diff --git a/src/wrappers/with-assembly.ts b/src/wrappers/with-assembly.ts
index bdaa407ca..bd7486881 100644
--- a/src/wrappers/with-assembly.ts
+++ b/src/wrappers/with-assembly.ts
@@ -133,6 +133,51 @@ function hasInvoke(
   return typeof tool.invoke === "function";
 }
 
+/**
+ * Hand a pre-execution deny to the gateway's audit sink (AAASM-5665).
+ *
+ * Before this, `withAssembly` called `check` and never `record`, so a denied
+ * call produced no audit event at all — the thrown `PolicyViolationError` was
+ * the only trace, and it never leaves the process.
+ *
+ * `GatewayRecordEvent` carries no tool-name field and adding one is a wire
+ * change, so the tool is named inside `reason` — reusing the thrown error's own
+ * message, so the audit event and the error a caller sees cannot drift apart.
+ *
+ * **Every failure mode is swallowed, synchronous throws included.** A failing
+ * audit sink must not convert a policy deny into some other error: the throw
+ * that follows this call is the enforcement decision and has to survive. The
+ * `try`/`catch` is load-bearing rather than stylistic — `gatewayClient` is a
+ * documented public injection point, so a caller-supplied `record` that throws
+ * synchronously never produces a promise for a trailing `.catch()` to attach
+ * to, and would escape past the `PolicyViolationError`. Mirrors the Python
+ * companion's `try/except Exception` around the same hook (AAASM-4782).
+ *
+ * This is deliberately awaited, unlike the `void ... .catch()` in
+ * `recordToolResultNonBlocking` (`hooks/ai-sdk.ts`, `hooks/openai-agents.ts`):
+ * the event is handed over before the deny is thrown, so it cannot be lost if
+ * the caller exits on the error. The cost is that a `record` which hangs delays
+ * the deny — there is no timeout here, unlike `waitForApprovalWithTimeout`.
+ *
+ * What this does *not* do is make a deny observable in a released binary. Both
+ * shipped clients discard the event — `createNoopGatewayClient` returns
+ * undefined, `createNativeGatewayClient` fires only a one-time `AA_DEBUG` note
+ * — so a deny stays Unmeasured in audit evidence (ADR 0033 §6). Supplying a
+ * sink that retains it is tracked as AAASM-5681.
+ */
+async function recordDeny(
+  gateway: GatewayClient,
+  action: string,
+  runId: string,
+  reason: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await gateway.record({ action, runId, reason });
+  } catch {
+    // Intentionally ignored — see the note above on why the deny must survive.
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Run the full pre-execution governance chain for one wrapped tool call.
  *
@@ -161,18 +206,34 @@ async function enforceGovernance(
     runId
   });
 
-  if (decision.denied) {
-    throw new PolicyViolationError(`Tool '${name}' blocked: ${decision.reason ?? "Denied"}`);
-  }
+  // Both refusal routes converge on a single record-then-throw below rather
+  // than each carrying its own copy (AAASM-5665). Two call sites is an
+  // invitation to fix one and miss the other — which is exactly what happened
+  // in review: the approval-rejected copy could be deleted outright with the
+  // whole suite still green. One site cannot drift from itself.
+  let denial: { action: string; error: PolicyViolationError } | undefined;
 
-  if (decision.pending) {
+  if (decision.denied) {
+    denial = {
+      action: "tool_call_denied",
+      error: new PolicyViolationError(`Tool '${name}' blocked: ${decision.reason ?? "Denied"}`)
+    };
+  } else if (decision.pending) {
     const finalDecision = await waitForApprovalWithTimeout(gateway, name, runId, approvalTimeoutMs);
     if (finalDecision.denied) {
-      throw new PolicyViolationError(
-        `Approval rejected for '${name}': ${finalDecision.reason ?? "Rejected"}`
-      );
+      denial = {
+        action: "tool_call_approval_rejected",
+        error: new PolicyViolationError(
+          `Approval rejected for '${name}': ${finalDecision.reason ?? "Rejected"}`
+        )
+      };
     }
   }
+
+  if (denial) {
+    await recordDeny(gateway, denial.action, runId, denial.error.message);
+    throw denial.error;
+  }
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/tests/helpers/negative-control.ts b/tests/helpers/negative-control.ts
index 38867ac40..024c6ff59 100644
--- a/tests/helpers/negative-control.ts
+++ b/tests/helpers/negative-control.ts
@@ -163,6 +163,93 @@ export interface PolicyGatewayClient extends GatewayClient {
   readonly auditResults: readonly GatewayResultRecord[];
 }
 
