError as exc: + print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr) + return 1 + if args.json: + print( + json.dumps( + {"registrations": registrations, "blockers": blockers}, + indent=2, + sort_keys=True, + ) + ) + else: + for registration in registrations: + print(f"registered {registration['registration']}") + for blocker in blockers: + print(f"BLOCKED {blocker['release']}: {blocker['reason']}") + print( + f"\n{len(registrations)} registration(s), {len(blockers)} blocker(s)." + ) + return 0 + + commands, todos = plan( + resolved, + root=args.root, + r2_bucket=args.r2_bucket or default_r2_raw_bucket(), + ) + if args.json: + print(json.dumps({"commands": commands, "todos": todos}, indent=2)) + return 0 + print("# Run from a networked machine with R2 credentials.\n") + for command in commands: + print(command + "\n") + if todos: + print("# TODO") + for todo in todos: + print(f"# {todo}") + return 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d315441 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/conftest.py @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +"""Shared fixtures for the Chronicle test suite. + +Chronicle is mid-rename (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism 3), so its +settings answer to three prefixes at once: ``CHRONICLE_``, and the ledger-era +``POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_`` and ``LEDGER_``. Any of them can be set in an +operator's shell, and many tests assert the defaults those variables override. +Isolation therefore belongs to the whole suite, not to one module. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os + +import pytest + +from chronicle.env import ( + CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX, + LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES, + reset_env_deprecation_state, +) + +RENAME_WINDOW_PREFIXES = (CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX, *LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES) + + +def pytest_configure(config): + """Strip the rename window before collection imports a single module. + + The autouse fixture below runs per test, which is too late for anything a + module does while being imported. Collection happens after this hook, so + clearing here means no module can read an operator's ``LEDGER_SCHEMA`` + (warning as it goes, or freezing it into a constant) before a fixture has + had the chance to isolate it. Modules should resolve settings at call time + rather than at import; this hook makes that property testable instead of + depending on which shell ran pytest. + """ + for name in list(os.environ): + if name.startswith(RENAME_WINDOW_PREFIXES): + del os.environ[name] + reset_env_deprecation_state() + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def isolated_rename_window_env(monkeypatch): + """Run every test with no rename-window variable inherited from the shell.""" + for name in list(os.environ): + if name.startswith(RENAME_WINDOW_PREFIXES): + monkeypatch.delenv(name, raising=False) + reset_env_deprecation_state() + yield + reset_env_deprecation_state() diff --git a/tests/fixtures/microcosm/golden_plan.json b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/golden_plan.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9941d5fb --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/golden_plan.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "commands": [ + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_cps --package-id census-cps-asec-2023 --year 2023 --out-dir db/data/census/cps_asec_2023 --url https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2023/march/asecpub23csv.zip --source-page https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/data/datasets.html --table 'CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2023 public-use files' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage '2023 ASEC / 2022 income reference year' --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 d2e000250782adfbdd7f29c82b66d866591a30f0d330496698ec19f9c784ce11 --expected-size-bytes 150165063 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_cps --package-id census-cps-basic-monthly-2024 --year 2024 --out-dir db/data/census/cps_basic_monthly_2024 --url TODO_PUBLISHER_URL --source-page https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2024/basic/ --table 'CPS basic monthly public-use files, January-December 2024' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage 2024 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_acs --package-id census-acs-pums-2022-1yr --year 2022 --out-dir db/data/census/acs_pums_2022_1yr --url https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2022/1-Year/csv_hus.zip --source-page https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs --table 'ACS 2022 1-Year PUMS household file' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage 2022 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_acs --package-id census-acs-pums-2022-1yr --year 2022 --out-dir db/data/census/acs_pums_2022_1yr --url https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2022/1-Year/csv_pus.zip --source-page https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs --table 'ACS 2022 1-Year PUMS person file' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage 2022 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_acs --package-id census-acs-pums-2024-1yr --year 2024 --out-dir db/data/census/acs_pums_2024_1yr --url https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/csv_hus.zip --filename csv_hus.zip --source-page https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/ --table 'ACS 2024 1-Year PUMS household file' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage 2024 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 8281008e53de98f0ef81e7a2ee5a8725991dda1ecfd2713ead73246425e515d0 --expected-size-bytes 251500587 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_acs --package-id census-acs-pums-2024-1yr --year 2024 --out-dir db/data/census/acs_pums_2024_1yr --url https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/csv_pus.zip --filename csv_pus.zip --source-page https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/ --table 'ACS 2024 1-Year PUMS person file' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage 2024 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 afdc6d90c6e2f0bab365ed32d95ba4c4d8ac651162f46ac7861295b2dc469894 --expected-size-bytes 602847146 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id federal_reserve --package-id federal-reserve-scf-2022 --year 2022 --out-dir db/data/federal_reserve/scf_2022 --url https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/scfp2022s.zip --source-page https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm --table 'Survey of Consumer Finances 2022 summary extract' --publisher 'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System' --vintage 2022 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 3bb4d890ae2463ff6039ec7692e375f544dd98a55a37ca2cb2340354b9cc9d80 --licence-evidence-issuer 'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public data set published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id federal_reserve --package-id federal-reserve-scf-2022 --year 2022 --out-dir db/data/federal_reserve/scf_2022 --url https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/scf2022s.zip --source-page https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm --table 'Survey of Consumer Finances 2022 full public data set' --publisher 'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System' --vintage 2022 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 --licence-evidence-issuer 'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public data set published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw", + "uv run chronicle fetch-artifact --source-id census_sipp --package-id census-sipp-2023 --year 2023 --out-dir db/data/census/sipp_2023 --url TODO_PUBLISHER_URL --source-page https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp.html --table 'Survey of Income and Program Participation 2023 public-use file' --publisher 'U.S. Census Bureau' --vintage 2023 --access public --licence US-Government-Work --kind microdata_release --expected-sha256 TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 --licence-evidence-issuer 'U.S. Census Bureau' --licence-evidence-scope 'Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7105.' --licence-evidence-url TODO_EVIDENCE_URL --upload-r2 --r2-bucket ledger-raw" + ], + "todos": [ + "census-cps-asec-2023: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "census-cps-basic-monthly-2024: Microcosm records no publisher URL (field 'locator'); read it off https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2024/basic/.", + "census-cps-basic-monthly-2024: Microcosm pins no checksum for this release. A public release is archived only against a reviewed checksum; replace TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 before running this command.", + "census-cps-basic-monthly-2024: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "census-cps-basic-monthly-2024: Microcosm pins the twelve monthly files as the locator string 'jan24pub through dec24pub' with no per-file URL, filename extension, or checksum. The publisher directory is the stage source; the twelve filenames must be read off that directory before the fetch commands can be completed.", + "census-acs-pums-2022-household: Microcosm's pinned sha256 0b319b496f19a6913066f9c5ea572edfda3d78a187be6f375846617d0b441bd4 is NOT the publisher artifact's checksum. A public release is archived only against a reviewed checksum its licence evidence covers; review the publisher bytes and replace TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 before running this command.", + "census-acs-pums-2022-household: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "census-acs-pums-2022-household: The Microcosm artifact's own sha256 belongs to the derived acs_2022.h5, not to the publisher zip; only the publisher URL is reused here. The fetch computes the release checksum.", + "census-acs-pums-2022-person: Microcosm's pinned sha256 0b319b496f19a6913066f9c5ea572edfda3d78a187be6f375846617d0b441bd4 is NOT the publisher artifact's checksum. A public release is archived only against a reviewed checksum its licence evidence covers; review the publisher bytes and replace TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 before running this command.", + "census-acs-pums-2022-person: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "census-acs-pums-2022-person: The Microcosm artifact's own sha256 belongs to the derived acs_2022.h5, not to the publisher zip; only the publisher URL is reused here. The fetch computes the release checksum.", + "census-acs-pums-2024-household: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "census-acs-pums-2024-person: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "federal-reserve-scf-2022-summary: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "federal-reserve-scf-2022-full: Microcosm pins no checksum for this release. A public release is archived only against a reviewed checksum; replace TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 before running this command.", + "federal-reserve-scf-2022-full: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "federal-reserve-scf-2022-full: Microcosm records no checksum for this zip: 'Full-file SHA-256 pending one network-enabled provisioning fetch'. The fetch below computes and registers it.", + "census-sipp-2023: Microcosm records no publisher URL (field 'locator'); read it off https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp.html.", + "census-sipp-2023: Microcosm's pinned sha256 5c30439e365fc26483318ef61d1d8f4bb2f0e9d6bb47c22c06756a7698733ee2 is NOT the publisher artifact's checksum. A public release is archived only against a reviewed checksum its licence evidence covers; review the publisher bytes and replace TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256 before running this command.", + "census-sipp-2023: no durable licence-evidence URL is catalogued; replace TODO_EVIDENCE_URL with the publisher's statement that this file is issued under US-Government-Work before running this command.", + "census-sipp-2023: Microcosm reaches this file through an immutable Hugging Face mirror (revision 21280dca5995e978d706740a8a4b9b7860cfd7b6) and records no Census URL, so the publisher URL must be read off the SIPP dataset page before the fetch. Microcosm's pinned sha256 5c30439e365fc26483318ef61d1d8f4bb2f0e9d6bb47c22c06756a7698733ee2 and size 3726010471 are for the mirrored pu2023.csv member, not for whatever archive the Census page serves, so they are not the checksum this fetch should be expected to reproduce." + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/be/source_stages.json b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/be/source_stages.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9ea696a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/be/source_stages.json @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +{ + "snapshot_of": { + "repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "commit": "fe2f92f8c79d36b897e6ae4d7e4b3c33fc7ebd28", + "note": "Synthetic consumer manifests in Microcosm's shapes, carrying the reviewed pins verbatim; decoy artifacts exercise selection." + }, + "version": "fixture", + "country": "be", + "policy": "synthetic Microcosm BE source-stages manifest", + "stages": [ + { + "stage": "silc_load", + "survey": "BE-SILC (Statbel national SILC)", + "source": "https://statbel.fgov.be/en/themes/households/poverty-and-living-conditions", + "grain": "person", + "artifacts": [ + { + "kind": "restricted_microdata", + "format": "csv_or_spss", + "vintage": "2023", + "locator": "Statbel BE-SILC scientific-use files: D (household register), R (personal register), H (household data), P (personal data)", + "licence": "Statbel/Eurostat scientific-use; restricted" + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85411e3f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +{ + "snapshot_of": { + "repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "commit": "fe2f92f8c79d36b897e6ae4d7e4b3c33fc7ebd28", + "note": "Synthetic consumer manifests in Microcosm's shapes, carrying the reviewed pins verbatim; decoy artifacts exercise selection." + }, + "version": "fixture", + "country": "uk", + "policy": "synthetic Microcosm HMRC income source-stages manifest", + "stages": [ + { + "stage": "hmrc_spi_income", + "survey": "Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape 2022-23", + "source": "https://example.invalid/collated_tables.ods", + "grain": "person", + "artifacts": [ + { + "role": "qrf_donor", + "kind": "private_microdata", + "format": "tab_delimited", + "survey": "Survey of Personal Incomes Public Use Tape 2022-23", + "vintage": "2022-23", + "tax_year_start": 2022, + "ukds_study_number": "SN 9422", + "doi": "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9422-1", + "filename": "put2223uk.tab", + "sha256": "5ef829461060c91a2a47be59ad541d9b519fc3976d66ca80d4920f711bb96f66", + "size_bytes": 141323762, + "access": "private_local_input", + "locator": "caller-supplied local input", + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "published_fact_surface", + "kind": "administrative_table", + "format": "ods", + "vintage": "2023-24", + "locator": "https://example.invalid/collated_tables.ods", + "sha256": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", + "size_bytes": 2 + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22d59100 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +{ + "snapshot_of": { + "repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "commit": "fe2f92f8c79d36b897e6ae4d7e4b3c33fc7ebd28", + "note": "Synthetic consumer manifests in Microcosm's shapes, carrying the reviewed pins verbatim; decoy artifacts exercise selection." + }, + "version": "fixture", + "country": "uk", + "policy": "synthetic Microcosm source-stages manifest for Chronicle tests", + "stages": [ + { + "stage": "frs_spine", + "survey": "Family Resources Survey 2023-24", + "source": "Department for Work and Pensions Family Resources Survey 2023-24, UK Data Service SN 9367, DOI 10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2", + "grain": "household", + "artifacts": [ + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "accounts", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "accounts.tab", + "sha256": "c5e31932bfd06087f835d2c83c0984c85a93409bf5ef85b699cb0958abcba1ea", + "size_bytes": 1807921, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "adult", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "adult.tab", + "sha256": "e09f9647d03585c81a528636028b2ed495f8f1fbcf64c5e7b4fe521b67367e06", + "size_bytes": 35323384, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "benefits", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "benefits.tab", + "sha256": "ff30d054cc659bcf23b44c492d98cfd701c0bfdb63e8e9aa9769b490ba9d636b", + "size_bytes": 4460292, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "benunit", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "benunit.tab", + "sha256": "88946815eace8561516d5cbb442c27e319c1e90abc381fb2338f0126e3b9e05b", + "size_bytes": 21213867, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "child", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "child.tab", + "sha256": "b5dc84fe8b002ee925e61fae23fed27b11537af9fb174f1d07d9cc1748b9702e", + "size_bytes": 2913156, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "chldcare", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "chldcare.tab", + "sha256": "566e0ebca1d5e2f3e424e556c91f4cb583d17dadfdfa59feb3841eda7e5976a3", + "size_bytes": 273837, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "extchild", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "extchild.tab", + "sha256": "8d358d7ee66ee4a7ceab87b4f24fbbf21ac86dc038dc7831e51fb271f96a57ec", + "size_bytes": 18677, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "househol", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "househol.tab", + "sha256": "5fd26b8b675f33b3b30c9ac789a18da17de734790f77e00ded287d1c3a187b30", + "size_bytes": 12387117, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "job", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "job.tab", + "sha256": "88b77ffe06865f029f713bb1d55ff12bdea8a1234de5bc293e72458fe64f3a74", + "size_bytes": 10934873, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "maint", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "maint.tab", + "sha256": "f2dc924eb5a51b0c357791693d15b431327dc39c6421011efb313d88bf839695", + "size_bytes": 15440, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "mortgage", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "mortgage.tab", + "sha256": "ce36b477d67837c469608a0d68f7ef269ac04758974235f1157d2f6b92cdbfdc", + "size_bytes": 631783, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "oddjob", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "oddjob.tab", + "sha256": "b4ba3dd3151f73a01422983c60514a3e38458ddfa4fb33ae4ed0326873406305", + "size_bytes": 5165, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "penprov", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "penprov.tab", + "sha256": "ee001461c40306ec24b38b2881e1774121114266a2ee449d606cd0a811c37731", + "size_bytes": 522313, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "pension", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "pension.tab", + "sha256": "150d6fad1fce81254fb7aea1526fbb00b63d4027d6e2ac4c26bb90aea3127eb7", + "size_bytes": 1225838, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "kind": "administrative_table", + "format": "ods", + "vintage": "2023-24", + "locator": "https://example.invalid/decoy_table.ods", + "sha256": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "size_bytes": 1 + } + ] + }, + { + "stage": "frs_employment", + "survey": "Family Resources Survey 2023-24", + "source": "UK Data Service SN 9252; local licensed 2023_24 tabs.", + "grain": "person", + "artifacts": [ + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "adult", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "adult.tab", + "sha256": "e09f9647d03585c81a528636028b2ed495f8f1fbcf64c5e7b4fe521b67367e06", + "size_bytes": 35323384, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + }, + { + "role": "frs_table", + "table": "job", + "kind": "licensed_microdata", + "format": "tab", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "locator": "job.tab", + "sha256": "88b77ffe06865f029f713bb1d55ff12bdea8a1234de5bc293e72458fe64f3a74", + "size_bytes": 10934873, + "runtime_sha256_required": true + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us/source_stages.json b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us/source_stages.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1523b8b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us/source_stages.json @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +{ + "snapshot_of": { + "repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "commit": "fe2f92f8c79d36b897e6ae4d7e4b3c33fc7ebd28", + "note": "Synthetic consumer manifests in Microcosm's shapes, carrying the reviewed pins verbatim; decoy artifacts exercise selection." + }, + "version": "fixture", + "country": "us", + "policy": "synthetic Microcosm US source-stages manifest", + "stages": [ + { + "stage": "weeks_unemployed_input", + "survey": "Census CPS ASEC", + "source": "https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html", + "grain": "person", + "artifacts": [ + { + "kind": "public_microdata", + "format": "zip_csv", + "vintage": "2023 ASEC / 2022 income reference year", + "locator": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2023/march/asecpub23csv.zip", + "sha256": "d2e000250782adfbdd7f29c82b66d866591a30f0d330496698ec19f9c784ce11", + "size_bytes": 150165063, + "member": "pppub23.csv" + }, + { + "kind": "official_data_dictionary", + "format": "pdf", + "vintage": "2023", + "locator": "https://example.invalid/asec2023_ddl_pub_full.pdf" + } + ] + }, + { + "stage": "org_wages", + "survey": "CPS ORG", + "source": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2024/basic/", + "grain": "person", + "artifacts": [ + { + "kind": "public_microdata", + "format": "cps_basic_monthly_csv_or_zip", + "vintage": "2024", + "locator": "jan24pub through dec24pub; HRMIS 4 and 8" + }, + { + "kind": "administrative_table", + "format": "published_table", + "vintage": "2024", + "locator": "https://example.invalid/union2.t01.1" + } + ] + }, + { + "stage": "acs_rent", + "survey": "Census ACS 2022", + "source": "https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs", + "grain": "household", + "artifacts": [ + { + "kind": "public_microdata", + "format": "census_asec_hdf5", + "vintage": "2022-2024 pooled", + "locator": "SHA-locked Census CPS ASEC person and household tables" + }, + { + "kind": "versioned_derived_microdata", + "format": "hdf5_arrays", + "vintage": "2022", + "locator": "Census ACS 2022 PUMS processed person/household arrays (acs_2022.h5)", + "sha256": "0b319b496f19a6913066f9c5ea572edfda3d78a187be6f375846617d0b441bd4", + "official_person_source": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2022/1-Year/csv_pus.zip", + "official_household_source": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2022/1-Year/csv_hus.zip" + } + ] + }, + { + "stage": "scf_wealth", + "survey": "Fed SCF 2022 + Census SIPP 2023", + "source": "https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm", + "grain": "household", + "artifacts": [ + { + "kind": "public_microdata", + "format": "stata_in_zip", + "vintage": "2022", + "locator": "https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/scfp2022s.zip", + "member": "rscfp2022.dta", + "sha256": "3bb4d890ae2463ff6039ec7692e375f544dd98a55a37ca2cb2340354b9cc9d80" + }, + { + "kind": "public_microdata", + "format": "stata_in_zip", + "vintage": "2022", + "locator": "https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/scf2022s.zip", + "member": "p22i6.dta", + "expected_rows": 22975 + }, + { + "kind": "public_microdata", + "format": "pipe_delimited_csv", + "vintage": "2023", + "locator": "Census SIPP 2023 public-use file; immutable Hugging Face mirror revision 21280dca5995e978d706740a8a4b9b7860cfd7b6", + "member": "pu2023.csv", + "revision": "21280dca5995e978d706740a8a4b9b7860cfd7b6", + "sha256": "5c30439e365fc26483318ef61d1d8f4bb2f0e9d6bb47c22c06756a7698733ee2", + "size_bytes": 3726010471 + } + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us_runtime/acs_2024_1yr_sources.json b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us_runtime/acs_2024_1yr_sources.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..389950b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/microcosm/packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/us_runtime/acs_2024_1yr_sources.json @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +{ + "snapshot_of": { + "repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "commit": "fe2f92f8c79d36b897e6ae4d7e4b3c33fc7ebd28", + "note": "Synthetic consumer manifests in Microcosm's shapes, carrying the reviewed pins verbatim; decoy artifacts exercise selection." + }, + "version": "fixture", + "spine": "acs_2024_1yr", + "vintage": "2024", + "verified_on": "2026-08-01", + "source_directory": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/", + "artifacts": [ + { + "role": "household", + "filename": "csv_hus.zip", + "url": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/csv_hus.zip", + "sha256": "8281008e53de98f0ef81e7a2ee5a8725991dda1ecfd2713ead73246425e515d0", + "size_bytes": 251500587 + }, + { + "role": "person", + "filename": "csv_pus.zip", + "url": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums/2024/1-Year/csv_pus.zip", + "sha256": "afdc6d90c6e2f0bab365ed32d95ba4c4d8ac651162f46ac7861295b2dc469894", + "size_bytes": 602847146 + } + ] +} diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_artifact_peer4.py b/tests/test_chronicle_artifact_peer4.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c6d6d48 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_artifact_peer4.py @@ -0,0 +1,526 @@ +"""Failing-first regressions for PR #226 peer round 4.""" + +import hashlib +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + ArtifactCommandResult, + SourceArtifactManifestError, + fetch_source_artifact, + inventory_source_artifacts, + publish_derived_artifacts, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.cli import main as cli_main +from chronicle.harness import main as harness_main + + +def _package(tmp_path, *, filename="table.csv", manifest_name="manifest.yaml"): + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + content = b"publisher,value\nexample,123\n" + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + manifest_path = package / manifest_name + manifest = { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": "https://example.test/table.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content), + } + }, + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + return package, manifest_path, manifest + + +def _no_upload(monkeypatch): + def unexpected_upload(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("uploader reached before refusal") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", unexpected_upload) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("shape", ["file-link", "directory-link", "dangling", "fifo"]) +def test_derived_preflights_complete_tree_before_reads_or_uploads( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, shape +): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + suite.mkdir() + (suite / "a_good.jsonl").write_bytes(b"{}\n") + outside = tmp_path / "outside" + outside.mkdir() + (outside / "secret.csv").write_bytes(b"outside bytes") + unsafe = suite / "z_unsafe" + if shape == "file-link": + unsafe.symlink_to(outside / "secret.csv") + elif shape == "directory-link": + unsafe.symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True) + elif shape == "dangling": + unsafe.symlink_to(outside / "missing") + else: + os.mkfifo(unsafe) + output = tmp_path / "registry.jsonl" + output.write_text("sentinel\n") + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("build read reached before tree refusal") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", unexpected_read) + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts.infer_build_id", unexpected_read) + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + build_artifacts_output=output, + ) + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries == () + assert any("regular" in error or "symlink" in error for error in report.errors) + assert output.read_text() == "sentinel\n" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", ["foo bar", "a/b", "..", 123, None, ""]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["raw", "derived"]) +def test_new_publication_refuses_noncanonical_identity_before_reads( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, field, bad_id, operation +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + kwargs = {"source_id": "publisher", "package_id": "package"} + kwargs[field] = bad_id + if operation == "raw": + manifest[field] = bad_id + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("artifact read reached with noncanonical publication identity") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", unexpected_read) + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts.infer_build_id", unexpected_read) + if operation == "raw": + report = publish_source_artifacts(package) + else: + report = publish_derived_artifacts(package, year=2024, **kwargs) + assert not report.valid + assert any( + "identity" in error or "source_id" in error or "package_id" in error + for error in ( + *report.errors, + *(e for entry in report.entries for e in entry.errors), + ) + ) + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("declaration", [" padded ", 123, None, " ", ""]) +def test_fetch_refuses_noncanonical_present_manifest_identity_before_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, field, declaration +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + args = {"source_id": "publisher", "package_id": "package"} + args[field] = "padded" if declaration == " padded " else "123" + manifest[field] = declaration + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("publisher read reached with noncanonical manifest declaration") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match=field): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.csv", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + filename="table.csv", + **args, + ) + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["publish", "inventory"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("physical", "declared"), + [("table.csv", "TABLE.csv"), ("café.csv", "cafe\u0301.csv")], +) +def test_sweeps_refuse_single_normalized_artifact_alias_before_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, operation, physical, declared +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path, filename=physical) + # On filesystems that normalize Unicode on creation, choose the other + # logical spelling from the actual directory entry returned by iterdir. + actual = next( + path.name for path in package.iterdir() if path.name != manifest_path.name + ) + if actual == declared: + declared = physical + manifest["files"][2024]["filename"] = declared + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("artifact read reached through a normalized alias") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", unexpected_read) + function = ( + publish_source_artifacts + if operation == "publish" + else inventory_source_artifacts + ) + report = function(package) + assert not report.valid + assert any( + "spelling" in error for entry in report.entries for error in entry.errors + ) + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["publish-raw", "inventory-artifacts"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("shape", ["directory", "dangling", "fifo"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("entrypoint", ["function", "harness", "cli"]) +def test_explicit_sweep_reports_nonregular_manifest_sibling( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys, operation, shape, entrypoint +): + package, manifest_path, _manifest = _package( + tmp_path, manifest_name="manifest_selected.yaml" + ) + sibling = package / "manifest_sibling.yaml" + if shape == "directory": + sibling.mkdir() + elif shape == "dangling": + sibling.symlink_to(package / "missing") + else: + os.mkfifo(sibling) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + if entrypoint == "function": + function = ( + publish_source_artifacts + if operation == "publish-raw" + else inventory_source_artifacts + ) + report = function(package, manifest_filename=manifest_path.name) + assert not report.valid + assert "regular file" in " ".join(report.errors) + else: + args = [operation, "--root", str(package), "--manifest", manifest_path.name] + if entrypoint == "harness": + assert harness_main(args) == 1 + else: + monkeypatch.setattr("sys.argv", ["chronicle", *args]) + with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exit_info: + cli_main() + assert exit_info.value.code == 1 + assert "regular file" in json.dumps(json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out)) + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["root", "nested", "excluded-registry"]) +def test_derived_preflight_rejects_symlinks_at_every_tree_boundary( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, location +): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + outside = tmp_path / "outside" + outside.mkdir() + (outside / "secret.csv").write_bytes(b"outside") + if location == "root": + suite.symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True) + else: + suite.mkdir() + target = suite / "build_artifacts.jsonl" + if location == "nested": + (suite / "reports").mkdir() + target = suite / "reports" / "database.json" + target.symlink_to(outside / "secret.csv") + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + build_id="ledger.build.v1:peer4", + ) + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries == () + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", ["foo bar", "a/b", "..", 123, ""]) +def test_raw_publication_refuses_noncanonical_explicit_identity_before_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, field, bad_id +): + package, manifest_path, _manifest = _package(tmp_path) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("artifact read reached with invalid explicit identity") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", unexpected_read) + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, **{field: bad_id}) + assert not report.valid + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "defect", + [ + "contradictory", + "incomplete", + "non-r2", + "empty", + "sha256", + "filename", + "local-digest", + ], +) +def test_inventory_refuses_invalid_recorded_r2_and_does_not_count_link( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, defect +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + spec = manifest["files"][2024] + key = f"raw/publisher/package/2024/{spec['sha256']}/table.csv" + block = { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "archive", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://archive/{key}", + } + if defect == "contradictory": + block["bucket"] = "different" + elif defect == "incomplete": + del block["provider"] + elif defect == "non-r2": + block["provider"] = "s3" + block["uri"] = f"s3://archive/{key}" + elif defect == "empty": + block = {} + elif defect == "sha256": + spec["sha256"] = "0" * 64 + elif defect == "filename": + block["key"] = key.replace("table.csv", "other.csv") + block["uri"] = f"r2://archive/{block['key']}" + else: + del spec["sha256"] + (package / "table.csv").write_bytes(b"different local bytes") + spec["storage"] = {"r2": block} + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + if defect != "local-digest": + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("inventory read bytes before refusing invalid R2 identity") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", unexpected_read) + report = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + assert not report.valid + assert report.counts["r2_link_count"] == 0 + assert report.entries[0].r2 is None + assert any("recorded_r2" in error for error in report.entries[0].errors) + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +def test_inventory_accepts_consistent_uri_only_r2_locator(tmp_path): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + spec = manifest["files"][2024] + spec["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "uri": f"r2://archive/raw/publisher/package/2024/{spec['sha256']}/table.csv", + } + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + report = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["r2_link_count"] == 1 + + +def test_derived_publication_refuses_unrecognized_explicit_route_before_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + suite.mkdir() + (suite / "facts.jsonl").write_bytes(b"{}\n") + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("build read reached for an unrecognizable derived route") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts.infer_build_id", unexpected_read) + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + r2_bucket="chronicle-builds", + r2_prefix="builds", + ) + assert not report.valid + assert "derived_route" in " ".join(report.errors) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "env_prefix", ["CHRONICLE_", "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_", "LEDGER_"] +) +def test_derived_publication_propagates_configured_prefix( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, env_prefix +): + from chronicle.consumer_contract import _points_at_derived + + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + suite.mkdir() + (suite / "facts.jsonl").write_bytes(b"{}\n") + monkeypatch.setenv(f"{env_prefix}R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", "chronicle-builds") + monkeypatch.setenv(f"{env_prefix}R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", "builds") + uploaded = [] + + def upload(location, *_args, **_kwargs): + uploaded.append(location) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("test",), returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", upload) + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + build_id="ledger.build.v1:peer4", + ) + assert report.valid + assert len(uploaded) == 1 + assert uploaded[0].key.startswith("builds/") + assert _points_at_derived(uploaded[0].bucket, uploaded[0].key) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("declaration", [None, 123, "historical name"]) +def test_raw_publication_preserves_history_without_new_identity_requirements( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, field, declaration +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + spec = manifest["files"][2024] + key = f"historical/route/{spec['sha256']}/table.csv" + spec["storage"] = {"r2": {"provider": "r2", "uri": f"r2://archive/{key}"}} + manifest[field] = declaration + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + report = publish_source_artifacts(package) + assert report.valid + assert report.entries[0].skipped + assert report.entries[0].r2_location.uri == f"r2://archive/{key}" + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("yaml_identity", ["2024-01-01", "!!set {legacy: null}"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("entrypoint", ["harness", "cli"]) +def test_raw_cli_serializes_noncanonical_yaml_identity_refusals( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys, field, yaml_identity, entrypoint +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + manifest[field] = yaml.safe_load(yaml_identity) + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_text() + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + args = ["publish-raw", "--root", str(package)] + if entrypoint == "harness": + assert harness_main(args) == 1 + else: + monkeypatch.setattr("sys.argv", ["chronicle", *args]) + with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exit_info: + cli_main() + assert exit_info.value.code == 1 + payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + assert not payload["valid"] + assert isinstance(payload["entries"][0][field], str) + assert "r2_identity_invalid" in " ".join(payload["entries"][0]["errors"]) + assert manifest_path.read_text() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_year", ["/2024", "..", "2024/elsewhere"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["raw", "derived"]) +def test_publication_refuses_vintage_namespace_escape_before_reads( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_year, operation +): + package, manifest_path, manifest = _package(tmp_path) + manifest["files"][bad_year] = manifest["files"].pop(2024) + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("publication read reached with a vintage namespace escape") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", unexpected_read) + if operation == "raw": + report = publish_source_artifacts(package) + else: + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + package, + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=bad_year, + build_id="ledger.build.v1:peer4", + r2_bucket="custom-store", + ) + assert not report.valid + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bad_build_id", ["ledger.build.v1:bad/id", "ledger.build.v1:bad id"] +) +def test_derived_publication_refuses_noncanonical_build_segment( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_build_id +): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + suite.mkdir() + (suite / "facts.jsonl").write_bytes(b"{}\n") + _no_upload(monkeypatch) + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + build_id=bad_build_id, + ) + assert not report.valid + assert report.errors == ("malformed_build_id",) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_year", ["/2024", "..", "2024/elsewhere"]) +def test_fetch_refuses_vintage_namespace_escape_before_publisher_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_year +): + package, _manifest_path, _manifest = _package(tmp_path) + + def unexpected_read(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("fetch reached publisher with a vintage namespace escape") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match="year"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.csv", + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=bad_year, + output_dir=package, + ) diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py b/tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py index 7104ec03..23bc9910 100644 --- a/tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_artifacts.py @@ -4,12 +4,23 @@ import hashlib import json +from pathlib import Path +import shutil +import sqlite3 import pytest import yaml from chronicle.cli import main as cli_main from chronicle.artifacts import ( + AmbiguousManifestError, + ArtifactCommandResult, + ArtifactFilenameError, + MalformedManifestError, + ManifestNameError, + RecordedR2LocatorError, + SourceArtifactManifestError, + SourceArtifactRevisionError, build_artifact_key, build_artifact_rows, build_derived_r2_key, @@ -174,6 +185,7 @@ def test_fetch_source_artifact_writes_manifest_and_inventory(tmp_path): assert inventory.counts == { "artifact_count": 1, "checksum_mismatch_count": 0, + "hash_only_count": 0, "manifest_count": 1, "missing_count": 0, "r2_link_count": 0, @@ -240,8 +252,10 @@ def test_publish_source_artifacts_uploads_manifest_entries(tmp_path): assert report.counts == { "artifact_count": 1, "failed_count": 0, + "hash_only_refused_count": 0, "manifest_count": 1, "r2_link_count": 1, + "skipped_count": 0, "uploaded_count": 1, } assert storage["bucket"] == "ledger-raw" @@ -320,7 +334,7 @@ def test_publish_source_artifacts_uses_country_for_each_manifest(tmp_path): assert "ledger-raw/raw/irs_soi/soi-table/2023/" in commands -def test_publish_source_artifacts_refuses_stale_country_key(tmp_path): +def test_publish_source_artifacts_preserves_a_legacy_countryless_key(tmp_path): output_dir = tmp_path / "data" / "ird" / "wff" source = tmp_path / "wff.xlsx" source.write_bytes(b"official WFF workbook") @@ -343,6 +357,9 @@ def test_publish_source_artifacts_refuses_stale_country_key(tmp_path): ), } } + artifact["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] = ( + f"r2://ledger-raw/{artifact['storage']['r2']['key']}" + ) manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" @@ -351,13 +368,11 @@ def test_publish_source_artifacts_refuses_stale_country_key(tmp_path): report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) - assert not report.valid + assert report.valid assert report.entries[0].upload is None - assert ( - report.entries[0] - .errors[0] - .startswith("recorded_r2_key_disagrees_with_country_prefix:") - ) + assert report.entries[0].errors == () + assert report.entries[0].skipped == "recorded_r2_already_published" + assert report.entries[0].r2_location.key == artifact["storage"]["r2"]["key"] assert not log.exists() @@ -658,3 +673,3545 @@ def test_top_level_cli_dispatches_publish_derived(tmp_path, capsys, monkeypatch) assert exc.value.code == 0 assert payload["valid"] + + +def _sqlite_build(path, build_id): + """Write a minimal build database carrying one ledger_builds row.""" + with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection: + connection.execute("CREATE TABLE ledger_builds (build_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY)") + connection.execute("INSERT INTO ledger_builds VALUES (?)", (build_id,)) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("db_name", ["chronicle.db", "ledger.db"]) +def test_infer_build_id_reads_new_and_legacy_database_names(tmp_path, db_name): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + suite.mkdir() + _sqlite_build(suite / db_name, "ledger.build.v1:from-db") + + assert infer_build_id(suite) == "ledger.build.v1:from-db" + + +def test_infer_build_id_prefers_the_chronicle_database(tmp_path): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + suite.mkdir() + _sqlite_build(suite / "chronicle.db", "ledger.build.v1:chronicle") + _sqlite_build(suite / "ledger.db", "ledger.build.v1:legacy") + + assert infer_build_id(suite) == "ledger.build.v1:chronicle" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("db_name", ["chronicle.db", "ledger.db"]) +def test_publish_derived_classifies_both_database_names(tmp_path, db_name): + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + reports = suite / "reports" + reports.mkdir(parents=True) + build_id = "ledger.build.v1:kind" + (reports / "database.json").write_text(json.dumps({"build_id": build_id})) + (suite / db_name).write_bytes(b"db") + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text("#!/bin/sh\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-1", + year=2023, + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + ) + rows = {row["artifact_name"]: row for row in build_artifact_rows(report)} + + assert rows[db_name]["artifact_kind"] == "sqlite_database" + + +def test_publish_derived_uses_the_configured_bucket(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", "chronicle-derived") + suite = tmp_path / "suite" + reports = suite / "reports" + reports.mkdir(parents=True) + (reports / "database.json").write_text( + json.dumps({"build_id": "ledger.build.v1:bucket"}) + ) + (suite / "facts.jsonl").write_text("{}\n") + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + + report = publish_derived_artifacts( + suite, + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-1", + year=2023, + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + ) + + assert report.valid + assert report.entries[0].r2_location.bucket == "chronicle-derived" + assert "chronicle-derived/derived/irs_soi/" in log.read_text() + + +def test_publish_raw_skips_an_object_already_held_by_a_preserved_bucket( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """A recorded storage.r2 bucket is preserved history, not a publish target. + + Archived witness records pin raw R2 URLs by hash, so backfilling the same + bytes into a renamed bucket must not rewrite the manifest. The entry is + already published, so the sweep reports it skipped and stays green: after + the bucket-default flip every entry published before it takes this path. + """ + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-1-1" + source = tmp_path / "soi.xlsx" + source.write_bytes(b"official SOI workbook") + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-1", + year=2023, + output_dir=output_dir, + ) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + artifact = manifest["files"][2023] + recorded_key = ( + f"raw/irs_soi/soi-table-1-1/2023/{artifact['sha256']}/{artifact['filename']}" + ) + artifact["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": recorded_key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{recorded_key}", + } + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + entry = report.entries[0] + + assert report.valid + assert entry.errors == () + assert entry.upload is None + assert entry.skipped == ( + "recorded_r2_bucket_is_preserved_history:" + "recorded=ledger-raw:requested=chronicle-raw" + ) + assert entry.r2_location is not None + assert entry.r2_location.bucket == "ledger-raw" + assert entry.r2_location.key == recorded_key + assert entry.to_dict()["skipped"] == entry.skipped + assert report.counts["skipped_count"] == 1 + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 0 + assert report.counts["failed_count"] == 0 + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_publish_refuses_a_wrong_route_before_a_preserved_bucket_skip( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "ird" / "wff" + source = tmp_path / "wff.xlsx" + source.write_bytes(b"official WFF workbook") + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="ird", + package_id="ird-wff", + year=2024, + output_dir=output_dir, + ) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + artifact = manifest["files"][2024] + wrong_key = ( + f"raw/uk/ons/wrong-package/1999/{artifact['sha256']}/{artifact['filename']}" + ) + artifact["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": wrong_key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{wrong_key}", + } + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries[0].upload is None + assert report.entries[0].skipped is None + assert ( + report.entries[0] + .errors[0] + .startswith("recorded_r2_key_disagrees_with_country_prefix:") + ) + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_publish_refuses_release_year_route_without_a_labelled_peer( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "example" / "example-package-2023" + anchor = tmp_path / "anchor.csv" + selected = tmp_path / "selected.csv" + anchor.write_bytes(b"numeric anchor") + selected.write_bytes(b"unrelated labelled entry") + fetch_source_artifact( + str(anchor), + source_id="example", + package_id="example-package-2023", + year=2023, + output_dir=output_dir, + ) + fetch_source_artifact( + str(selected), + source_id="example", + package_id="example-package-2023", + year="UNRELATED_LABEL", + output_dir=output_dir, + ) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + for table, route_year in ((2023, 2023), ("UNRELATED_LABEL", 2023)): + artifact = manifest["files"][table] + key = build_r2_key( + source_id="example", + package_id="example-package-2023", + year=route_year, + sha256=artifact["sha256"], + filename=artifact["filename"], + package_path=manifest_path, + ) + artifact["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{key}", + } + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir) + labelled = next( + entry for entry in report.entries if entry.year == "UNRELATED_LABEL" + ) + + assert not report.valid + assert labelled.upload is None + assert labelled.skipped is None + assert labelled.errors[0].startswith( + "recorded_r2_key_disagrees_with_country_prefix:" + ) + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("relative_package", "expected_entries"), + [ + ("usda_snap/fy69_to_current", 2), + ("statbel/fiscal_income_distribution_2023", 9), + ], + ids=("sibling-owned-object", "labelled-table-vintages"), +) +def test_publish_preserves_tracked_legacy_routes_during_bucket_cutover( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, relative_package, expected_entries +): + source = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "db" / "data" / relative_package + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / relative_package + shutil.copytree(source, package) + manifests_before = { + path.name: path.read_bytes() + for path in package.iterdir() + if path.is_file() and path.name.lower().startswith("manifest") + } + + def unexpected_upload(*_args, **_kwargs): + raise AssertionError("preserved history must not be re-uploaded") + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", unexpected_upload) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package) + + assert report.valid, [ + error for entry in report.entries for error in entry.errors + ] + list(report.errors) + assert report.counts["artifact_count"] == expected_entries + assert report.counts["skipped_count"] == expected_entries + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 0 + assert all(entry.upload is None and entry.errors == () for entry in report.entries) + assert { + path.name: path.read_bytes() + for path in package.iterdir() + if path.is_file() and path.name.lower().startswith("manifest") + } == manifests_before + + +def test_documented_bucket_cutover_sweep_accepts_the_tracked_registry( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys +): + """The documented bucket flip is green for every recorded historical key.""" + tracked_data = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "db" / "data" + copied_data = tmp_path / "db" / "data" + shutil.copytree(tracked_data, copied_data) + manifest_bytes = { + path.relative_to(copied_data): path.read_bytes() + for path in copied_data.rglob("*") + if path.is_file() and path.name.lower().startswith("manifest") + } + uploads = [] + + def non_writing_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location, local_path, wrangler_command)) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("non-writing-uploader",), + returncode=0, + stdout="", + stderr="", + ) + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", non_writing_uploader) + + exit_code = harness_main( + [ + "publish-raw", + "--root", + str(copied_data), + "--wrangler-command", + "non-writing-uploader", + "--skip-hash-only", + ] + ) + report = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + counts = report["counts"] + + # The tracked registry grows as packages land, so the sweep is pinned by + # its invariants rather than by today's exact counts: every artifact is a + # preserved-bucket skip with an R2 link or an explicit hash-only skip. + # Nothing uploads or fails, and no manifest-level error occurs. + # The floors keep the test meaningful. + observed = (exit_code, report["valid"], len(report["errors"])) + assert observed == (0, True, 0), json.dumps( + {"observed": observed, "counts": counts}, sort_keys=True + ) + assert counts["uploaded_count"] == 0, counts + assert counts["failed_count"] == 0, counts + assert counts["skipped_count"] == counts["artifact_count"], counts + assert counts["artifact_count"] == ( + counts["r2_link_count"] + counts["hash_only_refused_count"] + ), counts + assert counts["hash_only_refused_count"] >= 15, counts + assert counts["artifact_count"] >= 194, counts + assert counts["manifest_count"] >= 161, counts + assert all(entry["skipped"] or entry["upload"] for entry in report["entries"]) + assert uploads == [] + assert { + path.relative_to(copied_data): path.read_bytes() + for path in copied_data.rglob("*") + if path.is_file() and path.name.lower().startswith("manifest") + } == manifest_bytes + + +def test_fetch_artifact_keeps_an_already_recorded_bucket(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-1-1" + source = tmp_path / "soi.xlsx" + source.write_bytes(b"official SOI workbook") + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-1", + year=2023, + output_dir=output_dir, + upload_r2=True, + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + ) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + first = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + assert first["files"][2023]["storage"]["r2"]["bucket"] == "ledger-raw" + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + report = fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-1", + year=2023, + output_dir=output_dir, + upload_r2=True, + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + ) + second = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + + # The backfill copy really is uploaded to the new bucket, but the manifest + # keeps recording where the bytes were first published. + assert report.r2_location.bucket == "chronicle-raw" + assert "chronicle-raw" in log.read_text() + assert ( + second["files"][2023]["storage"]["r2"] == first["files"][2023]["storage"]["r2"] + ) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Publisher revisions +# +# A raw R2 key is content-addressed, so a recorded storage.r2 block is a claim +# about specific bytes. On 2026-09-02 the IRS re-published 22in05ira.xlsx and +# 22in06ira.xlsx under their existing URLs (PolicyEngine/chronicle#225): a +# repeated fetch must never pair those new bytes with the old object's URI. