diff --git a/src/backend/app/rate_limit.py b/src/backend/app/rate_limit.py
index d4bd1db..b4bbacc 100644
--- a/src/backend/app/rate_limit.py
+++ b/src/backend/app/rate_limit.py
@@ -58,5 +58,15 @@ def rate_limit_exceeded_handler(
 #:   app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, rate_limit_exceeded_handler)
 limiter = Limiter(key_func=client_ip)
 
-#: Brute-force limit applied to auth endpoints that accept credentials.
+#: Brute-force limit applied to auth endpoints that accept credentials
+#: (login). Deliberately strict because each attempt is a password guess.
 AUTH_RATE_LIMIT = "5/minute"
+
+#: Limit applied to the token-refresh endpoint. Refresh carries no
+#: user-supplied credentials — only a signed, HttpOnly refresh cookie — and the
+#: frontend calls it automatically on every page load (twice under React
+#: StrictMode in dev). The strict login limit would therefore reject normal
+#: reloads with a 429 and bounce the user to the login page, so refresh gets a
+#: much more generous ceiling that still bounds abuse of the rotating-token
+#: endpoint.
+REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT = "60/minute"
diff --git a/src/backend/app/routers/auth.py b/src/backend/app/routers/auth.py
index d7b9e91..f1d8a4f 100644
--- a/src/backend/app/routers/auth.py
+++ b/src/backend/app/routers/auth.py
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 from app.database import get_db
 from app.dependencies import get_current_user
 from app.models.user import User
-from app.rate_limit import AUTH_RATE_LIMIT, limiter
+from app.rate_limit import AUTH_RATE_LIMIT, REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT, limiter
 from app.schemas.auth import AccessTokenResponse, LoginRequest
 from app.schemas.user import UserResponse
 from app.services import auth_service
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ def login(
 
 
 @router.post("/refresh", response_model=AccessTokenResponse)
-@limiter.limit(AUTH_RATE_LIMIT)
+@limiter.limit(REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT)
 def refresh(
     request: Request,
     response: Response,
diff --git a/src/backend/tests/integration/test_auth_router.py b/src/backend/tests/integration/test_auth_router.py
index 8d2827e..a82528e 100644
--- a/src/backend/tests/integration/test_auth_router.py
+++ b/src/backend/tests/integration/test_auth_router.py
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 from app.config import settings
 from app.models.user import User
+from app.rate_limit import REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT
 from tests.conftest import ADMIN_PASSWORD, INACTIVE_PASSWORD, VIEWER_PASSWORD
 
 
@@ -270,23 +271,38 @@ def test_login_rate_limited_after_five_attempts(
     assert "detail" in sixth.json()
 
 
-def test_refresh_rate_limited_after_five_attempts(client: TestClient) -> None:
-    """Six rapid refresh attempts from the same IP hit 429 on the sixth.
+def test_refresh_not_rate_limited_at_login_threshold(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Refresh tolerates more requests than the strict login limit.
 
-    The refresh endpoint is called without a valid cookie so it would return
-    401 anyway, but the rate limit is evaluated before authentication and
-    counts all requests regardless of cookie validity.
+    The frontend calls ``/auth/refresh`` automatically on every page load (twice
+    under React StrictMode in dev), so it must not share login's 5/minute
+    brute-force ceiling. Ten rapid refreshes — well past the login limit — must
+    never be rate-limited, otherwise normal reloads would bounce the user to the
+    login page with a 429.
     """
-    for i in range(5):
+    for i in range(10):
         resp = client.post("/auth/refresh")
-        assert resp.status_code == 401, (
-            f"attempt {i + 1}: expected 401, got {resp.status_code}"
+        assert resp.status_code != 429, (
+            f"attempt {i + 1} unexpectedly rate-limited"
         )
 
-    sixth = client.post("/auth/refresh")
-    assert sixth.status_code == 429
-    assert "retry-after" in sixth.headers
-    assert "detail" in sixth.json()
+
+def test_refresh_eventually_rate_limited(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Refresh is still bounded — exceeding its own limit returns 429.
+
+    The endpoint rotates the refresh token on each successful call, so it keeps
+    a generous-but-finite ceiling. Sending one request beyond REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT
+    from the same IP trips the limiter.
+    """
+    limit = int(REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT.split("/")[0])
+
+    for _ in range(limit):
+        client.post("/auth/refresh")
+
+    over_limit = client.post("/auth/refresh")
+    assert over_limit.status_code == 429
+    assert "retry-after" in over_limit.headers
+    assert "detail" in over_limit.json()
 
 
 def test_login_under_limit_is_not_rate_limited(
diff --git a/src/frontend/src/components/ui/badge.tsx b/src/frontend/src/components/ui/badge.tsx
index 981f826..1e19eae 100644
--- a/src/frontend/src/components/ui/badge.tsx
+++ b/src/frontend/src/components/ui/badge.tsx
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ const badgeVariants = cva(
   {
     variants: {
       variant: {
-        default: "border-primary/30 bg-primary/10 text-foreground",
-        secondary: "border-border bg-secondary text-foreground",
-        success: "border-success/30 bg-success/10 text-foreground",
-        warning: "border-warning/30 bg-warning/10 text-foreground",
-        destructive: "border-destructive/30 bg-destructive/10 text-foreground",
-        outline: "border-border text-foreground",
+        default: "border-primary/30 bg-primary/10 text-primary",
+        secondary: "border-border bg-secondary text-secondary-foreground",
+        success: "border-success/30 bg-success/10 text-success",
+        warning: "border-warning/30 bg-warning/10 text-warning",
+        destructive: "border-destructive/30 bg-destructive/10 text-destructive",
+        outline: "border-border text-muted-foreground",
       },
     },
     defaultVariants: {