+/**
+ * A {@link GatewayClient} whose `check` returns `pending` and whose approval is
+ * then rejected — the second refusal route through `enforceGovernance`, which
+ * emits a different audit action from a straight policy deny.
+ */
+export function createPendingThenRejectGatewayClient(
+  approvalReason?: string
+): PolicyGatewayClient {
+  const decisions: RecordedCheck[] = [];
+  const checkRequests: GatewayCheckRequest[] = [];
+  const auditEvents: GatewayRecordEvent[] = [];
+  const auditResults: GatewayResultRecord[] = [];
+
+  return {
+    mode: "sdk-only",
+    decisions,
+    checkRequests,
+    auditEvents,
+    auditResults,
+    start: async () => undefined,
+    close: async () => undefined,
+    check: async (request: GatewayCheckRequest): Promise<GatewayDecision> => {
+      checkRequests.push(request);
+      decisions.push({
+        toolName: request.toolName,
+        action: request.action,
+        runId: request.runId,
+        denied: false
+      });
+      return { denied: false, pending: true };
+    },
+    // Omitting the reason is the case that exercises the wrapper's `?? "Rejected"`
+    // fallback — a gateway is not obliged to explain itself.
+    waitForApproval: async () =>
+      approvalReason === undefined ? { denied: true } : { denied: true, reason: approvalReason },
+    record: async (event: GatewayRecordEvent) => {
+      auditEvents.push(event);
+    },
+    recordResult: async (record: GatewayResultRecord) => {
+      auditResults.push(record);
+    },
+    scanPrompts: async () => undefined
+  };
+}
+
+/** A denying {@link GatewayClient} whose audit `record` always fails. */
+export interface FailingRecordGatewayClient extends GatewayClient {
+  /** How many times `record` was entered, so a test can tell "failed" from "never called". */
+  readonly recordAttempts: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A denying client whose `record` fails in one of two shapes.
+ *
+ * `sync-throw` is the load-bearing one: it throws *before* returning a promise,
+ * so a trailing `.catch()` on the return value never sees it. Only a
+ * `try`/`catch` around the call contains it.
+ */
+export function createFailingRecordGatewayClient(
+  mode: "async-reject" | "sync-throw"
+): FailingRecordGatewayClient {
+  let attempts = 0;
+  return {
+    mode: "sdk-only",
+    get recordAttempts() {
+      return attempts;
+    },
+    start: async () => undefined,
+    close: async () => undefined,
+    check: async (request: GatewayCheckRequest): Promise<GatewayDecision> => ({
+      denied: true,
+      pending: false,
+      reason: `tool '${request.toolName}' is denied by policy`
+    }),
+    waitForApproval: async () => ({ denied: true }),
+    record: (() => {
+      attempts += 1;
+      if (mode === "sync-throw") {
+        throw new Error("audit sink down (sync)");
+      }
+      return Promise.reject(new Error("audit sink down (async)"));
+    }) as GatewayClient["record"],
+    recordResult: async () => undefined,
+    scanPrompts: async () => undefined
+  };
+}
+
 export function createPolicyGatewayClient(options: {
   denyTools: readonly string[];
 }): PolicyGatewayClient {
diff --git a/tests/quickstart-negative-control.test.ts b/tests/quickstart-negative-control.test.ts
index 71a5ff616..0956cb06f 100644
--- a/tests/quickstart-negative-control.test.ts
+++ b/tests/quickstart-negative-control.test.ts
@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ import { PolicyViolationError } from "../src/errors/policy-violation-error.js";
 import { initAssembly } from "../src/core/init-assembly.js";
 import { withAssembly } from "../src/wrappers/with-assembly.js";
 import {
+  createFailingRecordGatewayClient,
   createFileSideEffect,
   createNetworkSideEffect,
+  createPendingThenRejectGatewayClient,
   createPolicyGatewayClient,
   type FileSideEffect,
   type NetworkSideEffect
@@ -239,6 +241,109 @@ describe("quick-start negative control: what a deny is and is not attributed to"
   });
 });
 