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +REPUBLISHED_URL = "https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/22in05ira.xlsx" +REPUBLISHED_FILENAME = "22in05ira.xlsx" +FIRST_PUBLICATION = b"IRA table 5, first publication" +SECOND_PUBLICATION = b"IRA table 5, silently re-published with revised rows" + + +def _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log): + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + return wrangler + + +def _serve(monkeypatch, content): + """Serve ``content`` from the publisher URL, without touching the network.""" + + def _fake_read_artifact(source_url): + assert source_url == REPUBLISHED_URL + return content, REPUBLISHED_FILENAME + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", _fake_read_artifact) + + +def _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler, *, upload_r2=True, **kwargs): + return fetch_source_artifact( + REPUBLISHED_URL, + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-5", + year=2022, + output_dir=output_dir, + upload_r2=upload_r2, + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + **kwargs, + ) + + +def test_repeated_fetch_of_identical_bytes_preserves_the_recorded_block( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Same bytes: the recorded block survives whatever bucket is configured.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + first = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + second = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + assert report.valid + # The backfill copy really goes to the renamed bucket, but the manifest + # keeps recording where these bytes were first published. + assert report.r2_location.bucket == "chronicle-raw" + assert "chronicle-raw" in log.read_text() + assert second["storage"] == first["storage"] + # Field order too, so the block is byte-for-byte identical once dumped. + assert list(second["storage"]["r2"].items()) == list(first["storage"]["r2"].items()) + assert second["storage"]["r2"]["bucket"] == "ledger-raw" + assert "previous_r2" not in second["storage"] + assert second["sha256"] == first["sha256"] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("upload_r2", "configured_bucket"), + [ + pytest.param(True, None, id="reuploaded"), + # The two routes that reached a manifest in the wild: a fetch that only + # registers the bytes, and a fetch once the bucket default has moved. + # Both preserved the recorded block while rewriting sha256/size_bytes. + pytest.param(False, None, id="registered-without-upload"), + pytest.param(True, "chronicle-raw", id="after-the-bucket-rename"), + ], +) +def test_repeated_fetch_of_different_bytes_is_refused( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, upload_r2, configured_bucket +): + """A publisher revision must not inherit the recorded object's provenance.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + artifact_path = output_dir / REPUBLISHED_FILENAME + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + first_report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + manifest_before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + uploads_before = log.read_text() + + if configured_bucket: + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", configured_bucket) + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError) as raised: + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler, upload_r2=upload_r2) + + message = str(raised.value) + assert first_report.sha256 in message + assert hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() in message + assert f"size_bytes={len(FIRST_PUBLICATION)}" in message + assert f"size_bytes={len(SECOND_PUBLICATION)}" in message + assert "release revision" in message + assert "--record-revision" in message + # Nothing was overwritten, copied or uploaded on the way to the refusal. + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == manifest_before + assert artifact_path.read_bytes() == FIRST_PUBLICATION + assert log.read_text() == uploads_before + + +def test_record_revision_writes_a_new_key_and_keeps_the_previous_object( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """The opt-in records the new bytes' own key under the configured bucket.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + first_report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + superseded = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler, record_revision=True) + revised = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + revised_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() + + assert report.valid + # storage.r2 names the object that holds the entry's current bytes... + assert revised["sha256"] == revised_sha256 + assert revised["size_bytes"] == len(SECOND_PUBLICATION) + assert revised["storage"]["r2"]["bucket"] == "chronicle-raw" + assert revised["storage"]["r2"]["key"] == ( + f"raw/irs_soi/soi-table-5/2022/{revised_sha256}/{REPUBLISHED_FILENAME}" + ) + assert revised["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] == ( + f"r2://chronicle-raw/{revised['storage']['r2']['key']}" + ) + # ...and never the superseded key, which stays addressable as history. + previous = revised["storage"]["previous_r2"] + assert [entry["uri"] for entry in previous] == [superseded["storage"]["r2"]["uri"]] + assert previous[0]["bucket"] == "ledger-raw" + assert previous[0]["sha256"] == first_report.sha256 + assert previous[0]["size_bytes"] == len(FIRST_PUBLICATION) + assert previous[0]["fetched_at"] == superseded["fetched_at"] + assert previous[0]["superseded_at"] == revised["fetched_at"] + assert (output_dir / REPUBLISHED_FILENAME).read_bytes() == SECOND_PUBLICATION + assert f"chronicle-raw/{revised['storage']['r2']['key']}" in log.read_text() + + +def test_a_revised_manifest_still_reads_as_one_r2_linked_artifact( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """storage.previous_r2 is a sibling key, so every storage.r2 reader is intact.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, tmp_path / "wrangler.log") + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler, record_revision=True) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(output_dir) + + assert inventory.valid + assert inventory.counts["r2_link_count"] == 1 + assert inventory.counts["checksum_mismatch_count"] == 0 + assert inventory.entries[0].r2["bucket"] == "ledger-raw" + assert inventory.entries[0].sha256_actual == ( + hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() + ) + + +def test_publish_raw_refuses_a_file_the_recorded_object_does_not_hold( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Recorded sha256 != local sha256 is a revision, not a backfill.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + first_report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + + # Reproduce the state a pre-fix fetch left behind: new bytes on disk, the + # entry's own hash rewritten, the recorded key still addressing the old + # bytes. + revised_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() + (output_dir / REPUBLISHED_FILENAME).write_bytes(SECOND_PUBLICATION) + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + manifest["files"][2022]["sha256"] = revised_sha256 + manifest["files"][2022]["size_bytes"] = len(SECOND_PUBLICATION) + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + manifest_before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + uploads_before = log.read_text() + + report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries[0].upload is None + assert report.entries[0].r2_location is None + assert report.entries[0].errors == ( + "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch:" + f"recorded_sha256={first_report.sha256}:" + f"recorded_filename={REPUBLISHED_FILENAME}:" + f"local_sha256={revised_sha256}:" + f"local_filename={REPUBLISHED_FILENAME}", + ) + assert log.read_text() == uploads_before + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == manifest_before + + +def test_publish_raw_uploads_a_registered_revision_and_keeps_its_history( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Once the revision is registered, publishing it is ordinary work.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + first_report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler, record_revision=True) + revised_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() + + report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + published = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + assert report.valid + assert published["storage"]["r2"]["key"].endswith( + f"/{revised_sha256}/{REPUBLISHED_FILENAME}" + ) + assert [entry["sha256"] for entry in published["storage"]["previous_r2"]] == [ + first_report.sha256 + ] + + +def test_fetch_artifact_cli_refuses_a_revision_then_records_it_on_request( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, tmp_path / "wrangler.log") + argv = [ + "fetch-artifact", + "--url", + REPUBLISHED_URL, + "--source-id", + "irs_soi", + "--package-id", + "soi-table-5", + "--year", + "2022", + "--out-dir", + str(output_dir), + "--upload-r2", + "--wrangler-command", + str(wrangler), + ] + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + assert harness_main(argv) == 0 + capsys.readouterr() + + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + refused = harness_main(argv) + refusal = capsys.readouterr() + + assert refused == 1 + assert "--record-revision" in refusal.err + assert refusal.out == "" + + assert harness_main([*argv, "--record-revision"]) == 0 + recorded = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + + assert recorded["sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() + assert recorded["r2_location"]["key"].endswith( + f"/{recorded['sha256']}/{REPUBLISHED_FILENAME}" + ) + + +def test_record_revision_without_an_upload_records_no_current_object( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """An offline revision keeps history without claiming the new bytes exist. + + Registering a revision without ``--upload-r2`` leaves the entry with no + ``storage.r2`` at all rather than a pointer to bytes R2 does not hold. The + superseded object stays addressable, and a later publish-raw completes the + registration. + """ + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + first_report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler, upload_r2=False, record_revision=True) + registered = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + assert "r2" not in registered["storage"] + assert [entry["sha256"] for entry in registered["storage"]["previous_r2"]] == [ + first_report.sha256 + ] + + report = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + published = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + revised_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(SECOND_PUBLICATION).hexdigest() + + assert report.valid + assert published["storage"]["r2"]["key"].endswith( + f"/{revised_sha256}/{REPUBLISHED_FILENAME}" + ) + assert [entry["sha256"] for entry in published["storage"]["previous_r2"]] == [ + first_report.sha256 + ] + + +def _shared_archive_entry(content, *, package_id, year, filename="shared.zip"): + sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + key = f"raw/usda_snap/{package_id}/{year}/{sha256}/{filename}" + return { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": "https://example.test/shared.zip", + "sha256": sha256, + "size_bytes": len(content), + "fetched_at": "2026-05-11T11:57:29+00:00", + "storage": { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{key}", + } + }, + } + + +def test_shared_archive_revision_is_refused_through_an_unregistered_owner(tmp_path): + """A selected empty vintage cannot bypass another manifest's identity.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "usda_snap" / "fy69_to_current" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + original = b"USDA archive, first publication" + revised = b"USDA archive, revised publication" + filename = "snap-zip-fy69tocurrent-6.zip" + (package / filename).write_bytes(original) + primary_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + primary_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "usda_snap", + "package_id": "usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + "files": {}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + sibling_path = package / "manifest_fy2025_monthly_source_package.yaml" + sibling_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "usda_snap", + "package_id": "usda-snap-fy2025-monthly-state-caseloads", + "files": { + 2025: _shared_archive_entry( + original, + package_id="usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + year=2024, + filename=filename, + ) + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + publisher = _publish(tmp_path, filename, revised) + before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in (primary_path, sibling_path)} + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError): + fetch_source_artifact( + str(publisher), + source_id="usda_snap", + package_id="usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert (package / filename).read_bytes() == original + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in before} == before + + +def test_record_revision_updates_every_owner_of_usda_shared_archive(tmp_path): + """The tracked USDA two-manifest shape has one physical archive.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "usda_snap" / "fy69_to_current" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + original = b"USDA archive, first publication" + revised = b"USDA archive, revised publication" + revised_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(revised).hexdigest() + filename = "snap-zip-fy69tocurrent-6.zip" + (package / filename).write_bytes(original) + manifests = ( + ( + package / "manifest.yaml", + "usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + 2024, + "usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + 2024, + ), + ( + package / "manifest_fy2025_monthly_source_package.yaml", + "usda-snap-fy2025-monthly-state-caseloads", + 2025, + "usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + 2024, + ), + ) + previous_uris = {} + for path, package_id, vintage, route_package, route_year in manifests: + entry = _shared_archive_entry( + original, + package_id=route_package, + year=route_year, + filename=filename, + ) + entry["source_table"] = f"owner {vintage}" + previous_uris[path] = entry["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] + path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "usda_snap", + "package_id": package_id, + "files": {vintage: entry}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + publisher = _publish(tmp_path, filename, revised) + + fetch_source_artifact( + str(publisher), + source_id="usda_snap", + package_id="usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + record_revision=True, + ) + + assert (package / filename).read_bytes() == revised + for path, _package_id, vintage, _route_package, _route_year in manifests: + entry = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text())["files"][vintage] + assert entry["sha256"] == revised_sha256 + assert entry["size_bytes"] == len(revised) + assert entry["source_table"] == f"owner {vintage}" + assert "r2" not in entry["storage"] + assert [item["uri"] for item in entry["storage"]["previous_r2"]] == [ + previous_uris[path] + ] + + +def test_record_revision_updates_every_same_manifest_owner(tmp_path): + """SSA-style semantic aliases of one file share one byte identity.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "ssa" / "supplement" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + original = b"SSA extracted table, first publication" + revised = b"SSA extracted table, revised publication" + revised_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(revised).hexdigest() + filename = "ssa_oasdi_ssi_2024.csv" + (package / filename).write_bytes(original) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + entries = { + 2024: _shared_archive_entry( + original, + package_id="ssa-annual-statistical-supplement-2025", + year=2024, + filename=filename, + ), + "extracted_targets": _shared_archive_entry( + original, + package_id="ssa-annual-statistical-supplement-2025", + year="extracted_targets", + filename=filename, + ), + } + for entry in entries.values(): + entry["source_url"] = "https://example.test/ssa.csv" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "ssa", + "package_id": "ssa-annual-statistical-supplement-2025", + "files": entries, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + publisher = _publish(tmp_path, filename, revised) + + fetch_source_artifact( + str(publisher), + source_id="ssa", + package_id="ssa-annual-statistical-supplement-2025", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + record_revision=True, + ) + + updated = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"] + assert {entry["sha256"] for entry in updated.values()} == {revised_sha256} + assert { + item["sha256"] + for entry in updated.values() + for item in entry["storage"]["previous_r2"] + } == {hashlib.sha256(original).hexdigest()} + + +def test_a_recorded_block_that_only_carries_a_uri_is_still_recognized( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Identity reads the URI when a hand-written block records no key.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, tmp_path / "wrangler.log") + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + _serve(monkeypatch, FIRST_PUBLICATION) + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + recorded = manifest["files"][2022]["storage"]["r2"] + manifest["files"][2022]["storage"]["r2"] = { + "provider": recorded["provider"], + "bucket": recorded["bucket"], + "uri": recorded["uri"], + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + uri_only = manifest["files"][2022]["storage"]["r2"] + + report = _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + preserved = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + assert report.valid + assert preserved["storage"]["r2"] == uri_only + + _serve(monkeypatch, SECOND_PUBLICATION) + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError): + _fetch_republished(output_dir, wrangler) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Manifest addressing, entry identity, and recorded locators +# +# Everything below concerns the state a fetch reads before it writes: which +# manifest it reads, what that manifest's entry says its vintage holds, and +# whether the recorded R2 block names one object or two. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST = "manifest_traditional_source_package.yaml" +ROTH_MANIFEST = "manifest_roth_source_package.yaml" + + +def _publish(tmp_path, name, content): + """Write bytes a fetch can read as a local publisher path.""" + path = tmp_path / "publisher" / name + path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + path.write_bytes(content) + return path + + +def _fetch_local(output_dir, source_path, *, package_id="soi-table-5", **kwargs): + return fetch_source_artifact( + str(source_path), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id=package_id, + year=2022, + output_dir=output_dir, + **kwargs, + ) + + +def _entry(manifest_path): + return yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2022] + + +def test_fetch_artifact_writes_the_manifest_it_was_given(tmp_path): + """One publisher directory, two source packages, two manifests. + + db/data/irs_soi/ira_contributions keeps the traditional and Roth IRA + packages side by side. A fetch that always wrote manifest.yaml would write + a third manifest neither package reads. + """ + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + traditional = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"traditional IRA table") + roth = _publish(tmp_path, "22in06ira.xlsx", b"roth IRA table") + package.mkdir(parents=True) + for name, package_id in ( + (TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, "soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022"), + (ROTH_MANIFEST, "soi-ira-roth-contributions-2022"), + ): + (package / name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + {"source_id": "irs_soi", "package_id": package_id, "files": {}}, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + + _fetch_local( + package, + traditional, + package_id="soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + manifest_filename=TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, + ) + _fetch_local( + package, + roth, + package_id="soi-ira-roth-contributions-2022", + manifest_filename=ROTH_MANIFEST, + ) + + assert sorted(path.name for path in package.glob("manifest*.yaml")) == [ + ROTH_MANIFEST, + TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, + ] + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + assert _entry(package / TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST)["filename"] == "22in05ira.xlsx" + assert _entry(package / ROTH_MANIFEST)["filename"] == "22in06ira.xlsx" + assert _entry(package / TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST)["sha256"] == ( + hashlib.sha256(b"traditional IRA table").hexdigest() + ) + + +def test_a_revision_is_refused_in_the_manifest_that_records_it(tmp_path): + """The IRA revision workflow the docs cite, on a two-manifest package.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + traditional = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"traditional IRA table") + _fetch_local( + package, + traditional, + package_id="soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + manifest_filename=TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, + ) + recorded = (package / TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST).read_bytes() + + # The IRS re-publishes under the same URL and vintage. + traditional.write_bytes(b"traditional IRA table, revised rows") + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError) as raised: + _fetch_local( + package, + traditional, + package_id="soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + manifest_filename=TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, + ) + + assert TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST in str(raised.value) + assert (package / TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST).read_bytes() == recorded + assert (package / "22in05ira.xlsx").read_bytes() == b"traditional IRA table" + + # Without the flag the same fetch would address a manifest.yaml that no + # package reads and that protects nothing: the #225 path. It is refused, + # naming the manifests the directory keeps, and nothing is written. + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousManifestError) as stray: + _fetch_local( + package, + traditional, + package_id="soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + ) + + assert TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST in str(stray.value) + assert "--manifest" in str(stray.value) + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + assert (package / TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST).read_bytes() == recorded + assert (package / "22in05ira.xlsx").read_bytes() == b"traditional IRA table" + + +def test_fetch_artifact_cli_refuses_a_stray_default_manifest(tmp_path, capsys): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + traditional = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"traditional IRA table") + _fetch_local( + package, + traditional, + package_id="soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + manifest_filename=TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, + ) + argv = [ + "fetch-artifact", + "--url", + str(traditional), + "--source-id", + "irs_soi", + "--package-id", + "soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + "--year", + "2022", + "--out-dir", + str(package), + ] + + assert harness_main(argv) == 1 + + err = capsys.readouterr().err + assert err.startswith("error: ") + assert TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST in err + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("existing_name", ["manifest.yml", "MANIFEST_TABLES.YML"]) +def test_fetch_refuses_a_stray_default_beside_supported_manifest_spelling( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, existing_name +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + existing = package / existing_name + existing.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "manifest_kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + "files": {}, + } + ) + ) + recorded = existing.read_bytes() + publisher = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"traditional IRA table") + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("publisher bytes were read before manifest refusal") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousManifestError, match=existing_name): + _fetch_local( + package, + publisher, + package_id="soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + ) + + assert existing.read_bytes() == recorded + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_stray_default_beside_a_case_variant_named_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + named_manifest = package / "MANIFEST_TRADITIONAL.YML" + named_manifest.write_text("source_id: irs_soi\nfiles: {}\n") + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"traditional IRA table") + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("a case-variant named manifest did not block I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousManifestError, match="MANIFEST_TRADITIONAL.YML"): + _fetch_local(package, source) + + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +def test_a_same_bytes_rename_is_refused_by_name_not_as_a_revision(tmp_path): + """Identical bytes under another filename are neither a revision nor a + re-fetch: the entry's filename must keep agreeing with its recorded key.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"IRA table 5") + _fetch_local(package, source, filename="table-5.xlsx", upload_r2=False) + recorded = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + for record_revision in (False, True): + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError) as raised: + _fetch_local( + package, source, upload_r2=False, record_revision=record_revision + ) + message = str(raised.value) + assert "rename is not a release revision" in message + assert "filename=table-5.xlsx" in message + assert "names them 22in05ira.xlsx" in message + assert "--filename table-5.xlsx" in message + + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == recorded + assert not (package / "22in05ira.xlsx").exists() + assert (package / "table-5.xlsx").read_bytes() == b"IRA table 5" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "manifest_filename", + ["../manifest.yaml", "nested/manifest.yaml", "", " ", ".", ".."], +) +def test_a_manifest_name_must_stay_inside_the_package(tmp_path, manifest_filename): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.xlsx", b"table") + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="inside the package directory"): + _fetch_local(package, source, manifest_filename=manifest_filename) + + assert not package.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("source_url", "filename", "message"), + [ + pytest.param("publisher.csv", "manifest.yaml", "manifest name", id="default"), + pytest.param( + "publisher.csv", "MANIFEST_NAMED.YML", "manifest name", id="named" + ), + pytest.param( + "publisher.csv", "nested/publisher.csv", "bare filename", id="nested" + ), + pytest.param( + "https://publisher.test/manifest.yaml", + None, + "manifest name", + id="inferred", + ), + ], +) +def test_artifact_filename_is_refused_before_publisher_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, source_url, filename, message +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text("source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table\nfiles: {}\n") + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("an invalid artifact filename reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match=message): + fetch_source_artifact( + source_url, + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + filename=filename, + ) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("source_id", "package_id"), + [ + pytest.param("/", "package", id="source-id"), + pytest.param("publisher", "/", id="package-id"), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_invalid_r2_identity_before_publisher_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, source_id, package_id +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + artifact_path = package / "table.csv" + artifact_path.write_bytes(b"registered publisher bytes") + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("an invalid R2 identity reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="canonical R2 key segment"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.test/table.csv", + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert artifact_path.read_bytes() == b"registered publisher bytes" + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +def test_manifest_name_must_be_discoverable_before_publisher_io(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.csv", b"publisher table") + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("an undiscoverable manifest name reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestNameError, match="invisible"): + _fetch_local(package, source, manifest_filename="custom.yaml") + + assert not package.exists() + + +def test_fetch_artifact_cli_reports_a_manifest_name_outside_the_package( + tmp_path, capsys +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.xlsx", b"table") + argv = [ + "fetch-artifact", + "--url", + str(source), + "--source-id", + "irs_soi", + "--package-id", + "soi-table-5", + "--year", + "2022", + "--out-dir", + str(package), + "--manifest", + "../manifest.yaml", + ] + + assert harness_main(argv) == 1 + + err = capsys.readouterr().err + assert err.startswith("error: ") + assert "inside the package directory" in err + assert not package.exists() + assert not (tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +def test_fetch_artifact_cli_targets_the_named_manifest(tmp_path, capsys): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + traditional = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"traditional IRA table") + argv = [ + "fetch-artifact", + "--url", + str(traditional), + "--source-id", + "irs_soi", + "--package-id", + "soi-ira-traditional-contributions-2022", + "--year", + "2022", + "--out-dir", + str(package), + "--manifest", + TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST, + ] + + assert harness_main(argv) == 0 + payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + + assert payload["manifest_path"].endswith(TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST) + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + traditional.write_bytes(b"traditional IRA table, revised rows") + + assert harness_main(argv) == 1 + assert TRADITIONAL_MANIFEST in capsys.readouterr().err + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("existing_name", "requested_name"), + [ + pytest.param("manifest.yml", "manifest.yaml", id="yml-default"), + pytest.param("Manifest.yaml", "manifest.yaml", id="case-variant-default"), + pytest.param( + "manifest_monthly_source_package.yaml", + "manifest_monthy_source_package.yaml", + id="mistyped-named-manifest", + ), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_to_create_any_manifest_beside_an_existing_registry( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, existing_name, requested_name +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "usda_snap" / "fy69_to_current" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + existing = package / existing_name + existing.write_text( + "source_id: usda_snap\npackage_id: usda-snap-fy69-to-current\nfiles: {}\n" + ) + before = existing.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("ambiguous manifest creation reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousManifestError, match=existing_name): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/snap.zip", + source_id="usda_snap", + package_id="usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + manifest_filename=requested_name, + ) + + assert existing.read_bytes() == before + assert requested_name not in {path.name for path in package.iterdir()} + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_symlinked_manifest_before_publisher_io(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + outside_manifest = tmp_path / "outside-manifest.yaml" + outside_manifest.write_text( + "source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table\nfiles: {}\n" + ) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.symlink_to(outside_manifest) + before = outside_manifest.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("a symlinked manifest reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="symlink"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.xlsx", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert manifest_path.is_symlink() + assert outside_manifest.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_fetch_refuses_physically_distinct_normalized_manifest_aliases( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text("source_id: publisher\npackage_id: package\nfiles: {}\n") + case_alias = package / "Manifest.yaml" + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts.package_manifest_paths", + lambda _package: [manifest_path, case_alias], + ) + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("normalized manifest aliases reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousManifestError, match="normalized manifest name"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.csv", + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_symlinked_artifact_target_before_publisher_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text("source_id: publisher\npackage_id: package\nfiles: {}\n") + outside = tmp_path / "outside.csv" + outside.write_bytes(b"outside bytes") + artifact_path = package / "table.csv" + artifact_path.symlink_to(outside) + before = {manifest_path: manifest_path.read_bytes(), outside: outside.read_bytes()} + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("symlinked artifact target reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(ArtifactFilenameError, match="symbolic link"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.csv", + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert artifact_path.is_symlink() + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in before} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "manifest_filename", + [ + pytest.param("../manifest.yaml", id="parent"), + pytest.param("manifest_*.yaml", id="star-glob"), + pytest.param("manifest_?.yml", id="question-glob"), + pytest.param("manifest_[ab].yaml", id="character-class-glob"), + ], +) +def test_sweep_manifest_selector_must_be_a_literal_supported_filename( + tmp_path, manifest_filename +): + root = tmp_path / "requested-root" + package = root / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"publisher table" + (package / "table.csv").write_bytes(content) + (package / "manifest_a.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + outside_manifest = root.parent / "manifest.yaml" + outside_manifest.write_text("files: {}\n") + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + before = { + path: path.read_bytes() + for path in (package / "manifest_a.yaml", outside_manifest) + } + + with pytest.raises(ManifestNameError, match="Manifest"): + publish_source_artifacts( + root, + manifest_filename=manifest_filename, + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + ) + + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in before} == before + assert not log.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "operation", [inventory_source_artifacts, publish_source_artifacts] +) +def test_invalid_sweep_manifest_selector_is_refused_even_when_root_is_missing( + tmp_path, operation +): + with pytest.raises(ManifestNameError): + operation(tmp_path / "missing", manifest_filename="../manifest.yaml") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", ["inventory-artifacts", "publish-raw"]) +def test_sweep_cli_reports_an_invalid_manifest_selector(command, tmp_path, capsys): + exit_code = harness_main( + [ + command, + "--root", + str(tmp_path), + "--manifest", + "../manifest.yaml", + ] + ) + + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert exit_code == 1 + assert captured.out == "" + assert captured.err.startswith("error: ") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Identity without a recorded R2 object +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _failing_wrangler(tmp_path, log): + wrangler = tmp_path / "failing-wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\nexit 1\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + return wrangler + + +def test_a_registered_entry_is_protected_before_it_is_ever_published(tmp_path): + """No storage.r2 yet is not no identity: the entry declares its bytes.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"IRA table 5, first publication") + first = _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + recorded = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + assert "storage" not in _entry(package / "manifest.yaml") + + # Same bytes: an ordinary repeated fetch, not a revision. + assert _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False).sha256 == first.sha256 + + source.write_bytes(b"IRA table 5, silently re-published") + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError) as raised: + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + message = str(raised.value) + assert first.sha256 in message + assert hashlib.sha256(b"IRA table 5, silently re-published").hexdigest() in message + assert "size_bytes=30" in message + assert "--record-revision" in message + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == recorded + assert (package / "22in05ira.xlsx").read_bytes() == ( + b"IRA table 5, first publication" + ) + + +def test_a_failed_upload_does_not_disable_revision_protection(tmp_path): + """The state #225 hit: bytes registered, upload failed, no storage.r2.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _failing_wrangler(tmp_path, log) + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"IRA table 5, first publication") + + report = _fetch_local( + package, source, upload_r2=True, wrangler_command=str(wrangler) + ) + recorded = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + assert report.errors == ("r2_upload_failed",) + assert "storage" not in _entry(package / "manifest.yaml") + + source.write_bytes(b"IRA table 5, silently re-published") + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError): + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=True, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == recorded + + +def test_record_revision_over_an_unpublished_entry_supersedes_nothing(tmp_path): + """There is no object to keep, so the entry gets no previous_r2 key.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"IRA table 5, first publication") + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + source.write_bytes(b"IRA table 5, silently re-published") + report = _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False, record_revision=True) + revised = _entry(package / "manifest.yaml") + + assert report.valid + assert revised["sha256"] == ( + hashlib.sha256(b"IRA table 5, silently re-published").hexdigest() + ) + assert "storage" not in revised + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Recorded locator cross-checks +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _recorded_package(tmp_path, content=b"IRA table 5, first publication"): + """A package whose entry records a published, content-addressed object.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, tmp_path / "wrangler.log") + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", content) + report = _fetch_local( + package, source, upload_r2=True, wrangler_command=str(wrangler) + ) + return package, source, report + + +def _rewrite_recorded_r2(package, mutate, manifest="manifest.yaml"): + manifest_path = package / manifest + payload = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + mutate(payload["files"][2022]["storage"]) + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False)) + return manifest_path + + +def _other_sha256(): + return hashlib.sha256(b"some other object entirely").hexdigest() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "previous_r2", + [ + pytest.param({}, id="mapping"), + pytest.param("not a list", id="scalar"), + pytest.param(None, id="null"), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_non_list_previous_r2_before_publisher_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, previous_r2 +): + """Malformed archived provenance must not be replaced by a new history.""" + package, source, _report = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + manifest_path = _rewrite_recorded_r2( + package, + lambda storage: storage.__setitem__("previous_r2", previous_r2), + ) + artifact_path = package / "22in05ira.xlsx" + before = { + manifest_path: manifest_path.read_bytes(), + artifact_path: artifact_path.read_bytes(), + } + source.write_bytes(b"IRA table 5, revised publication") + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("malformed previous_r2 reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises( + MalformedManifestError, + match=r"storage[.]previous_r2 must be a list", + ): + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False, record_revision=True) + + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in before} == before + + +def _contradict_key(storage): + key = storage["r2"]["key"] + storage["r2"]["key"] = key.replace(key.split("/")[-2], _other_sha256()) + + +def _contradict_bucket(storage): + storage["r2"]["bucket"] = "some-other-bucket" + + +def _contradict_provider(storage): + storage["r2"]["provider"] = "s3" + + +def _mangle_uri(storage): + storage["r2"]["uri"] = "r2:/ledger-raw-missing-a-slash" + + +def _drop_the_locator(storage): + storage["r2"] = {"provider": "r2", "bucket": "ledger-raw"} + + +def _flatten_the_key(storage): + storage["r2"]["key"] = "raw/irs_soi/22in05ira.xlsx" + storage["r2"]["uri"] = f"r2://ledger-raw/{storage['r2']['key']}" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("mutate", "expected"), + [ + pytest.param(_contradict_key, "contradicts uri", id="key-vs-uri"), + pytest.param(_contradict_bucket, "contradicts uri", id="bucket-vs-uri"), + pytest.param( + _contradict_provider, "does not identify R2", id="provider-vs-uri" + ), + pytest.param(_mangle_uri, "is not provider://bucket/key", id="uri-shape"), + pytest.param(_drop_the_locator, "records no uri", id="no-locator"), + pytest.param( + _flatten_the_key, "is not content-addressed", id="not-content-addressed" + ), + ], +) +def test_a_recorded_block_that_names_two_objects_is_refused(tmp_path, mutate, expected): + """A contradictory locator is an error, never a silently preserved block. + + The key-vs-uri case is the one that used to pass: identity was read from + the key alone, so a block whose uri named different bytes was carried + forward verbatim, and the manifest kept publishing a URI for an object it + no longer described. + """ + package, source, _ = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + manifest_path = _rewrite_recorded_r2(package, mutate) + recorded = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + # Identical bytes: the fetch would otherwise preserve the recorded block. + with pytest.raises(RecordedR2LocatorError) as raised: + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + assert expected in str(raised.value) + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == recorded + + +def test_a_malformed_storage_block_is_not_treated_as_absent(tmp_path): + package, source, _ = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + manifest_path = _rewrite_recorded_r2( + package, lambda storage: storage.update({"r2": ["r2://ledger-raw/raw/key"]}) + ) + recorded = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="must be a mapping"): + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == recorded + + +def test_publish_raw_refuses_a_contradictory_recorded_block(tmp_path): + """Nothing is uploaded under a block that does not name one object.""" + package, _, _ = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + log = tmp_path / "publish.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + manifest_path = _rewrite_recorded_r2(package, _contradict_key) + recorded = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries[0].upload is None + assert report.entries[0].errors[0].startswith("recorded_r2_locator_invalid:") + assert "contradicts uri" in report.entries[0].errors[0] + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == recorded + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Malformed manifests +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "document", + [ + pytest.param("- one entry\n- another\n", id="list"), + pytest.param("a bare scalar\n", id="scalar"), + pytest.param("files: [\n", id="unparseable"), + ], +) +def test_a_malformed_manifest_is_refused_before_anything_is_fetched(tmp_path, document): + """Not an absent manifest: refusing it protects what it still records. + + The publisher path does not exist, so reaching the fetch at all would raise + FileNotFoundError instead. Getting MalformedManifestError is what says the + manifest was read and refused first. + """ + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text(document) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError): + _fetch_local(package, tmp_path / "publisher" / "never-read.xlsx") + + assert manifest_path.read_text() == document + assert list(package.iterdir()) == [manifest_path] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "document", + [ + "files:\n- not a mapping\n", + "files: 3\n", + "source_id: irs_soi\nfiles: text\n", + ], +) +def test_a_non_mapping_files_block_is_refused_before_anything_is_fetched( + tmp_path, document +): + """The same document inventory-artifacts and publish-raw report as + 'files must be a mapping'; a fetch must not overwrite the artifact first.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text(document) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="files must be a mapping"): + _fetch_local(package, tmp_path / "publisher" / "never-read.xlsx") + + assert manifest_path.read_text() == document + assert list(package.iterdir()) == [manifest_path] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "document", + [ + "", + "\n", + "{}\n", + "# only a comment\n", + "files:\n", + "source_id: irs_soi\nfiles:\n", + ], +) +def test_an_empty_manifest_still_reads_as_absent(tmp_path, document): + """Including a bare ``files:`` line, which parses as an explicit null: the + fetch records into a fresh mapping rather than failing after the write.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text(document) + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"IRA table 5") + + report = _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + assert report.valid + assert _entry(package / "manifest.yaml")["filename"] == "22in05ira.xlsx" + + +def test_a_malformed_manifest_is_reported_by_inventory_and_publish(tmp_path): + """Neither sweep may crash on, or silently skip, a document it cannot read.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text("- not a mapping\n") + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package) + + assert not inventory.valid + assert inventory.entries == () + assert "must be a YAML mapping" in inventory.errors[0] + assert not published.valid + assert published.entries == () + assert "must be a YAML mapping" in published.errors[0] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "duplicate_document", + [ + pytest.param( + "source_id: hidden_source\n" + "source_id: irs_soi\n" + "package_id: soi-table-5\n" + "files: {}\n", + id="source-id", + ), + pytest.param( + "source_id: irs_soi\n" + "package_id: hidden-package\n" + "package_id: soi-table-5\n" + "files: {}\n", + id="package-id", + ), + pytest.param( + "source_id: irs_soi\n" + "package_id: soi-table-5\n" + "files:\n" + " 2022:\n" + " filename: hidden.xlsx\n" + f" sha256: {hashlib.sha256(b'hidden bytes').hexdigest()}\n" + "files: {}\n", + id="files", + ), + pytest.param( + "source_id: irs_soi\n" + "package_id: soi-table-5\n" + "files:\n" + " 2022:\n" + " filename: hidden.xlsx\n" + f" sha256: {hashlib.sha256(b'hidden bytes').hexdigest()}\n" + " 2022: {}\n", + id="vintage", + ), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_duplicate_manifest_keys_before_publisher_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, duplicate_document +): + """A lossy YAML parse must never decide which identity gets rewritten.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text(duplicate_document) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("duplicate manifest keys reached publisher I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="duplicate key"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.xlsx", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-5", + year=2022, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Sol gate round 3: fetch preflight and in-place manifest updates +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ( + "mismatched_field", + "declared_source_id", + "declared_package_id", + "source_id", + "package_id", + ), + [ + pytest.param( + "source_id", + "other_source", + "requested-package", + "requested_source", + "requested-package", + id="source-id", + ), + pytest.param( + "package_id", + "usda_snap", + "usda-snap-fy69-to-current", + "usda_snap", + "usda-snap-fy2025-monthly-state-caseloads", + id="package-id", + ), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_a_selected_manifest_for_another_package_before_io( + tmp_path, + monkeypatch, + mismatched_field, + declared_source_id, + declared_package_id, + source_id, + package_id, +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "usda_snap" / "fy69_to_current" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": declared_source_id, + "package_id": declared_package_id, + "files": {}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("a mismatched manifest must be refused before I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError) as raised: + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/snap-zip-fy69tocurrent-6.zip", + source_id=source_id, + package_id=package_id, + year=2025, + output_dir=package, + ) + + message = str(raised.value) + declared = { + "source_id": declared_source_id, + "package_id": declared_package_id, + }[mismatched_field] + requested = {"source_id": source_id, "package_id": package_id}[mismatched_field] + assert f"{mismatched_field}={declared!r}" in message + assert f"{mismatched_field}={requested!r}" in message + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + assert list(package.iterdir()) == [manifest_path] + + +def test_fetch_uses_a_quoted_year_key_for_revision_protection(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + artifact_path = package / "table.xlsx" + original = b"original publisher bytes" + revised = b"silently revised publisher bytes" + artifact_path.write_bytes(original) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table", + "files": { + "2024": { + "filename": artifact_path.name, + "source_url": "https://example.test/table.xlsx", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(original).