diff --git a/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/artifact/verify.rs b/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/artifact/verify.rs
index ca0aab99..88b28f28 100644
--- a/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/artifact/verify.rs
+++ b/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/artifact/verify.rs
@@ -501,9 +501,30 @@ pub async fn handle_verify(file: &Path, args: VerifyArtifactArgs) -> Result<()>
                     valid = false;
                 }
                 Some(sha) => {
-                    // Verify the commit is signed by a trusted key.
-                    // Uses in-process verification via auths-verifier (no git shell-out).
-                    let commit_sig_ok = verify_commit_in_process(sha).await;
+                    // Verify the commit is signed by a trusted key. With an identity
+                    // bundle the commit leg verifies against the bundle's evidenced
+                    // KELs (the stateless CI posture — same doctrine as
+                    // `auths verify <sha> --identity-bundle`); otherwise the local
+                    // registry resolves the signer in-process (no git shell-out).
+                    let commit_sig_ok = match &identity_bundle {
+                        Some(bundle_path) => {
+                            match crate::commands::verify_commit::commit_trusted_via_bundle(
+                                sha,
+                                bundle_path,
+                            )
+                            .await
+                            {
+                                Ok(()) => true,
+                                Err(reason) => {
+                                    if !is_json_mode() {
+                                        eprintln!("  Commit-anchor leg failed: {reason}");
+                                    }
+                                    false
+                                }
+                            }
+                        }
+                        None => verify_commit_in_process(sha).await,
+                    };
 
                     if !commit_sig_ok {
                         valid = false;
@@ -643,7 +664,12 @@ pub async fn handle_verify(file: &Path, args: VerifyArtifactArgs) -> Result<()>
             commit_sha: commit_sha_val,
             commit_verified,
             oidc_join,
-            error: log_anchor_error.or(oidc_error),
+            error: log_anchor_error.or(oidc_error).or_else(|| {
+                (!valid).then(|| {
+                    "attestation chain or its commit-anchor leg did not verify (see lines above)"
+                        .to_string()
+                })
+            }),
         },
     )
 }
@@ -703,6 +729,18 @@ fn resolve_identity_key(
     identity_bundle: &Option<PathBuf>,
     attestation: &Attestation,
 ) -> Result<(auths_verifier::DevicePublicKey, CanonicalDid)> {
+    // An ephemeral (`did:key:`) attestation is SELF-signed: its chain leg can only
+    // verify against the issuer's own in-band key — the bundle's root never signed
+    // it. The bundle still anchors the COMMIT leg (artifact ← ephemeral key ←
+    // commit ← maintainer), enforced in the ephemeral commit-anchor step below.
+    if attestation.issuer.as_str().starts_with("did:key:") {
+        let issuer = &attestation.issuer;
+        let (pk_bytes, curve) = resolve_pk_from_did(issuer)
+            .with_context(|| format!("Failed to resolve public key from issuer DID '{issuer}'"))?;
+        let pk = auths_verifier::DevicePublicKey::try_new(curve, &pk_bytes)
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Invalid issuer public key resolved from DID: {e}"))?;
+        return Ok((pk, issuer.clone()));
+    }
     if let Some(bundle_path) = identity_bundle {
         let bundle_content = fs::read_to_string(bundle_path)
             .with_context(|| format!("Failed to read identity bundle: {:?}", bundle_path))?;
diff --git a/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/verify_commit.rs b/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/verify_commit.rs
index f8faba30..7b0fc0d8 100644
--- a/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/verify_commit.rs
+++ b/crates/auths-cli/src/commands/verify_commit.rs
@@ -603,6 +603,98 @@ fn raw_commit_object(sha: &str) -> Result<String> {
 
 /// Map a [`CommitVerdict`] onto a CLI result row: the valid flag, the verified signer,
 /// and a human-readable reason for every failure mode.
+/// Bundle-evidence commit trust for sibling commands — the artifact verifier's
+/// ephemeral commit-anchor leg. Same doctrine as `auths verify <sha>
+/// --identity-bundle`: the repo's pinned roots are the anchor, the bundle is KEL
+/// EVIDENCE only (RT-005), and the verdict tolerates the bundle's offline
+/// freshness grade exactly as the commit command does.
+///
+/// Args:
+/// * `sha`: the full commit SHA the attestation anchors to.
+/// * `bundle_path`: the identity bundle supplied to the artifact verify.
+///
+/// Usage:
+/// ```ignore
+/// commit_trusted_via_bundle(&sha, Path::new(".auths/ci-bundle.json")).await?;
+/// ```
+pub(crate) async fn commit_trusted_via_bundle(
+    sha: &str,
+    bundle_path: &std::path::Path,
+) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
+    let raw_commit = raw_commit_object(sha).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let (trailer_root_did, device_did) =
+        auths_sdk::workflows::commit_trust::commit_signer_trailers(&raw_commit)
+            .ok_or_else(|| "commit carries no Auths-Id/Auths-Device trailers".to_string())?;
+
+    let pinned_roots = super::verify_helpers::load_project_pinned_roots();
+    if pinned_roots.is_empty() {
+        return Err(
+            "no pinned roots (.auths/roots) — a bundle is evidence for a pinned root, \
+             never the source of the pin"
+                .to_string(),
+        );
+    }
+    #[allow(clippy::disallowed_methods)] // presentation boundary: freshness needs the wall clock
+    let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+    let (root, kel, device_kels) = load_bundle_trust(bundle_path, now)?;
+    if !pinned_roots.contains(&root) {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "identity bundle root {root} is not independently trusted: add it to .auths/roots"
+        ));
+    }
+    let mut bundle_kels: Vec<BundleKel> = Vec::new();
+    if !kel.is_empty() {
+        bundle_kels.push(BundleKel {
+            did: root,
+            events: kel,
+        });
+    }
+    bundle_kels.extend(
+        device_kels
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|(did, events)| BundleKel { did, events }),
+    );
+
+    let auths_home = auths_sdk::paths::auths_home().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let registry =
+        GitRegistryBackend::from_config_unchecked(RegistryConfig::single_tenant(&auths_home));
+    let device_kel = resolve_signer_kel(&registry, &bundle_kels, &device_did)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("device KEL for {device_did} could not be resolved: {e}"))?;
+    let root_did = match device_kel.first().and_then(|e| e.delegator()) {
+        Some(delegator) => format!("did:keri:{delegator}"),
+        None => trailer_root_did,
+    };
+    let root_kel = resolve_signer_kel(&registry, &bundle_kels, &root_did)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("root KEL for {root_did} could not be resolved: {e}"))?;
+
+    let provider = auths_crypto::RingCryptoProvider;
+    let receipt_lookup = GitWitnessReceiptLookup::new(&auths_home);
+    let witnessed = verify_commit_against_kel_witnessed_scoped(
+        raw_commit.as_bytes(),
+        &device_kel,
+        &root_kel,
+        &pinned_roots,
+        &provider,
+        &receipt_lookup,
+        VerifierWitnessPolicy::Warn,
+        now.timestamp(),
+    )
+    .await;
+    let verdict = witnessed
+        .verdict
+        .with_freshness(&FreshnessPolicy::default(), FreshnessEvidence::Offline);
+    let result = verdict_to_result(sha.to_string(), verdict);
+    if result.valid {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(result.error.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            "commit did not verify against the bundle-evidenced KELs".to_string()
+        }))
+    }
+}
+
 fn verdict_to_result(commit: String, verdict: CommitVerdict) -> VerifyCommitResult {
     let mut result = VerifyCommitResult::failure(commit, String::new());
     // The stable machine code travels in the `status` field regardless of the