+describe("quick-start negative control: a deny is handed to the gateway's record call", () => {
+  it("hands the gateway an audit event naming the denied tool and its run", async () => {
+    const effect = fileEffect();
+    const gateway = createPolicyGatewayClient({ denyTools: ["write_file"] });
+    const tools = {
+      write_file: { execute: async (content: string) => effect.write(content) }
+    };
+
+    withAssembly(tools, { gatewayClient: gateway, agentId: AGENT_ID });
+
+    const outcome = await settle(tools.write_file.execute("denied-content"));
+
+    // Absence of the effect first, as everywhere else in this file.
+    expect(effect.occurred()).toBe(false);
+    expect(outcome).toBeInstanceOf(PolicyViolationError);
+
+    // The load-bearing assertion for AAASM-5665: the audit event the wrapper
+    // handed the gateway. Before this, `withAssembly` called `check` and never
+    // `record`, so `auditEvents` stayed empty on a deny while `decisions` was
+    // 1 — a deny existed only in the decision log.
+    //
+    // Scope of the evidence: this is the fixture's in-process array. Both
+    // shipped GatewayClient implementations discard the event
+    // (createNoopGatewayClient, createNativeGatewayClient), so a deny is
+    // Unmeasured in audit evidence on the shipped path — AAASM-5681. What this
+    // pins is the wrapper's call.
+    expect(gateway.auditEvents).toHaveLength(1);
+    const event = gateway.auditEvents[0];
+    expect(event?.action).toBe("tool_call_denied");
+    // Correlates the audit event with the decision that produced it.
+    expect(event?.runId).toBe(gateway.decisions[0]?.runId);
+    // GatewayRecordEvent has no tool-name field, so the tool is named in the
+    // reason. Asserting that keeps the event attributable without a wire change.
+    expect(event?.reason).toContain("write_file");
+
+    // The allowed-result sink is still untouched on a deny: the tool never ran,
+    // so there is no result to record. Without this, an implementation that
+    // recorded a bogus empty result would pass the assertions above.
+    expect(gateway.auditResults).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("hands the gateway a distinct audit event when an approval is rejected", async () => {
+    // The second refusal route. Review round 1 found this call site executed by
+    // five tests and asserted by none: deleting it left the suite bit-identical,
+    // while deleting its policy-deny sibling failed a test. Execution is not
+    // pinning, so the action string gets its own control.
+    // Run with and without an approver reason. A gateway is not obliged to
+    // explain a rejection, and attribution must survive that: the tool name
+    // comes from the wrapper's own message, not from the gateway's text.
+    for (const approvalReason of ["approver said no", undefined]) {
+      const effect = fileEffect();
+      const gateway = createPendingThenRejectGatewayClient(approvalReason);
+      const tools = {
+        write_file: { execute: async (content: string) => effect.write(content) }
+      };
+      const label = approvalReason === undefined ? "no reason" : "with reason";
+
+      withAssembly(tools, { gatewayClient: gateway, agentId: AGENT_ID });
+
+      const outcome = await settle(tools.write_file.execute("denied-content"));
+
+      expect(effect.occurred(), `[${label}] the rejected tool body ran`).toBe(false);
+      expect(outcome, `[${label}]`).toBeInstanceOf(PolicyViolationError);
+
+      expect(gateway.auditEvents, `[${label}]`).toHaveLength(1);
+      const event = gateway.auditEvents[0];
+      // Distinct from the policy-deny action, so the two routes stay
+      // distinguishable in whatever sink eventually retains them.
+      expect(event?.action, `[${label}]`).toBe("tool_call_approval_rejected");
+      expect(event?.runId, `[${label}]`).toBe(gateway.decisions[0]?.runId);
+      expect(event?.reason, `[${label}]`).toContain("write_file");
+      expect(gateway.auditResults, `[${label}]`).toHaveLength(0);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("still throws the policy violation when the record call itself fails", async () => {
+    // A caller-supplied gatewayClient is a documented public injection point, so
+    // a record() that throws is reachable user code. Both failure shapes are
+    // covered: a rejected promise, and a SYNCHRONOUS throw — the latter produces
+    // no promise for a trailing .catch() to attach to and escaped past the deny
+    // before this was a try/catch.
+    for (const mode of ["async-reject", "sync-throw"] as const) {
+      const effect = fileEffect();
+      const gateway = createFailingRecordGatewayClient(mode);
+      const tools = {
+        write_file: { execute: async (content: string) => effect.write(content) }
+      };
+
+      withAssembly(tools, { gatewayClient: gateway, agentId: AGENT_ID });
+
+      const outcome = await settle(tools.write_file.execute("denied-content"));
+
+      expect(effect.occurred(), `[${mode}] the denied tool body ran`).toBe(false);
+      // The enforcement decision survives the audit failure — a caller doing
+      // `catch (e) { if (e instanceof PolicyViolationError) ... }` still sees it.
+      expect(outcome, `[${mode}] the audit failure replaced the deny`).toBeInstanceOf(
+        PolicyViolationError
+      );
+      expect(gateway.recordAttempts, `[${mode}] record() was never attempted`).toBe(1);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
 describe("quick-start negative control: an ungoverned seam cannot look protected", () => {
   it("a tool with no execute/invoke seam is warned about and still performs its effect", async () => {
     const effect = fileEffect();