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(original), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + source = _publish(tmp_path, artifact_path.name, revised) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError): + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + assert artifact_path.read_bytes() == original + + +def test_fetch_refuses_both_spellings_of_one_year_before_io(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table", + "files": { + 2024: {"filename": "numeric.xlsx"}, + "2024": {"filename": "quoted.xlsx"}, + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("ambiguous year keys must be refused before I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="both keys"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.xlsx", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + assert list(package.iterdir()) == [manifest_path] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "file_spec", + [ + pytest.param([], id="list"), + pytest.param("not a mapping", id="string"), + pytest.param(0, id="zero"), + pytest.param(False, id="false"), + pytest.param(None, id="null"), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_a_non_mapping_year_entry_before_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, file_spec +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table", + "files": {2024: file_spec}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("a malformed year entry must be refused before I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="entry 2024.*mapping"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/table.xlsx", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + assert list(package.iterdir()) == [manifest_path] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("revision", [False, True], ids=["refetch", "revision"]) +def test_fetch_carries_forward_fields_it_does_not_own(tmp_path, revision): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.xlsx", b"original publisher bytes") + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + metadata = { + "source_table": "Publisher table 7", + "notes": "Keep this review note.", + "source_urls": ["https://example.test/landing-page"], + "archive_member": "table.csv", + "year": 2024, + } + manifest["files"][2024].update(metadata) + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + if revision: + source.write_bytes(b"publisher revision") + + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + record_revision=revision, + ) + + updated = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2024] + for field, value in metadata.items(): + assert updated.get(field) == value + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Sol gate round 3: whole-tree manifest discovery and files-block shape +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _write_sweep_manifests(root): + manifest_names = ( + "manifest.yaml", + "manifest.yml", + "manifest_named.yaml", + "manifest_named.yml", + "Manifest_Mixed.YAML", + ) + for index, manifest_name in enumerate(manifest_names): + package = root / f"package-{index}" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = f"publisher artifact {index}".encode() + filename = f"artifact-{index}.csv" + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + (package / manifest_name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": f"package-{index}", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + decoy = root / "decoy" / "manifest-not-a-package.yaml" + decoy.parent.mkdir() + decoy.write_text("this: is not a package manifest\n") + + +def test_inventory_default_sweep_discovers_every_package_manifest(tmp_path): + root = tmp_path / "data" + _write_sweep_manifests(root) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(root) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["manifest_count"] == 5 + assert report.counts["artifact_count"] == 5 + assert {entry.manifest_path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] for entry in report.entries} == { + "manifest.yaml", + "manifest.yml", + "manifest_named.yaml", + "manifest_named.yml", + "Manifest_Mixed.YAML", + } + + +def test_publish_default_sweep_discovers_every_package_manifest(tmp_path): + root = tmp_path / "data" + _write_sweep_manifests(root) + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["manifest_count"] == 5 + assert report.counts["artifact_count"] == 5 + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 5 + assert len(log.read_text().splitlines()) == 5 + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "files", + [ + pytest.param([], id="empty-list"), + pytest.param("", id="empty-string"), + pytest.param(0, id="zero"), + pytest.param(False, id="false"), + ], +) +def test_sweeps_reject_falsy_non_mapping_files_blocks(tmp_path, files): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": files, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert (inventory.valid, published.valid) == (False, False) + assert "files must be a mapping" in inventory.errors[0] + assert "files must be a mapping" in published.errors[0] + assert inventory.entries == () + assert published.entries == () + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_sweeps_treat_a_null_files_block_as_absent(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": None, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package) + + assert inventory.valid + assert published.valid + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Manifest-declared artifact paths +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("path_kind", ["absolute", "parent"]) +def test_sweeps_refuse_non_bare_artifact_filenames_without_reading_them( + tmp_path, path_kind +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + outside = tmp_path / "data" / "outside.csv" + outside.write_bytes(b"outside publisher bytes") + filename = str(outside) if path_kind == "absolute" else "../outside.csv" + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(outside.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + expected = f"non_canonical_filename:{filename}" + + assert not inventory.valid + assert inventory.entries[0].errors == (expected,) + assert inventory.entries[0].local_path == str(package) + assert not published.valid + assert published.entries[0].errors == (expected,) + assert published.entries[0].upload is None + assert published.entries[0].local_path == str(package) + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_sweeps_refuse_a_symlinked_artifact_without_reading_it(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + outside = tmp_path / "outside.csv" + outside.write_bytes(b"outside publisher bytes") + artifact_path = package / "table.csv" + artifact_path.symlink_to(outside) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": artifact_path.name, + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(outside.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + expected = "artifact_path_is_symlink:table.csv" + + assert not inventory.valid + assert inventory.entries[0].errors == (expected,) + assert not inventory.entries[0].exists + assert not published.valid + assert published.entries[0].errors == (expected,) + assert published.entries[0].upload is None + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + assert artifact_path.is_symlink() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bad_kind", + [ + pytest.param("parent", id="parent-path"), + pytest.param("symlink", id="symlink"), + pytest.param("manifest-name", id="manifest-name"), + pytest.param("previous-r2", id="malformed-history"), + ], +) +def test_publish_preflights_every_entry_before_any_upload( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_kind +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + first = b"first publisher table" + second = b"second publisher table" + (package / "one.csv").write_bytes(first) + outside = tmp_path / "data" / "outside.csv" + outside.write_bytes(second) + second_path = package / "two.csv" + bad_filename = "two.csv" + bad_storage = None + if bad_kind == "parent": + bad_filename = "../outside.csv" + elif bad_kind == "symlink": + second_path.symlink_to(outside) + elif bad_kind == "manifest-name": + bad_filename = "manifest.yaml" + else: + second_path.write_bytes(second) + bad_storage = {"previous_r2": {"not": "a list"}} + bad_entry = { + "filename": bad_filename, + "source_url": "https://example.test/two.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(second).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(second), + } + if bad_storage is not None: + bad_entry["storage"] = bad_storage + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": { + 2023: { + "filename": "one.csv", + "source_url": "https://example.test/one.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(first).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(first), + }, + 2024: bad_entry, + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + uploads = [] + + def non_writing_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location, local_path, wrangler_command)) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("non-writing-uploader",), + returncode=0, + stdout="", + stderr="", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", non_writing_uploader) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package) + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_publish_preflights_every_sibling_manifest_before_any_upload( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"publisher table" + (package / "table.csv").write_bytes(content) + manifests = { + package / "manifest_a.yaml": { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package-a", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + package / "manifest_b.yaml": { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package-b", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "manifest.yaml", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(b"not a manifest").hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + } + for path, payload in manifests.items(): + path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False)) + before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in manifests} + uploads = [] + + def non_writing_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location, local_path, wrangler_command)) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("non-writing-uploader",), + returncode=0, + stdout="", + stderr="", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", non_writing_uploader) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package) + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert any( + "manifest_named_filename:manifest.yaml" in entry.errors + for entry in report.entries + ) + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in manifests} == before + + +def test_publish_preflights_entire_root_before_any_upload(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + root = tmp_path / "data" + good_package = root / "a_good" + bad_package = root / "z_bad" + good_package.mkdir(parents=True) + bad_package.mkdir(parents=True) + good_content = b"good publisher table" + bad_content = b"bad publisher table" + (good_package / "good.csv").write_bytes(good_content) + (bad_package / "bad.csv").write_bytes(bad_content) + manifests = { + good_package / "manifest.yaml": { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "good-package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "good.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(good_content).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + bad_package / "manifest.yaml": { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "bad-package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "../bad.csv", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(bad_content).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + } + for path, payload in manifests.items(): + path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False)) + before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in manifests} + uploads = [] + + def non_writing_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location, local_path, wrangler_command)) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("non-writing-uploader",), + returncode=0, + stdout="", + stderr="", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", non_writing_uploader) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root) + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert any( + "non_canonical_filename:../bad.csv" in entry.errors for entry in report.entries + ) + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in manifests} == before + + +def test_sweeps_refuse_conflicting_owners_across_package_manifests( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"publisher table" + filename = "table.csv" + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + manifest_paths = ( + package / "manifest_a.yaml", + package / "manifest_b.yaml", + ) + for path, sha256 in zip( + manifest_paths, + (hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), hashlib.sha256(b"other").hexdigest()), + ): + path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": path.stem, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "sha256": sha256, + "size_bytes": len(content), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in manifest_paths} + uploads = [] + + def non_writing_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location, local_path, wrangler_command)) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("non-writing-uploader",), + returncode=0, + stdout="", + stderr="", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", non_writing_uploader) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package) + + assert not inventory.valid + assert not published.valid + assert any("identify different bytes" in error for error in inventory.errors) + assert any("identify different bytes" in error for error in published.errors) + assert uploads == [] + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in manifest_paths} == before + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Sol gate round 3: canonical R2 locators before bucket-cutover skips +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_publish_preserves_an_explicit_historical_route_during_bucket_cutover( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.xlsx", b"publisher table") + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + ) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + spec = manifest["files"][2024] + wrong_key = f"raw/irs_soi/other-package/2023/{spec['sha256']}/{spec['filename']}" + spec["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": wrong_key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{wrong_key}", + } + } + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert report.valid + assert report.entries[0].upload is None + assert report.entries[0].errors == () + assert report.entries[0].skipped == ( + "recorded_r2_bucket_is_preserved_history:" + "recorded=ledger-raw:requested=chronicle-raw" + ) + assert report.entries[0].r2_location.key == wrong_key + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def _make_recorded_locator_use_s3(package): + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + r2 = manifest["files"][2022]["storage"]["r2"] + r2["provider"] = "s3" + r2["uri"] = f"s3://{r2['bucket']}/{r2['key']}" + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + return manifest_path + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_self_consistent_non_r2_locator_before_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package, source, _report = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + manifest_path = _make_recorded_locator_use_s3(package) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("a non-R2 storage.r2 locator must be refused before I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(RecordedR2LocatorError, match="provider.*r2"): + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("missing_field", ["provider", "uri"]) +def test_fetch_refuses_an_incomplete_r2_locator_before_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, missing_field +): + package, source, _report = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + manifest["files"][2022]["storage"]["r2"].pop(missing_field) + manifest_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + def unexpected_read(_source_url): + raise AssertionError("an incomplete storage.r2 locator reached I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + + with pytest.raises(RecordedR2LocatorError, match=missing_field): + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +def test_publish_refuses_a_self_consistent_non_r2_locator(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package, _source, _report = _recorded_package(tmp_path) + manifest_path = _make_recorded_locator_use_s3(package) + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + log = tmp_path / "publish.log" + wrangler = _wrangler_stub(tmp_path, log) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries[0].upload is None + assert report.entries[0].skipped is None + assert report.entries[0].errors[0].startswith("recorded_r2_locator_invalid:") + assert "provider" in report.entries[0].errors[0] + assert not log.exists() + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Sol gate round 3: identity segments, alias enumeration, non-regular manifests +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bad_id", + ["irs soi", "a/b", "..", " irs_soi", "irs_soi ", "a\\b", "a\tb"], +) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +def test_fetch_refuses_noncanonical_identity_segments_before_io( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_id, field +): + """A registration identity that _clean_key_part would rewrite (or that + embeds separators) must be refused, never normalized into a different + R2 namespace.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.xlsx", b"table") + + def unexpected_read(_url): + raise AssertionError("publisher read reached with a bad identity") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + kwargs = {"source_id": "irs_soi", "package_id": "soi-table-5"} + kwargs[field] = bad_id + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match="segment"): + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + year=2022, + output_dir=package, + **kwargs, + ) + + assert not package.exists() + + +def test_matching_directory_entry_refuses_multiple_normalized_aliases(): + """Two physical entries sharing one normalized key are a package defect; + returning the first spelling would silently ignore the other bytes.""" + from types import SimpleNamespace + + from chronicle.registration import matching_directory_entry + + entries = [ + SimpleNamespace(name="TABLE.CSV"), + SimpleNamespace(name="other.csv"), + SimpleNamespace(name="table.csv"), + ] + directory = SimpleNamespace(is_dir=lambda: True, iterdir=lambda: iter(entries)) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="TABLE.CSV.*table.csv|table.csv.*TABLE.CSV"): + matching_directory_entry(directory, "table.csv") + + assert matching_directory_entry(directory, "other.csv").name == "other.csv" + + +def test_publish_and_inventory_report_duplicate_artifact_aliases(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + """A duplicate-alias defect surfaces as an entry error, not a crash and + not a silent first-match read.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "22in05ira.xlsx", b"IRA table 5") + _fetch_local(output_dir, source, upload_r2=False) + + def duplicate_alias(_directory, filename): + raise ValueError(f"{filename!r} matches two physical spellings in the package.") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts.matching_directory_entry", duplicate_alias) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(output_dir) + published = publish_source_artifacts(output_dir) + + assert not inventory.valid + assert any( + "duplicate_artifact_spellings" in error + for entry in inventory.entries + for error in entry.errors + ) + assert not published.valid + assert any( + "duplicate_artifact_spellings" in error + for entry in published.entries + for error in entry.errors + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("shape", ["dangling", "directory"]) +def test_sweeps_refuse_non_regular_manifest_entries(tmp_path, shape): + """A manifest-named entry that is not a regular file must fail the sweep + loudly instead of vanishing from it.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + target = package / "manifest.yaml" + if shape == "dangling": + target.symlink_to(package / "nowhere.yaml") + else: + target.mkdir() + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match="regular file"): + inventory_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "db" / "data") + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match="regular file"): + publish_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "db" / "data") + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_dangling_manifest_symlink_instead_of_creating_one( + tmp_path, +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "manifest.yaml").symlink_to(package / "nowhere.yaml") + source = _publish(tmp_path, "table.xlsx", b"table") + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactManifestError, match="regular file"): + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").is_symlink() + assert not (package / "table.xlsx").exists() + + +def test_record_revision_updates_every_owner_even_when_yaml_aliases_share_one_entry( + tmp_path, +): + """Two vintages sharing one physical file are two owners even when the + manifest spelled them with a YAML anchor and alias (one dict object); + identifying the selected owner by object identity skipped both.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "soi-table-5" + source = _publish(tmp_path, "archive.zip", b"first publication") + _fetch_local(package, source, upload_r2=False) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + entry = _entry(manifest_path) + lines = [ + "kind: publisher_table", + "source_id: irs_soi", + "package_id: soi-table-5", + "files:", + " 2022: &shared", + ] + for field, value in entry.items(): + lines.append(f" {field}: {json.dumps(value)}") + lines.append(" 2023: *shared") + manifest_path.write_text("\n".join(lines) + "\n") + old_sha = entry["sha256"] + + source.write_bytes(b"second publication, revised rows") + report = fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-5", + year=2023, + output_dir=package, + upload_r2=False, + record_revision=True, + ) + + assert report.valid + manifest = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text()) + new_sha = hashlib.sha256(b"second publication, revised rows").hexdigest() + assert manifest["files"][2023]["sha256"] == new_sha + assert manifest["files"][2022]["sha256"] == new_sha, ( + "the aliased owner kept the superseded checksum" + ) + assert old_sha != new_sha + + +def test_identical_byte_refetch_keeps_r2_identified_shared_file_valid(tmp_path): + """Two manifests may identify one package-local file through identical + content-addressed R2 locators without declaring ``sha256``. Refetching + the same bytes records ``sha256`` on the selected manifest only; the + sibling's effective identity (its recorded R2 key) still agrees, so the + package directory must stay valid for every sweep.""" + from chronicle.artifacts import ( + _effective_recorded_digest, + default_r2_raw_bucket, + ) + from chronicle.registration import validate_package_directory + + def collisions(manifests): + # The sweeps resolve each entry's effective identity (its recorded + # content-addressed R2 key when no ``sha256`` is declared) exactly + # like this before comparing owners. + return validate_package_directory( + manifests, entry_digest=_effective_recorded_digest + ) + + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"shared publisher table" + filename = "shared.csv" + sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + source = tmp_path / "publisher-download.csv" + source.write_bytes(content) + bucket = default_r2_raw_bucket() + manifest_paths = (package / "manifest_a.yaml", package / "manifest_b.yaml") + for path in manifest_paths: + key = build_r2_key( + source_id="publisher", + package_id=path.stem, + year=2024, + sha256=sha256, + filename=filename, + ) + path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": path.stem, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": str(source), + "storage": { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": bucket, + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://{bucket}/{key}", + } + }, + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + manifests = {str(path): yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) for path in manifest_paths} + assert collisions(manifests) == () + assert inventory_source_artifacts(package).valid + + report = fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="publisher", + package_id="manifest_a", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + filename=filename, + manifest_filename="manifest_a.yaml", + ) + assert report.valid + assert report.sha256 == sha256 + + manifests = {str(path): yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) for path in manifest_paths} + assert manifests[str(manifest_paths[0])]["files"][2024]["sha256"] == sha256 + assert "sha256" not in manifests[str(manifest_paths[1])]["files"][2024] + assert collisions(manifests) == () + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package) + for sweep in (inventory, published): + assert not any("filename_collision" in error for error in sweep.errors) + assert not any("identify different bytes" in error for error in sweep.errors) + assert sweep.valid + + +def _write_unidentified_shared_manifests(package, source, *, filename="shared.csv"): + """Two manifests naming one package-local file with no identity yet.""" + manifest_paths = (package / "manifest_a.yaml", package / "manifest_b.yaml") + for path in manifest_paths: + path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": path.stem, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": str(source), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + return manifest_paths + + +def _fake_wrangler(tmp_path): + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + return wrangler, log + + +def test_selected_publication_of_a_shared_unidentified_file_keeps_siblings_valid( + tmp_path, +): + """Two manifests may name one package-local file before either records an + identity. Publishing only one of them records its checksum and locator; + the sibling, which still records nothing, must not become a false + collision, and its own later publication must record the same identity.""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"shared publisher table" + (package / "shared.csv").write_bytes(content) + source = tmp_path / "publisher-download.csv" + source.write_bytes(content) + manifest_a, manifest_b = _write_unidentified_shared_manifests(package, source) + wrangler, log = _fake_wrangler(tmp_path) + expected_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + + assert inventory_source_artifacts(package).valid + + selected = publish_source_artifacts( + package, manifest_filename="manifest_a.yaml", wrangler_command=str(wrangler) + ) + assert selected.valid + assert selected.counts["uploaded_count"] == 1 + assert yaml.safe_load(manifest_a.read_text())["files"][2024]["sha256"] == ( + expected_sha256 + ) + assert "sha256" not in yaml.safe_load(manifest_b.read_text())["files"][2024] + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + assert inventory.valid, inventory.errors + assert not any("filename_collision" in error for error in inventory.errors) + + sibling = publish_source_artifacts( + package, manifest_filename="manifest_b.yaml", wrangler_command=str(wrangler) + ) + assert sibling.valid, sibling.errors + assert sibling.counts["uploaded_count"] == 1 + recorded_b = yaml.safe_load(manifest_b.read_text())["files"][2024] + recorded_a = yaml.safe_load(manifest_a.read_text())["files"][2024] + assert recorded_b["sha256"] == expected_sha256 + assert recorded_b["storage"]["r2"]["key"].endswith(f"/{expected_sha256}/shared.csv") + assert recorded_a["storage"]["r2"]["key"].endswith(f"/{expected_sha256}/shared.csv") + assert len(log.read_text().splitlines()) == 2 + + everything = publish_source_artifacts(package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler)) + assert everything.valid, everything.errors + assert everything.counts["uploaded_count"] == 0 + assert everything.counts["skipped_count"] == 2 + + +def test_partial_upload_failure_of_a_shared_file_stays_retryable(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + """A full sweep whose second upload fails records the first manifest's + identity only. The retry must not report a collision for the sibling that + still records nothing, and must finish recording the same identity.""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"shared publisher table" + (package / "shared.csv").write_bytes(content) + source = tmp_path / "publisher-download.csv" + source.write_bytes(content) + manifest_a, manifest_b = _write_unidentified_shared_manifests(package, source) + expected_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + uploads = [] + failures = {"remaining": 1} + + def uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append(location) + if len(uploads) == 2 and failures["remaining"]: + failures["remaining"] -= 1 + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("failing-uploader",), returncode=1, stdout="", stderr="boom" + ) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("uploader",), returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", uploader) + + first = publish_source_artifacts(package) + assert not first.valid + assert first.counts["uploaded_count"] == 1 + assert first.counts["failed_count"] == 1 + recorded = { + path.name: yaml.safe_load(path.read_text())["files"][2024] + for path in (manifest_a, manifest_b) + } + identified = [name for name, entry in recorded.items() if "sha256" in entry] + assert len(identified) == 1 + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + assert inventory.valid, inventory.errors + assert not any("filename_collision" in error for error in inventory.errors) + + retry = publish_source_artifacts(package) + assert retry.valid, retry.errors + assert retry.counts["uploaded_count"] == 1 + assert retry.counts["skipped_count"] == 1 + assert retry.counts["failed_count"] == 0 + for path in (manifest_a, manifest_b): + entry = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text())["files"][2024] + assert entry["sha256"] == expected_sha256 + assert entry["storage"]["r2"]["key"].endswith(f"/{expected_sha256}/shared.csv") + assert len(uploads) == 3 + + +def test_sweeps_refuse_identifying_a_shared_file_whose_bytes_changed( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """An unidentified sibling is not a collision, but identifying it would + hash the package-local bytes. When those bytes no longer match what the + identified owner records, every sweep refuses before any upload.""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + old_content = b"shared publisher table" + new_content = b"shared publisher table, revised" + (package / "shared.csv").write_bytes(new_content) + source = tmp_path / "publisher-download.csv" + source.write_bytes(new_content) + manifest_a, manifest_b = _write_unidentified_shared_manifests(package, source) + identified = yaml.safe_load(manifest_a.read_text()) + identified["files"][2024]["sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(old_content).hexdigest() + identified["files"][2024]["size_bytes"] = len(old_content) + manifest_a.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(identified, sort_keys=False)) + uploads = [] + + def unexpected_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append(location) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("uploader",), returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", unexpected_uploader) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + published = publish_source_artifacts(package) + sibling_only = publish_source_artifacts( + package, manifest_filename="manifest_b.yaml" + ) + + for sweep in (inventory, published, sibling_only): + assert not sweep.valid + assert any("two identities" in error for error in sweep.errors), sweep.errors + assert uploads == [] + assert "sha256" not in yaml.safe_load(manifest_b.read_text())["files"][2024] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("record_revision", [False, True]) +def test_first_fetch_initializes_a_predeclared_entry_without_identity( + tmp_path, record_revision +): + """A manifest may predeclare an entry with only ``filename`` and + ``source_url``. Its first fetch identifies it: the entry is the one being + initialized, not an unidentifiable owner, so both the fetch preflight + and the manifest writer must accept it (default and --record-revision).""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + source = tmp_path / "publisher-download.csv" + content = b"first publisher bytes" + source.write_bytes(content) + manifest_path = package / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": {2024: {"filename": "table.csv", "source_url": str(source)}}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + assert not (package / "table.csv").exists() + + report = fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + filename="table.csv", + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + + assert report.valid, report.errors + expected_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + assert report.sha256 == expected_sha256 + assert (package / "table.csv").read_bytes() == content + entry = yaml.safe_load(manifest_path.read_text())["files"][2024] + assert entry["filename"] == "table.csv" + assert entry["sha256"] == expected_sha256 + assert entry["size_bytes"] == len(content) + assert inventory_source_artifacts(package).valid + + again = fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="publisher", + package_id="package", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + filename="table.csv", + ) + assert again.valid, again.errors + assert again.sha256 == expected_sha256 + + +def test_fetch_still_refuses_an_unidentified_owner_in_another_manifest(tmp_path): + """Only the entry being initialized is exempt: another manifest naming the + same package-local file without an identity keeps refusing the fetch + before any byte is written, because the fetched bytes would silently + define what that sibling means.""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + source = tmp_path / "publisher-download.csv" + source.write_bytes(b"first publisher bytes") + manifest_a, manifest_b = _write_unidentified_shared_manifests( + package, source, filename="table.csv" + ) + before = {path: path.read_text() for path in (manifest_a, manifest_b)} + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="records no sha256 identity"): + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="publisher", + package_id="manifest_a", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + filename="table.csv", + manifest_filename="manifest_a.yaml", + ) + + assert not (package / "table.csv").exists() + assert {path: path.read_text() for path in (manifest_a, manifest_b)} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("missing", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +def test_selected_publication_overrides_apply_only_to_the_selected_manifest( + tmp_path, missing +): + """``--source-id`` / ``--package-id`` complete the selected manifest's + identity. An unselected sibling that declares a different identifier is + preflighted with its own identifiers, not the override, so the selected + publication succeeds and the sibling is left untouched.""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content_a = b"table a" + content_b = b"table b" + (package / "table_a.csv").write_bytes(content_a) + (package / "table_b.csv").write_bytes(content_b) + identity_a = {"source_id": "publisher_a", "package_id": "package_a"} + identity_b = {"source_id": "publisher_b", "package_id": "package_b"} + override = {missing: identity_a[missing]} + declared_a = {key: value for key, value in identity_a.items() if key != missing} + manifest_a = package / "manifest_a.yaml" + manifest_b = package / "manifest_b.yaml" + manifest_a.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + **declared_a, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table_a.csv", + "source_url": "https://publisher.test/a", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content_a).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content_a), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + manifest_b.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + **identity_b, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table_b.csv", + "source_url": "https://publisher.test/b", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content_b).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content_b), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + before_b = manifest_b.read_text() + wrangler, log = _fake_wrangler(tmp_path) + + report = publish_source_artifacts( + package, + manifest_filename="manifest_a.yaml", + wrangler_command=str(wrangler), + **override, + ) + + assert report.valid, report.errors + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 1 + assert report.counts["failed_count"] == 0 + recorded = yaml.safe_load(manifest_a.read_text()) + assert recorded[missing] == identity_a[missing] + assert recorded["files"][2024]["storage"]["r2"]["key"].startswith( + "raw/publisher_a/package_a/2024/" + ) + assert manifest_b.read_text() == before_b + assert len(log.read_text().splitlines()) == 1 + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +def test_default_publication_sweep_preflights_overrides_for_every_selected_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, field +): + """A sibling selected later must be checked with its publication identity.""" + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + for label in ("a", "b"): + content = f"publisher table {label}".encode() + filename = f"{label}.csv" + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + manifest = { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "publisher", + "package_id": "package", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": f"https://publisher.test/{filename}", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content), + } + }, + } + manifest[field] = label + (package / f"manifest_{label}.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False) + ) + before = {path: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + uploads = [] + + def non_writing_uploader(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location, local_path, wrangler_command)) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("non-writing-uploader",), + returncode=0, + stdout="", + stderr="", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", non_writing_uploader) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, **{field: "a"}) + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert {path: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before + assert any(field in error for entry in report.entries for error in entry.errors) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("missing", ["source_id", "package_id"]) +def test_default_sweep_overrides_apply_to_every_selected_sibling(tmp_path, missing): + """A default sweep selects every manifest in the directory. The override + must complete the manifest that lacks the identifier and confirm the + sibling that declares the same value, whichever order they are processed + in -- a selected sibling met through another selected manifest's package + preflight is not an unselected one.""" + package = tmp_path / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + content_a = b"table a" + content_b = b"table b" + (package / "table_a.csv").write_bytes(content_a) + (package / "table_b.csv").write_bytes(content_b) + identity = {"source_id": "publisher", "package_id": "package"} + override = {missing: identity[missing]} + declared_a = {key: value for key, value in identity.items() if key != missing} + manifest_a = package / "manifest_a.yaml" + manifest_b = package / "manifest_b.yaml" + manifest_a.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + **declared_a, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table_a.csv", + "source_url": "https://publisher.test/a", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content_a).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content_a), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + manifest_b.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + **identity, + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table_b.csv", + "source_url": "https://publisher.test/b", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content_b).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content_b), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + wrangler, log = _fake_wrangler(tmp_path) + + report = publish_source_artifacts( + package, wrangler_command=str(wrangler), **override + ) + + assert report.valid, report.errors + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 2 + assert report.counts["failed_count"] == 0 + assert not any("r2_identity_invalid" in error for error in report.errors) + for path in (manifest_a, manifest_b): + recorded = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) + assert recorded[missing] == identity[missing] + assert recorded["files"][2024]["storage"]["r2"]["key"].startswith( + "raw/publisher/package/2024/" + ) + assert len(log.read_text().splitlines()) == 2 diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_consumer_contract.py b/tests/test_chronicle_consumer_contract.py index cda97b66..30dd0056 100644 --- a/tests/test_chronicle_consumer_contract.py +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_consumer_contract.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import pytest +import chronicle.artifacts as artifacts import chronicle.consumer_contract as consumer_contract from chronicle.consumer_contract import ( CONSUMER_FACT_SCHEMA_VERSION, @@ -886,6 +887,41 @@ def test_export_consumer_facts_cli_rejects_contract_invalid_facts(tmp_path, caps }, "irs_soi.ty2024.table.us.taxable_interest_amount.ledger_derived", ), + # The guard used to match two hardcoded URI prefixes, so a URI naming + # any derived bucket other than `ledger-derived` did not match. Once the + # buckets are renamed (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism 3) that is + # every derived URI, so the guard has to match on shape. + ( + { + "source_name": "irs_soi", + "source_file": "publisher.xlsx", + "raw_r2_bucket": None, + "raw_r2_key": None, + "raw_r2_uri": "r2://chronicle-derived/derived/source/fact.json", + }, + "publisher.raw.fact", + ), + ( + { + "source_name": "irs_soi", + "source_file": "chronicle-derived:taxable_interest.json", + "raw_r2_bucket": "ledger-raw", + "raw_r2_uri": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/source/publisher.xlsx", + }, + "publisher.raw.fact", + ), + # The derived-row marker renames with everything else, so the guard has + # to reject the chronicle spelling the same way it rejects the ledger + # one (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, mechanism 3). + ( + { + "source_name": "irs_soi", + "source_file": "publisher.xlsx", + "raw_r2_bucket": "ledger-raw", + "raw_r2_uri": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/source/publisher.xlsx", + }, + "irs_soi.ty2024.table.us.taxable_interest_amount.chronicle_derived", + ), ], ) def test_consumer_contract_rejects_downstream_derived_target_facts( @@ -905,6 +941,157 @@ def test_consumer_contract_rejects_downstream_derived_target_facts( assert "derived_fact_provenance" in {error.code for error in report.errors} +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bucket_env", + [ + "CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", + "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", + "LEDGER_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", + ], +) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("field", "value"), + [ + ("raw_r2_bucket", "chronicle-builds"), + ("raw_r2_uri", "r2://chronicle-builds/builds/source/fact.json"), + ("source_file", "chronicle-builds:builds/source/fact.json"), + ("source_file", "r2://chronicle-builds/builds/source/fact.json"), + ("url", "r2://chronicle-builds/builds/source/fact.json"), + ], +) +def test_consumer_contract_rejects_configured_derived_bucket( + monkeypatch, tmp_path, bucket_env, field, value +): + monkeypatch.setenv(bucket_env, "chronicle-builds") + fact = _soi_agi_fact() + derived = replace(fact, source=replace(fact.source, **{field: value})) + + report = validate_consumer_fact_contract([derived]) + + assert "derived_fact_provenance" in {error.code for error in report.errors} + output = tmp_path / "new-directory" / "consumer_facts.jsonl" + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="consumer-contract"): + write_consumer_facts_jsonl([derived], output) + assert not output.parent.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "prefix_env", + [ + None, + "CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", + "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", + "LEDGER_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", + ], +) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("field", "value"), + [ + ("raw_r2_key", "builds/source/fact.json"), + ("raw_r2_uri", "r2://publisher-archive/builds/source/fact.json"), + ("source_file", "publisher-archive:builds/source/fact.json"), + ("source_file", "r2://publisher-archive/builds/source/fact.json"), + ("url", "r2://publisher-archive/builds/source/fact.json"), + ], +) +def test_consumer_contract_rejects_configured_derived_prefix( + monkeypatch, prefix_env, field, value +): + if prefix_env is None: + monkeypatch.setattr(artifacts, "DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", "builds") + else: + monkeypatch.setenv(prefix_env, "builds") + fact = _soi_agi_fact() + derived = replace(fact, source=replace(fact.source, **{field: value})) + + report = validate_consumer_fact_contract([derived]) + + assert "derived_fact_provenance" in {error.code for error in report.errors} + + +def test_consumer_contract_derived_routes_match_complete_names(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", "chronicle-builds") + monkeypatch.setattr(artifacts, "DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", "builds") + fact = _soi_agi_fact() + publisher = replace( + fact, + source=replace( + fact.source, + source_file="chronicle-builds-raw:buildstats/source/publisher.csv", + raw_r2_bucket="chronicle-builds-raw", + raw_r2_key="buildstats/source/publisher.csv", + raw_r2_uri="r2://chronicle-builds-raw/buildstats/source/publisher.csv", + ), + ) + + assert validate_consumer_fact_contract([publisher]).valid + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["raw_r2_uri", "source_file", "url"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("scheme", ["R2", "r2"]) +def test_consumer_contract_rejects_derived_uri_scheme_case( + monkeypatch, tmp_path, field, scheme +): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", "chronicle-builds") + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_PREFIX", "builds") + fact = _soi_agi_fact() + derived = replace( + fact, + source=replace( + fact.source, + **{field: f"{scheme}://chronicle-builds/builds/source/fact.json"}, + ), + ) + + report = validate_consumer_fact_contract([derived]) + + assert "derived_fact_provenance" in {error.code for error in report.errors} + output = tmp_path / "new-directory" / "consumer_facts.jsonl" + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="consumer-contract"): + write_consumer_facts_jsonl([derived], output) + assert not output.parent.exists() + + +def test_derived_record_marker_is_rejected_in_either_spelling(): + """Both rename-window spellings produce the identical boundary error.""" + fact = _soi_agi_fact() + base = "irs_soi.ty2024.table.us.taxable_interest_amount" + + reports = { + suffix: validate_consumer_fact_contract( + [replace(fact, source_record_id=f"{base}.{suffix}")] + ) + for suffix in ("ledger_derived", "chronicle_derived") + } + + ledger_errors = [ + (error.code, error.message) for error in reports["ledger_derived"].errors + ] + chronicle_errors = [ + (error.code, error.message) for error in reports["chronicle_derived"].errors + ] + assert ledger_errors == chronicle_errors + assert "derived_fact_provenance" in {code for code, _ in ledger_errors} + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "source_record_id", + [ + # A publisher-backed row that merely contains the marker as a word, or + # carries it without the separating dot, is not a derived target row. + "irs_soi.ty2024.table.us.chronicle_derived_totals", + "irs_soi.ty2024.table.us.ledger_derived_totals", + "chronicle_derived", + ], +) +def test_derived_record_marker_matches_the_whole_final_segment(source_record_id): + fact = replace(_soi_agi_fact(), source_record_id=source_record_id) + + report = validate_consumer_fact_contract([fact]) + + assert report.valid + + def test_export_consumer_facts_cli_preserves_decimal_values(tmp_path, capsys): input_path = tmp_path / "facts.jsonl" output_path = tmp_path / "consumer_facts.jsonl" @@ -940,3 +1127,32 @@ def test_contract_reports_malformed_lineage_keys_instead_of_raising(tmp_path): ValueError, match="Cannot export invalid Chronicle consumer-contract facts" ): write_consumer_facts_jsonl([fact], tmp_path / "facts.jsonl") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("bucket", "key"), + [ + ("publisher-derived", "exports/facts.jsonl"), + ("PUBLISHER-Derived", "exports/facts.jsonl"), + ("some-archive", "derived/exports/facts.jsonl"), + ], +) +def test_consumer_contract_keeps_rejecting_legacy_derived_routes(bucket, key): + """Configured routes extend the derived boundary; they never narrow it. + A bucket ending in ``-derived`` or a ``derived/`` key was rejected before + routes became configurable and must still be, under default config.""" + fact = _soi_agi_fact() + derived = replace( + fact, + source=replace( + fact.source, + source_file=f"{bucket}:{key}", + raw_r2_bucket=bucket, + raw_r2_key=key, + raw_r2_uri=f"r2://{bucket}/{key}", + ), + ) + + report = validate_consumer_fact_contract([derived]) + + assert "derived_fact_provenance" in {error.code for error in report.errors} diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_env.py b/tests/test_chronicle_env.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e1f065e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_env.py @@ -0,0 +1,402 @@ +"""Tests for the chronicle-first environment read window. + +Chronicle's operational stores migrate by dual-run (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, +mechanism 3): ``CHRONICLE_*`` names win, ledger-era names keep working behind a +deprecation warning. Every test here is hermetic — the suite-wide +``isolated_rename_window_env`` fixture in ``tests/conftest.py`` strips every +variable in the rename window from the ambient environment first. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import importlib +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import subprocess +import sys + +import pytest + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET, + DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET, + default_r2_derived_bucket, + default_r2_raw_bucket, +) +from chronicle.env import ( + CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX, + ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning, + DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA, + LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES, + default_chronicle_schema, + env_flag, + env_names, + env_value, +) +from chronicle.harness import main as harness_main +from chronicle.source_package import ( + SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, + SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, +) + + +def _fake_wrangler(tmp_path, log): + wrangler = tmp_path / "wrangler" + wrangler.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\necho ok\n") + wrangler.chmod(0o755) + return wrangler + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Lookup order +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_every_test_runs_with_the_rename_window_cleared(): + """Isolation is suite-wide (tests/conftest.py), not module-scoped. + + Modules well outside this one assert the defaults these variables override + — the raw and derived bucket names, the Supabase schema — so an operator's + shell must not reach any test. + """ + leaked = sorted( + name + for name in os.environ + if name.startswith((CHRONICLE_ENV_PREFIX, *LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES)) + ) + + assert leaked == [] + + +def test_env_names_puts_chronicle_first_then_ledger_era_names(): + assert env_names("CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH") == ( + "CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", + "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", + "LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", + ) + + +def test_env_names_expands_a_ledger_era_name_to_the_same_ladder(): + assert env_names("LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT") == env_names("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT") + + +def test_env_names_leaves_variables_outside_the_rename_window_alone(): + assert env_names("POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL") == ("POLICYENGINE_SUPABASE_URL",) + assert env_names("POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA") == ("POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA",) + + +def test_bare_prefix_is_not_treated_as_a_renamed_variable(): + assert env_names("LEDGER_") == ("LEDGER_",) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Precedence and the deprecation warning +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_chronicle_name_wins_over_both_ledger_era_names(monkeypatch, recwarn): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "/chronicle") + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "/ledger") + monkeypatch.setenv("POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "/policyengine-ledger") + + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT") == "/chronicle" + assert not [ + warning + for warning in recwarn.list + if issubclass(warning.category, ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning) + ] + + +def test_ledger_name_alone_still_works_and_warns(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "/ledger") + + with pytest.warns(ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning) as warnings_raised: + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT") == "/ledger" + + message = str(warnings_raised[0].message) + assert "LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT" in message + assert "CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT" in message + + +def test_policyengine_ledger_name_alone_still_works_and_warns(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA", "ledger") + + with pytest.warns(ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning) as warnings_raised: + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA") == "ledger" + + message = str(warnings_raised[0].message) + assert "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA" in message + assert "CHRONICLE_SCHEMA" in message + + +def test_deprecation_warning_is_raised_once_per_process(monkeypatch, recwarn): + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT", "/ledger") + + for _ in range(3): + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT") == "/ledger" + + deprecations = [ + warning + for warning in recwarn.list + if issubclass(warning.category, ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning) + ] + assert len(deprecations) == 1 + + +def test_deprecation_warning_is_attributed_to_the_calling_module(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", "1") + + with pytest.warns(ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning) as warnings_raised: + assert env_flag(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV) + + # env_flag and env_value must report at the same depth, or operators get a + # notice pointing at Chronicle's own source instead of their call site. + assert Path(warnings_raised[0].filename).name == "test_chronicle_env.py" + + +def test_unset_variables_fall_back_to_the_default(): + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT") is None + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", default="/fallback") == "/fallback" + + +def test_empty_values_count_as_unset(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "") + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "/ledger") + + with pytest.warns(ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning): + assert env_value("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT") == "/ledger" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Flags +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["1", "true", "TRUE", "yes", "on", " on "]) +def test_env_flag_accepts_truthy_spellings(monkeypatch, value): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", value) + assert env_flag(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", ["0", "false", "no", "off", "maybe"]) +def test_env_flag_rejects_other_values(monkeypatch, value): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", value) + assert not env_flag(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV) + + +def test_env_flag_lets_the_chronicle_name_turn_a_legacy_flag_off(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", "0") + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH", "1") + + # An operator who has migrated must be able to turn the flag off without + # first hunting down the stale ledger-era variable. + assert not env_flag(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Real call sites +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_source_artifact_env_constants_are_chronicle_named(): + assert SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV == "CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR" + assert SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV == "CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "name", + ["CHRONICLE_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR", "LEDGER_SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_DIR"], +) +def test_source_artifact_cache_dir_honors_both_names(monkeypatch, tmp_path, name): + from chronicle.source_package import _source_artifact_cache_path + + monkeypatch.setenv(name, str(tmp_path)) + + cache_path = _source_artifact_cache_path( + {"filename": "table.xlsx", "sha256": "abc123"} + ) + + assert cache_path == tmp_path / "abc123" / "table.xlsx" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "name", ["CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "LEDGER_PE_US_DATA_ROOT"] +) +def test_pe_source_root_cli_default_honors_both_names(monkeypatch, name): + from db.cli import _pe_source_root_env_default + + monkeypatch.setenv(name, "/pe-us") + + assert _pe_source_root_env_default("us") == "/pe-us" + + +def test_pe_source_inventory_env_constants_are_chronicle_named(): + from db.pe_source_inventory import PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV, PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV + + assert PE_US_DATA_ROOT_ENV == "CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT" + assert PE_UK_DATA_ROOT_ENV == "CHRONICLE_PE_UK_DATA_ROOT" + + +def test_db_cli_parser_builds_with_the_env_backed_defaults(monkeypatch, capsys): + """The db CLI builds its parser before dispatching any subcommand. + + Its --pe-us-root/--pe-uk-root defaults call into the env helper, so an + import error there breaks `chronicle init`, `load` and `stats` alike while + the rest of the test suite stays green. + """ + import db.cli + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_PE_US_DATA_ROOT", "/pe-us") + monkeypatch.setattr("sys.argv", ["chronicle", "--help"]) + + with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exit_info: + db.cli.main() + + assert exit_info.value.code == 0 + assert "Manage Chronicle target input data" in capsys.readouterr().out + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "name", + ["CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA", "LEDGER_SCHEMA"], +) +def test_supabase_schema_honors_every_name_in_the_window(monkeypatch, name): + """Set after import and still honored: the schema is read at call time.""" + import db.supabase_client + + monkeypatch.setenv(name, "chronicle_probe") + + assert db.supabase_client.chronicle_schema() == "chronicle_probe" + assert default_chronicle_schema() == "chronicle_probe" + + +def test_supabase_schema_default_is_unchanged(): + import db.supabase_client + + # The hosted schema name itself is out of this slice; only the variable + # that overrides it moved. + assert DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA == "ledger" + assert default_chronicle_schema() == "ledger" + assert db.supabase_client.chronicle_schema() == "ledger" + assert db.supabase_client.targets_schema() == "targets" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "schema_env", + ["CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA", "LEDGER_SCHEMA"], +) +def test_supabase_schema_compatibility_aliases_honor_import_time_environment( + schema_env, +): + """Deprecated exports retain the environment snapshot existing importers use.""" + environment = os.environ.copy() + for name in (*env_names("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA"), "POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA"): + environment.pop(name, None) + environment[schema_env] = "chronicle_import_probe" + environment["POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA"] = "targets_import_probe" + script = ( + "import json; " + "from db.supabase_client import LEDGER_SCHEMA, TARGETS_SCHEMA; " + "print(json.dumps([LEDGER_SCHEMA, TARGETS_SCHEMA]))" + ) + + completed = subprocess.run( + [sys.executable, "-c", script], + cwd=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1], + env=environment, + check=True, + capture_output=True, + text=True, + ) + + assert json.loads(completed.stdout) == [ + "chronicle_import_probe", + "targets_import_probe", + ] + + +def test_supabase_schema_is_not_bound_at_import(monkeypatch): + """Compatibility constants do not freeze the runtime schema resolver. + + The deprecated names expose only stable defaults for existing importers. + Query code calls the functions, which still honor an environment change + made after module import. + """ + import db.supabase_client + + assert db.supabase_client.LEDGER_SCHEMA == "ledger" + assert db.supabase_client.TARGETS_SCHEMA == "targets" + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "chronicle_probe") + monkeypatch.setenv("POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA", "targets_probe") + unreloaded = importlib.import_module("db.supabase_client") + + assert unreloaded.chronicle_schema() == "chronicle_probe" + assert unreloaded.targets_schema() == "targets_probe" + assert unreloaded.LEDGER_SCHEMA == "ledger" + assert unreloaded.TARGETS_SCHEMA == "targets" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# R2 bucket configuration +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_r2_bucket_defaults_are_still_the_ledger_era_names(): + assert DEFAULT_R2_RAW_BUCKET == "ledger-raw" + assert DEFAULT_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET == "ledger-derived" + assert default_r2_raw_bucket() == "ledger-raw" + assert default_r2_derived_bucket() == "ledger-derived" + + +def test_r2_buckets_follow_the_chronicle_env_vars(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", "chronicle-derived") + + assert default_r2_raw_bucket() == "chronicle-raw" + assert default_r2_derived_bucket() == "chronicle-derived" + + +def test_r2_buckets_honor_ledger_era_names_with_a_warning(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("LEDGER_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "legacy-raw") + + with pytest.warns(ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning): + assert default_r2_raw_bucket() == "legacy-raw" + + +def test_bootstrap_r2_cli_creates_the_configured_buckets(monkeypatch, tmp_path): + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _fake_wrangler(tmp_path, log) + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_DERIVED_BUCKET", "chronicle-derived") + + exit_code = harness_main(["bootstrap-r2", "--wrangler-command", str(wrangler)]) + + commands = log.read_text() + assert exit_code == 0 + assert "r2 bucket create chronicle-raw" in commands + assert "r2 bucket create chronicle-derived" in commands + + +def test_bootstrap_r2_cli_flags_still_override_the_environment(monkeypatch, tmp_path): + log = tmp_path / "wrangler.log" + wrangler = _fake_wrangler(tmp_path, log) + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + + harness_main( + [ + "bootstrap-r2", + "--raw-bucket", + "explicit-raw", + "--derived-bucket", + "explicit-derived", + "--wrangler-command", + str(wrangler), + ] + ) + + commands = log.read_text() + assert "r2 bucket create explicit-raw" in commands + assert "r2 bucket create explicit-derived" in commands + assert "chronicle-raw" not in commands diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_kind.py b/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_kind.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..329ad712 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_kind.py @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +"""The explicit-kind rule and the repository guard for microdata bytes. + +Every manifest created or modified after the microdata-identity ADR declares +``kind``. Manifests that predate the rule are frozen, byte for byte, in +``chronicle/grandfathered_manifests.py``; any other kindless manifest is an +error at every entry point -- ``fetch-artifact``, ``publish-raw``, +``inventory-artifacts``, ``validate-package`` and the source-package byte +reader -- and never a publisher table by default. A ``kind: microdata_release`` +package directory holds only manifests: public release bytes are archived in +R2 from a staging directory outside the tree, never committed. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import subprocess +import sys +import uuid +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + fetch_source_artifact, + inventory_source_artifacts, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.grandfathered_manifests import ( + GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS, + grandfathered_manifest_key, + is_grandfathered_manifest, + manifest_digest, +) +from chronicle.registration import ( + ManifestAccessError, + ManifestKindError, + manifest_kind, + safe_manifest_kind, +) +from chronicle.source_package import SourceArtifactSpec, validate_source_package + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +FREEZE_SIZE = 168 + + +def _tracked_manifests() -> list[Path]: + listed = subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(REPO_ROOT), "ls-files", "db/data"], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ).stdout.split() + return [ + REPO_ROOT / path + for path in listed + if Path(path).name.startswith("manifest") and path.endswith((".yaml", ".yml")) + ] + + +def _kindless(path: Path) -> bool: + payload = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) or {} + return isinstance(payload, dict) and "kind" not in payload + + +def test_every_kindless_manifest_in_the_tree_is_frozen_unmodified(): + tracked = _tracked_manifests() + assert tracked + kindless = { + path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix(): path + for path in tracked + if _kindless(path) + } + + missing = sorted(set(kindless) - set(GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS)) + assert missing == [], ( + "kindless manifests outside the frozen list; declare `kind:` in them: " + f"{missing}" + ) + modified = sorted( + key + for key, path in kindless.items() + if manifest_digest(path) != GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS[key] + ) + assert modified == [], ( + "frozen manifests modified without declaring `kind:`; declare it and " + f"drop them from the frozen list: {modified}" + ) + + +def test_the_frozen_list_only_shrinks(): + # Entries leave the list once a manifest declares its kind; none is added. + assert len(GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS) <= FREEZE_SIZE + stale = sorted( + key + for key in GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS + if not (REPO_ROOT / key).exists() or not _kindless(REPO_ROOT / key) + ) + assert stale == [], f"drop from the frozen list, the kind is declared: {stale}" + + +def _frozen_copy(tmp_path: Path) -> tuple[Path, str]: + key = "db/data/irs_soi/table_1_2/manifest.yaml" + assert key in GRANDFATHERED_KINDLESS_MANIFESTS + copy = tmp_path / key + copy.parent.mkdir(parents=True) + copy.write_bytes((REPO_ROOT / key).read_bytes()) + return copy, key + + +def test_a_frozen_manifest_reads_as_a_publisher_table_until_it_is_modified(tmp_path): + copy, key = _frozen_copy(tmp_path) + payload = yaml.safe_load(copy.read_text()) + + assert grandfathered_manifest_key(copy) == key + assert is_grandfathered_manifest(copy) + assert manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=copy) == "publisher_table" + assert safe_manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=copy) == ("publisher_table", None) + + copy.write_bytes(copy.read_bytes() + b"# touched\n") + assert not is_grandfathered_manifest(copy) + with pytest.raises(ManifestKindError, match="declares no kind"): + manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=copy) + assert safe_manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=copy) == ( + "publisher_table", + "manifest_kind_missing", + ) + + +def test_a_fetch_into_a_frozen_manifest_declares_its_kind(tmp_path): + copy, _key = _frozen_copy(tmp_path) + source = tmp_path / "24in12ms.xls" + source.write_bytes(b"the next vintage") + + report = fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-2", + year=2099, + output_dir=copy.parent, + ) + payload = yaml.safe_load(copy.read_text()) + + assert report.valid + assert payload["kind"] == "publisher_table" + assert list(payload)[:3] == ["source_id", "package_id", "kind"] + # The manifest left the freeze by declaring itself. + assert not is_grandfathered_manifest(copy) + assert manifest_kind(payload, manifest_path=copy) == "publisher_table" + + +def _kindless_package(tmp_path: Path) -> Path: + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "new_tables" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "table.ods").write_bytes(b"a table") + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-new-tables", + "files": { + 2023: { + "filename": "table.ods", + "source_url": "https://publisher.example/table.ods", + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + return package + + +def test_a_new_kindless_manifest_is_refused_by_fetch_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = _kindless_package(tmp_path) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads: list[str] = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", + lambda url: reads.append(url) or (b"x", "other.ods"), + ) + + for kind in (None, "publisher_table", "microdata_release"): + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="declares no kind"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/other.ods", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-new-tables", + year=2024, + output_dir=package, + kind=kind, + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_a_new_kindless_manifest_is_reported_and_skipped_by_the_sweeps( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = _kindless_package(tmp_path) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", + lambda *args, **kwargs: (_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError("no upload")), + ) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "db" / "data") + published = publish_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "db" / "data") + + assert not inventory.valid + assert any(error.startswith("manifest_kind_missing") for error in inventory.errors) + assert not published.valid + assert published.entries == () + assert any(error.startswith("manifest_kind_missing") for error in published.errors) + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_a_new_kindless_manifest_is_refused_by_the_byte_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package_name = f"chronicle_kind_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "tables" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(b"a,b\n1,2\n") + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-tables", + "files": {2023: {"filename": "table.csv", "source_url": "x"}}, + } + ) + ) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + monkeypatch.delitem(sys.modules, package_name, raising=False) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Tables", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/tables", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestKindError): + spec.assert_parseable_manifest() + with pytest.raises(ManifestKindError): + spec.build_source_rows(2023) + + package_dir = tmp_path / "package" + package_dir.mkdir() + (package_dir / "source_package.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "schema_version": "ledger.source_package.v1", + "package_id": "dwp-tables-parse-attempt", + "label": "A kindless manifest", + "artifact": { + "source_name": "dwp", + "source_table": "Tables", + "resource_package": package_name, + "resource_directory": "data/dwp/tables", + "manifest": "manifest.yaml", + "vintage": "2023", + "extracted_at": "2026-09-02", + "extraction_method": "none", + "parser": "delimited_text_full_rows", + "artifact_year": 2023, + }, + "record_sets": [], + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + report = validate_source_package(package_dir, year=2023) + assert not report.valid + assert [issue.code for issue in report.errors] == ["manifest_kind_missing"] + + +def test_no_tracked_microdata_bytes(): + """The repository guard: a release package holds manifests and nothing else.""" + release_dirs = { + path.parent + for path in _tracked_manifests() + if (yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) or {}).get("kind") == "microdata_release" + } + assert release_dirs + + tracked = subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(REPO_ROOT), "ls-files", "db/data"], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ).stdout.split() + for directory in release_dirs: + relative = directory.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix() + files = sorted( + Path(path).name + for path in tracked + if Path(path).parent.as_posix() == relative + ) + assert files == ["manifest.yaml"], f"{relative} tracks microdata bytes: {files}" + assert sorted(item.name for item in directory.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + + +def test_the_committed_tree_passes_the_kind_rule(): + report = inventory_source_artifacts(REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data") + assert not [error for error in report.errors if "manifest_kind" in error] diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_reading.py b/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_reading.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0b008f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_reading.py @@ -0,0 +1,596 @@ +"""Manifests are read strictly and every entry field the sweeps rely on is validated. + +A manifest is the record the byte boundary is decided from, so the reader +refuses what it cannot represent faithfully (a document whose duplicate keys +YAML would silently collapse), the comparison key for filenames covers every +spelling a filesystem folds together (case and Unicode normalisation), and +``validate_file_entry`` reports the shapes the commands used to act on +silently: a nameless or malformed entry, a misspelled field, a hash-only +entry carrying a storage block or a ``chronicle_fetch`` attestation, a +consumer attestation signed by Chronicle, and evidence whose URL has no host. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +import unicodedata +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + MalformedManifestError, + _read_manifest, + inventory_source_artifacts, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.licences import licence_evidence_errors +from chronicle.registration import ( + HashOnlyRegistrationError, + ManifestAccessError, + filename_key, + validate_file_entry, + validate_manifest_files, +) +from chronicle.source_package import SourceArtifactSpec +from tests.test_chronicle_microdata_registration import ( + ATTESTED, + EVIDENCE, + FIXTURE_SHA, + LICENSED_BYTES, + OTHER_SHA, + PINNED, + PUBLIC_SHA, + _attested_entry, + _fetch_table, + _forbid_uploads, + _public_release_entry, + _refuse_read, + _register, +) + + +NFC_NAME = unicodedata.normalize("NFC", "adúlt.tab") +NFD_NAME = unicodedata.normalize("NFD", "adúlt.tab") +LICENSED_SHA = hashlib.sha256(LICENSED_BYTES).hexdigest() + + +def _write(path: Path, text: str) -> bytes: + path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + path.write_text(text) + return path.read_bytes() + + +def _release_manifest(**fields: object) -> dict: + payload = { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {}, + } + payload.update(fields) + return payload + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Filename keys fold Unicode normalisation as well as case +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_filename_key_folds_unicode_normalisation(): + assert NFC_NAME != NFD_NAME + assert filename_key(NFC_NAME) == filename_key(NFD_NAME) + assert filename_key(NFD_NAME.upper()) == filename_key(NFC_NAME) + + +def test_a_normalisation_alias_is_a_filename_collision(): + manifest = _release_manifest( + files={ + 2023: [ + _attested_entry(filename=NFC_NAME), + {**_public_release_entry(filename=NFD_NAME)}, + ] + } + ) + codes = validate_manifest_files(manifest) + assert any(code.startswith("filename_collision:") for code in codes), codes + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_normalisation_alias_of_a_hash_only_name(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _register(package, filename=NFC_NAME) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="access='licensed'"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / NFD_NAME, + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename=NFD_NAME, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + assert sorted(path.name for path in package.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Entry validation vocabulary +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_a_nameless_or_malformed_entry_is_an_error_everywhere(): + nameless = _attested_entry(filename=None) + assert "missing_filename" in validate_file_entry( + nameless, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + assert "missing_filename" in validate_file_entry( + {"source_url": "x"}, + kind="publisher_table", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + for malformed in ("adult.tab", 3, None, ["adult.tab"]): + assert validate_file_entry( + malformed, kind="publisher_table", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) == ("malformed_file_spec",) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("field", "code"), + [ + ("Access", "misspelled_field:Access"), + ("ACCESS", "misspelled_field:ACCESS"), + ("Sha256", "misspelled_field:Sha256"), + ("Licence", "misspelled_field:Licence"), + ("Storage", "misspelled_field:Storage"), + ("Hash_Source", "misspelled_field:Hash_Source"), + (" access", "misspelled_field: access"), + ], +) +def test_a_misspelled_field_is_reported_not_ignored(field, code): + entry = _attested_entry() + entry[field] = entry.pop("access") if field.strip().lower() == "access" else "x" + codes = validate_file_entry( + entry, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + assert code in codes, codes + + +def test_an_unknown_entry_field_is_reported_not_ignored(): + """An ordinary typo must not turn gated bytes into inferred public bytes.""" + codes = validate_file_entry( + { + "filename": "adult.tab", + "acess": "licensed", + }, + kind="publisher_table", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + + assert "unknown_field:acess" in codes, codes + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "storage", + [ + {"r2": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/x"}, + {"previous_r2": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/x"}, + {"r2": {"uri": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/x"}}, + {"previous_r2": [{"uri": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/x"}]}, + {"anything": 1}, + "r2://ledger-raw/raw/x", + ["r2://ledger-raw/raw/x"], + ], +) +def test_a_hash_only_entry_may_carry_no_storage_block_of_any_shape(storage): + codes = validate_file_entry( + _attested_entry(storage=storage), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + assert "storage_for_hash_only_entry" in codes, codes + + +def test_a_hash_only_entry_is_never_a_chronicle_fetch(): + entry = _attested_entry( + hash_source="chronicle_fetch", + attested_by="chronicle", + verified_at="2026-09-03", + attestation_evidence=None, + ) + codes = validate_file_entry( + entry, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + assert "hash_source_not_allowed_for_hash_only_entry:chronicle_fetch" in codes + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("attestation", [ATTESTED, PINNED]) +def test_a_consumer_attestation_is_not_signed_by_chronicle(attestation): + entry = _attested_entry(**{**attestation, "attested_by": "chronicle"}) + codes = validate_file_entry( + entry, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + assert "attested_by_chronicle_for_consumer_hash_source" in codes, codes + + +def test_register_refuses_a_consumer_attestation_signed_by_chronicle(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="chronicle"): + _register(package, attested_by="chronicle") + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="chronicle"): + _register(package, **{**PINNED, "attested_by": "Chronicle"}) + assert not package.exists() + + +def test_release_public_digests_are_keyed_per_vintage(): + """Public release bytes are staged content-addressed outside the tree, so + one filename may hold different bytes under different vintages; under one + vintage a revision is history, not a second entry.""" + per_vintage = _release_manifest( + files={ + 2022: [_public_release_entry()], + 2023: [ + _public_release_entry( + sha256=OTHER_SHA, + vintage="2023", + licence_evidence={ + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": OTHER_SHA, + }, + ) + ], + } + ) + assert validate_manifest_files(per_vintage) == () + + same_vintage = _release_manifest( + files={ + 2022: [ + _public_release_entry(), + _public_release_entry( + sha256=OTHER_SHA, + licence_evidence={ + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": OTHER_SHA, + }, + ), + ] + } + ) + assert "filename_collision:csv_hus.zip" in validate_manifest_files(same_vintage) + + table = { + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table-1-2", + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": { + 2022: {"filename": "t.xlsx", "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA}, + 2023: {"filename": "t.xlsx", "sha256": OTHER_SHA}, + }, + } + assert "filename_collision:t.xlsx" in validate_manifest_files(table) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "url", + [ + "https://", + "http://", + "https:// evidence.example", + " https://evidence.example", + "https://evidence.example/a b", + "ftp://evidence.example/x", + "evidence.example/x", + ], +) +def test_an_evidence_url_needs_a_scheme_and_a_host_and_no_whitespace(url): + evidence = { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + "url": url, + } + assert "licence_evidence_url_not_durable" in licence_evidence_errors( + evidence, licence="US-Government-Work", sha256=PUBLIC_SHA + ) + + +def test_an_evidence_url_with_a_host_is_durable(): + evidence = {**EVIDENCE, "licence": "US-Government-Work", "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA} + assert ( + licence_evidence_errors( + evidence, licence="US-Government-Work", sha256=PUBLIC_SHA + ) + == [] + ) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# register-artifact validates the manifest it records into +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "existing", + [ + {"filename": "other.tab", "access": "Public", "sha256": OTHER_SHA}, + {"filename": "adult.tab", "access": "open", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + {**_attested_entry(filename="other.tab", storage="r2://ledger-raw/x")}, + {**_attested_entry(filename="other.tab", hash_source="chronicle_fetch")}, + ], + ids=[ + "title-case-access", + "unknown-access-same-name", + "string-storage", + "chronicle-fetch", + ], +) +def test_register_refuses_an_invalid_existing_entry_instead_of_replacing_it( + tmp_path, existing +): + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + original = _write( + package / "manifest.yaml", + yaml.safe_dump(_release_manifest(files={2023: [existing]}), sort_keys=False), + ) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="not a valid"): + _register(package) + + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_register_reports_unreadable_yaml_as_a_refusal(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + original = _write(package / "manifest.yaml", "files: [\n") + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="not valid YAML"): + _register(package) + + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Duplicate keys are a malformed manifest, never silently collapsed +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +DUPLICATE_DOCUMENTS = { + "duplicate-vintage": ( + "source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table-1-2\nkind: publisher_table\n" + "files:\n 2023:\n filename: a.xlsx\n 2023:\n filename: b.xlsx\n" + ), + "int-alias-vintage": ( + "source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table-1-2\nkind: publisher_table\n" + "files:\n 2023:\n filename: a.xlsx\n 2_023:\n filename: b.xlsx\n" + ), + "float-alias-vintage": ( + "source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table-1-2\nkind: publisher_table\n" + "files:\n 2023:\n filename: a.xlsx\n 2023.0:\n filename: b.xlsx\n" + ), + "duplicate-files-block": ( + "source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table-1-2\nkind: publisher_table\n" + "files:\n 2023:\n filename: a.xlsx\nfiles:\n 2024:\n filename: b.xlsx\n" + ), + "duplicate-entry-field": ( + "source_id: irs_soi\npackage_id: soi-table-1-2\nkind: publisher_table\n" + "files:\n 2023:\n filename: a.xlsx\n access: public\n access: licensed\n" + ), +} + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "document", DUPLICATE_DOCUMENTS.values(), ids=DUPLICATE_DOCUMENTS +) +def test_a_manifest_with_duplicate_keys_is_refused_by_every_reader( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, document +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table_1_2" + original = _write(package / "manifest.yaml", document) + (package / "a.xlsx").write_bytes(b"a") + (package / "b.xlsx").write_bytes(b"b") + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="duplicate key"): + _read_manifest(package / "manifest.yaml") + + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="duplicate key"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "c.xlsx", package, year=2025, upload_r2=True) + assert reads == [] + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "db" / "data") + assert not inventory.valid + assert inventory.entries == () + assert any("duplicate key" in error for error in inventory.errors) + + published = publish_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "db" / "data") + assert not published.valid + assert published.entries == () + assert any("duplicate key" in error for error in published.errors) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="duplicate key"): + _register(package, source_id="irs_soi", package_id="soi-table-1-2") + + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_the_byte_reader_refuses_a_manifest_with_duplicate_keys(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + import sys + import uuid + + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "irs_soi" / "t" + _write(resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", DUPLICATE_DOCUMENTS["duplicate-vintage"]) + (resource_dir / "a.xlsx").write_bytes(b"a") + (resource_dir / "b.xlsx").write_bytes(b"b") + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + monkeypatch.delitem(sys.modules, package_name, raising=False) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="irs_soi", + source_table="Table 1.2", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/irs_soi/t", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="duplicate key"): + spec.assert_parseable(2023) + + +def test_strict_loader_keeps_yaml_merge_overrides_and_refuses_explicit_duplicates(): + """A ``<<: *defaults`` merge followed by an explicit override is valid YAML + (the explicit key wins); only two explicit spellings of one key are a + duplicate the loader must refuse.""" + from chronicle.registration import load_manifest_document + + merged = load_manifest_document( + "defaults: &defaults\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/a\n" + " filename: table.csv\n" + "files:\n" + " 2024:\n" + " <<: *defaults\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/b\n" + " sha256: " + "ab" * 32 + "\n" + ) + + assert merged["files"][2024]["source_url"] == "https://publisher.test/b" + assert merged["files"][2024]["filename"] == "table.csv" + + with pytest.raises(yaml.YAMLError, match="duplicate key 'source_url'"): + load_manifest_document( + "defaults: &defaults\n" + " filename: table.csv\n" + "files:\n" + " 2024:\n" + " <<: *defaults\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/a\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/b\n" + ) + + +def test_strict_loader_keeps_merge_sequence_precedence_for_artifact_selection(): + """``<<: [first, second]`` selects ``first``'s values: earlier mappings in a + merge sequence take precedence over later ones (YAML merge-key semantics, + and what ``yaml.safe_load`` does), while an explicit key in the entry still + overrides every merged source. The selected ``filename``/``sha256`` pair is + what fetch, publish, and the source-package reader use to pick bytes, so + reversing the precedence silently selects a different artifact.""" + from chronicle.registration import load_manifest_document + + document = ( + "first: &first\n" + " filename: first.csv\n" + " sha256: " + "aa" * 32 + "\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/first\n" + "second: &second\n" + " filename: second.csv\n" + " sha256: " + "bb" * 32 + "\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/second\n" + " licence: second-only\n" + "files:\n" + " 2024:\n" + " <<: [*first, *second]\n" + " 2023:\n" + " <<: [*first, *second]\n" + " filename: explicit.csv\n" + " 2022:\n" + " <<: [{filename: inline-first.csv}, {filename: inline-second.csv}]\n" + " 2021:\n" + " <<:\n" + " - <<: [*second, *first]\n" + " source_url: https://publisher.test/nested\n" + " - *first\n" + ) + + strict = load_manifest_document(document) + reference = yaml.safe_load(document) + assert strict["files"] == reference["files"] + + selected = strict["files"][2024] + assert selected["filename"] == "first.csv" + assert selected["sha256"] == "aa" * 32 + assert selected["source_url"] == "https://publisher.test/first" + # Keys only the later source carries are still merged in. + assert selected["licence"] == "second-only" + # An explicit key beats every merged source; the rest still follow first. + assert strict["files"][2023]["filename"] == "explicit.csv" + assert strict["files"][2023]["sha256"] == "aa" * 32 + assert strict["files"][2022]["filename"] == "inline-first.csv" + # Nested: the first sequence entry is itself a merge whose own explicit + # key wins inside it, and whose [second, first] order selects second. + nested = strict["files"][2021] + assert nested["filename"] == "second.csv" + assert nested["source_url"] == "https://publisher.test/nested" + + +def test_strict_loader_refuses_recursive_merges_as_yaml_errors(): + """A mapping that merges itself (directly or through a nested merge) has + no expansion. The loader must refuse it with a ``yaml.YAMLError`` that the + manifest-reading commands already handle, never a ``RecursionError``.""" + from chronicle.registration import load_manifest_document + + for document in ( + # Direct self-merge. + "files: &f\n 2024:\n filename: table.csv\n <<: *f\n", + # Self-merge through a nested merge sequence. + "files: &f\n 2024:\n filename: table.csv\n <<:\n - {filename: other.csv}\n - *f\n", + # Self-merge through a merged mapping's own merge. + "a: &a\n filename: table.csv\n <<: {<<: *a}\n", + ): + with pytest.raises(yaml.YAMLError, match="recursive"): + load_manifest_document(document) + + # A merge that only *repeats* a source is not a cycle. + repeated = load_manifest_document( + "d: &d\n filename: table.csv\nfiles:\n 2024:\n <<: [*d, *d]\n" + ) + assert repeated["files"][2024] == {"filename": "table.csv"} + + +def test_strict_loader_does_not_mutate_anchored_entries_when_merged_later(): + """Constructing a later merge of an anchored entry must not turn that + entry's inherited keys into 'explicit' ones: PyYAML constructs lazily and + flattens merged nodes in place.""" + from chronicle.registration import load_manifest_document + + document = load_manifest_document( + "defaults: &d\n" + " source_url: old\n" + "files:\n" + " 2024: &e\n" + " <<: *d\n" + " source_url: new\n" + "latest:\n" + " <<: *e\n" + ) + + assert document["files"][2024]["source_url"] == "new" + assert document["latest"]["source_url"] == "new" + + +def test_strict_loader_validates_duplicate_keys_inside_inline_merges(): + """A mapping reached through ``<<`` is still a mapping the document + spells out; duplicate keys inside it must be refused, not collapsed.""" + from chronicle.registration import load_manifest_document + + with pytest.raises(yaml.YAMLError, match="duplicate key 'files'"): + load_manifest_document( + "<<: {files: {2023: {filename: old.csv}}, files: {2024: {filename: new.csv}}}\n" + ) diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_vintages.py b/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_vintages.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11e4764c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_manifest_vintages.py @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +"""Every artifact boundary refuses duplicate logical manifest vintages.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + MalformedManifestError, + fetch_source_artifact, + inventory_source_artifacts, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.source_package import SourceArtifactSpec + + +@pytest.fixture +def duplicate_vintage_package(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + files = {} + for vintage, filename in ( + (2023, "selected.csv"), + (2024, "numeric.csv"), + ("2024", "quoted.csv"), + ): + content = f"publisher bytes for {filename}\n".encode() + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + files[vintage] = { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": f"https://example.test/{filename}", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content), + } + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table", + "files": files, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + return package + + +def _unexpected_artifact_io(*_args, **_kwargs): + raise AssertionError("duplicate logical vintages reached artifact I/O") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("year", [2023, 2024]) +def test_fetch_refuses_logical_vintage_duplicates_anywhere_before_io( + duplicate_vintage_package, monkeypatch, year +): + package = duplicate_vintage_package + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", _unexpected_artifact_io) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", _unexpected_artifact_io + ) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="both keys"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://example.test/selected.csv", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table", + year=year, + output_dir=package, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "operation", [publish_source_artifacts, inventory_source_artifacts] +) +def test_sweeps_refuse_logical_vintage_duplicates_before_artifact_io( + duplicate_vintage_package, monkeypatch, operation +): + package = duplicate_vintage_package + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + + def checked_read_bytes(path): + if path.parent == package and path.suffix == ".csv": + _unexpected_artifact_io() + return read_bytes(path) + + with monkeypatch.context() as guarded: + guarded.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", checked_read_bytes) + guarded.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", _unexpected_artifact_io + ) + report = operation(package) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries == () + assert any("both keys" in error for error in report.errors) + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("year", [2023, 2024]) +def test_source_loader_refuses_logical_vintage_duplicates_anywhere_before_io( + duplicate_vintage_package, tmp_path, monkeypatch, year +): + package = duplicate_vintage_package + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: tmp_path) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._read_source_artifact_content", + _unexpected_artifact_io, + ) + artifact = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="irs_soi", + source_table="Table", + resource_package="test_resources", + resource_directory="data/irs_soi/table", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2024", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="test", + ) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="both keys"): + artifact._artifact_content(year) + + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_catalogue.py b/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_catalogue.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54470a95 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_catalogue.py @@ -0,0 +1,785 @@ +"""Hermetic tests for ``scripts/register_microdata_releases.py``. + +The catalogue is resolved against ``tests/fixtures/microcosm``: synthetic +consumer manifests in Microcosm's two shapes (staged ``source_stages.json`` +files and the flat ACS runtime manifest) that carry the reviewed pins +verbatim beside decoy artifacts the selectors must ignore. Nothing here reads +a checkout outside the repository, and nothing skips: a resolution failure is +a failure. + +``emit`` must reproduce the two committed hash-only manifests byte for byte +from the fixture, and ``plan`` must print exactly the golden commands in +``tests/fixtures/microcosm/golden_plan.json`` -- every reviewed identity as an +argument, every unknown as a ``TODO`` that the real CLI refuses to run. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import contextlib +import json +import shlex +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.harness import main as harness_main + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +FIXTURE_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "tests" / "fixtures" / "microcosm" +GOLDEN_PLAN = FIXTURE_ROOT / "golden_plan.json" +FRS_MANIFEST = REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" / "manifest.yaml" +SPI_MANIFEST = ( + REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data" / "hmrc" / "spi_public_use_tape_2022_23" / "manifest.yaml" +) +UK_STAGES = "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json" +UK_HMRC_STAGES = ( + "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json" +) +#: The commits the committed registrations were transcribed from: the last +#: commit that changed each consumer manifest. +PIN_COMMITS = { + UK_STAGES: "2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77", + UK_HMRC_STAGES: "de7451bd19ca46d2967e73cdf393908d29e72542", +} +PIN_COMMIT_ARGS = [ + arg + for path, commit in PIN_COMMITS.items() + for arg in ("--microcosm-commit", f"{path}={commit}") +] + +sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO_ROOT / "scripts")) +import register_microdata_releases as script # noqa: E402 + + +def _run(argv: list[str], capsys) -> tuple[int, str, str]: + exit_code = script.main(argv) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + return exit_code, captured.out, captured.err + + +def _harness_parser(monkeypatch) -> argparse.ArgumentParser: + """Capture the real ``chronicle`` harness parser.""" + captured: dict[str, argparse.ArgumentParser] = {} + + def capture(self, args=None, namespace=None): + captured["parser"] = self + raise SystemExit(0) + + monkeypatch.setattr(argparse.ArgumentParser, "parse_args", capture) + with contextlib.suppress(SystemExit): + harness_main(["--help"]) + monkeypatch.undo() + return captured["parser"] + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# The fixture checkout +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_fixture_checkout_holds_every_catalogued_manifest(): + catalogued = sorted({release.manifest for release in script.CATALOGUE}) + assert catalogued + for relative in catalogued: + path = FIXTURE_ROOT / relative + assert path.exists(), relative + payload = json.loads(path.read_text()) + assert payload["snapshot_of"]["repository"] == "PolicyEngine/microcosm" + + +def test_selection_ignores_decoys_and_resolves_every_catalogue_entry(): + resolved = script.resolve(FIXTURE_ROOT, script.CATALOGUE) + by_id = {item.release.release_id: item for item in resolved} + frs = yaml.safe_load(FRS_MANIFEST.read_text())["files"][2023] + committed = {entry["filename"]: entry for entry in frs} + + assert len(by_id) == len(script.CATALOGUE) + for tab in script.FRS_TABS: + item = by_id[f"dwp-frs-2023-24:{tab}"] + expected = committed[f"{tab}.tab"] + assert item.stage["stage"] == "frs_spine" + assert item.artifact["kind"] == "licensed_microdata" + assert (item.filename, item.sha256, item.size_bytes, item.vintage) == ( + f"{tab}.tab", + expected["sha256"], + expected["size_bytes"], + expected["vintage"], + ) + spi = by_id["hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23:put2223uk"] + spi_committed = yaml.safe_load(SPI_MANIFEST.read_text())["files"][2022][0] + assert (spi.filename, spi.sha256, spi.size_bytes, spi.vintage) == ( + "put2223uk.tab", + spi_committed["sha256"], + spi_committed["size_bytes"], + spi_committed["vintage"], + ) + assert spi.url is None + silc = by_id["statbel-be-silc-2023"] + assert (silc.sha256, silc.size_bytes, silc.filename) == (None, None, None) + assert by_id["census-cps-basic-monthly-2024"].url is None + assert by_id["census-sipp-2023"].url is None + assert by_id["federal-reserve-scf-2022-full"].sha256 is None + assert by_id["census-acs-pums-2024-household"].filename == "csv_hus.zip" + + +def test_selection_accepts_agreeing_duplicates_and_refuses_conflicts(): + payload = json.loads((FIXTURE_ROOT / UK_STAGES).read_text()) + selector = script.ArtifactSelector( + kind="licensed_microdata", match={"table": "adult"} + ) + stage, artifact = script.select_artifact(payload, selector, release_id="x") + # adult.tab is listed by two stages with identical bytes; the first wins. + assert stage["stage"] == "frs_spine" + + conflicting = json.loads(json.dumps(payload)) + conflicting["stages"][1]["artifacts"][0]["sha256"] = "f" * 64 + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="conflicting values"): + script.select_artifact(conflicting, selector, release_id="x") + + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="no Microcosm artifact matches"): + script.select_artifact( + payload, + script.ArtifactSelector(kind="licensed_microdata", match={"table": "nope"}), + release_id="x", + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("field", "value"), + [("sha256", "f" * 64), ("kind", "restricted_microdata")], + ids=("checksum", "access-kind"), +) +def test_frs_catalogue_selector_refuses_cross_stage_pin_drift(field, value): + payload = json.loads((FIXTURE_ROOT / UK_STAGES).read_text()) + release = next( + release + for release in script.CATALOGUE + if release.release_id == "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult" + ) + employment = next( + stage for stage in payload["stages"] if stage["stage"] == "frs_employment" + ) + adult = next( + artifact + for artifact in employment["artifacts"] + if artifact.get("table") == "adult" + ) + adult[field] = value + + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="conflicting values"): + script.select_artifact( + payload, + release.selector, + release_id=release.release_id, + ) + + +def test_frs_catalogue_selector_refuses_relabelled_cross_stage_byte_identity(): + payload = json.loads((FIXTURE_ROOT / UK_STAGES).read_text()) + release = next( + release + for release in script.CATALOGUE + if release.release_id == "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult" + ) + employment = next( + stage for stage in payload["stages"] if stage["stage"] == "frs_employment" + ) + adult = next( + artifact + for artifact in employment["artifacts"] + if artifact.get("locator") == "adult.tab" + ) + adult["table"] = "adult_relabelled" + adult["kind"] = "restricted_microdata" + + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="conflicting values"): + script.select_artifact( + payload, + release.selector, + release_id=release.release_id, + ) + + +def test_resolve_refuses_a_missing_consumer_manifest(tmp_path): + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="manifest not found"): + script.resolve(tmp_path / "no-such-checkout", script.CATALOGUE[:1]) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# emit +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_emit_from_the_fixture_reproduces_the_committed_manifests_byte_for_byte( + tmp_path, +): + root = tmp_path / "data" + registrations, blockers = script.emit( + script.resolve(FIXTURE_ROOT, script.CATALOGUE), + root=root, + pin_commits=PIN_COMMITS, + consumer_repository=script.CONSUMER_REPOSITORY, + ) + + # The pure emitter receives verified commits and repository identity; CLI tests + # below exercise the mandatory commit/blob verification itself. + assert len(registrations) == 15 + assert [blocker["release"] for blocker in blockers] == ["statbel-be-silc-2023"] + assert "No hash is invented" in blockers[0]["reason"] + assert all(r["hash_source"] == "consumer_pin" for r in registrations) + assert all(r["r2_location"] is None for r in registrations) + written = sorted( + path.relative_to(root).as_posix() for path in root.rglob("*") if path.is_file() + ) + assert written == [ + "dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml", + "hmrc/spi_public_use_tape_2022_23/manifest.yaml", + ] + assert (root / "dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == ( + FRS_MANIFEST.read_bytes() + ) + assert (root / "hmrc/spi_public_use_tape_2022_23/manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == ( + SPI_MANIFEST.read_bytes() + ) + + +def test_emit_is_idempotent_over_the_committed_manifests(tmp_path): + root = tmp_path / "data" + for manifest in (FRS_MANIFEST, SPI_MANIFEST): + target = root / manifest.relative_to(REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data") + target.parent.mkdir(parents=True) + target.write_bytes(manifest.read_bytes()) + + registrations, _blockers = script.emit( + script.resolve(FIXTURE_ROOT, script.CATALOGUE), + root=root, + pin_commits=PIN_COMMITS, + consumer_repository=script.CONSUMER_REPOSITORY, + ) + + assert all(r["replaced"] for r in registrations) + assert ( + root / "dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml" + ).read_bytes() == FRS_MANIFEST.read_bytes() + + +def test_emit_refuses_a_pin_that_drifted_from_the_committed_one(tmp_path): + root = tmp_path / "data" + target = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" / "manifest.yaml" + target.parent.mkdir(parents=True) + target.write_bytes(FRS_MANIFEST.read_bytes()) + checkout = tmp_path / "consumer" + for path in FIXTURE_ROOT.rglob("*.json"): + copy = checkout / path.relative_to(FIXTURE_ROOT) + copy.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + copy.write_bytes(path.read_bytes()) + stages = json.loads((checkout / UK_STAGES).read_text()) + for stage in stages["stages"]: + for artifact in stage["artifacts"]: + if artifact.get("table") == "adult": + artifact["sha256"] = "f" * 64 + (checkout / UK_STAGES).write_text(json.dumps(stages)) + + resolved = script.resolve(checkout, script.CATALOGUE) + + with pytest.raises(script.HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="--allow-reissue"): + script.emit( + resolved, + root=root, + pin_commits=PIN_COMMITS, + consumer_repository=script.CONSUMER_REPOSITORY, + ) + assert target.read_bytes() == FRS_MANIFEST.read_bytes() + + +def _fixture_copy(destination: Path) -> Path: + for path in FIXTURE_ROOT.rglob("*.json"): + copy = destination / path.relative_to(FIXTURE_ROOT) + copy.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + copy.write_bytes(path.read_bytes()) + return destination + + +def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str: + return subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True + ).stdout.strip() + + +def _committed_fixture_checkout( + destination: Path, + *, + origin: str = "https://github.com/PolicyEngine/microcosm.git", +) -> tuple[Path, str]: + checkout = _fixture_copy(destination) + _git(checkout, "init", "-q") + _git(checkout, "remote", "add", "origin", origin) + _git(checkout, "config", "user.email", "t@example.com") + _git(checkout, "config", "user.name", "t") + _git(checkout, "add", ".") + _git(checkout, "commit", "-q", "-m", "consumer pins") + return checkout, _git(checkout, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("explicit", [False, True], ids=("automatic", "explicit")) +def test_emit_refuses_an_unrelated_repository_with_matching_consumer_blobs( + tmp_path, capsys, explicit +): + origin = "https://github.com/unrelated/lookalike-consumer.git" + checkout, commit = _committed_fixture_checkout( + tmp_path / "unrelated", origin=origin + ) + assert ( + _git(checkout, "cat-file", "blob", f"{commit}:{UK_STAGES}") + == (checkout / UK_STAGES).read_text().strip() + ) + root = tmp_path / "data" + argv = [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "--json", + "emit", + ] + if explicit: + argv += ["--microcosm-commit", commit] + + exit_code, out, err = _run(argv, capsys) + + assert exit_code == 1, out + assert "repository identity" in err + assert "PolicyEngine/microcosm" in err + assert "unrelated/lookalike-consumer" in err + assert not root.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("explicit", [False, True], ids=("automatic", "explicit")) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "origin", + [None, "https://gitlab.com/PolicyEngine/microcosm.git"], + ids=("missing-origin", "different-host"), +) +def test_emit_refuses_a_missing_or_wrong_host_consumer_origin( + tmp_path, capsys, explicit, origin +): + checkout, commit = _committed_fixture_checkout(tmp_path / "consumer") + if origin is None: + _git(checkout, "remote", "remove", "origin") + else: + _git(checkout, "remote", "set-url", "origin", origin) + root = tmp_path / "data" + argv = [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "emit", + ] + if explicit: + argv += ["--microcosm-commit", commit] + + exit_code, _out, err = _run(argv, capsys) + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "repository identity" in err + assert "PolicyEngine/microcosm" in err + assert not root.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("staged", [False, True], ids=("dirty", "staged")) +def test_emit_refuses_dirty_or_staged_consumer_manifest_bytes(tmp_path, capsys, staged): + checkout, pinned = _committed_fixture_checkout(tmp_path / "consumer") + manifest_path = checkout / UK_STAGES + manifest_path.write_bytes(manifest_path.read_bytes() + b"\n") + if staged: + _git(checkout, "add", UK_STAGES) + root = tmp_path / "data" + + exit_code, _out, err = _run( + [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "emit", + ], + capsys, + ) + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "do not match" in err + assert UK_STAGES in err + assert pinned in err + assert not root.exists() + + +def test_emit_refuses_an_explicit_commit_whose_blob_differs_from_loaded_manifest( + tmp_path, capsys +): + checkout, old_commit = _committed_fixture_checkout(tmp_path / "consumer") + manifest_path = checkout / UK_STAGES + manifest_path.write_bytes(manifest_path.read_bytes() + b"\n") + _git(checkout, "add", UK_STAGES) + _git(checkout, "commit", "-q", "-m", "new consumer pin blob") + assert _git(checkout, "rev-parse", "HEAD") != old_commit + root = tmp_path / "data" + + exit_code, _out, err = _run( + [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "emit", + "--microcosm-commit", + old_commit, + ], + capsys, + ) + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "do not match" in err + assert UK_STAGES in err + assert old_commit in err + assert not root.exists() + + +def test_emit_refuses_a_tree_object_as_an_explicit_commit(tmp_path, capsys): + checkout, _commit = _committed_fixture_checkout(tmp_path / "consumer") + tree = _git(checkout, "rev-parse", "HEAD^{tree}") + root = tmp_path / "data" + + exit_code, _out, err = _run( + [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "emit", + "--microcosm-commit", + tree, + ], + capsys, + ) + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "not a commit" in err + assert tree in err + assert not root.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("explicit", [False, True], ids=("automatic", "explicit")) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("origin", "repository"), + [ + ("https://github.com/PolicyEngine/microcosm.git", "PolicyEngine/microcosm"), + ("https://github.com/PolicyEngine/microcosm/", "PolicyEngine/microcosm"), + ("git@github.com:PolicyEngine/microcosm.git", "PolicyEngine/microcosm"), + ("ssh://git@github.com/PolicyEngine/microcosm.git", "PolicyEngine/microcosm"), + ("https://GITHUB.COM/policyengine/microcosm.git", "policyengine/microcosm"), + ], + ids=("https", "https-trailing-slash", "ssh-scp", "ssh-url", "case-normalized"), +) +def test_emit_accepts_a_commit_whose_blob_matches_the_loaded_manifest( + tmp_path, capsys, explicit, origin, repository +): + checkout, commit = _committed_fixture_checkout(tmp_path / "consumer", origin=origin) + root = tmp_path / "data" + argv = [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "--json", + "emit", + ] + if explicit: + argv += ["--microcosm-commit", commit] + + exit_code, out, err = _run(argv, capsys) + + assert exit_code == 0, err + assert len(json.loads(out)["registrations"]) == 1 + manifest = yaml.safe_load((root / "dwp/frs_2023_24/manifest.yaml").read_text()) + entry = manifest["files"][2023][0] + assert entry["pinned_from"] == { + "repository": repository, + "path": UK_STAGES, + "commit": commit, + } + assert entry["attested_by"] == repository + + +def test_commit_validation_uses_the_snapshot_resolve_actually_parsed(tmp_path): + checkout, commit = _committed_fixture_checkout(tmp_path / "consumer") + manifest_path = checkout / UK_STAGES + committed_bytes = manifest_path.read_bytes() + manifest_path.write_bytes(committed_bytes + b"\n") + release = next( + release + for release in script.CATALOGUE + if release.release_id == "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult" + ) + item = script.resolve(checkout, (release,))[0] + # Restoring the worktree after resolution must not change which bytes are + # verified: registration values came from the earlier in-memory snapshot. + manifest_path.write_bytes(committed_bytes) + + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="do not match"): + script.assert_manifest_matches_commit( + checkout, + UK_STAGES, + commit, + loaded_bytes=item.manifest_bytes, + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("explicit", [False, True], ids=("automatic", "explicit")) +def test_emit_refuses_a_microcosm_root_nested_in_an_enclosing_repository( + tmp_path, capsys, explicit +): + repository = tmp_path / "repository" + checkout = _fixture_copy(repository / "vendor" / "microcosm") + _git(repository, "init", "-q") + _git(repository, "config", "user.email", "t@example.com") + _git(repository, "config", "user.name", "t") + _git(repository, "add", ".") + _git(repository, "commit", "-q", "-m", "nested consumer checkout") + commit = _git(repository, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + root = tmp_path / "data" + argv = [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(root), + "--release", + "dwp-frs-2023-24:adult", + "emit", + ] + if explicit: + argv += ["--microcosm-commit", commit] + + exit_code, _out, err = _run(argv, capsys) + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "Git repository root" in err + assert str(repository) in err + assert str(checkout) in err + assert not root.exists() + + +def test_emit_needs_a_commit_it_can_read_or_be_told(tmp_path, capsys): + # The fixture inside this repository is committed, so a run against it + # would read a Chronicle commit as if it were the consumer's. Outside any + # repository there is no commit to read; inside one whose manifests are + # untracked there is none either. Both refuse before writing. + outside = _fixture_copy(tmp_path / "outside-git") + assert not (outside / ".git").exists() + untracked = _fixture_copy(tmp_path / "untracked") + _git(untracked, "init", "-q") + _git(untracked, "config", "user.email", "t@example.com") + _git(untracked, "config", "user.name", "t") + (untracked / "README").write_text("nothing pinned here") + _git(untracked, "add", "README") + _git(untracked, "commit", "-q", "-m", "unrelated") + + for checkout in (outside, untracked): + exit_code, _out, err = _run( + [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(checkout), + "--root", + str(tmp_path / "data"), + "emit", + ], + capsys, + ) + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "--microcosm-commit" in err + assert not (tmp_path / "data").exists() + + exit_code, _out, err = _run( + [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(outside), + "--root", + str(tmp_path / "data"), + "emit", + "--microcosm-commit", + "not-a-commit", + ], + capsys, + ) + assert exit_code == 2 + assert "40-hex commit" in err + assert not (tmp_path / "data").exists() + + +def test_emit_refuses_an_unreadable_explicit_commit_before_writing(tmp_path, capsys): + outside = _fixture_copy(tmp_path / "outside-git") + + exit_code, _out, err = _run( + [ + "--microcosm-root", + str(outside), + "--root", + str(tmp_path / "data"), + "--json", + "emit", + *PIN_COMMIT_ARGS, + ], + capsys, + ) + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "Cannot read consumer manifest" in err + assert not (tmp_path / "data").exists() + + +def test_pin_commit_reads_the_last_commit_that_changed_the_file(tmp_path): + repo = tmp_path / "consumer" + (repo / "build").mkdir(parents=True) + git = ["git", "-C", str(repo)] + subprocess.run([*git, "init", "-q"], check=True) + subprocess.run([*git, "config", "user.email", "t@example.com"], check=True) + subprocess.run([*git, "config", "user.name", "t"], check=True) + (repo / "build" / "stages.json").write_text("{}") + subprocess.run([*git, "add", "."], check=True) + subprocess.run([*git, "commit", "-q", "-m", "pin"], check=True) + pinned = subprocess.run( + [*git, "rev-parse", "HEAD"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True + ).stdout.strip() + (repo / "other.txt").write_text("unrelated") + subprocess.run([*git, "add", "."], check=True) + subprocess.run([*git, "commit", "-q", "-m", "unrelated"], check=True) + + assert script.pin_commit(repo, "build/stages.json") == pinned + with pytest.raises(script.CatalogueError, match="records no commit"): + script.pin_commit(repo, "build/missing.json") + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# plan +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_plan_matches_the_golden_commands_exactly(capsys): + exit_code, out, _err = _run( + ["--microcosm-root", str(FIXTURE_ROOT), "--root", "db/data", "--json", "plan"], + capsys, + ) + golden = json.loads(GOLDEN_PLAN.read_text()) + + assert exit_code == 0 + assert json.loads(out) == golden + assert len(golden["commands"]) == 9 + + +def test_every_planned_command_parses_with_the_reviewed_identity_as_arguments( + monkeypatch, +): + parser = _harness_parser(monkeypatch) + golden = json.loads(GOLDEN_PLAN.read_text()) + + for command in golden["commands"]: + argv = shlex.split(command) + assert argv[:3] == ["uv", "run", "chronicle"] + namespace = parser.parse_args(argv[3:]) + assert namespace.command == "fetch-artifact" + assert namespace.access == "public" + assert namespace.kind == "microdata_release" + assert namespace.licence == "US-Government-Work" + assert namespace.publisher + assert namespace.vintage + assert namespace.expected_sha256 + assert namespace.licence_evidence_issuer + assert namespace.licence_evidence_scope + assert namespace.licence_evidence_url + assert namespace.upload_r2 is True + + +def test_plan_prints_a_todo_and_never_a_guess(capsys): + golden = json.loads(GOLDEN_PLAN.read_text()) + by_release = { + shlex.split(command)[shlex.split(command).index("--package-id") + 1]: command + for command in golden["commands"] + } + + # Every reviewed publisher checksum travels as an argument. + assert ( + "--expected-sha256 d2e000250782adfbdd7f29c82b66d866591a30f0d330496698ec19f9c784ce11" + in by_release["census-cps-asec-2023"] + ) + assert "--expected-size-bytes 150165063" in by_release["census-cps-asec-2023"] + # Unknowns are TODOs the CLI refuses: no URL, no publisher-bytes checksum, + # no catalogued evidence URL. + assert "--url TODO_PUBLISHER_URL" in by_release["census-cps-basic-monthly-2024"] + assert "--url TODO_PUBLISHER_URL" in by_release["census-sipp-2023"] + for package_id in ( + "census-cps-basic-monthly-2024", + "census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + "federal-reserve-scf-2022", + "census-sipp-2023", + ): + assert any( + "--expected-sha256 TODO_REVIEWED_SHA256" in command + for package, command in by_release.items() + if package == package_id + ) + assert all("TODO_EVIDENCE_URL" in command for command in golden["commands"]) + assert not any("TODO_VINTAGE" in command for command in golden["commands"]) + # The derived-h5 hash Microcosm pins for ACS 2022 never masquerades as + # the publisher checksum. + assert ( + "0b319b496f19a6913066f9c5ea572edfda3d78a187be6f375846617d0b441bd4" + not in "\n".join(golden["commands"]) + ) + + +def test_a_planned_command_with_a_todo_is_refused_before_anything_is_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys +): + golden = json.loads(GOLDEN_PLAN.read_text()) + reads: list[str] = [] + + def unexpected_read(source_url): + reads.append(source_url) + raise AssertionError("a planned command with a TODO must not read") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", + lambda *args, **kwargs: (_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError("no upload")), + ) + + for command in golden["commands"]: + argv = shlex.split(command)[3:] + out_index = argv.index("--out-dir") + 1 + argv[out_index] = str(tmp_path / argv[out_index]) + exit_code = harness_main([*argv, "--staging-dir", str(tmp_path / "staging")]) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert exit_code == 1 + assert captured.out == "" + assert "error:" in captured.err + + assert reads == [] + assert not (tmp_path / "db").exists() + assert not (tmp_path / "staging").exists() diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_registration.py b/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_registration.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ec4003d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_registration.py @@ -0,0 +1,3856 @@ +"""Tests for microdata-release registration: identity without content. + +Chronicle registers every raw microdata release its consumers build from and +stores the bytes of only the ones a publisher permits it to redistribute +(``docs/adr-chronicle-raw-microdata-identity.md``). These tests pin the whole +refusal surface: which access classes may carry bytes, which commands refuse +them, that every refusal happens before any filesystem or network side effect, +and that a hash-only registration is a complete, valid artifact record with no +local file and no R2 key. + +The catalogue and the checked-in synthetic consumer manifests are covered in +``tests/test_chronicle_microdata_catalogue.py``; the explicit-kind rule and the +repository guard in ``tests/test_chronicle_manifest_kind.py``. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor +from contextlib import contextmanager +import fcntl +import hashlib +import json +import os +import sys +import threading +import uuid +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + ArtifactCommandResult, + ExpectedArtifactIdentityError, + MalformedManifestError, + SourceArtifactRevisionError, + _expected_identity, + _upsert_manifest, + fetch_source_artifact, + inventory_source_artifacts, + microdata_staging_path, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.harness import main as harness_main +from chronicle.registration import ( + ACCESS_CLASSES, + HASH_SOURCES, + AmbiguousVintageKeyError, + ArtifactFilenameError, + HashOnlyRegistrationError, + ListSpecRejected, + ManifestAccessError, + MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError, + bare_filename, + entry_access, + filename_key, + has_file_entries, + is_bare_filename, + is_hash_only, + is_microdata_release, + iter_file_specs, + manifest_kind, + normalize_access, + register_hash_only_artifact, + registration_id, + resolve_vintage_key, + safe_entry_access, + stores_bytes, + validate_file_entry, + validate_manifest_files, + vintage_key_forms, + _registration_lock_path, +) +from chronicle.source_package import ( + SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, + SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, + SourceArtifactSpec, + _read_source_artifact_content, + validate_source_package, +) + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +FRS_PACKAGE = REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" +SPI_PACKAGE = REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data" / "hmrc" / "spi_public_use_tape_2022_23" + +# A syntactically valid checksum that identifies no real publisher bytes. +FIXTURE_SHA = "a" * 64 +OTHER_SHA = "b" * 64 +FIXTURE_COMMIT = "2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77" + +ATTESTED = { + "hash_source": "consumer_attested", + "attested_by": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "attestation_evidence": ( + "microcosm uk/source_stages.json frs_spine pin, verified against the " + "licensed copy" + ), + "verified_at": "2026-09-02", +} +PINNED = { + "hash_source": "consumer_pin", + "attested_by": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "pinned_from": { + "repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "path": "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json", + "commit": FIXTURE_COMMIT, + }, +} + +# Evidence binding a public release to an allowlisted term. The URL is a +# test value; the check is that it is a durable http(s) location. +EVIDENCE = { + "issuer": "U.S. Census Bureau", + "scope": ( + "Public-use microdata file published by the U.S. Census Bureau, a " + "federal agency; a work of the United States Government under 17 " + "U.S.C. §105." + ), + "url": "https://evidence.example/census/public-use-files", +} +PUBLIC_BYTES = b"public household pums" +PUBLIC_SHA = hashlib.sha256(PUBLIC_BYTES).hexdigest() + + +def _register(output_dir: Path, **overrides: object) -> object: + """Register a fixture licensed artifact, with per-test overrides.""" + kwargs: dict[str, object] = { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "year": 2023, + "output_dir": output_dir, + "filename": "adult.tab", + "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA, + "licence": "UK Data Service End User Licence", + "access": "licensed", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "size_bytes": 35323384, + "doi": "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2", + **ATTESTED, + } + kwargs.update(overrides) + return register_hash_only_artifact(**kwargs) # type: ignore[arg-type] + + +def _manifest(output_dir: Path) -> dict: + return yaml.safe_load((output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_text()) + + +def _refuse_read(monkeypatch, message: str = "the publisher was read") -> list: + """Make any publisher read an ordering violation; return the read log.""" + reads: list[str] = [] + + def unexpected_read(source_url): + reads.append(source_url) + raise AssertionError(f"ORDERING VIOLATION: {message} before the refusal") + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", unexpected_read) + return reads + + +def _serve(monkeypatch, content: bytes, filename: str | None = None) -> list: + """Serve ``content`` for any URL, recording each read.""" + reads: list[str] = [] + + def fake_read(source_url): + reads.append(source_url) + return content, filename or Path(source_url).name + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", fake_read) + return reads + + +def _record_uploads(monkeypatch) -> list[tuple[str, str]]: + uploads: list[tuple[str, str]] = [] + + def fake_upload(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + uploads.append((location.uri, str(local_path))) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("stub",), returncode=0, stdout="ok", stderr="" + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", fake_upload) + return uploads + + +def _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) -> None: + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", + lambda *args, **kwargs: (_ for _ in ()).throw( + AssertionError("nothing may be uploaded on the way to a refusal") + ), + ) + + +def _fetch_table(source: Path, output_dir: Path, **overrides: object): + kwargs: dict[str, object] = { + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table-1-2", + "year": 2023, + "output_dir": output_dir, + } + kwargs.update(overrides) + return fetch_source_artifact(str(source), **kwargs) # type: ignore[arg-type] + + +def _fetch_release( + output_dir: Path, + *, + staging_dir: Path, + filename: str = "csv_hus.zip", + content: bytes = PUBLIC_BYTES, + **overrides: object, +): + """Fetch a public microdata release with complete evidence.""" + kwargs: dict[str, object] = { + "source_id": "census_acs", + "package_id": "census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + "year": 2022, + "output_dir": output_dir, + "filename": filename, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "access": "public", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "publisher": "U.S. Census Bureau", + "vintage": "2022", + "expected_sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + "licence_evidence": EVIDENCE, + "staging_dir": staging_dir, + } + kwargs.update(overrides) + return fetch_source_artifact( + f"https://publisher.example/pums/{filename}", + **kwargs, # type: ignore[arg-type] + ) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Access, kind, filename and vintage vocabularies +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_access_classes_are_the_closed_contract_set(): + assert ACCESS_CLASSES == ("public", "licensed", "restricted") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("access", ACCESS_CLASSES) +def test_only_public_access_may_carry_bytes(access): + assert stores_bytes(access) is (access == "public") + assert is_hash_only(access) is (access != "public") + + +def test_absent_access_is_inferred_public_for_a_table_entry(): + assert normalize_access(None) == "public" + assert entry_access({"filename": "table.xlsx"}) == "public" + + +def test_unknown_access_class_is_refused(): + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="Unknown access class"): + normalize_access("internal") + + +def test_unknown_access_class_falls_back_to_restricted_not_public(): + # Never upload bytes because a class failed to parse. + assert safe_entry_access({"access": "internal"}) == "restricted" + + +def test_manifest_kind_is_explicit_except_for_an_absent_manifest(): + assert manifest_kind(None) == "publisher_table" + assert manifest_kind({}) == "publisher_table" + assert is_microdata_release({"kind": "microdata_release"}) is True + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="Unknown manifest kind"): + manifest_kind({"kind": "microdata_rows"}) + # A manifest with content and no kind is an error, never a table. + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="declares no kind"): + manifest_kind({"files": {2023: {"filename": "table.xlsx"}}}) + + +def test_a_manifest_with_no_entries_has_nothing_to_classify(): + # A bare ``files:`` line or an empty mapping declares no entry that could + # be misread as a publisher table, so the manifest reads like an absent + # one and the command writing its first entry declares the kind. + assert has_file_entries({"source_id": "irs_soi", "files": None}) is False + assert has_file_entries({"source_id": "irs_soi", "files": {}}) is False + assert has_file_entries({"files": {2023: {"filename": "t.xlsx"}}}) is True + assert has_file_entries({"files": {2023: []}}) is False + assert has_file_entries({"files": ["not", "a", "mapping"]}) is True + assert manifest_kind({"source_id": "irs_soi", "files": None}) == "publisher_table" + assert manifest_kind({"source_id": "irs_soi", "files": {}}) == "publisher_table" + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="declares no kind"): + manifest_kind({"source_id": "irs_soi", "files": {2023: {"filename": "t"}}}) + + +def test_hash_sources_are_the_closed_contract_set(): + assert HASH_SOURCES == ("chronicle_fetch", "consumer_attested", "consumer_pin") + + +def test_registration_identity_is_the_contract_tuple(): + assert ( + registration_id( + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + sha256=FIXTURE_SHA, + filename="adult.tab", + ) + == f"dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/{FIXTURE_SHA}/adult.tab" + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "alias", + [ + "./adult.tab", + "sub/../adult.tab", + "adult.tab/", + "../pkg/adult.tab", + "/x/adult.tab", + ".", + "..", + " adult.tab", + "", + ], +) +def test_bare_filename_refuses_every_alias(alias): + assert not is_bare_filename(alias) + with pytest.raises(ArtifactFilenameError, match="bare filename"): + bare_filename(alias) + + +def test_bare_filename_accepts_a_plain_name_and_keys_case_folded(): + assert bare_filename("adult.tab") == "adult.tab" + assert filename_key("ADULT.TAB") == filename_key("adult.tab") + assert filename_key("cafe\N{COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT}.tab") == filename_key( + "caf\N{LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH ACUTE}.tab" + ) + assert filename_key("./Adult.tab") == "adult.tab" + + +def test_vintage_key_forms_pair_the_two_spellings_of_a_year_only(): + assert vintage_key_forms(2023) == (2023, "2023") + assert vintage_key_forms("2023") == ("2023", 2023) + assert vintage_key_forms("A_1") == ("A_1",) + assert vintage_key_forms("0123") == ("0123",) + assert resolve_vintage_key({"2023": {}}, 2023) == "2023" + assert resolve_vintage_key({2023: {}}, "2023") == 2023 + assert resolve_vintage_key({}, 2023) is None + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousVintageKeyError, match="both keys"): + resolve_vintage_key({2023: {}, "2023": {}}, 2023) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Entry and manifest validation vocabulary +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_microdata_release_entry_requires_access_licence_and_attestation(): + errors = validate_file_entry( + {"filename": "adult.tab", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + + assert "missing_access" in errors + assert "missing_licence" in errors + assert "missing_hash_source" in errors + + +def _attested_entry(**mutation: object) -> dict: + entry = { + "filename": "adult.tab", + "access": "licensed", + "licence": "UK Data Service End User Licence", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA, + "doi": "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2", + **ATTESTED, + } + entry.update(mutation) + return {key: value for key, value in entry.items() if value is not None} + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("mutation", "expected_code"), + [ + ({"licence": None}, "missing_licence"), + ({"sha256": None}, "missing_sha256"), + ({"sha256": "not-a-checksum"}, "malformed_sha256"), + ({"sha256": FIXTURE_SHA.upper()}, "malformed_sha256"), + ({"vintage": None}, "missing_vintage"), + ({"doi": None}, "missing_access_route"), + ({"hash_source": None}, "missing_hash_source"), + ({"hash_source": "transcribed"}, "unknown_hash_source:transcribed"), + ({"attested_by": None}, "missing_attested_by"), + ({"attestation_evidence": None}, "missing_attestation_evidence"), + ({"verified_at": None}, "missing_verified_at"), + ({"filename": "./adult.tab"}, "non_canonical_filename:./adult.tab"), + ], +) +def test_hash_only_entry_reports_each_missing_field(mutation, expected_code): + errors = validate_file_entry( + _attested_entry(**mutation), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + + assert expected_code in errors + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("mutation", "expected_code"), + [ + ({"filename": True}, "missing_filename"), + ({"licence": ["UKDS"]}, "missing_licence"), + ({"vintage": {"year": 2023}}, "missing_vintage"), + ({"doi": None, "access_route": True}, "missing_access_route"), + ({"attested_by": ["microcosm"]}, "missing_attested_by"), + ( + {"attestation_evidence": {"manifest": "source_stages.json"}}, + "missing_attestation_evidence", + ), + ({"verified_at": True}, "missing_verified_at"), + ], + ids=( + "filename", + "licence", + "vintage", + "access-route", + "attested-by", + "evidence", + "verified-at", + ), +) +def test_required_text_fields_reject_non_string_yaml_values(mutation, expected_code): + errors = validate_file_entry( + _attested_entry(**mutation), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + + assert expected_code in errors + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("mutation", "expected_code"), + [ + ({"pinned_from": None}, "missing_pinned_from"), + ({"pinned_from": "microcosm@abc"}, "malformed_pinned_from"), + ( + {"pinned_from": {"repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm"}}, + "pinned_from_missing_field:commit", + ), + ( + {"pinned_from": {**PINNED["pinned_from"], "commit": "abc123"}}, + "malformed_pinned_from_commit", + ), + ({"verified_at": "2026-09-02"}, "verified_at_forbidden_for_consumer_pin"), + ], +) +def test_consumer_pin_entry_reports_its_own_fields(mutation, expected_code): + entry = _attested_entry(attestation_evidence=None, verified_at=None, **PINNED) + entry.update(mutation) + entry = {key: value for key, value in entry.items() if value is not None} + + errors = validate_file_entry( + entry, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + + assert expected_code in errors + + +def test_chronicle_fetch_entry_is_attested_by_chronicle_with_a_date(): + entry = _attested_entry( + hash_source="chronicle_fetch", attested_by="microcosm", verified_at=None + ) + errors = validate_file_entry( + entry, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + assert "attested_by_not_chronicle" in errors + assert "missing_verified_at" in errors + + +def test_hash_only_entry_flags_bytes_and_r2_locations(): + entry = _attested_entry( + access="restricted", + storage={ + "r2": {"bucket": "ledger-raw", "key": "raw/x/y/z"}, + "previous_r2": [{"uri": "r2://ledger-raw/raw/x/y/old"}], + }, + ) + + errors = validate_file_entry( + entry, + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=True, + ) + + assert "bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry" in errors + assert "r2_location_for_hash_only_entry" in errors + assert "r2_history_for_hash_only_entry" in errors + + +def test_public_table_entry_needs_no_licence_access_route_or_attestation(): + assert ( + validate_file_entry( + {"filename": "table.xlsx", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + kind="publisher_table", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=True, + ) + == () + ) + + +def _public_release_entry(**mutation: object) -> dict: + entry = { + "filename": "csv_hus.zip", + "access": "public", + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "licence_evidence": { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + }, + "vintage": "2022", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + "hash_source": "chronicle_fetch", + "attested_by": "chronicle", + "verified_at": "2026-09-03", + } + entry.update(mutation) + return {key: value for key, value in entry.items() if value is not None} + + +def test_public_release_entry_is_complete_with_allowlisted_evidence(): + assert ( + validate_file_entry( + _public_release_entry(), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + == () + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("mutation", "expected_code"), + [ + ( + {"licence": "U.S. Census Bureau public-use file"}, + "licence_not_redistributable:U.S. Census Bureau public-use file", + ), + ({"licence_evidence": None}, "missing_licence_evidence"), + ({"licence_evidence": "see website"}, "malformed_licence_evidence"), + ( + { + "licence_evidence": { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + "url": "", + } + }, + "licence_evidence_missing_field:url", + ), + ( + { + "licence_evidence": { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "CC0-1.0", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + } + }, + "licence_evidence_licence_mismatch", + ), + ( + { + "licence_evidence": { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": OTHER_SHA, + } + }, + "licence_evidence_sha256_mismatch", + ), + ( + { + "licence_evidence": { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + "url": "see the website", + } + }, + "licence_evidence_url_not_durable", + ), + ({"vintage": None}, "missing_vintage"), + ({"sha256": None}, "missing_sha256"), + ({"hash_source": None}, "missing_hash_source"), + ], +) +def test_public_release_entry_reports_missing_evidence(mutation, expected_code): + errors = validate_file_entry( + _public_release_entry(**mutation), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + assert expected_code in errors + + +def test_public_release_bytes_beside_the_manifest_are_a_repository_violation(): + errors = validate_file_entry( + _public_release_entry(), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=True, + ) + assert "bytes_present_for_microdata_release_entry" in errors + + +def test_list_file_spec_expands_only_for_a_microdata_release(): + specs = [{"filename": "adult.tab"}, {"filename": "child.tab"}] + + assert iter_file_specs(specs, kind="microdata_release") == tuple(specs) + + rejected = iter_file_specs(specs, kind="publisher_table") + assert len(rejected) == 1 + assert isinstance(rejected[0], ListSpecRejected) + assert validate_file_entry( + rejected[0], + kind="publisher_table", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) == ("list_file_spec_requires_microdata_release_kind",) + + +def test_manifest_level_validation_reports_keys_names_and_collisions(): + manifest = { + "files": { + 2023: [ + {"filename": "adult.tab", "access": "licensed", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + {"filename": "./adult.tab", "access": "public", "sha256": OTHER_SHA}, + {"filename": "child.tab", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + {"filename": "child.tab", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + ], + "2023": {"filename": "other.csv"}, + 2022: {"filename": "table.xlsx", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + 2021: {"filename": "TABLE.xlsx", "sha256": OTHER_SHA}, + } + } + + errors = validate_manifest_files(manifest) + + assert "duplicate_vintage_key:2023" in errors + assert "non_canonical_filename:./adult.tab" in errors + assert "filename_collision:adult.tab" in errors + assert "duplicate_filename_in_vintage:child.tab" in errors + # Two public entries, one path, different bytes: the tree can hold one. + assert "filename_collision:table.xlsx" in errors + + +def test_manifest_level_validation_accepts_the_same_file_under_two_keys(): + # The SSA manifests register one file under a year and a label key. + manifest = { + "files": { + 2024: {"filename": "ssa.csv", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + "extracted_targets": {"filename": "ssa.csv", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + } + } + assert validate_manifest_files(manifest) == () + + +def test_manifest_level_validation_accepts_a_hash_only_reissue(): + manifest = { + "files": { + 2023: [ + {"filename": "adult.tab", "access": "licensed", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + {"filename": "adult.tab", "access": "licensed", "sha256": OTHER_SHA}, + ] + } + } + assert validate_manifest_files(manifest) == () + assert validate_manifest_files({"files": ["not", "a", "mapping"]}) == ( + "files_not_a_mapping", + ) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# register-artifact +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_register_writes_identity_without_bytes_or_an_r2_key(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + + report = _register(output_dir) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + entry = manifest["files"][2023][0] + + assert report.valid + assert report.replaced is False + assert report.hash_source == "consumer_attested" + assert report.attested_by == "PolicyEngine/microcosm" + assert report.registration == f"dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/{FIXTURE_SHA}/adult.tab" + assert manifest["kind"] == "microdata_release" + assert entry["access"] == "licensed" + assert entry["sha256"] == FIXTURE_SHA + assert entry["hash_source"] == "consumer_attested" + assert entry["attested_by"] == "PolicyEngine/microcosm" + assert entry["attestation_evidence"] == ATTESTED["attestation_evidence"] + assert entry["verified_at"] == "2026-09-02" + assert "storage" not in entry + assert sorted(path.name for path in output_dir.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + + +def test_register_a_consumer_pin_records_where_it_was_read(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + + _register(output_dir, attestation_evidence=None, verified_at=None, **PINNED) + entry = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023][0] + + assert entry["hash_source"] == "consumer_pin" + assert entry["pinned_from"] == PINNED["pinned_from"] + assert "verified_at" not in entry + assert list(entry).index("hash_source") < list(entry).index("pinned_from") + + +def test_register_refuses_public_access(tmp_path): + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="refuses access='public'"): + _register(tmp_path / "pkg", access="public") + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("sha256", ["", "abc123", FIXTURE_SHA.upper(), "z" * 64]) +def test_register_never_invents_a_hash(tmp_path, sha256): + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="Never invent a hash"): + _register(tmp_path / "pkg", sha256=sha256) + assert not (tmp_path / "pkg").exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("overrides", "expected"), + [ + ({"licence": ""}, "must record the publisher licence"), + ({"vintage": ""}, "must record the artifact vintage"), + ({"filename": "../adult.tab"}, "must be a bare filename"), + ({"filename": "./adult.tab"}, "must be a bare filename"), + ({"hash_source": "chronicle_fetch"}, "does not apply"), + ({"hash_source": "guessed"}, "Unknown hash_source"), + ({"attested_by": ""}, "pass --attested-by"), + ({"attestation_evidence": None}, "pass --attestation-evidence"), + ({"verified_at": None}, "pass --verified-at"), + ], +) +def test_register_refuses_an_incomplete_registration(tmp_path, overrides, expected): + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match=expected): + _register(tmp_path / "pkg", **overrides) + assert not (tmp_path / "pkg").exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("overrides", "expected"), + [ + ({"pinned_from": None}, "pass --pinned-from-repository"), + ({"pinned_from": {"repository": "PolicyEngine/microcosm"}}, "40-hex commit"), + ({"verified_at": "2026-09-02"}, "carries no verified_at"), + ], +) +def test_register_refuses_an_incomplete_consumer_pin(tmp_path, overrides, expected): + kwargs = {"hash_source": None, "attestation_evidence": None, "verified_at": None} + kwargs.update(PINNED) + kwargs.update(overrides) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match=expected): + _register(tmp_path / "pkg", **kwargs) + + +def test_register_refuses_without_an_access_route(tmp_path): + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="how the bytes are reached"): + _register(tmp_path / "pkg", doi=None) + + +def test_register_refuses_while_the_bytes_are_present(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "adult.tab").write_bytes(b"licensed microdata must not live here") + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="while its bytes"): + _register(output_dir) + + +def test_register_refuses_a_normalized_alias_of_local_bytes(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + """Simulate a case-sensitive directory while running on folded APFS.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + actual_path = output_dir / "ADULT.TAB" + content = b"licensed microdata must not live here" + actual_path.write_bytes(content) + requested_path = output_dir / "adult.tab" + real_exists = Path.exists + + def case_sensitive_exists(path: Path) -> bool: + if path == requested_path: + return False + return real_exists(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "exists", case_sensitive_exists) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="ADULT.TAB"): + _register(output_dir, filename="adult.tab") + + assert actual_path.read_bytes() == content + assert not (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "document", + ["[]\n", "false\n", "0\n", "''\n"], + ids=["empty-list", "false", "zero", "empty-string"], +) +def test_register_refuses_a_falsy_non_mapping_manifest(tmp_path, document): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text(document) + original = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="must be a mapping"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == original + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("field", "blank"), + [("source_id", None), ("source_id", " "), ("package_id", "")], +) +def test_register_replaces_blank_manifest_identity_fields(tmp_path, field, blank): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + payload = { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {}, + } + payload[field] = blank + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False)) + + report = _register(output_dir) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + + assert report.source_id == "dwp" + assert report.package_id == "dwp-frs-2023-24" + assert manifest["source_id"] == "dwp" + assert manifest["package_id"] == "dwp-frs-2023-24" + + +def test_register_replaces_a_blank_manifest_level_access_route(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "source_page": None, + "files": {}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + source_page = "https://publisher.example/frs" + + _register(output_dir, doi=None, source_page=source_page) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + entry = manifest["files"][2023][0] + + assert manifest["source_page"] == source_page + assert "missing_access_route" not in validate_file_entry( + entry, + kind="microdata_release", + manifest=manifest, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("outside_exists", [True, False], ids=["existing", "dangling"]) +def test_register_refuses_a_symlinked_manifest_target_before_writing( + tmp_path, outside_exists +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + outside = tmp_path / "outside.yaml" + original = yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ).encode() + if outside_exists: + outside.write_bytes(original) + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.symlink_to(outside) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="symbolic link"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert manifest_path.is_symlink() + if outside_exists: + assert outside.read_bytes() == original + else: + assert not outside.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("target_exists", [True, False], ids=("existing", "dangling")) +def test_register_refuses_a_symlinked_output_directory_before_writing( + tmp_path, target_exists +): + outside = tmp_path / "outside" + if target_exists: + outside.mkdir() + output_dir = tmp_path / "requested" + output_dir.symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="symbolic link"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert output_dir.is_symlink() + assert not (outside / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +def test_register_checks_symlinks_before_resolving_parent_segments(tmp_path): + inside = tmp_path / "inside" + inside.mkdir() + outside = tmp_path / "outside" + linked_parent = outside / "linked-parent" + linked_parent.mkdir(parents=True) + (outside / "escaped").mkdir() + (inside / "escaped").mkdir() + link = inside / "link" + link.symlink_to(linked_parent, target_is_directory=True) + output_dir = link / ".." / "escaped" + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="symbolic link"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert not (outside / "escaped" / "manifest.yaml").exists() + assert not (inside / "escaped" / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + +def test_registration_persists_with_atomic_replace_under_an_exclusive_lock( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + events: list[tuple[str, int | None]] = [] + real_flock = fcntl.flock + real_replace = os.replace + + def observed_flock(fd, operation): + events.append(("flock", operation)) + return real_flock(fd, operation) + + def observed_replace(source, destination): + assert events and events[-1] == ("flock", fcntl.LOCK_EX) + events.append(("replace", None)) + return real_replace(source, destination) + + monkeypatch.setattr(fcntl, "flock", observed_flock) + monkeypatch.setattr(os, "replace", observed_replace) + + report = _register(tmp_path / "pkg") + + assert report.valid + assert events == [ + ("flock", fcntl.LOCK_EX), + ("replace", None), + ("flock", fcntl.LOCK_UN), + ] + + +def test_registration_lock_identity_folds_case_variant_package_paths(tmp_path): + assert _registration_lock_path(tmp_path / "Package") == _registration_lock_path( + tmp_path / "package" + ) + + +def test_concurrent_registrations_preserve_both_manifest_updates(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + first_inside_replace = threading.Event() + release_first_replace = threading.Event() + second_inside_replace = threading.Event() + call_count = 0 + call_count_lock = threading.Lock() + from chronicle import registration + + real_atomic_replace = registration._atomic_replace_manifest + + def coordinated_replace(manifest_path, document): + nonlocal call_count + with call_count_lock: + call_index = call_count + call_count += 1 + if call_index == 0: + first_inside_replace.set() + assert release_first_replace.wait(5) + else: + second_inside_replace.set() + real_atomic_replace(manifest_path, document) + + monkeypatch.setattr(registration, "_atomic_replace_manifest", coordinated_replace) + with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as executor: + first = executor.submit(_register, output_dir) + assert first_inside_replace.wait(5) + second = executor.submit( + _register, output_dir, filename="child.tab", sha256=OTHER_SHA + ) + try: + assert not second_inside_replace.wait(0.25) + finally: + release_first_replace.set() + assert first.result(timeout=5).valid + assert second.result(timeout=5).valid + + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023] + assert {(entry["filename"], entry["sha256"]) for entry in entries} == { + ("adult.tab", FIXTURE_SHA), + ("child.tab", OTHER_SHA), + } + + +def test_fetch_shares_the_registration_lock_before_publisher_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + from chronicle import registration + + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + registration_inside_replace = threading.Event() + release_registration = threading.Event() + publisher_read = threading.Event() + real_atomic_replace = registration._atomic_replace_manifest + + def blocked_registration_replace(manifest_path, document): + registration_inside_replace.set() + assert release_registration.wait(5) + real_atomic_replace(manifest_path, document) + + def served_after_lock(_source_url): + publisher_read.set() + return PUBLIC_BYTES, "public-alias.zip" + + monkeypatch.setattr( + registration, "_atomic_replace_manifest", blocked_registration_replace + ) + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", served_after_lock) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as executor: + registration_future = executor.submit( + _register, + output_dir, + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + year=2022, + filename="adult.tab", + sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + vintage="2022", + ) + assert registration_inside_replace.wait(5) + fetch_future = executor.submit( + _fetch_release, + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + filename="public-alias.zip", + content=PUBLIC_BYTES, + upload_r2=True, + ) + try: + assert not publisher_read.wait(0.25) + finally: + release_registration.set() + assert registration_future.result(timeout=5).valid + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError): + fetch_future.result(timeout=5) + + assert uploads == [] + assert not staging.exists() + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + assert [(entry["filename"], entry["access"]) for entry in entries] == [ + ("adult.tab", "licensed") + ] + + +def test_publish_holds_the_registration_lock_through_manifest_write( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + from chronicle import registration + + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + upload_started = threading.Event() + release_upload = threading.Event() + registration_inside_replace = threading.Event() + real_atomic_replace = registration._atomic_replace_manifest + + def blocked_upload(location, local_path, *, wrangler_command): + upload_started.set() + assert release_upload.wait(5) + return ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("stub",), returncode=0, stdout="ok", stderr="" + ) + + def observed_registration_replace(manifest_path, document): + registration_inside_replace.set() + real_atomic_replace(manifest_path, document) + + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", blocked_upload) + monkeypatch.setattr( + registration, "_atomic_replace_manifest", observed_registration_replace + ) + + with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as executor: + publish_future = executor.submit( + publish_source_artifacts, + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + skip_hash_only=True, + ) + assert upload_started.wait(5) + registration_future = executor.submit( + _register, + output_dir, + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + year=2022, + filename="child.tab", + vintage="2022", + ) + try: + assert not registration_inside_replace.wait(0.25) + finally: + release_upload.set() + assert publish_future.result(timeout=5).valid + assert registration_future.result(timeout=5).valid + + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + assert {entry["filename"] for entry in entries} == {"csv_hus.zip", "child.tab"} + public = next(entry for entry in entries if entry["filename"] == "csv_hus.zip") + assert public["storage"]["r2"]["provider"] == "r2" + + +def test_atomic_registration_failure_preserves_the_original_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + manifest_path = output_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + original = manifest_path.read_bytes() + + monkeypatch.setattr( + os, + "replace", + lambda _source, _destination: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError("replace failed")), + ) + + with pytest.raises(OSError, match="replace failed"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == original + assert not list(output_dir.glob(".manifest.yaml.*.tmp")) + + +def test_register_refuses_a_publisher_table_manifest(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": {2023: {"filename": "table.ods", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}}, + } + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="publisher_table manifest"): + _register(output_dir) + + +def test_register_refuses_a_kindless_manifest_with_content(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "files": {2023: {"filename": "table.ods", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}}, + } + ) + ) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="declares no kind"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def _entryless_manifest(tmp_path: Path, **fields: object) -> Path: + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + payload = {"source_id": "dwp", "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", **fields} + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False).replace("files: null", "files:") + ) + return output_dir + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("files", [None, {}], ids=["explicit-null", "empty-mapping"]) +def test_register_declares_the_kind_of_an_entryless_kindless_manifest(tmp_path, files): + output_dir = _entryless_manifest(tmp_path, files=files) + + report = _register(output_dir) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + + assert report.valid + assert manifest["kind"] == "microdata_release" + assert manifest["files"][2023][0]["filename"] == "adult.tab" + + +def test_register_never_reclassifies_a_declared_publisher_table(tmp_path): + # An explicit kind is fixed even when the manifest holds no entry yet. + output_dir = _entryless_manifest(tmp_path, kind="publisher_table", files={}) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="publisher_table manifest"): + _register(output_dir) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_register_refuses_a_manifest_for_a_different_source(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="declares source_id='dwp'"): + _register(output_dir, source_id="ons", filename="other.tab") + + +def test_register_is_idempotent_and_byte_stable(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + first = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + report = _register(output_dir) + + assert report.replaced is True + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == first + + +def test_register_refuses_a_reissue_unless_it_is_asked_for(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="pass --allow-reissue"): + _register(output_dir, sha256=OTHER_SHA) + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + report = _register(output_dir, sha256=OTHER_SHA, allow_reissue=True) + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023] + + assert report.replaced is False + assert [entry["sha256"] for entry in entries] == [FIXTURE_SHA, OTHER_SHA] + + +def test_register_keeps_distinct_files_under_one_vintage(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir, filename="adult.tab") + _register(output_dir, filename="child.tab", sha256=OTHER_SHA) + + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023] + + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in entries] == ["adult.tab", "child.tab"] + + +def test_reregistering_the_current_pin_stays_idempotent_after_a_reissue(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir, sha256=FIXTURE_SHA) + _register(output_dir, sha256=OTHER_SHA, allow_reissue=True) + + report = _register(output_dir, sha256=OTHER_SHA) + + assert report.replaced is True + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023] + assert [entry["sha256"] for entry in entries] == [FIXTURE_SHA, OTHER_SHA] + + +# Finding 7: a quoted string year key is the same vintage as the integer. + + +def _quoted_year_release(tmp_path: Path, **entry_overrides: object) -> Path: + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + entry = _attested_entry(**entry_overrides) + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {"2023": [entry]}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + return output_dir + + +def test_register_sees_a_registration_under_a_quoted_year_key(tmp_path): + output_dir = _quoted_year_release(tmp_path) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="already registers"): + _register(output_dir, sha256=OTHER_SHA) + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + report = _register(output_dir) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + + assert report.replaced is True + # The manifest's own key spelling is retained; no parallel key appears. + assert list(manifest["files"]) == ["2023"] + + +def test_register_refuses_a_vintage_recorded_under_both_key_spellings(tmp_path): + output_dir = _quoted_year_release(tmp_path) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + manifest["files"][2023] = [_attested_entry(filename="child.tab")] + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="duplicate_vintage_key"): + _register(output_dir, filename="job.tab", sha256=OTHER_SHA) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +# Finding 3: a public identity with an object in R2 is not reclassified. + + +def _archived_release(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, *, filename="asecpub23csv.zip"): + """A public release whose bytes were archived, then cleaned up locally.""" + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + filename=filename, + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + year=2023, + upload_r2=True, + ) + assert uploads + staged = microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging, + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + year=2023, + sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + filename=filename, + ) + staged.unlink() + return output_dir, uploads + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("access", ["licensed", "restricted"]) +def test_register_refuses_to_reclassify_an_identity_r2_still_holds( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, access +): + output_dir, uploads = _archived_release(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="records the R2 object"): + _register( + output_dir, + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + filename="asecpub23csv.zip", + sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + access=access, + licence="Some licence", + vintage="2023", + ) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + entry = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023][0] + assert entry["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] == uploads[0][0] + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(output_dir, staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging") + assert inventory.counts["r2_link_count"] == 1 + + +def test_register_refuses_to_reclassify_an_unarchived_public_entry(tmp_path): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "census_cps", + "package_id": "census-cps-asec-2023", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {2023: [_public_release_entry(filename="asecpub23csv.zip")]}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="explicit decision"): + _register( + output_dir, + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + filename="ASECPUB23CSV.ZIP", + sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + licence="Some licence", + vintage="2023", + ) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_register_refuses_a_collision_with_a_public_alias(tmp_path): + # Finding 1 from the registration side: a manifest never holds one path + # under two access classes, whatever spelling the other entry uses. + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {2022: [_public_release_entry(filename="Adult.tab")]}, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="explicit decision"): + _register(output_dir) + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# fetch-artifact +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_hash_only_access_class(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + source = tmp_path / "adult.tab" + source.write_bytes(b"licensed microdata") + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="fetch-artifact stores bytes"): + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=tmp_path / "pkg", + access="licensed", + ) + + +def test_fetch_refuses_to_pull_bytes_over_a_hash_only_registration( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + original_manifest = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + source = tmp_path / "adult.tab" + source.write_bytes(b"licensed microdata") + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="Its bytes must not enter"): + fetch_source_artifact( + str(source), + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=output_dir, + filename="adult.tab", + access="public", + ) + + assert not (output_dir / "adult.tab").exists() + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original_manifest + + +# Finding 5: the inferred filename is refused before the read, not after. + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("year", [2023, 2022], ids=["same-vintage", "other-vintage"]) +def test_fetch_without_filename_refuses_a_hash_only_registration_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, year +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + original_manifest = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch, "the artifact was downloaded") + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="Its bytes must not enter"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/Umbraco/Surface/Download/9367/adult.tab", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=year, + output_dir=output_dir, + licence="UK Data Service End User Licence", + access="public", + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original_manifest + assert sorted(path.name for path in output_dir.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + + +def test_fetch_refuses_an_uninferrable_or_unsupported_source_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + common = { + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table-1-2", + "year": 2023, + "output_dir": tmp_path / "pkg", + } + with pytest.raises(ArtifactFilenameError, match="inferred from the URL"): + fetch_source_artifact("https://publisher.example/", **common) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsupported source URL scheme"): + fetch_source_artifact("ftp://publisher.example/table.xlsx", **common) + assert reads == [] + assert not (tmp_path / "pkg").exists() + + +# Finding 1: no alias of a registered name slips past the byte boundary. + +ALIASES = { + "dot-slash": lambda out: "./adult.tab", + "dot-dot-segment": lambda out: "sub/../adult.tab", + "trailing-slash": lambda out: "adult.tab/", + "parent-then-back": lambda out: f"../{out.name}/adult.tab", + "absolute": lambda out: str(out / "adult.tab"), + "case": lambda out: "ADULT.TAB", +} + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("alias", ALIASES.values(), ids=ALIASES.keys()) +def test_fetch_refuses_every_alias_of_a_hash_only_registration_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, alias +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + original_manifest = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/frs/adult.tab", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=output_dir, + filename=alias(output_dir), + licence="Open Government Licence v3", + access="public", + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert sorted(path.name for path in output_dir.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original_manifest + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_path_that_escapes_the_package_directory(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + with pytest.raises(ArtifactFilenameError, match="bare filename"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "table.xlsx", + tmp_path / "pkg", + filename="../../escaped.xlsx", + ) + assert reads == [] + assert not (tmp_path / "escaped.xlsx").exists() + + +def test_fetch_writes_the_access_class_and_kind_explicitly(tmp_path): + source = tmp_path / "table.xlsx" + source.write_bytes(b"publisher table") + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + + _fetch_table(source, output_dir) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + + assert list(manifest)[:3] == ["source_id", "package_id", "kind"] + assert manifest["kind"] == "publisher_table" + assert manifest["files"][2023]["access"] == "public" + + +def test_fetch_into_a_microdata_release_manifest_requires_the_evidence( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + base = { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "year": 2023, + "output_dir": output_dir, + "filename": "codebook.pdf", + "access": "public", + "licence": "OGL-UK-3.0", + "publisher": "Department for Work and Pensions", + "vintage": "2023_24", + # Not the digest the manifest registers hash-only: those bytes are + # refused as the gated artifact whatever name they arrive under. + "expected_sha256": OTHER_SHA, + "licence_evidence": {**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + "staging_dir": tmp_path / "staging", + } + cases = [ + ({"licence": None}, "pass --licence"), + ({"vintage": None}, "pass --vintage"), + ({"publisher": None}, "pass --publisher"), + ({"expected_sha256": None}, "pass --expected-sha256"), + ( + {"licence": "UK Data Service End User Licence"}, + "not on Chronicle's allowlist", + ), + ({"licence_evidence": None}, "licence_evidence_missing_field:issuer"), + ( + {"licence_evidence": {**EVIDENCE, "url": "ask the archive"}}, + "url_not_durable", + ), + ] + for overrides, expected in cases: + kwargs = {**base, **overrides} + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match=expected): + fetch_source_artifact("https://publisher.example/codebook.pdf", **kwargs) + + assert reads == [] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_registration_recorded_under_another_vintage( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + # The write target is a path in the package directory, not a year, so a + # registration under 2022 must still block a fetch requested for 2023. + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(package, year=2022, vintage="2022_23") + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="for 2022 as access='licensed'"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/adult.tab", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=package, + filename="adult.tab", + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + access="public", + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert not (package / "adult.tab").exists() + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_list_entry_in_a_manifest_without_a_kind(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + # A missing kind must not make the guard blind to the entries the + # manifest actually holds: the byte boundary is refused first. + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "files": {2023: [_attested_entry()]}, + } + ) + ) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="Its bytes must not enter"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/adult.tab", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=package, + filename="adult.tab", + access="public", + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert not (package / "adult.tab").exists() + + +# Finding 4: the existing manifest is validated strictly before any I/O. + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_kind_that_conflicts_with_the_manifest(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + release = tmp_path / "release" + _register(release) + table = tmp_path / "table" + (tmp_path / "t.xlsx").write_bytes(b"table") + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", table) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + before = {path: (path / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() for path in (release, table)} + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="is a microdata_release manifest"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/codebook.pdf", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=release, + kind="publisher_table", + upload_r2=True, + ) + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="is a publisher_table manifest"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/22in05ira.xlsx", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-2", + year=2022, + output_dir=table, + kind="microdata_release", + licence="US-Government-Work", + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + for path, original in before.items(): + assert (path / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + assert not (path / "codebook.pdf").exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("files", [None, {}], ids=["explicit-null", "empty-mapping"]) +def test_fetch_declares_the_requested_kind_on_an_entryless_kindless_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, files +): + output_dir = _entryless_manifest(tmp_path, files=files) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + + report = _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + publisher="Department for Work and Pensions", + vintage="2023_24", + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + ) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + + assert report.valid + assert manifest["kind"] == "microdata_release" + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in manifest["files"][2023]] == ["csv_hus.zip"] + + +def test_fetch_never_reclassifies_a_declared_kind_without_entries( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = _entryless_manifest(tmp_path, kind="publisher_table", files={}) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="is a publisher_table manifest"): + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + publisher="Department for Work and Pensions", + vintage="2023_24", + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_stored_unknown_kind_even_with_an_explicit_kind( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_rows", + "files": {2023: {"filename": "table.ods", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}}, + } + ) + ) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + for kind in (None, "publisher_table"): + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="unknown manifest kind"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/codebook.pdf", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=package, + kind=kind, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_release_entry_without_an_access_class(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + package.mkdir() + entry = _attested_entry() + del entry["access"] + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "publisher": "DWP", + "files": {2023: [entry]}, + } + ) + ) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="missing_access"): + fetch_source_artifact( + "https://publisher.example/adult.tab", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=package, + filename="adult.tab", + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + vintage="2023_24", + expected_sha256=FIXTURE_SHA, + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + assert not (package / "adult.tab").exists() + + +def test_fetch_refuses_an_invalid_manifest_before_reading(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "pkg" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": { + 2023: [ + _attested_entry(filename="adult.tab"), + _public_release_entry(filename="./adult.tab"), + ] + }, + } + ) + ) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="not a valid microdata_release"): + _fetch_release( + package, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + filename="job.tab", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_fetch_never_drops_an_existing_registration(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + _serve(monkeypatch, b"a public codebook in the same package") + + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + filename="codebook.pdf", + content=b"a public codebook in the same package", + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + publisher="Department for Work and Pensions", + vintage="2023_24", + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + ) + + entries = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023] + + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in entries] == ["adult.tab", "codebook.pdf"] + assert entries[0]["access"] == "licensed" + assert entries[0]["sha256"] == FIXTURE_SHA + assert entries[0]["attestation_evidence"] == ATTESTED["attestation_evidence"] + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Public microdata releases: bytes only with evidence, staged outside the tree +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_fetch_archives_a_public_release_from_a_staging_directory( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "census" / "acs_pums_2022_1yr" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + + report = _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + person = b"public person pums" + _serve(monkeypatch, person) + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + filename="csv_pus.zip", + content=person, + upload_r2=True, + ) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + entries = manifest["files"][2022] + + staged = microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging, + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + year=2022, + sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + filename="csv_hus.zip", + ) + assert report.valid + assert Path(report.local_path) == staged + assert staged.read_bytes() == PUBLIC_BYTES + # No release bytes ever land beside the manifest. + assert sorted(path.name for path in output_dir.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + assert uploads[0][1] == str(staged) + assert uploads[0][0].endswith(f"/2022/{PUBLIC_SHA}/csv_hus.zip") + assert manifest["kind"] == "microdata_release" + assert manifest["publisher"] == "U.S. Census Bureau" + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in entries] == ["csv_hus.zip", "csv_pus.zip"] + first = entries[0] + assert first["access"] == "public" + assert first["licence"] == "US-Government-Work" + assert first["licence_evidence"] == { + **EVIDENCE, + "licence": "US-Government-Work", + "sha256": PUBLIC_SHA, + } + assert first["vintage"] == "2022" + assert first["hash_source"] == "chronicle_fetch" + assert first["attested_by"] == "chronicle" + assert first["verified_at"] == first["fetched_at"][:10] + assert first["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] == uploads[0][0] + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + assert inventory.valid + assert inventory.counts["hash_only_count"] == 0 + assert inventory.counts["r2_link_count"] == 2 + assert all(entry.exists for entry in inventory.entries) + + +def test_a_public_release_without_a_recorded_object_is_incomplete( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + + assert not inventory.valid + assert inventory.entries[0].errors == ("r2_object_not_recorded",) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("locator", "expected_error"), + [ + pytest.param({}, "recorded_r2_locator_invalid:", id="empty"), + pytest.param( + { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": ( + "raw/census_acs/census-acs-pums-2022-1yr/2022/" + f"{PUBLIC_SHA}/csv_hus.zip" + ), + "uri": ( + "r2://ledger-raw/raw/census_acs/" + "census-acs-pums-2022-1yr/2022/" + f"{OTHER_SHA}/csv_hus.zip" + ), + }, + "recorded_r2_locator_invalid:", + id="contradictory", + ), + pytest.param( + { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": ( + "raw/census_acs/census-acs-pums-2022-1yr/2022/" + f"{OTHER_SHA}/other.zip" + ), + "uri": ( + "r2://ledger-raw/raw/census_acs/" + "census-acs-pums-2022-1yr/2022/" + f"{OTHER_SHA}/other.zip" + ), + }, + "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch:", + id="wrong-entry-identity", + ), + pytest.param( + { + "provider": "s3", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": ( + "raw/census_acs/census-acs-pums-2022-1yr/2022/" + f"{PUBLIC_SHA}/csv_hus.zip" + ), + "uri": ( + "s3://ledger-raw/raw/census_acs/" + "census-acs-pums-2022-1yr/2022/" + f"{PUBLIC_SHA}/csv_hus.zip" + ), + }, + "recorded_r2_locator_invalid:", + id="wrong-provider", + ), + pytest.param( + { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": ( + f"raw/wrong-source/wrong-package/1999/{PUBLIC_SHA}/csv_hus.zip" + ), + "uri": ( + "r2://ledger-raw/raw/wrong-source/wrong-package/1999/" + f"{PUBLIC_SHA}/csv_hus.zip" + ), + }, + "recorded_r2_locator_invalid:", + id="wrong-registration-identity", + ), + ], +) +def test_inventory_refuses_an_invalid_or_identity_mismatched_r2_locator( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, locator, expected_error +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=tmp_path / "unused-staging") + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + manifest["files"][2022][0]["storage"] = {"r2": locator} + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + + inventory = inventory_source_artifacts( + output_dir, staging_dir=tmp_path / "no-staged-bytes" + ) + + assert not inventory.valid + assert inventory.counts["r2_link_count"] == 0 + assert inventory.entries[0].r2 is None + assert "r2_object_not_recorded" in inventory.entries[0].errors + assert any( + error.startswith(expected_error) for error in inventory.entries[0].errors + ) + + +# Finding 8: the fetch refuses bytes the reviewed pin does not cover. + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_reissue_before_any_side_effect(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _serve(monkeypatch, b"silently re-published bytes") + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError) as raised: + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + expected_sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + message = str(raised.value) + assert PUBLIC_SHA in message + assert hashlib.sha256(b"silently re-published bytes").hexdigest() in message + assert "unreviewed reissue" in message + assert not output_dir.exists() + assert not staging.exists() + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_size_that_disagrees_with_the_pin(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError, match="size_bytes=1"): + _fetch_release( + tmp_path / "pkg", + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + expected_size_bytes=1, + ) + assert not (tmp_path / "pkg").exists() + + +def test_record_revision_does_not_override_the_expected_identity(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + _serve(monkeypatch, b"revised bytes") + + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError): + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + expected_sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + record_revision=True, + ) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_an_expectation_that_contradicts_the_record_is_refused_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError, match="already records"): + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + expected_sha256=OTHER_SHA, + licence_evidence=EVIDENCE, + ) + + assert reads == [] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["", "abc", FIXTURE_SHA.upper()]) +def test_fetch_never_accepts_an_invented_expected_hash(tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad): + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError, match="Never invent a hash"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", tmp_path / "pkg", expected_sha256=bad) + assert reads == [] + + +def test_a_table_fetch_honours_an_expected_hash_before_writing(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + source = tmp_path / "table.xlsx" + source.write_bytes(b"publisher table") + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError): + _fetch_table(source, output_dir, expected_sha256=OTHER_SHA) + assert not output_dir.exists() + + report = _fetch_table( + source, + output_dir, + expected_sha256=hashlib.sha256(b"publisher table").hexdigest(), + expected_size_bytes=len(b"publisher table"), + ) + assert report.valid + + +def test_fetch_refuses_release_bytes_already_tracked_beside_the_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "csv_hus.zip").write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="staged outside the package tree"): + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging") + + assert reads == [] + + +# Finding 6: a release vintage is a list, and every entry keeps its identity. + + +def test_refetching_a_release_file_with_different_bytes_is_refused( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + person = b"public person pums" + _serve(monkeypatch, person) + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + filename="csv_pus.zip", + content=person, + upload_r2=True, + ) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + revised = b"household pums, silently re-published" + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + uploads_before = list(uploads) + + # The list entry's recorded identity is live: a reviewed pin for other + # bytes contradicts it, and the contradiction is refused before the read. + with pytest.raises( + ExpectedArtifactIdentityError, match="already records" + ) as raised: + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging, content=revised, upload_r2=True) + + assert PUBLIC_SHA in str(raised.value) + assert "csv_hus.zip" in str(raised.value) + assert reads == [] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + assert uploads == uploads_before + + # Served bytes that differ from the pin the record and the evidence agree + # on are refused after the read, before any write or upload. + _serve(monkeypatch, revised) + with pytest.raises(ExpectedArtifactIdentityError, match="unreviewed reissue"): + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + content=revised, + upload_r2=True, + expected_sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + ) + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + assert uploads == uploads_before + assert not microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging, + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + year=2022, + sha256=hashlib.sha256(revised).hexdigest(), + filename="csv_hus.zip", + ).exists() + + +def test_refetching_identical_release_bytes_preserves_the_entry_in_place( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + person = b"public person pums" + _serve(monkeypatch, person) + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + filename="csv_pus.zip", + content=person, + upload_r2=True, + ) + before = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_R2_RAW_BUCKET", "chronicle-raw") + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + report = _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + after = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + + assert report.valid + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in after] == ["csv_hus.zip", "csv_pus.zip"] + # The recorded object is history: the backfill copy does not restate it. + assert after[0]["storage"] == before[0]["storage"] + assert after[0]["storage"]["r2"]["bucket"] == "ledger-raw" + assert after[1] == before[1] + + +def test_record_revision_of_a_release_file_supersedes_only_that_entry( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + person = b"public person pums" + _serve(monkeypatch, person) + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + filename="csv_pus.zip", + content=person, + upload_r2=True, + ) + before = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + revised = b"household pums, revised" + _serve(monkeypatch, revised) + + _fetch_release( + output_dir, + staging_dir=staging, + content=revised, + upload_r2=True, + record_revision=True, + ) + after = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in after] == ["csv_hus.zip", "csv_pus.zip"] + assert after[0]["sha256"] == hashlib.sha256(revised).hexdigest() + assert after[0]["licence_evidence"]["sha256"] == after[0]["sha256"] + assert [entry["uri"] for entry in after[0]["storage"]["previous_r2"]] == [ + before[0]["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] + ] + assert after[1] == before[1] + + +def test_a_second_file_never_turns_a_publisher_table_vintage_into_a_list( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + (tmp_path / "22in05ira.xlsx").write_bytes(b"IRA table 5") + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "22in05ira.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + (tmp_path / "22in05ira_rev.xlsx").write_bytes(b"IRA table 5, renamed") + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "22in05ira_rev.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "22in05ira_rev.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022, record_revision=True + ) + revised = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022] + + assert isinstance(revised, dict) + assert revised["filename"] == "22in05ira_rev.xlsx" + + +def test_the_manifest_write_refuses_a_same_bytes_rename_by_itself(tmp_path): + # PR #226's rule: identical bytes under another filename are a rename, + # not a revision, so --record-revision does not apply. The write path + # repeats the guard so no caller reaches a false-provenance write. + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + (tmp_path / "22in05ira.xlsx").write_bytes(b"IRA table 5") + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "22in05ira.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + + for record_revision in (False, True): + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError, match="rename is not"): + _upsert_manifest( + output_dir / "manifest.yaml", + source_id="irs_soi", + package_id="soi-table-1-2", + dataset="irs_soi_soi-table-1-2", + source_page=None, + table=None, + publisher=None, + year=2022, + filename="table-5.xlsx", + source_url="https://publisher.example/table-5.xlsx", + sha256=hashlib.sha256(b"IRA table 5").hexdigest(), + size_bytes=len(b"IRA table 5"), + fetched_at="2026-09-04T00:00:00+00:00", + access="public", + licence=None, + kind="publisher_table", + vintage=None, + licence_evidence=None, + expected=_expected_identity(None, None), + r2_location=None, + record_revision=record_revision, + ) + + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_a_second_file_over_an_unidentified_table_entry_is_refused( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + output_dir.mkdir() + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table-1-2", + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": {2022: {"filename": "22in05ira.xlsx", "source_url": "x"}}, + } + ) + ) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(MalformedManifestError, match="one file per vintage"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "other.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + + assert reads == [] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +# Finding 7 on the fetch side. + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_revision_recorded_under_a_quoted_year_key( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + (tmp_path / "t.xlsx").write_bytes(b"first") + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + manifest["files"] = {"2022": manifest["files"][2022]} + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + (tmp_path / "t.xlsx").write_bytes(b"second") + + with pytest.raises(SourceArtifactRevisionError, match="entry '2022'"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + (tmp_path / "t.xlsx").write_bytes(b"first") + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + assert list(_manifest(output_dir)["files"]) == ["2022"] + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_vintage_recorded_under_both_key_spellings( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + (tmp_path / "t.xlsx").write_bytes(b"first") + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + manifest = _manifest(output_dir) + manifest["files"]["2022"] = dict(manifest["files"][2022]) + (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + original = (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="duplicate_vintage_key"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", output_dir, year=2022) + + assert reads == [] + assert (output_dir / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# publish-raw +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _hash_only_tree(tmp_path: Path) -> Path: + """Build a data root holding one hash-only registration.""" + root = tmp_path / "data" + _register(root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24") + return root + + +def test_publish_raw_refuses_hash_only_entries_without_reading_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.counts["hash_only_refused_count"] == 1 + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 0 + entry = report.entries[0] + assert entry.skipped == "hash_only_access:licensed" + assert entry.errors == ("hash_only_access_refuses_bytes:licensed",) + assert entry.r2_location is None + assert entry.upload is None + + +def test_publish_raw_skip_hash_only_reports_the_skip_without_failing( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, skip_hash_only=True) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["hash_only_refused_count"] == 1 + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 0 + assert report.entries[0].errors == () + assert report.entries[0].r2_location is None + + +def test_publish_raw_leaves_the_manifest_untouched(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + manifest_path = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" / "manifest.yaml" + original = manifest_path.read_bytes() + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + publish_source_artifacts(root, skip_hash_only=True) + + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == original + + +def test_publish_raw_reports_a_violation_even_when_skipping(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + (root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" / "adult.tab").write_bytes(b"leaked bytes") + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, skip_hash_only=True) + + # --skip-hash-only turns off the refusal, not the contract check. + assert not report.valid + assert "bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry" in report.entries[0].errors + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("skip_hash_only", [False, True]) +def test_publish_raw_never_uploads_a_hash_only_file_through_a_public_alias( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, skip_hash_only +): + # Finding 1: a hand-edited public alias of the licensed entry must not + # carry its bytes to the bucket; the manifest is refused whole. + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + package = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + (package / "adult.tab").write_bytes(b"leaked licensed bytes") + manifest = _manifest(package) + manifest["files"][2023].append( + { + **_public_release_entry(filename="./adult.tab"), + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(b"leaked licensed bytes").hexdigest(), + } + ) + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False)) + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, skip_hash_only=skip_hash_only) + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries == () + assert any("filename_collision:adult.tab" in error for error in report.errors) + assert any("non_canonical_filename:./adult.tab" in error for error in report.errors) + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_publish_raw_uploads_a_staged_release_and_never_the_tree(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + output_dir = tmp_path / "data" / "census" / "acs_pums_2022_1yr" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output_dir, staging_dir=staging) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "data", staging_dir=staging) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 1 + assert uploads[0][1].startswith(str(staging)) + assert ( + _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022][0]["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] + == (uploads[0][0]) + ) + + (output_dir / "csv_hus.zip").write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + report = publish_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "data", staging_dir=staging) + assert not report.valid + assert "bytes_present_for_microdata_release_entry" in report.entries[0].errors + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# inventory-artifacts +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_inventory_accepts_a_hash_only_entry_with_no_local_file(tmp_path): + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(root) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["hash_only_count"] == 1 + assert report.counts["missing_count"] == 0 + entry = report.entries[0] + assert entry.valid + assert entry.exists is False + assert entry.hash_only is True + assert entry.access == "licensed" + assert entry.licence == "UK Data Service End User Licence" + assert entry.sha256_expected == FIXTURE_SHA + assert entry.sha256_actual is None + # The size is the publisher's, recorded rather than measured. + assert entry.size_bytes == 35323384 + + +def test_inventory_flags_a_hash_only_entry_whose_bytes_are_present(tmp_path): + root = _hash_only_tree(tmp_path) + (root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" / "adult.tab").write_bytes(b"leaked bytes") + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(root) + + assert not report.valid + assert "bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry" in report.entries[0].errors + + +def test_inventory_rejects_a_list_entry_outside_a_microdata_release(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "tables" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-tables", + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": {2023: [{"filename": "a.ods", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}]}, + } + ) + ) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "data") + + assert not report.valid + assert report.entries[0].errors == ( + "list_file_spec_requires_microdata_release_kind", + ) + + +def test_inventory_reports_manifest_level_defects(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "tables" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-tables", + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": { + 2023: {"filename": "../a.ods", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + "2023": {"filename": "b.ods", "sha256": FIXTURE_SHA}, + }, + } + ) + ) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(tmp_path / "data") + + assert not report.valid + assert any("duplicate_vintage_key:2023" in error for error in report.errors) + # The shared loader refuses the whole document before entry/path inspection. + assert report.entries == () + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Source packages never parse a microdata release or a hash-only entry +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_source_artifact_spec_refuses_to_parse_a_registered_release(): + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey 2023-24", + resource_package="db", + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs_2023_24", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError, match="registers a"): + spec.assert_parseable_manifest() + with pytest.raises(MicrodataReleaseNotParseableError): + spec._artifact_content(2023) + + +def test_year_mapping_refuses_a_multi_file_vintage_and_both_key_spellings(): + from chronicle.source_package import _year_mapping + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="list of 2 entries"): + _year_mapping( + {2023: [{"filename": "adult.tab"}, {"filename": "child.tab"}]}, 2023 + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="both keys"): + _year_mapping({2023: {"filename": "a"}, "2023": {"filename": "b"}}, 2023) + assert _year_mapping({"2023": {"filename": "a"}}, 2023) == {"filename": "a"} + + +def test_validate_package_reports_a_microdata_release_carve_out(tmp_path): + package_dir = tmp_path / "frs_2023_24" + package_dir.mkdir() + (package_dir / "source_package.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "schema_version": "ledger.source_package.v1", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24-parse-attempt", + "label": "Attempt to parse a registered microdata release", + "artifact": { + "source_name": "dwp", + "source_table": "Family Resources Survey 2023-24", + "resource_package": "db", + "resource_directory": "data/dwp/frs_2023_24", + "manifest": "manifest.yaml", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "extracted_at": "2026-09-02", + "extraction_method": "none", + "parser": "delimited_text_full_rows", + "artifact_year": 2023, + }, + "record_sets": [], + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + + report = validate_source_package(package_dir, year=2023) + + assert not report.valid + assert "microdata_release_not_parseable" in {issue.code for issue in report.errors} + + +# Finding 2: the byte reader refuses a hash-only entry under any manifest kind. + +LICENSED_BYTES = b"sernum\tage\n1\t45\n2\t31\n" + + +class _UnreadableArtifactPath: + """Bytes sit in the package tree; a refusal must not read them.""" + + def read_bytes(self) -> bytes: + raise AssertionError("a hash-only entry's bytes must not be read") + + +def _isolated_reader(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> Path: + cache_root = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache_root)) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", + lambda _url: (_ for _ in ()).throw( + AssertionError("a hash-only entry must never be fetched") + ), + ) + return cache_root + + +def _licensed_table_spec( + tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, *, kind: str | None, access: str +) -> tuple[SourceArtifactSpec, Path]: + """A publisher-table package whose single entry is hash-only. + + The resource package is a namespace package on ``sys.path`` with a unique + name, so ``importlib.resources.files`` resolves it exactly as it resolves + the repository's ``db`` package. + """ + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + manifest: dict = {"source_id": "dwp", "package_id": "dwp-frs"} + if kind is not None: + manifest["kind"] = kind + entry = _attested_entry( + access=access, + sha256=hashlib.sha256(LICENSED_BYTES).hexdigest(), + source_url="https://ukdataservice.example/adult.tab", + ) + manifest["files"] = {2023: entry} + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump(manifest, sort_keys=False) + ) + (resource_dir / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + monkeypatch.delitem(sys.modules, package_name, raising=False) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + return spec, resource_dir + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("access", ["licensed", "restricted"]) +def test_byte_reader_refuses_a_hash_only_entry_before_any_store( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, access +): + cache_root = _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + entry = _attested_entry(access=access, source_url="https://x.example/adult.tab") + cached = cache_root / FIXTURE_SHA / "adult.tab" + cached.parent.mkdir(parents=True) + cached.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match=f"access={access!r}"): + _read_source_artifact_content(_UnreadableArtifactPath(), entry) + + +def test_byte_reader_treats_an_unknown_access_class_as_unreadable( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + entry = _attested_entry(access="internal") + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="Unknown access class 'internal'"): + _read_source_artifact_content(_UnreadableArtifactPath(), entry) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind", ["publisher_table"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("access", ["licensed", "restricted"]) +def test_artifact_content_refuses_a_hash_only_mapping_entry( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, kind, access +): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + spec, _resource_dir = _licensed_table_spec( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, kind=kind, access=access + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="identity only"): + spec.assert_parseable(2023) + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError): + spec._artifact_content(2023) + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError): + spec.build_source_rows(2023) + + +def test_validate_package_reports_a_hash_only_entry_without_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + spec, _resource_dir = _licensed_table_spec( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, kind="publisher_table", access="licensed" + ) + package_dir = tmp_path / "package" + package_dir.mkdir() + (package_dir / "source_package.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "schema_version": "ledger.source_package.v1", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-parse-attempt", + "label": "Attempt to parse a hash-only table entry", + "artifact": { + "source_name": spec.source_name, + "source_table": spec.source_table, + "resource_package": spec.resource_package, + "resource_directory": spec.resource_directory, + "manifest": "manifest.yaml", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "extracted_at": "2026-09-02", + "extraction_method": "none", + "parser": "delimited_text_full_rows", + "delimiter": "\t", + "artifact_year": 2023, + }, + "record_sets": [], + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + + report = validate_source_package(package_dir, year=2023) + + assert not report.valid + assert [issue.code for issue in report.errors] == [ + "hash_only_artifact_not_parseable" + ] + + +def test_build_suite_refuses_a_hash_only_entry_before_touching_the_output( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + from chronicle.suite import build_source_suite + + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + spec, _resource_dir = _licensed_table_spec( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, kind="publisher_table", access="licensed" + ) + package_dir = tmp_path / "package" + package_dir.mkdir() + (package_dir / "source_package.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "schema_version": "ledger.source_package.v1", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-parse-attempt", + "label": "Attempt to build a hash-only table entry", + "artifact": { + "source_name": spec.source_name, + "source_table": spec.source_table, + "resource_package": spec.resource_package, + "resource_directory": spec.resource_directory, + "manifest": "manifest.yaml", + "vintage": "2023_24", + "extracted_at": "2026-09-02", + "extraction_method": "none", + "parser": "delimited_text_full_rows", + "delimiter": "\t", + "artifact_year": 2023, + }, + "record_sets": [], + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + output_dir = tmp_path / "suite" + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError): + build_source_suite(package_dir, output_dir, year=2023) + + assert not output_dir.exists() + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# CLI +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_cli_register_artifact_round_trips(tmp_path, capsys): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + + exit_code = harness_main( + [ + "register-artifact", + "--source-id", + "hmrc", + "--package-id", + "hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23", + "--year", + "2022", + "--out-dir", + str(output_dir), + "--filename", + "put2223uk.tab", + "--sha256", + FIXTURE_SHA, + "--size-bytes", + "141323762", + "--vintage", + "2022-23", + "--licence", + "UK Data Service End User Licence (study SN 9422)", + "--access", + "restricted", + "--doi", + "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9422-1", + "--hash-source", + "consumer_pin", + "--attested-by", + "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "--pinned-from-repository", + "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "--pinned-from-path", + "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json", + "--pinned-from-commit", + FIXTURE_COMMIT, + ] + ) + payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + + assert exit_code == 0 + assert payload["valid"] is True + assert payload["access"] == "restricted" + assert payload["hash_source"] == "consumer_pin" + assert payload["r2_location"] is None + assert payload["registration"] == ( + f"hmrc/hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23/2022/{FIXTURE_SHA}/put2223uk.tab" + ) + assert not (output_dir / "put2223uk.tab").exists() + entry = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2022][0] + assert entry["pinned_from"]["commit"] == FIXTURE_COMMIT + + +def test_cli_register_artifact_rejects_public_access(tmp_path): + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + harness_main( + [ + "register-artifact", + "--source-id", + "census_cps", + "--package-id", + "census-cps-asec-2023", + "--year", + "2023", + "--out-dir", + str(tmp_path / "pkg"), + "--filename", + "asecpub23csv.zip", + "--sha256", + FIXTURE_SHA, + "--vintage", + "2023", + "--licence", + "Public domain", + "--access", + "public", + "--hash-source", + "consumer_pin", + "--attested-by", + "x", + ] + ) + + +def test_cli_refusals_print_an_error_and_exit_1(tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + _register(output_dir) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + exit_code = harness_main( + [ + "fetch-artifact", + "--url", + "https://publisher.example/adult.tab", + "--source-id", + "dwp", + "--package-id", + "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "--year", + "2023", + "--out-dir", + str(output_dir), + ] + ) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + + assert exit_code == 1 + assert captured.out == "" + assert "Its bytes must not enter" in captured.err + assert reads == [] + + exit_code = harness_main( + [ + "register-artifact", + "--source-id", + "dwp", + "--package-id", + "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "--year", + "2023", + "--out-dir", + str(output_dir), + "--filename", + "adult.tab", + "--sha256", + OTHER_SHA, + "--vintage", + "2023_24", + "--licence", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + "--access", + "licensed", + "--doi", + "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2", + "--hash-source", + "consumer_pin", + "--attested-by", + "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "--pinned-from-repository", + "PolicyEngine/microcosm", + "--pinned-from-path", + "p", + "--pinned-from-commit", + FIXTURE_COMMIT, + ] + ) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert exit_code == 1 + assert "pass --allow-reissue" in captured.err + + +def test_cli_fetch_archives_a_release_with_the_reviewed_identity( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys +): + output_dir = tmp_path / "pkg" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + argv = [ + "fetch-artifact", + "--url", + "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/datasets/2023/march/asecpub23csv.zip", + "--source-id", + "census_cps", + "--package-id", + "census-cps-asec-2023", + "--year", + "2023", + "--out-dir", + str(output_dir), + "--publisher", + "U.S. Census Bureau", + "--vintage", + "2023 ASEC / 2022 income reference year", + "--access", + "public", + "--licence", + "US-Government-Work", + "--kind", + "microdata_release", + "--expected-sha256", + PUBLIC_SHA, + "--expected-size-bytes", + str(len(PUBLIC_BYTES)), + "--licence-evidence-issuer", + EVIDENCE["issuer"], + "--licence-evidence-scope", + EVIDENCE["scope"], + "--licence-evidence-url", + EVIDENCE["url"], + "--staging-dir", + str(staging), + "--upload-r2", + ] + + assert harness_main(argv) == 0 + payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + entry = _manifest(output_dir)["files"][2023][0] + + assert payload["valid"] is True + assert payload["sha256"] == PUBLIC_SHA + assert entry["filename"] == "asecpub23csv.zip" + assert entry["vintage"] == "2023 ASEC / 2022 income reference year" + assert entry["licence_evidence"]["sha256"] == PUBLIC_SHA + assert uploads[0][0].endswith("/asecpub23csv.zip") + + _serve(monkeypatch, b"a reissue") + assert harness_main(argv) == 1 + captured = capsys.readouterr() + assert PUBLIC_SHA in captured.err + assert captured.out == "" + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# The committed registrations +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#: Every committed hash-only pin, keyed by registration identity. Values are +#: (sha256, size_bytes, vintage, access, licence); the checksums are the +#: reviewed consumer pins and any change here is a change of identity. +GOLDEN_PINS: dict[tuple[str, str, int, str], tuple[str, int, str, str, str]] = { + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "accounts.tab"): ( + "c5e31932bfd06087f835d2c83c0984c85a93409bf5ef85b699cb0958abcba1ea", + 1807921, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "adult.tab"): ( + "e09f9647d03585c81a528636028b2ed495f8f1fbcf64c5e7b4fe521b67367e06", + 35323384, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "benefits.tab"): ( + "ff30d054cc659bcf23b44c492d98cfd701c0bfdb63e8e9aa9769b490ba9d636b", + 4460292, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "benunit.tab"): ( + "88946815eace8561516d5cbb442c27e319c1e90abc381fb2338f0126e3b9e05b", + 21213867, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "child.tab"): ( + "b5dc84fe8b002ee925e61fae23fed27b11537af9fb174f1d07d9cc1748b9702e", + 2913156, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "chldcare.tab"): ( + "566e0ebca1d5e2f3e424e556c91f4cb583d17dadfdfa59feb3841eda7e5976a3", + 273837, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "extchild.tab"): ( + "8d358d7ee66ee4a7ceab87b4f24fbbf21ac86dc038dc7831e51fb271f96a57ec", + 18677, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "househol.tab"): ( + "5fd26b8b675f33b3b30c9ac789a18da17de734790f77e00ded287d1c3a187b30", + 12387117, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "job.tab"): ( + "88b77ffe06865f029f713bb1d55ff12bdea8a1234de5bc293e72458fe64f3a74", + 10934873, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "maint.tab"): ( + "f2dc924eb5a51b0c357791693d15b431327dc39c6421011efb313d88bf839695", + 15440, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "mortgage.tab"): ( + "ce36b477d67837c469608a0d68f7ef269ac04758974235f1157d2f6b92cdbfdc", + 631783, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "oddjob.tab"): ( + "b4ba3dd3151f73a01422983c60514a3e38458ddfa4fb33ae4ed0326873406305", + 5165, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "penprov.tab"): ( + "ee001461c40306ec24b38b2881e1774121114266a2ee449d606cd0a811c37731", + 522313, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("dwp", "dwp-frs-2023-24", 2023, "pension.tab"): ( + "150d6fad1fce81254fb7aea1526fbb00b63d4027d6e2ac4c26bb90aea3127eb7", + 1225838, + "2023_24", + "licensed", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + ), + ("hmrc", "hmrc-spi-public-use-tape-2022-23", 2022, "put2223uk.tab"): ( + "5ef829461060c91a2a47be59ad541d9b519fc3976d66ca80d4920f711bb96f66", + 141323762, + "2022-23", + "restricted", + "UK Data Service End User Licence (study SN 9422)", + ), +} + +CONSUMER_PIN_COMMITS = { + "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/source_stages.json": ( + "2fb2e2f8a99c37725bd6e7a15ff4c2595c912b77" + ), + "packages/microcosm-build/src/microcosm/build/uk/hmrc_income_source_stages.json": ( + "de7451bd19ca46d2967e73cdf393908d29e72542" + ), +} + + +def _committed_entries(package: Path) -> list[tuple[dict, int, dict]]: + manifest = yaml.safe_load((package / "manifest.yaml").read_text()) + assert manifest["kind"] == "microdata_release" + return [ + (manifest, year, entry) + for year, entries in manifest["files"].items() + for entry in entries + ] + + +def test_committed_pins_match_the_golden_mapping_exactly(): + committed = { + (manifest["source_id"], manifest["package_id"], year, entry["filename"]): ( + entry["sha256"], + entry["size_bytes"], + entry["vintage"], + entry["access"], + entry["licence"], + ) + for package in (FRS_PACKAGE, SPI_PACKAGE) + for manifest, year, entry in _committed_entries(package) + } + + assert committed == GOLDEN_PINS + assert len(GOLDEN_PINS) == 15 + + +def test_committed_frs_registration_covers_every_pinned_tab(): + filenames = [entry["filename"] for _m, _y, entry in _committed_entries(FRS_PACKAGE)] + assert filenames == sorted( + key[3] for key in GOLDEN_PINS if key[1] == "dwp-frs-2023-24" + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("package", [FRS_PACKAGE, SPI_PACKAGE]) +def test_committed_registrations_are_consumer_pins_without_bytes(package): + entries = _committed_entries(package) + + assert entries + for _manifest_payload, _year, entry in entries: + assert entry["access"] in {"licensed", "restricted"} + assert entry["hash_source"] == "consumer_pin" + assert entry["attested_by"] == "PolicyEngine/microcosm" + assert entry["pinned_from"]["repository"] == "PolicyEngine/microcosm" + assert ( + entry["pinned_from"]["commit"] + == (CONSUMER_PIN_COMMITS[entry["pinned_from"]["path"]]) + ) + assert "verified_at" not in entry + assert "storage" not in entry + # No bytes accompany a hash-only registration. + assert not (package / entry["filename"]).exists() + assert sorted(path.name for path in package.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] + + +def test_committed_registrations_pass_inventory_with_the_golden_identities(): + report = inventory_source_artifacts(REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data") + hash_only = [entry for entry in report.entries if entry.hash_only] + + assert report.valid + assert all(entry.valid and not entry.exists for entry in hash_only) + assert all(entry.r2 is None for entry in hash_only) + identities = { + ( + yaml.safe_load(Path(entry.manifest_path).read_text())["source_id"], + yaml.safe_load(Path(entry.manifest_path).read_text())["package_id"], + int(entry.year), + entry.filename, + ): (entry.sha256_expected, entry.size_bytes) + for entry in hash_only + } + assert identities == { + key: (value[0], value[1]) for key, value in GOLDEN_PINS.items() + } + + +def test_no_committed_registration_computes_an_r2_key(): + for package in (FRS_PACKAGE, SPI_PACKAGE): + text = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_text() + assert "storage:" not in text + assert "ledger-raw" not in text + assert "r2://" not in text + + +def test_registration_hashes_are_not_hashes_of_anything_chronicle_holds(): + # A registered checksum identifies publisher bytes Chronicle never sees; + # it must never coincide with the hash of the manifest that records it. + for package in (FRS_PACKAGE, SPI_PACKAGE): + manifest_hash = hashlib.sha256( + (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + ).hexdigest() + assert manifest_hash not in (package / "manifest.yaml").read_text() + + +def _public_manifest_with_archived_revision() -> dict: + """A renamed public release keeps the old immutable object's identity.""" + current_key = f"raw/census_cps/census-cps-asec-2023/2023/{PUBLIC_SHA}/current.zip" + archived_key = ( + f"raw/census_cps/census-cps-asec-2023/2023/{FIXTURE_SHA}/archived.tab" + ) + return { + "kind": "microdata_release", + "source_id": "census_cps", + "package_id": "census-cps-asec-2023", + "files": { + 2023: [ + _public_release_entry( + filename="current.zip", + storage={ + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{current_key}", + }, + "previous_r2": [ + { + "provider": "r2", + "key": archived_key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{archived_key}", + } + ], + }, + ) + ] + }, + } + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("manifest_scope", ["selected", "sibling"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("filename", "sha256"), + [("licensed-alias.tab", FIXTURE_SHA), ("ARCHIVED.TAB", OTHER_SHA)], + ids=["archived-digest", "archived-filename"], +) +def test_registration_refuses_archived_revision_alias_before_mutation( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, manifest_scope, filename, sha256 +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + public_manifest = _public_manifest_with_archived_revision() + selected = package / "manifest.yaml" + if manifest_scope == "selected": + selected.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(public_manifest, sort_keys=False)) + else: + selected.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({**public_manifest, "files": {}}, sort_keys=False) + ) + (package / "manifest_public.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump(public_manifest, sort_keys=False) + ) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_mutation(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("archived revision alias reached a filesystem mutation") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "mkdir", unexpected_mutation) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._registration_lock", unexpected_mutation + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._atomic_replace_manifest", unexpected_mutation + ) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="records the R2 object"): + _register( + package, + source_id="census_cps", + package_id="census-cps-asec-2023", + filename=filename, + sha256=sha256, + ) + + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("manifest_scope", ["selected", "sibling"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("filename", "sha256", "expected_error"), + [ + ( + "licensed-alias.tab", + FIXTURE_SHA, + f"archived_sha256_collision:{FIXTURE_SHA}", + ), + ("ARCHIVED.TAB", OTHER_SHA, "archived_filename_collision:archived.tab"), + ], + ids=["archived-digest", "archived-filename"], +) +def test_package_validation_refuses_hash_only_archived_revision_alias( + manifest_scope, filename, sha256, expected_error +): + from chronicle.registration import validate_package_directory + + public_manifest = _public_manifest_with_archived_revision() + licensed_entry = _attested_entry(filename=filename, sha256=sha256) + if manifest_scope == "selected": + public_manifest["files"][2023].append(licensed_entry) + manifests = {"manifest.yaml": public_manifest} + else: + manifests = { + "manifest_public.yaml": public_manifest, + "manifest.yaml": { + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {2023: [licensed_entry]}, + }, + } + + assert expected_error in validate_package_directory(manifests) + + +def _registration_sibling_collision(package: Path, collision: str) -> str: + """Write valid siblings whose disagreement is unrelated to the new entry.""" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "microdata_release", + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "files": {}, + } + ) + ) + if collision.startswith("archived-"): + first = _public_manifest_with_archived_revision() + filename = ( + "archived-alias.tab" if collision == "archived-digest" else "ARCHIVED.TAB" + ) + sha256 = FIXTURE_SHA if collision == "archived-digest" else OTHER_SHA + second = { + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {2023: [_attested_entry(filename=filename, sha256=sha256)]}, + } + expected_error = ( + f"archived_sha256_collision:{FIXTURE_SHA}" + if collision == "archived-digest" + else "archived_filename_collision:archived.tab" + ) + else: + manifests = [] + for digest in (FIXTURE_SHA, OTHER_SHA): + entry = {"filename": "table.csv"} + if collision == "r2-digest": + key = f"raw/dwp/dwp-tables/2023/{digest}/table.csv" + entry["storage"] = { + "r2": {"provider": "r2", "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{key}"} + } + else: + entry["sha256"] = digest + manifests.append({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2023: entry}}) + first, second = manifests + expected_error = "filename_collision_across_manifests:table.csv" + for name, manifest in (("first", first), ("second", second)): + (package / f"manifest_{name}.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(manifest)) + return expected_error + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "collision", + ["declared-digest", "r2-digest", "archived-digest", "archived-filename"], +) +def test_registration_refuses_unrelated_sibling_collision_before_mutation( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, collision +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + expected_error = _registration_sibling_collision(package, collision) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + lock_path = _registration_lock_path(package) + assert not lock_path.exists() + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_mutation(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("existing sibling collision reached a filesystem mutation") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "mkdir", unexpected_mutation) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._registration_lock", unexpected_mutation + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._atomic_replace_manifest", unexpected_mutation + ) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match=expected_error): + _register(package, filename="unrelated.tab", sha256="c" * 64) + + assert not lock_path.exists() + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before + + +def test_registration_rechecks_sibling_collision_under_lock_before_replacement( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + expected_error = _registration_sibling_collision(package, "declared-digest") + sibling = package / "manifest_second.yaml" + sibling_bytes = sibling.read_bytes() + sibling.unlink() + original = (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + lock_entries = [] + + @contextmanager + def collision_while_acquiring_lock(output): + assert output == package + lock_entries.append(output) + sibling.write_bytes(sibling_bytes) + yield + + def unexpected_replacement(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("sibling collision under the lock reached manifest replacement") + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._registration_lock", collision_while_acquiring_lock + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._atomic_replace_manifest", unexpected_replacement + ) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match=expected_error): + _register(package, filename="unrelated.tab", sha256="c" * 64) + + assert lock_entries == [package] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + assert sibling.read_bytes() == sibling_bytes + + +def _registration_recorded_sibling(defect: str | None = None) -> tuple[dict, str]: + """A sibling whose effective owners and R2 locators must all be valid.""" + + def entry(year, digest=FIXTURE_SHA, filename="table.csv"): + key = f"raw/dwp/dwp-tables/{year}/{digest}/{filename}" + return { + "filename": filename, + "storage": { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{key}", + } + }, + } + + first = entry(2023) + files = {2023: first} + expected_error = "" + if defect == "effective-owner": + files[2024] = entry(2024, OTHER_SHA) + expected_error = "identify different bytes" + elif defect == "malformed-locator": + first["storage"]["r2"]["uri"] = "not-an-r2-locator" + expected_error = "storage.r2" + elif defect == "checksum-mismatch": + first["sha256"] = OTHER_SHA + expected_error = "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch" + elif defect == "filename-mismatch": + first["filename"] = "renamed.csv" + expected_error = "recorded_r2_identity_mismatch" + elif defect == "malformed-archived-locator": + first["storage"]["previous_r2"] = [ + {"provider": "r2", "uri": "not-an-r2-locator"} + ] + expected_error = "storage.previous_r2" + else: + assert defect is None + files[2024] = entry(2024) + first["storage"]["previous_r2"] = [ + entry(2023, OTHER_SHA, "archived.csv")["storage"]["r2"] + ] + return { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-tables", + "files": files, + }, expected_error + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "defect", + [ + "effective-owner", + "malformed-locator", + "checksum-mismatch", + "filename-mismatch", + "malformed-archived-locator", + ], +) +def test_registration_refuses_invalid_recorded_sibling_before_mutation( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, defect +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "microdata_release", "files": {}}) + ) + sibling, expected_error = _registration_recorded_sibling(defect) + (package / "manifest_tables.yaml").write_text(yaml.safe_dump(sibling)) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} + lock_path = _registration_lock_path(package) + assert not lock_path.exists() + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + def unexpected_mutation(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("invalid recorded sibling reached a filesystem mutation") + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "mkdir", unexpected_mutation) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._registration_lock", unexpected_mutation + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._atomic_replace_manifest", unexpected_mutation + ) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match=expected_error): + _register(package, filename="unrelated.tab", sha256="c" * 64) + + assert not lock_path.exists() + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in package.iterdir()} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "defect", + [ + "effective-owner", + "malformed-locator", + "checksum-mismatch", + "filename-mismatch", + "malformed-archived-locator", + ], +) +def test_registration_rechecks_recorded_sibling_under_lock_before_replacement( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, defect +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + selected = package / "manifest.yaml" + selected.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "microdata_release", "files": {}})) + original = selected.read_bytes() + sibling_path = package / "manifest_tables.yaml" + valid_sibling, _ = _registration_recorded_sibling() + sibling_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(valid_sibling)) + invalid_sibling, expected_error = _registration_recorded_sibling(defect) + invalid_document = yaml.safe_dump(invalid_sibling) + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + lock_entries = [] + + @contextmanager + def invalidation_while_acquiring_lock(output): + assert output == package + lock_entries.append(output) + sibling_path.write_text(invalid_document) + yield + + def unexpected_replacement(*args, **kwargs): + pytest.fail("invalid recorded sibling under lock reached replacement") + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._registration_lock", invalidation_while_acquiring_lock + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.registration._atomic_replace_manifest", unexpected_replacement + ) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match=expected_error): + _register(package, filename="unrelated.tab", sha256="c" * 64) + + assert lock_entries == [package] + assert selected.read_bytes() == original + assert sibling_path.read_text() == invalid_document + assert not _registration_lock_path(package).exists() + assert {path.name for path in package.iterdir()} == { + "manifest.yaml", + "manifest_tables.yaml", + } + + +def test_registration_accepts_agreeing_recorded_sibling_owners_and_history( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "microdata_release", "files": {}}) + ) + sibling, _ = _registration_recorded_sibling() + sibling_path = package / "manifest_tables.yaml" + sibling_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(sibling)) + original = sibling_path.read_bytes() + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = _register(package, filename="unrelated.tab", sha256="c" * 64) + + assert report.filename == "unrelated.tab" + assert sibling_path.read_bytes() == original + + +def test_registration_does_not_read_unidentified_sibling_owner_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + package.mkdir() + (package / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "microdata_release", "files": {}}) + ) + content = b"public publisher table" + table_path = package / "table.csv" + table_path.write_bytes(content) + digest = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + sibling, _ = _registration_recorded_sibling() + locator = sibling["files"][2023]["storage"]["r2"] + for field in ("key", "uri"): + locator[field] = locator[field].replace(FIXTURE_SHA, digest) + sibling["files"][2024] = {"filename": "table.csv"} + sibling_path = package / "manifest_tables.yaml" + sibling_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(sibling)) + original = sibling_path.read_bytes() + original_read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + def refuse_artifact_read(path): + if path == table_path: + pytest.fail("hash-only registration read a sibling artifact's bytes") + return original_read_bytes(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", refuse_artifact_read) + report = _register(package, filename="unrelated.tab", sha256="c" * 64) + + assert report.filename == "unrelated.tab" + assert sibling_path.read_bytes() == original + assert original_read_bytes(table_path) == content diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_staging.py b/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_staging.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c64e87d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_microdata_staging.py @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +"""Public microdata staging stays outside repositories and package trees.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from contextlib import nullcontext +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + ArtifactCommandResult, + microdata_staging_path, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.registration import ManifestAccessError +from tests.test_chronicle_microdata_registration import ( + PUBLIC_BYTES, + PUBLIC_SHA, + _fetch_release, + _record_uploads, + _serve, +) + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] + + +@pytest.fixture( + params=[ + "output-directory", + "nested-output-directory", + "repository-directory", + "repository-data-directory", + "another-package-directory", + "another-package-yml", + "another-named-package", + "another-git-checkout", + "another-git-worktree", + "bare-git-repository", + "symlink-component", + "symlink-before-parent-component", + "symlink-identity-component", + "symlink-filename-component", + ], +) +def unsafe_microdata_staging(tmp_path, request): + destination = request.param + output = tmp_path / "package" + staging = tmp_path / "staging" + if destination == "output-directory": + staging = output + elif destination == "nested-output-directory": + staging = output / "nested" / "staging" + elif destination == "repository-directory": + staging = REPO_ROOT / ".chronicle-test-staging-refusal" / "nested" + elif destination == "repository-data-directory": + staging = REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data" / ".chronicle-test-staging-refusal" + elif destination in { + "another-package-directory", + "another-package-yml", + "another-named-package", + }: + package = tmp_path / "another-package" + package.mkdir() + manifest_name = { + "another-package-directory": "manifest.yaml", + "another-package-yml": "Manifest.yml", + "another-named-package": "manifest_public.YAML", + }[destination] + (package / manifest_name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {}}) + ) + staging = package / "nested" / "staging" + elif destination in { + "another-git-checkout", + "another-git-worktree", + "bare-git-repository", + }: + repository = tmp_path / "another-repository" + repository.mkdir() + if destination == "another-git-checkout": + (repository / ".git").mkdir() + elif destination == "another-git-worktree": + (repository / ".git").write_text("gitdir: /elsewhere/worktrees/example\n") + else: + (repository / "HEAD").write_text("ref: refs/heads/main\n") + (repository / "objects").mkdir() + (repository / "refs").mkdir() + staging = repository / "nested" / "staging" + else: + outside = tmp_path / "outside" / "child" + outside.mkdir(parents=True) + if destination == "symlink-identity-component": + staging.mkdir() + (staging / "census_acs").symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True) + elif destination == "symlink-filename-component": + identity = ( + staging + / "census_acs" + / "census-acs-pums-2022-1yr" + / "2022" + / PUBLIC_SHA + ) + identity.mkdir(parents=True) + (identity / "csv_hus.zip").symlink_to(outside / "missing.zip") + else: + alias = tmp_path / "alias" + alias.symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True) + staging = ( + alias / ".." / "staging" + if destination == "symlink-before-parent-component" + else alias / "staging" + ) + + return output, staging + + +def test_fetch_refuses_unsafe_microdata_staging_before_publisher_read( + monkeypatch, unsafe_microdata_staging +): + output, staging = unsafe_microdata_staging + effects = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._registration_lock", + lambda path: effects.append(("lock", path)) or nullcontext(), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._read_artifact", + lambda url: ( + effects.append(("publisher_read", url)) or (PUBLIC_BYTES, "csv_hus.zip") + ), + ) + # Record every mutation instead of putting release bytes anywhere, even + # while this regression runs against the vulnerable implementation. + monkeypatch.setattr( + Path, "mkdir", lambda path, **kwargs: effects.append(("mkdir", path)) + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + Path, + "write_bytes", + lambda path, content: effects.append(("write_bytes", path)), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upsert_manifest", + lambda path, **kwargs: effects.append(("manifest_write", path)), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", + lambda location, path, **kwargs: ( + effects.append(("upload", path)) + or ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("stub",), returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ) + ), + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="[Ss]taging"): + _fetch_release(output, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + + assert effects == [] + + +def test_publish_refuses_unsafe_microdata_staging_before_read_or_upload( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, unsafe_microdata_staging +): + output, staging = unsafe_microdata_staging + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + _fetch_release(output, staging_dir=tmp_path / "safe-staging") + manifest_path = output / "manifest.yaml" + before = manifest_path.read_bytes() + staged = microdata_staging_path( + staging_dir=staging, + source_id="census_acs", + package_id="census-acs-pums-2022-1yr", + year=2022, + sha256=PUBLIC_SHA, + filename="csv_hus.zip", + ) + effects = [] + original_is_file = Path.is_file + original_read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + # Simulate existing staged bytes without writing into any unsafe tree. + monkeypatch.setattr( + Path, "is_file", lambda path: path == staged or original_is_file(path) + ) + + def read_bytes(path): + if path == staged: + effects.append(("artifact_read", path)) + return PUBLIC_BYTES + return original_read_bytes(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", read_bytes) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._registration_lock", + lambda path: effects.append(("lock", path)) or nullcontext(), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts._upload_r2_object", + lambda location, path, **kwargs: ( + effects.append(("upload", path)) + or ArtifactCommandResult( + command=("stub",), returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ) + ), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + Path, + "write_text", + lambda path, content, **kwargs: effects.append(("manifest_write", path)), + ) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(output, staging_dir=staging) + + assert effects == [], report + assert not report.valid + assert any( + ("staging" in error.lower() or "artifact_path_is_symlink" in error) + for error in ( + *report.errors, + *(e for entry in report.entries for e in entry.errors), + ) + ) + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("spelling", ["absolute", "relative", "parent-component"]) +def test_fetch_accepts_external_microdata_staging(tmp_path, monkeypatch, spelling): + output = tmp_path / "package" + external = tmp_path / "package-external" + staging = external + if spelling == "relative": + monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path) + staging = Path("package-external") + elif spelling == "parent-component": + (tmp_path / "existing").mkdir() + staging = tmp_path / "existing" / ".." / "package-external" + _serve(monkeypatch, PUBLIC_BYTES) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = _fetch_release(output, staging_dir=staging, upload_r2=True) + + assert report.valid + staged = Path(report.local_path) + assert staged.is_relative_to(external) + assert staged.read_bytes() == PUBLIC_BYTES + assert uploads == [(report.r2_location.uri, str(staged))] + assert sorted(path.name for path in output.iterdir()) == ["manifest.yaml"] diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_mirror.py b/tests/test_chronicle_mirror.py index 787429c1..b9026cae 100644 --- a/tests/test_chronicle_mirror.py +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_mirror.py @@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations import json +from pathlib import Path +import re +import pytest + +from chronicle.env import ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning, DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA from chronicle.harness import main as harness_main from chronicle.mirror import ( LEDGER_MIRROR_TABLES, @@ -18,7 +23,7 @@ def test_export_chronicle_db_tables_writes_jsonl_and_manifest(tmp_path): - db_path = tmp_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = tmp_path / "chronicle.db" output_dir = tmp_path / "mirror" build_chronicle_db( build_soi_table_1_1_facts(2023), @@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ def test_export_chronicle_db_tables_writes_jsonl_and_manifest(tmp_path): def test_export_chronicle_db_tables_orders_rows_deterministically(tmp_path): - db_path = tmp_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = tmp_path / "chronicle.db" first_output_dir = tmp_path / "mirror-first" second_output_dir = tmp_path / "mirror-second" build_chronicle_db( @@ -72,7 +77,7 @@ def test_export_chronicle_db_tables_orders_rows_deterministically(tmp_path): def test_export_db_tables_cli_emits_manifest_summary(tmp_path, capsys): - db_path = tmp_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = tmp_path / "chronicle.db" output_dir = tmp_path / "mirror" build_chronicle_db( build_soi_table_1_1_facts(2023), @@ -99,7 +104,7 @@ def test_export_db_tables_cli_emits_manifest_summary(tmp_path, capsys): def test_load_supabase_mirror_dry_run_counts_exported_rows(tmp_path): - db_path = tmp_path / "ledger.db" + db_path = tmp_path / "chronicle.db" output_dir = tmp_path / "mirror" build_chronicle_db( build_soi_table_1_1_facts(2023), @@ -189,6 +194,155 @@ def test_load_supabase_mirror_cli_dry_run(tmp_path, capsys): assert payload["table_count"] == len(LEDGER_MIRROR_TABLES) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Schema configuration +# +# The mirror loader is the primary writer into the hosted schema, so it is the +# call site CHRONICLE_SCHEMA has to reach (PolicyEngine/chronicle#143, +# mechanism 3). It defaulted to the literal "ledger" while only the read-side +# client honored the renamed variable, which would have sent a rehearsal load +# into production the moment an operator set it. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _empty_mirror(tmp_path): + mirror_dir = tmp_path / "mirror" + mirror_dir.mkdir() + for table in LEDGER_MIRROR_TABLES: + (mirror_dir / f"{table}.jsonl").write_text("") + return mirror_dir + + +def _one_build_artifact(tmp_path): + path = tmp_path / "build_artifacts.jsonl" + path.write_text( + json.dumps( + { + "build_artifact_key": "ledger.build_artifact.v1:test", + "build_id": "ledger.build.v1:test", + "artifact_kind": "json", + "artifact_name": "reports/build_summary.json", + "sha256": "abc", + "size_bytes": 3, + "r2_bucket": "ledger-derived", + "r2_key": "derived/test", + "r2_uri": "r2://ledger-derived/derived/test", + }, + sort_keys=True, + ) + + "\n" + ) + return path + + +def _load_into_fake_client(tmp_path, **kwargs): + client = _FakeSupabaseClient() + report = load_supabase_mirror( + _empty_mirror(tmp_path), + table_paths={"build_artifacts": _one_build_artifact(tmp_path)}, + client=client, + **kwargs, + ) + return report, client + + +def test_load_supabase_mirror_defaults_to_the_ledger_schema(tmp_path): + report, client = _load_into_fake_client(tmp_path) + + assert report.schema == "ledger" + assert [upsert[0] for upsert in client.upserts] == ["ledger"] + + +def test_load_supabase_mirror_writes_to_the_chronicle_schema(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + """The renamed variable configures the writer, not just the reader.""" + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "chronicle_probe") + + report, client = _load_into_fake_client(tmp_path) + + assert report.schema == "chronicle_probe" + assert [upsert[0] for upsert in client.upserts] == ["chronicle_probe"] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", ["POLICYENGINE_LEDGER_SCHEMA", "LEDGER_SCHEMA"]) +def test_load_supabase_mirror_honors_a_ledger_era_schema_name( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, name +): + monkeypatch.setenv(name, "legacy_probe") + + with pytest.warns(ChronicleEnvDeprecationWarning): + report, client = _load_into_fake_client(tmp_path) + + assert report.schema == "legacy_probe" + assert [upsert[0] for upsert in client.upserts] == ["legacy_probe"] + + +def test_an_explicit_schema_still_wins_over_the_environment(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "chronicle_probe") + + report, client = _load_into_fake_client(tmp_path, schema="explicit_probe") + + assert report.schema == "explicit_probe" + assert [upsert[0] for upsert in client.upserts] == ["explicit_probe"] + + +def test_load_supabase_mirror_cli_writes_to_the_configured_schema( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, capsys +): + """The CLI resolves the same way when no --schema is supplied.""" + client = _FakeSupabaseClient() + monkeypatch.setattr("chronicle.mirror._get_supabase_client", lambda: client) + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "chronicle_probe") + argv = [ + "load-supabase-mirror", + "--dir", + str(_empty_mirror(tmp_path)), + "--build-artifacts", + str(_one_build_artifact(tmp_path)), + ] + + exit_code = harness_main(argv) + payload = json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) + + assert exit_code == 0 + assert payload["schema"] == "chronicle_probe" + assert [upsert[0] for upsert in client.upserts] == ["chronicle_probe"] + + assert harness_main([*argv, "--schema", "explicit_probe"]) == 0 + assert json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out)["schema"] == "explicit_probe" + assert [upsert[0] for upsert in client.upserts] == [ + "chronicle_probe", + "explicit_probe", + ] + + +def _readme_supabase_cutover_section(): + readme = (Path(__file__).parents[1] / "README.md").read_text() + return readme[ + readme.index("To prepare the deterministic SQLite artifact") : readme.index( + "Chronicle settings are read" + ) + ] + + +def test_readme_supabase_cutover_documents_the_runtime_schema_default(): + section = _readme_supabase_cutover_section() + + assert f"writes to `{DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA}`" in section + assert "With no schema environment override and no `--schema`" in section + assert "`CHRONICLE_SCHEMA=chronicle`" in section + assert "`--schema chronicle`" in section + + +def test_readme_supabase_cutover_only_names_checked_in_migrations(): + section = _readme_supabase_cutover_section() + repository = Path(__file__).parents[1] + migration_paths = re.findall(r"`([^`\n]+[.]sql)`", section) + missing = [path for path in migration_paths if not (repository / path).is_file()] + + assert "create and apply a Supabase/Postgres migration" in section + assert missing == [] + + class _FakeSupabaseClient: def __init__(self): self.upserts = [] diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_namespace.py b/tests/test_chronicle_namespace.py index 9b0ffd41..a8ce2b63 100644 --- a/tests/test_chronicle_namespace.py +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_namespace.py @@ -8,11 +8,7 @@ query_targets, ) from db.schema import Target as DbTarget -from db.supabase_client import ( - LEDGER_SCHEMA, - TARGETS_SCHEMA, - query_targets as db_query_targets, -) +from db.supabase_client import query_targets as db_query_targets def test_chronicle_targets_reexport_schema_objects(): @@ -29,8 +25,43 @@ def test_chronicle_client_reexports_supabase_client(): def test_chronicle_supabase_schema_boundaries_are_defaulted(): - assert LEDGER_SCHEMA == "ledger" - assert TARGETS_SCHEMA == "targets" + """The schema names resolve per call, so this reads the cleared window. + + ``db.supabase_client`` is imported at collection, before any fixture runs. + Resolving the schema there — as an import-time constant — would bind an + operator's ``CHRONICLE_SCHEMA`` (or a ledger-era name, warning as it went) + into the module for the whole session, and no fixture could take it back. + Reading at call time is what makes this a test of the defaults rather than + of the shell. + """ + from db import supabase_client + + assert supabase_client.chronicle_schema() == "ledger" + assert supabase_client.targets_schema() == "targets" + + +def test_chronicle_supabase_schema_compatibility_aliases_are_defaulted(): + """The shipped module keeps its pre-rename import surface.""" + from chronicle.env import DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA + from db.supabase_client import ( + DEFAULT_TARGETS_SCHEMA, + LEDGER_SCHEMA, + TARGETS_SCHEMA, + ) + + assert LEDGER_SCHEMA == DEFAULT_CHRONICLE_SCHEMA == "ledger" + assert TARGETS_SCHEMA == DEFAULT_TARGETS_SCHEMA == "targets" + + +def test_chronicle_supabase_schema_follows_the_environment(monkeypatch): + """The renamed variable reaches the client after it has been imported.""" + from db import supabase_client + + monkeypatch.setenv("CHRONICLE_SCHEMA", "chronicle_probe") + monkeypatch.setenv("POLICYENGINE_TARGETS_SCHEMA", "targets_probe") + + assert supabase_client.chronicle_schema() == "chronicle_probe" + assert supabase_client.targets_schema() == "targets_probe" def test_chronicle_normalization_exports_helpers(): diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_package_directory.py b/tests/test_chronicle_package_directory.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bd6218f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_package_directory.py @@ -0,0 +1,1391 @@ +"""The byte boundary spans every manifest a package directory keeps. + +A publisher directory may keep several manifests -- ``manifest.yaml`` beside +``manifest_.yaml`` files -- and ``fetch-artifact --manifest`` (PR +#226) selects which one a fetch records into. The boundary is the file in the +directory, not the manifest: a name or a digest registered hash-only in any +manifest there must not be fetched, published, parsed, or reclassified +through another. An artifact may not be named like a manifest, a fetch may +not record into a manifest that identifies another package, and +``register-artifact`` addresses a named manifest exactly as a fetch does. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +from pathlib import Path +import uuid + +import pytest +import yaml + +from chronicle.artifacts import ( + AmbiguousManifestError, + _package_manifests, + inventory_source_artifacts, + publish_source_artifacts, +) +from chronicle.harness import main as harness_main +from chronicle.registration import ( + ArtifactFilenameError, + HashOnlyRegistrationError, + ManifestAccessError, + is_manifest_filename, + register_hash_only_artifact, + validate_file_entry, + validate_package_directory, +) +from chronicle.source_package import SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, SourceArtifactSpec +from tests.test_chronicle_microdata_registration import ( + ATTESTED, + EVIDENCE, + FIXTURE_SHA, + LICENSED_BYTES, + PUBLIC_BYTES, + PUBLIC_SHA, + _attested_entry, + _fetch_release, + _fetch_table, + _forbid_uploads, + _isolated_reader, + _record_uploads, + _refuse_read, + _register, + _serve, +) + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +LICENSED_SHA = hashlib.sha256(LICENSED_BYTES).hexdigest() + + +def _write(path: Path, payload: dict) -> bytes: + path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False)) + return path.read_bytes() + + +def _table_manifest(**fields: object) -> dict: + payload = { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": {}, + } + payload.update(fields) + return payload + + +def _public_table_entry(filename: str, content: bytes) -> dict: + return { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": f"https://publisher.example/{filename}", + "access": "public", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(), + "size_bytes": len(content), + } + + +def _hash_only_manifest(**entry: object) -> dict: + return { + "source_id": "dwp", + "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "kind": "microdata_release", + "files": {2023: [_attested_entry(**entry)]}, + } + + +def _snapshot(package: Path) -> dict[str, bytes]: + return {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in sorted(package.iterdir())} + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# fetch-artifact +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("target", "sibling"), + [ + ("manifest_codebook.yaml", "manifest.yaml"), + ("manifest.yaml", "manifest_release.yaml"), + ("manifest_a.yaml", "manifest_b.yml"), + ], +) +def test_fetch_refuses_a_name_a_sibling_manifest_registers_hash_only( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, target, sibling +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / sibling, _hash_only_manifest()) + # The target exists so the stray-default rule is not what refuses. + _write(package / target, _table_manifest()) + before = _snapshot(package) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match=sibling) as refused: + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "adult.tab", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename="adult.tab", + manifest_filename=target, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert "access='licensed'" in str(refused.value) + assert reads == [] + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +def test_fetch_refuses_bytes_a_sibling_manifest_registers_hash_only( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """The same bytes under another name are the same gated artifact.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA)) + _write(package / "manifest_tables.yaml", _table_manifest()) + before = _snapshot(package) + + # Pinned to the gated digest: refused before the read. + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="manifest.yaml"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "other.tab", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename="other.tab", + manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml", + expected_sha256=LICENSED_SHA, + ) + assert reads == [] + + # Not pinned: the served bytes turn out to be the gated ones, and are + # refused before anything is written or uploaded. + _serve(monkeypatch, LICENSED_BYTES) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="manifest.yaml"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "other.tab", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename="other.tab", + manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml", + upload_r2=True, + ) + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +def test_fetch_refuses_bytes_its_own_manifest_registers_hash_only( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """A release manifest never archives a digest it registers hash-only.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA)) + before = _snapshot(package) + _serve(monkeypatch, LICENSED_BYTES) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="adult.tab"): + _fetch_release( + package, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + filename="codebook.pdf", + content=LICENSED_BYTES, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + vintage="2023_24", + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + publisher="Department for Work and Pensions", + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert _snapshot(package) == before + assert not (tmp_path / "staging").exists() + + +def test_fetch_refuses_to_overwrite_a_file_a_sibling_manifest_records( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Two manifests may record one public file only as the same bytes.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + original = b"the table both manifests record" + (package / "table.ods").parent.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "table.ods").write_bytes(original) + _write( + package / "manifest_source_package.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2024: _public_table_entry("table.ods", original)}), + ) + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _table_manifest()) + before = _snapshot(package) + _serve(monkeypatch, b"a different table") + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="manifest_source_package.yaml"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "table.ods", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename="table.ods", + ) + + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + # The same bytes are the same file: recorded twice, overwritten never. + _serve(monkeypatch, original) + report = _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "table.ods", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename="table.ods", + ) + assert report.valid + assert (package / "table.ods").read_bytes() == original + + +def test_fetch_strictly_validates_a_sibling_before_any_publisher_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest_tables.yaml", _table_manifest()) + _write( + package / "manifest.yaml", + _table_manifest( + files={ + 2023: { + "filename": "adult.tab", + "Access": "licensed", + "sha256": LICENSED_SHA, + } + } + ), + ) + before = _snapshot(package) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="misspelled_field:Access"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "adult.tab", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename="adult.tab", + manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml", + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +def test_fetch_validation_finds_a_normalized_alias_of_hash_only_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Simulate a case-sensitive directory while running on folded APFS.""" + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA)) + actual_path = package / "ADULT.TAB" + actual_path.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + declared_path = package / "adult.tab" + real_exists = Path.exists + + def case_sensitive_exists(path: Path) -> bool: + if path == declared_path: + return False + return real_exists(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "exists", case_sensitive_exists) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + _forbid_uploads(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry"): + _fetch_release( + package, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + filename="codebook.pdf", + content=PUBLIC_BYTES, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + publisher="Department for Work and Pensions", + vintage="2023_24", + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + assert actual_path.read_bytes() == LICENSED_BYTES + + +def test_release_fetch_finds_a_normalized_alias_beside_the_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write( + package / "manifest.yaml", + _hash_only_manifest(files={}) | {"files": {}, "publisher": "DWP"}, + ) + actual_path = package / "CODEBOOK.PDF" + actual_path.write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + declared_path = package / "codebook.pdf" + real_exists = Path.exists + + def case_sensitive_exists(path: Path) -> bool: + if path == declared_path: + return False + return real_exists(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "exists", case_sensitive_exists) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="exists beside the manifest"): + _fetch_release( + package, + staging_dir=tmp_path / "staging", + filename="codebook.pdf", + content=PUBLIC_BYTES, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + licence="OGL-UK-3.0", + publisher="DWP", + vintage="2023_24", + licence_evidence={**EVIDENCE, "issuer": "DWP"}, + upload_r2=True, + ) + + assert reads == [] + + +def test_package_manifests_refuses_distinct_normalized_name_aliases( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + """Portable simulation of two case-distinct files on a sensitive volume.""" + package = tmp_path / "package" + selected = package / "MANIFEST.YAML" + sibling = tmp_path / "case-distinct-entry" / "manifest.yaml" + _write(selected, _table_manifest()) + _write(sibling, _hash_only_manifest()) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.artifacts.package_manifest_paths", + lambda _output: [selected, sibling], + ) + + with pytest.raises(AmbiguousManifestError, match="normalized manifest name"): + _package_manifests(package, selected, _table_manifest()) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "name", + ["manifest.yaml", "MANIFEST.YAML", "manifest.yml", "manifest_tables.yaml"], +) +def test_an_artifact_may_not_be_named_like_a_manifest(tmp_path, monkeypatch, name): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ArtifactFilenameError, match="manifest"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / name, + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + filename=name, + ) + with pytest.raises(ArtifactFilenameError, match="manifest"): + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "publisher" / name, + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + ) + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="manifest"): + _register(package, filename=name) + + assert reads == [] + assert not package.exists() + assert is_manifest_filename(name) + assert f"manifest_named_filename:{name}" in validate_file_entry( + _attested_entry(filename=name), + kind="microdata_release", + manifest={}, + local_file_exists=False, + ) + + +def test_fetch_refuses_a_manifest_that_identifies_another_package( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "table_1_2" + original = _write( + package / "manifest.yaml", + { + "source_id": "irs_soi", + "package_id": "soi-table-1-2", + "kind": "publisher_table", + }, + ) + reads = _refuse_read(monkeypatch) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="package_id='soi-table-1-2'"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", package, package_id="soi-table-9") + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="source_id='irs_soi'"): + _fetch_table(tmp_path / "t.xlsx", package, source_id="irs") + + assert reads == [] + assert (package / "manifest.yaml").read_bytes() == original + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# publish-raw and inventory-artifacts +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _mixed_directory(tmp_path: Path) -> Path: + """manifest.yaml registers adult.tab hash-only; a sibling table manifest + records the same name, and another file with the same bytes, as public.""" + root = tmp_path / "data" + package = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA)) + (package / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + (package / "extract.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + (package / "table.ods").write_bytes(b"a public table") + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest( + files={ + 2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES), + 2022: _public_table_entry("extract.tab", LICENSED_BYTES), + 2021: _public_table_entry("table.ods", b"a public table"), + } + ), + ) + return root + + +def _named_manifest_tree(tmp_path: Path) -> Path: + root = tmp_path / "data" + for index, manifest_name in enumerate( + ("manifest_tables.yaml", "manifest_release.yml", "MANIFEST_UPPER.YAML") + ): + package = root / "dwp" / f"package_{index}" + content = f"public table {index}".encode() + filename = f"table_{index}.ods" + package.mkdir(parents=True) + (package / filename).write_bytes(content) + _write( + package / manifest_name, + _table_manifest( + files={2020 + index: _public_table_entry(filename, content)} + ), + ) + return root + + +def test_default_inventory_discovers_named_yaml_and_yml_manifests(tmp_path): + root = _named_manifest_tree(tmp_path) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(root) + explicit = inventory_source_artifacts( + root, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml" + ) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["manifest_count"] == 3 + assert report.counts["artifact_count"] == 3 + assert explicit.counts["manifest_count"] == 1 + assert explicit.counts["artifact_count"] == 1 + + +def test_default_publish_discovers_named_yaml_and_yml_manifests(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + root = _named_manifest_tree(tmp_path) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root) + + assert report.valid + assert report.counts["manifest_count"] == 3 + assert report.counts["artifact_count"] == 3 + assert report.counts["uploaded_count"] == 3 + assert len(uploads) == 3 + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("operation", ["inventory", "publish"]) +def test_artifact_sweeps_find_a_normalized_alias_of_hash_only_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, operation +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA)) + actual_path = package / "ADULT.TAB" + actual_path.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + declared_path = package / "adult.tab" + real_exists = Path.exists + + def case_sensitive_exists(path: Path) -> bool: + if path == declared_path: + return False + return real_exists(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "exists", case_sensitive_exists) + if operation == "inventory": + report = inventory_source_artifacts(package) + else: + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, skip_hash_only=True) + assert uploads == [] + + assert not report.valid + assert any( + "bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry" in error + for entry in report.entries + for error in entry.errors + ) + + +def test_publish_raw_never_uploads_what_a_sibling_manifest_registers_hash_only( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + root = _mixed_directory(tmp_path) + package = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + before = _snapshot(package) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert report.entries == () + assert any( + error.startswith("filename_collision_across_manifests:adult.tab") + for error in report.errors + ) + assert any( + error.startswith(f"sha256_collision_across_manifests:{LICENSED_SHA}") + for error in report.errors + ) + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +def test_publish_refuses_an_unpinned_public_alias_of_hash_only_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + public = _public_table_entry("public-alias.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + public.pop("sha256") + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: public}), + ) + _write( + package / "manifest_release.yaml", + _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA), + ) + (package / "public-alias.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert any( + error.startswith(f"sha256_collision_across_manifests:{LICENSED_SHA}") + for entry in report.entries + for error in entry.errors + ) + + +def test_publish_strictly_validates_a_sibling_before_any_upload(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + root = tmp_path / "data" + package = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + malformed = _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA) + malformed["files"][2023][0]["Access"] = "licensed" + malformed["files"][2023][0].pop("access") + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", malformed) + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES)}), + ) + (package / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert any("misspelled_field:Access" in error for error in report.errors) + + +def test_publish_validates_a_sibling_before_reading_selected_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + root = tmp_path / "data" + package = root / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + malformed = _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA) + malformed["files"][2023][0]["Access"] = "licensed" + malformed["files"][2023][0].pop("access") + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", malformed) + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES)}), + ) + artifact_path = package / "adult.tab" + artifact_path.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + reads = [] + real_read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + + def record_artifact_read(path): + if path == artifact_path: + reads.append(path) + return real_read_bytes(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", record_artifact_read) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(root, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + assert reads == [] + assert uploads == [] + assert any("misspelled_field:Access" in error for error in report.errors) + + +def test_publish_validates_the_complete_selected_manifest_before_any_upload( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + malformed = _public_table_entry("other.tab", PUBLIC_BYTES) + malformed["Access"] = "licensed" + malformed.pop("access") + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest( + files={ + 2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES), + 2022: malformed, + } + ), + ) + (package / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + (package / "other.tab").write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + assert uploads == [] + assert any("misspelled_field:Access" in error for error in report.errors) + + +def test_publish_validates_selected_manifest_before_reading_any_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + malformed = _public_table_entry("other.tab", PUBLIC_BYTES) + malformed["Access"] = "licensed" + malformed.pop("access") + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest( + files={ + 2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES), + 2022: malformed, + } + ), + ) + artifact_paths = {package / "adult.tab", package / "other.tab"} + (package / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + (package / "other.tab").write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + reads = [] + real_read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + + def record_artifact_read(path): + if path in artifact_paths: + reads.append(path) + return real_read_bytes(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", record_artifact_read) + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + + report = publish_source_artifacts(package, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + assert reads == [] + assert uploads == [] + assert any("misspelled_field:Access" in error for error in report.errors) + + +def test_inventory_reports_collisions_across_manifests(tmp_path): + root = _mixed_directory(tmp_path) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts(root, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml") + + assert not report.valid + codes = {error.split(": ")[0] for error in report.errors} + assert "filename_collision_across_manifests:adult.tab" in codes + assert f"sha256_collision_across_manifests:{LICENSED_SHA}" in codes + # table.ods is recorded once and reported only for itself. + assert not any("table.ods" in code for code in codes) + + +def test_inventory_does_not_read_bytes_for_an_invalid_entry(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + entry = _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + entry["Access"] = "licensed" + entry.pop("access") + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: entry}), + ) + artifact_path = package / "adult.tab" + artifact_path.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + reads = [] + real_read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + + def record_artifact_read(path): + if path == artifact_path: + reads.append(path) + return real_read_bytes(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", record_artifact_read) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts( + package, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml" + ) + + assert not report.valid + assert reads == [] + assert "misspelled_field:Access" in report.entries[0].errors + + +def test_inventory_does_not_read_bytes_after_locator_validation_error( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + package = tmp_path / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + entry = _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + key = f"raw/dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/{entry['sha256']}/{entry['filename']}" + entry["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://other-bucket/{key}", + } + } + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: entry}), + ) + artifact_path = package / "adult.tab" + artifact_path.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + reads = [] + real_read_bytes = Path.read_bytes + + def record_artifact_read(path): + if path == artifact_path: + reads.append(path) + return real_read_bytes(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", record_artifact_read) + + report = inventory_source_artifacts( + package, manifest_filename="manifest_tables.yaml" + ) + + assert not report.valid + assert reads == [] + assert report.entries[0].sha256_actual is None + assert any( + error.startswith("recorded_r2_locator_invalid:") + for error in report.entries[0].errors + ) + + +def test_two_manifests_may_record_one_public_file_as_the_same_bytes(tmp_path): + """The tracked shape: manifest.yaml and manifest_.yaml both + record one publisher file with one digest (db/data/usda_snap/...).""" + root = tmp_path / "data" + package = root / "usda_snap" / "fy69_to_current" + content = b"snap zip" + (package).mkdir(parents=True) + (package / "snap.zip").write_bytes(content) + entry = _public_table_entry("snap.zip", content) + _write(package / "manifest.yaml", _table_manifest(files={2024: entry})) + _write(package / "manifest_fy2025.yaml", _table_manifest(files={2025: entry})) + + assert ( + validate_package_directory( + { + "manifest.yaml": yaml.safe_load( + (package / "manifest.yaml").read_text() + ), + "manifest_fy2025.yaml": yaml.safe_load( + (package / "manifest_fy2025.yaml").read_text() + ), + } + ) + == () + ) + assert inventory_source_artifacts(root).valid + assert inventory_source_artifacts( + root, manifest_filename="manifest_fy2025.yaml" + ).valid + + +def test_the_committed_tree_has_no_collisions_across_manifests(): + report = inventory_source_artifacts(REPO_ROOT / "db" / "data") + assert not [error for error in report.errors if "across_manifests" in error] + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# register-artifact +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_register_refuses_an_identity_a_sibling_manifest_holds_public(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + archived = _public_table_entry("adult.tab", PUBLIC_BYTES) + archived["storage"] = { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": f"raw/uk/dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/{PUBLIC_SHA}/adult.tab", + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/raw/uk/dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/{PUBLIC_SHA}/adult.tab", + } + } + _write( + package / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest( + files={ + 2023: archived, + 2022: _public_table_entry("extract.tab", b"unarchived public bytes"), + } + ), + ) + _write( + package / "manifest.yaml", {"source_id": "dwp", "package_id": "dwp-frs-2023-24"} + ) + before = _snapshot(package) + + # By name: the sibling archived adult.tab. + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="manifest_tables.yaml"): + _register(package) + # By digest: the sibling archived these bytes under another name. + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="manifest_tables.yaml"): + _register(package, filename="other.tab", sha256=PUBLIC_SHA) + # A public record with no object is still an explicit class change. + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="manifest_tables.yaml"): + _register(package, filename="extract.tab") + + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +def test_register_refuses_a_stray_default_manifest_beside_named_ones(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest_tables.yaml", _table_manifest()) + before = _snapshot(package) + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="--manifest"): + _register(package) + + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +def test_register_targets_the_named_manifest(tmp_path, capsys): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "dwp" / "frs_2023_24" + _write(package / "manifest_tables.yaml", _table_manifest()) + + report = _register(package, manifest_filename="manifest_release.yaml") + + assert report.valid + assert report.manifest_path.endswith("manifest_release.yaml") + written = yaml.safe_load((package / "manifest_release.yaml").read_text()) + assert written["kind"] == "microdata_release" + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in written["files"][2023]] == ["adult.tab"] + assert not (package / "manifest.yaml").exists() + + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="manifest"): + _register(package, manifest_filename="../manifest.yaml") + with pytest.raises(HashOnlyRegistrationError, match="manifest"): + _register(package, manifest_filename="adult.tab") + + argv = [ + "register-artifact", + "--source-id", + "dwp", + "--package-id", + "dwp-frs-2023-24", + "--year", + "2023", + "--out-dir", + str(package), + "--manifest", + "manifest_release.yaml", + "--filename", + "benefits.tab", + "--sha256", + FIXTURE_SHA, + "--vintage", + "2023_24", + "--licence", + "UK Data Service End User Licence", + "--access", + "licensed", + "--doi", + "10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2", + "--hash-source", + "consumer_attested", + "--attested-by", + ATTESTED["attested_by"], + "--attestation-evidence", + ATTESTED["attestation_evidence"], + "--verified-at", + ATTESTED["verified_at"], + ] + assert harness_main(argv) == 0 + capsys.readouterr() + written = yaml.safe_load((package / "manifest_release.yaml").read_text()) + assert [entry["filename"] for entry in written["files"][2023]] == [ + "adult.tab", + "benefits.tab", + ] + + +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# The source-package byte reader +# -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("defect", ["selected_access_spelling", "same_manifest_pin"]) +def test_byte_reader_validates_the_complete_selected_manifest( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, defect +): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + selected = _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + files: dict[int, dict] = {2023: selected} + if defect == "selected_access_spelling": + selected["Access"] = "licensed" + selected.pop("access") + else: + files[2022] = _attested_entry( + filename="other.tab", + sha256=LICENSED_SHA, + source_url="https://ukdataservice.example/other.tab", + ) + _write(resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", _table_manifest(files=files)) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError): + spec.assert_parseable(2023) + + +def test_byte_reader_finds_a_normalized_alias_for_another_current_entry( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + files = { + 2023: _public_table_entry("table.csv", PUBLIC_BYTES), + 2022: _attested_entry(filename="adult.tab", sha256=LICENSED_SHA), + } + _write(resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", _table_manifest(files=files)) + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + actual_path = resource_dir / "ADULT.TAB" + actual_path.write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + declared_path = resource_dir / "adult.tab" + real_is_file = Path.is_file + + def case_sensitive_is_file(path: Path) -> bool: + if path == declared_path: + return False + return real_is_file(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "is_file", case_sensitive_is_file) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter=",", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="bytes_present_for_hash_only_entry"): + spec.assert_parseable(2023) + + +def test_byte_reader_refuses_a_file_a_sibling_manifest_registers_hash_only( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + import sys + import uuid + + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES)}), + ) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest_release.yaml", + _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA), + ) + (resource_dir / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + monkeypatch.delitem(sys.modules, package_name, raising=False) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="manifest_release.yaml"): + spec.assert_parseable(2023) + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="manifest_release.yaml"): + spec.build_source_rows(2023) + + +def test_byte_reader_strictly_validates_a_sibling_manifest(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", PUBLIC_BYTES)}), + ) + malformed = _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA) + malformed["files"][2023][0]["Access"] = "licensed" + malformed["files"][2023][0].pop("access") + _write(resource_dir / "manifest_release.yaml", malformed) + (resource_dir / "adult.tab").write_bytes(PUBLIC_BYTES) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-02", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="manifest_release.yaml"): + spec.assert_parseable(2023) + + +def test_byte_reader_refuses_a_public_filename_collision_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + from chronicle import source_package + + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES)}), + ) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: _public_table_entry("ADULT.TAB", PUBLIC_BYTES)}), + ) + (resource_dir / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + reads = [] + real_read = source_package._read_source_artifact_content + + def record_read(path, artifact): + reads.append(path) + return real_read(path, artifact) + + monkeypatch.setattr(source_package, "_read_source_artifact_content", record_read) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises( + ManifestAccessError, + match="filename_collision_across_manifests:adult.tab", + ): + spec._artifact_content(2023) + assert reads == [] + + +def test_byte_reader_refuses_an_unpinned_public_alias_of_hash_only_bytes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + public = _public_table_entry("public-alias.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + public.pop("sha256") + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: public}), + ) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest_release.yaml", + _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA), + ) + (resource_dir / "public-alias.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest_tables.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match=LICENSED_SHA): + spec._artifact_content(2023) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "declared_sha256", + [None, "not-a-digest"], + ids=("omitted", "malformed"), +) +def test_byte_reader_does_not_cache_an_unpinned_alias_before_refusal( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, declared_sha256 +): + from chronicle import source_package + + cache_root = _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + public = _public_table_entry("public-alias.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + if declared_sha256 is None: + public.pop("sha256") + else: + public["sha256"] = declared_sha256 + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest_tables.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: public}), + ) + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest_release.yaml", + _hash_only_manifest(sha256=LICENSED_SHA), + ) + fetches = [] + + def record_fetch(source_url): + fetches.append(source_url) + return LICENSED_BYTES + + monkeypatch.setattr(source_package, "_fetch_source_artifact_content", record_fetch) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest_tables.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises((ManifestAccessError, ValueError)): + spec._artifact_content(2023) + assert fetches == [] + assert not cache_root.exists() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "locator", + [ + { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": (f"raw/dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/{LICENSED_SHA}/adult.tab"), + "uri": ( + "r2://other-bucket/raw/dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/" + f"{LICENSED_SHA}/adult.tab" + ), + }, + ["r2://ledger-raw/raw/dwp/dwp-frs-2023-24/2023/object"], + ], + ids=("contradictory-fields", "non-mapping"), +) +def test_source_reader_validates_r2_locator_before_reading( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, locator +): + from chronicle import source_package + + _isolated_reader(tmp_path, monkeypatch) + package_name = f"chronicle_test_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" + resource_dir = tmp_path / "pkgroot" / package_name / "data" / "dwp" / "frs" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + entry = _public_table_entry("adult.tab", LICENSED_BYTES) + entry["storage"] = {"r2": locator} + _write( + resource_dir / "manifest.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2023: entry}), + ) + (resource_dir / "adult.tab").write_bytes(LICENSED_BYTES) + reads = [] + real_read = source_package._read_source_artifact_content + + def record_read(path, artifact): + reads.append(path) + return real_read(path, artifact) + + monkeypatch.setattr(source_package, "_read_source_artifact_content", record_read) + monkeypatch.syspath_prepend(str(tmp_path / "pkgroot")) + spec = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="dwp", + source_table="Family Resources Survey", + resource_package=package_name, + resource_directory="data/dwp/frs", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2023_24", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="none", + parser="delimited_text_full_rows", + delimiter="\t", + artifact_year=2023, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="storage.r2"): + spec._artifact_content(2023) + assert reads == [] + + +def test_the_stray_default_manifest_rule_reaches_register_before_any_write(tmp_path): + package = tmp_path / "db" / "data" / "irs_soi" / "ira_contributions" + _write(package / "manifest_roth_source_package.yaml", _table_manifest()) + _write(package / "manifest_traditional_source_package.yaml", _table_manifest()) + before = _snapshot(package) + + with pytest.raises((HashOnlyRegistrationError, AmbiguousManifestError)): + register_hash_only_artifact( + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + output_dir=package, + filename="adult.tab", + sha256=FIXTURE_SHA, + licence="UK Data Service End User Licence", + access="licensed", + vintage="2023_24", + doi="10.5255/UKDA-SN-9367-2", + **ATTESTED, + ) + + assert _snapshot(package) == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("upload_r2", [False, True]) +def test_fetch_validates_proposed_cross_vintage_table_before_writes( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, upload_r2 +): + package = tmp_path / "package" + original = b"published table for 2022" + _write( + package / "manifest.yaml", + _table_manifest(files={2022: _public_table_entry("table.csv", original)}), + ) + (package / "table.csv").write_bytes(original) + before = _snapshot(package) + _serve(monkeypatch, b"different publisher bytes for 2023") + uploads = _record_uploads(monkeypatch) + writes = [] + + def record_bytes(path, content): + writes.append((path.name, content)) + return len(content) + + def record_text(path, content, *args, **kwargs): + writes.append((path.name, content)) + return len(content) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "write_bytes", record_bytes) + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "write_text", record_text) + refusal = None + try: + _fetch_table( + tmp_path / "table.csv", + package, + source_id="dwp", + package_id="dwp-frs-2023-24", + year=2023, + filename="table.csv", + upload_r2=upload_r2, + ) + except ManifestAccessError as error: + refusal = error + + assert writes == [], "proposed manifest must be valid before writing any bytes" + assert uploads == [] + assert refusal is not None + assert "filename_collision:table.csv" in str(refusal) + assert _snapshot(package) == before diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_source_package.py b/tests/test_chronicle_source_package.py index ae6f0166..af2b33f0 100644 --- a/tests/test_chronicle_source_package.py +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_source_package.py @@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations from copy import deepcopy +from dataclasses import replace import hashlib from io import BytesIO +import os from pathlib import Path -from zipfile import ZipFile +from zipfile import Path as ZipPath, ZipFile import openpyxl import pytest @@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ ) from chronicle.core import validate_facts from chronicle.epoch import SCHEMA_IDS +from chronicle.registration import ManifestAccessError, validate_file_entry from chronicle.source_package import ( SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, @@ -244,9 +247,7 @@ def test_hmrc_cgt_reuses_one_publisher_series_across_definition_years(): package = load_source_package("hmrc-cgt-statistics-2026") package_facts = package.build_facts(2026) facts = [ - fact - for fact in package_facts - if fact.measure.concept == "hmrc.cgt_tax_total" + fact for fact in package_facts if fact.measure.concept == "hmrc.cgt_tax_total" ] assert {fact.entity.name for fact in package_facts} == {"tax_unit"} @@ -1083,6 +1084,688 @@ def test_source_artifact_loader_fetches_missing_artifact_when_enabled( assert _source_artifact_cache_path(spec).read_bytes() == content +@pytest.fixture +def recorded_r2_artifact(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + resource_root = tmp_path / "resources" + resource_dir = resource_root / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + content = b"publisher source artifact" + digest = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + key = f"raw/publisher/package/2024/{digest}/table.csv" + entry = { + "filename": "table.csv", + "source_url": "https://example.test/table.csv", + "sha256": digest, + "storage": { + "r2": { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{key}", + } + }, + } + artifact = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="publisher", + source_table="Table", + resource_package="test_resources", + resource_directory="data/publisher/package", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2024", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="test", + artifact_year=2024, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: resource_root + ) + return artifact, resource_dir, content, entry + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry", [None, "not a file entry", 42]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["assert_parseable", "_artifact_content"]) +def test_source_artifact_spec_refuses_scalar_entry_before_artifact_io( + recorded_r2_artifact, monkeypatch, entry, method +): + artifact, resource_dir, _content, _valid_entry = recorded_r2_artifact + manifest_path = resource_dir / "manifest.yaml" + manifest_path.write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}) + ) + original_manifest = manifest_path.read_bytes() + reads = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._read_source_artifact_content", + lambda *args: reads.append(args) or b"unexpected source bytes", + ) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="malformed_file_spec"): + getattr(artifact, method)(2024) + + assert reads == [] + assert manifest_path.read_bytes() == original_manifest + assert list(resource_dir.iterdir()) == [manifest_path] + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "invalid_locator", + [ + "contradictory-key", + "contradictory-bucket", + "missing-provider", + "missing-uri", + "non-r2", + "null-block", + "checksum-identity", + "filename-identity", + ], +) +def test_source_artifact_spec_refuses_invalid_recorded_r2_before_read( + recorded_r2_artifact, monkeypatch, invalid_locator +): + artifact, resource_dir, content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + recorded = entry["storage"]["r2"] + if invalid_locator == "contradictory-key": + recorded["key"] = recorded["key"].replace("table.csv", "other.csv") + elif invalid_locator == "contradictory-bucket": + recorded["bucket"] = "other-raw" + elif invalid_locator == "missing-provider": + del recorded["provider"] + elif invalid_locator == "missing-uri": + del recorded["uri"] + elif invalid_locator == "non-r2": + recorded["provider"] = "s3" + recorded["uri"] = recorded["uri"].replace("r2://", "s3://") + elif invalid_locator == "null-block": + entry["storage"]["r2"] = None + elif invalid_locator == "checksum-identity": + entry["sha256"] = "0" * 64 + else: + recorded["key"] = recorded["key"].replace("table.csv", "other.csv") + recorded["uri"] = recorded["uri"].replace("table.csv", "other.csv") + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}) + ) + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(content) + + def unexpected_read(_artifact_path, _spec): + raise AssertionError("invalid R2 provenance reached artifact I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._read_source_artifact_content", unexpected_read + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="storage.r2|recorded R2"): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["local", "fetch"]) +def test_source_artifact_spec_checks_recorded_r2_digest_without_declared_checksum( + recorded_r2_artifact, tmp_path, monkeypatch, location +): + artifact, resource_dir, _content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + del entry["sha256"] + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}) + ) + changed_content = b"different publisher bytes" + cache = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache)) + if location == "local": + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(changed_content) + else: + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", + lambda _url: changed_content, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="checksum mismatch"): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + assert not cache.exists() + + +def test_source_artifact_spec_accepts_consistent_recorded_r2(recorded_r2_artifact): + artifact, resource_dir, content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}) + ) + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(content) + + assert artifact._artifact_content(2024) == ( + content, + "table.csv", + entry["source_url"], + entry["storage"]["r2"], + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["local", "fetch"]) +def test_source_reader_refuses_conflicting_r2_only_shared_owners_before_read( + recorded_r2_artifact, tmp_path, monkeypatch, location +): + artifact, resource_dir, content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + digest = entry.pop("sha256") + sibling = deepcopy(entry) + other_digest = hashlib.sha256(b"different sibling bytes").hexdigest() + for field in ("key", "uri"): + sibling["storage"]["r2"][field] = sibling["storage"]["r2"][field].replace( + digest, other_digest + ) + for name, owner in (("manifest.yaml", entry), ("manifest_sibling.yaml", sibling)): + (resource_dir / name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: owner}}) + ) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} + cache = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache)) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + fetches = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", + lambda url: fetches.append(url) or content, + ) + reads = [] + original_read = Path.read_bytes + + def read_bytes(path): + if path == resource_dir / "table.csv": + reads.append(path) + return original_read(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", read_bytes) + if location == "local": + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(content) + + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="filename_collision|different bytes"): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + assert reads == [] + assert fetches == [] + assert not cache.exists() + assert all( + (resource_dir / name).read_bytes() == data for name, data in before.items() + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["local", "cache", "fetch", "zip"]) +def test_source_reader_refuses_unpinned_bytes_that_contradict_shared_owner( + recorded_r2_artifact, tmp_path, monkeypatch, location +): + artifact, resource_dir, _content, sibling = recorded_r2_artifact + entry = { + "filename": "table.csv", + "source_url": sibling["source_url"], + } + sibling.pop("storage") + for name, owner in (("manifest.yaml", entry), ("manifest_sibling.yaml", sibling)): + (resource_dir / name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: owner}}) + ) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} + changed_content = b"unpinned bytes contradict the identified sibling" + cache = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache)) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + fetches = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", + lambda url: fetches.append(url) or changed_content, + ) + if location == "local": + (resource_dir / "table.csv").write_bytes(changed_content) + elif location == "cache": + cache_path = _source_artifact_cache_path(entry) + cache_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True) + cache_path.write_bytes(changed_content) + if location == "zip": + buffer = BytesIO() + with ZipFile(buffer, "w") as archive: + for name, data in before.items(): + archive.writestr(f"data/publisher/package/{name}", data) + archive.writestr("data/publisher/package/table.csv", changed_content) + with ZipFile(buffer) as archive: + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: ZipPath(archive) + ) + with pytest.raises( + ManifestAccessError, match="filename_collision|two identities" + ): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + else: + with pytest.raises( + ManifestAccessError, match="filename_collision|two identities" + ): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + assert fetches == ([entry["source_url"]] if location == "fetch" else []) + if location == "cache": + assert cache_path.read_bytes() == changed_content + else: + assert not cache.exists() + assert all( + (resource_dir / name).read_bytes() == data for name, data in before.items() + ) + + +def _public_microdata_sibling(entry): + return { + **deepcopy(entry), + "access": "public", + "licence": "CC0-1.0", + "licence_evidence": { + "issuer": "Fixture publisher", + "scope": "This fixture public microdata release is dedicated to CC0.", + "url": "https://example.test/licence", + }, + "vintage": "2024", + "hash_source": "chronicle_fetch", + "attested_by": "chronicle", + "verified_at": "2026-09-05", + } + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "alias", ["filename", "sha256", "archived-filename", "archived-sha256"] +) +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "declared_checksum", [True, False], ids=["declared", "r2-only"] +) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["cache", "fetch"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["_artifact_content", "build_source_rows"]) +def test_source_reader_refuses_public_microdata_sibling_alias_before_io( + recorded_r2_artifact, + tmp_path, + monkeypatch, + alias, + declared_checksum, + location, + method, +): + artifact, resource_dir, _content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + artifact = replace(artifact, parser="delimited_text_full_rows") + content = b"person_id,age\n1,45\n2,31\n" + digest = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest() + + def locator(filename, checksum): + key = f"raw/publisher/package/2024/{checksum}/{filename}" + return { + "provider": "r2", + "bucket": "ledger-raw", + "key": key, + "uri": f"r2://ledger-raw/{key}", + } + + entry["sha256"] = digest + entry["storage"]["r2"] = locator("table.csv", digest) + sibling = _public_microdata_sibling(entry) + if alias == "sha256": + sibling["filename"] = "microdata.csv" + elif alias.startswith("archived-"): + sibling["filename"] = "new-microdata.csv" + sibling["sha256"] = "a" * 64 + sibling["storage"]["previous_r2"] = [ + locator("table.csv", "b" * 64) + if alias == "archived-filename" + else locator("old-microdata.csv", digest) + ] + sibling["storage"]["r2"] = locator(sibling["filename"], sibling["sha256"]) + sibling["licence_evidence"].update( + licence=sibling["licence"], sha256=sibling["sha256"] + ) + assert ( + validate_file_entry( + sibling, kind="microdata_release", manifest={}, local_file_exists=False + ) + == () + ) + if not declared_checksum: + entry.pop("sha256") + for name, kind, owner in ( + ("manifest.yaml", "publisher_table", entry), + ("manifest_release.yaml", "microdata_release", sibling), + ): + (resource_dir / name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": kind, "files": {2024: owner}}) + ) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} + cache = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache)) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + cache_path = _source_artifact_cache_path({**entry, "sha256": digest}) + if location == "cache": + cache_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True) + cache_path.write_bytes(content) + fetches = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", + lambda url: fetches.append(url) or content, + ) + reads = [] + original_read = Path.read_bytes + + def read_bytes(path): + if path.name == "table.csv": + reads.append(path) + return original_read(path) + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_bytes", read_bytes) + emitted = [] + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="microdata"): + emitted.extend(getattr(artifact, method)(2024)) + + assert emitted == [] + assert reads == [] + assert fetches == [] + if location == "cache": + assert original_read(cache_path) == content + assert [path for path in cache.rglob("*") if path.is_file()] == [cache_path] + else: + assert not cache.exists() + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "identified", [True, False], ids=["known-distinct", "unpinned"] +) +def test_source_reader_requires_identity_beside_unrelated_public_microdata( + recorded_r2_artifact, tmp_path, monkeypatch, identified +): + artifact, resource_dir, content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + sibling = _public_microdata_sibling(entry) + sibling["filename"] = "microdata.csv" + sibling["sha256"] = "a" * 64 + sibling["storage"]["r2"] = { + field: value.replace("table.csv", "microdata.csv").replace( + entry["sha256"], "a" * 64 + ) + for field, value in sibling["storage"]["r2"].items() + } + sibling["licence_evidence"].update( + licence=sibling["licence"], sha256=sibling["sha256"] + ) + if not identified: + entry.pop("sha256") + entry.pop("storage") + for name, kind, owner in ( + ("manifest.yaml", "publisher_table", entry), + ("manifest_release.yaml", "microdata_release", sibling), + ): + (resource_dir / name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": kind, "files": {2024: owner}}) + ) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} + cache = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache)) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + fetches = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", + lambda url: fetches.append(url) or content, + ) + if identified: + assert artifact._artifact_content(2024)[0] == content + assert fetches == [entry["source_url"]] + assert _source_artifact_cache_path(entry).read_bytes() == content + else: + with pytest.raises(ManifestAccessError, match="microdata"): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + assert fetches == [] + assert not cache.exists() + assert {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} == before + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("identity", ["r2-only", "unpinned"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["fetch", "zip"]) +def test_source_reader_accepts_shared_owner_bytes_from_nonfilesystem_resources( + recorded_r2_artifact, tmp_path, monkeypatch, identity, location +): + artifact, resource_dir, content, sibling = recorded_r2_artifact + entry = deepcopy(sibling) + entry.pop("sha256") + if identity == "r2-only": + sibling.pop("sha256") + else: + entry.pop("storage") + sibling.pop("storage") + for name, owner in (("manifest.yaml", entry), ("manifest_sibling.yaml", sibling)): + (resource_dir / name).write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: owner}}) + ) + before = {path.name: path.read_bytes() for path in resource_dir.iterdir()} + monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path) + # Manifest labels passed to the shared validator are resource names; + # interpreting them as filesystem paths would read these unrelated bytes. + (tmp_path / "table.csv").write_bytes(b"unrelated working-directory bytes") + cache = tmp_path / "cache" + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(cache)) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", lambda url: content + ) + if location == "zip": + buffer = BytesIO() + with ZipFile(buffer, "w") as archive: + for name, data in before.items(): + archive.writestr(f"data/publisher/package/{name}", data) + archive.writestr("data/publisher/package/table.csv", content) + with ZipFile(buffer) as archive: + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: ZipPath(archive) + ) + assert artifact._artifact_content(2024)[0] == content + assert not cache.exists() + else: + assert artifact._artifact_content(2024)[0] == content + assert [path.read_bytes() for path in cache.rglob("table.csv")] == [content] + assert all( + (resource_dir / name).read_bytes() == data for name, data in before.items() + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry_kind", ["directory", "fifo"]) +@pytest.mark.parametrize("resource_kind", ["manifest", "artifact"]) +def test_source_artifact_spec_refuses_non_regular_resource_before_open( + recorded_r2_artifact, monkeypatch, entry_kind, resource_kind +): + artifact, resource_dir, _content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + name = "manifest.yaml" if resource_kind == "manifest" else "table.csv" + resource = resource_dir / name + if entry_kind == "directory": + resource.mkdir() + else: + os.mkfifo(resource) + if resource_kind == "artifact": + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}) + ) + + def unexpected_read(_artifact_path, _spec): + raise AssertionError("non-regular artifact reached artifact I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._read_source_artifact_content", unexpected_read + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not a regular file"): + if resource_kind == "manifest": + # Resolve without opening: a broken guard must fail promptly even + # for a FIFO, whose actual open would block the test process. + artifact.manifest_resource() + else: + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + +def test_source_artifact_spec_reads_regular_importlib_zip_resources( + recorded_r2_artifact, monkeypatch +): + artifact, _resource_dir, content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + buffer = BytesIO() + with ZipFile(buffer, "w") as archive: + archive.writestr("data/publisher/package/table.csv", content) + archive.writestr( + "data/publisher/package/manifest.yaml", + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}), + ) + with ZipFile(buffer) as archive: + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: ZipPath(archive) + ) + assert artifact._artifact_content(2024)[0] == content + + +def test_source_artifact_spec_fetches_absent_regular_resource( + recorded_r2_artifact, tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + artifact, resource_dir, content, entry = recorded_r2_artifact + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump({"kind": "publisher_table", "files": {2024: entry}}) + ) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_CACHE_ENV, str(tmp_path / "cache")) + monkeypatch.setenv(SOURCE_ARTIFACT_FETCH_ENV, "1") + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._fetch_source_artifact_content", lambda _url: content + ) + + assert artifact._artifact_content(2024)[0] == content + assert _source_artifact_cache_path(entry).read_bytes() == content + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "path_kind", + ["absolute", "parent", "symlink", "normalized-alias", "manifest-name"], +) +def test_source_artifact_spec_refuses_unsafe_manifest_filename_before_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, path_kind +): + resource_root = tmp_path / "resources" + resource_dir = resource_root / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + outside = resource_dir.parent / "outside.csv" + outside.write_bytes(b"outside publisher bytes") + if path_kind == "absolute": + filename = str(outside) + elif path_kind == "parent": + filename = "../outside.csv" + else: + filename = "table.csv" + if path_kind == "symlink": + (resource_dir / filename).symlink_to(outside) + elif path_kind == "normalized-alias": + (resource_dir / "TABLE.csv").write_bytes(outside.read_bytes()) + else: + filename = "manifest_artifact.yaml" + (resource_dir / filename).write_bytes(outside.read_bytes()) + (resource_dir / "manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump( + { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": filename, + "source_url": outside.as_uri(), + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(outside.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), + } + }, + }, + sort_keys=False, + ) + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: resource_root + ) + + def unexpected_artifact_read(_artifact_path, _spec): + raise AssertionError("unsafe artifact path reached artifact I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._read_source_artifact_content", + unexpected_artifact_read, + ) + artifact = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="publisher", + source_table="Table", + resource_package="test_resources", + resource_directory="data/publisher/package", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2024", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="test", + artifact_year=2024, + ) + + if path_kind == "symlink": + message = "symbolic link" + elif path_kind == "normalized-alias": + message = "normalized filename" + elif path_kind == "manifest-name": + message = "manifest name" + else: + message = "bare filename" + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=message): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "path_kind", ["absolute", "parent", "symlink", "normalized-alias", "unsupported"] +) +def test_source_artifact_spec_refuses_unsafe_manifest_path_before_artifact_read( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, path_kind +): + resource_root = tmp_path / "resources" + resource_dir = resource_root / "data" / "publisher" / "package" + resource_dir.mkdir(parents=True) + payload = { + "kind": "publisher_table", + "files": { + 2024: { + "filename": "table.csv", + "source_url": "https://example.test/table.csv", + } + }, + } + outside_manifest = resource_dir.parent / "outside-manifest.yaml" + outside_manifest.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False)) + if path_kind == "absolute": + manifest_name = str(outside_manifest) + elif path_kind == "parent": + manifest_name = "../outside-manifest.yaml" + elif path_kind == "symlink": + manifest_name = "manifest.yaml" + (resource_dir / manifest_name).symlink_to(outside_manifest) + elif path_kind == "normalized-alias": + manifest_name = "manifest.yaml" + (resource_dir / "Manifest.yaml").write_text( + yaml.safe_dump(payload, sort_keys=False) + ) + else: + manifest_name = "registry.yaml" + (resource_dir / manifest_name).write_text(yaml.safe_dump(payload)) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: resource_root + ) + + def unexpected_artifact_read(_artifact_path, _spec): + raise AssertionError("unsafe manifest path reached artifact I/O") + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package._read_source_artifact_content", + unexpected_artifact_read, + ) + artifact = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="publisher", + source_table="Table", + resource_package="test_resources", + resource_directory="data/publisher/package", + manifest=manifest_name, + vintage="2024", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="test", + artifact_year=2024, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + def test_source_package_path_builds_valid_soi_table_1_4_facts(): package_path = REPO_ROOT / "packages" / "irs_soi" / "table_1_4" package = load_source_package(package_path) @@ -4284,3 +4967,59 @@ def test_build_facts_with_label_year_does_not_crash(): # Record-set periods are literal 2024, so a label build still resolves them. assert facts assert all(fact.period.value == 2024 for fact in facts) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bad_directory", + ["/etc", "../outside", "data/../../outside", "data/./publisher"], +) +def test_resource_directory_must_stay_inside_the_resource_package( + tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_directory +): + """`resource_directory` is joined under the resource package root; an + absolute or parent-traversing value escapes it and must be refused + before any read.""" + resource_root = tmp_path / "pkg" + resource_root.mkdir() + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: resource_root + ) + artifact = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="publisher", + source_table="Table", + resource_package="test_resources", + resource_directory=bad_directory, + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2024", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="test", + artifact_year=2024, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="resource_directory"): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) + + +def test_resource_directory_refuses_a_symlinked_ancestor(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + resource_root = tmp_path / "pkg" + real = tmp_path / "elsewhere" / "package" + real.mkdir(parents=True) + (resource_root / "data").mkdir(parents=True) + (resource_root / "data" / "publisher").symlink_to(real.parent) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "chronicle.source_package.files", lambda _package: resource_root + ) + artifact = SourceArtifactSpec( + source_name="publisher", + source_table="Table", + resource_package="test_resources", + resource_directory="data/publisher/package", + manifest="manifest.yaml", + vintage="2024", + extracted_at="2026-09-04", + extraction_method="test", + artifact_year=2024, + ) + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="symbolic link|resource_directory"): + artifact._artifact_content(2024) diff --git a/tests/test_chronicle_suite.py b/tests/test_chronicle_suite.py index 6911d6e2..c08f8abe 100644 --- a/tests/test_chronicle_suite.py +++ b/tests/test_chronicle_suite.py @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ def test_build_source_suite_writes_artifacts_and_reports(tmp_path): assert (output_dir / "source_regions.jsonl").exists() assert (output_dir / "facts.jsonl").exists() assert (output_dir / "consumer_facts.jsonl").exists() - assert (output_dir / "ledger.db").exists() + assert (output_dir / "chronicle.db").exists() assert (output_dir / "datapackage.json").exists() assert (output_dir / "ro-crate-metadata.json").exists() assert (output_dir / "reports" / "source_regions.json").exists() @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ def test_build_source_suite_writes_artifacts_and_reports(tmp_path): "source_regions.jsonl", "facts.jsonl", "consumer_facts.jsonl", - "ledger.db", + "chronicle.db", "reports/build_summary.json", "reports/source_regions.json", "reports/selectors.json", @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ def test_build_source_suite_writes_artifacts_and_reports(tmp_path): "concept_alignment_validation_skipped" ] - with sqlite3.connect(output_dir / "ledger.db") as connection: + with sqlite3.connect(output_dir / "chronicle.db") as connection: facts_count = connection.execute( "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM aggregate_facts" ).fetchone()[0] @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ def test_build_source_suite_supports_soi_table_1_4(tmp_path): "concept_alignment_validation_skipped" ) assert (output_dir / "source_regions.jsonl").exists() - assert (output_dir / "ledger.db").exists() + assert (output_dir / "chronicle.db").exists() def test_agent_acceptance_accepts_aggregate_income_range_source_rows(): @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ def test_build_suite_cli_emits_json_summary(tmp_path, capsys): assert payload["outputs"]["source_regions"] == str( output_dir / "source_regions.jsonl" ) - assert payload["outputs"]["database"] == str(output_dir / "ledger.db") + assert payload["outputs"]["database"] == str(output_dir / "chronicle.db") assert payload["outputs"]["consumer_facts"] == str( output_dir / "consumer_facts.jsonl" )