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Security and privacy

Native sandbox

Studio retains the macOS App Sandbox and requests only:

  • Outbound network access for image downloads and platform connectivity.
  • Inbound network access for loopback-only local forwarding.
  • Audio input for microphone features in the trusted local workspace.
  • Virtualization for its private Linux VM.
  • The two Sparkle installer communication names required for signed application updates: ai.cbk.private-oci-stack-spks and ai.cbk.private-oci-stack-spki.

It does not request general file access, camera access, Apple Events automation, or a blanket library-validation exception.

Sparkle's signed Installer XPC service, Autoupdate, and Updater components operate outside the host sandbox for the update workflow. The unused Downloader service is removed.

Runtime boundary

Containerization is linked into the sandboxed application and the bundled Linux kernel boots inside Studio's VM. Host listeners use loopback addresses only. Studio neither depends on nor controls another installed container runtime.

Studio ignores SIGPIPE before starting runtime workers so a disconnected socket returns EPIPE to Containerization's existing relay error handling instead of terminating the app. Other signals are unchanged. The regression-only StudioCrashProbe executable is not bundled or granted application entitlements.

Data and credentials

Runtime data lives in Studio's Application Support area. Model provider credentials are atomically saved as an owner-only configuration file inside the existing platform-data disk. The native UI can determine whether a provider is configured but never reads a saved secret back for display.

Cache cleanup preserves persistent volumes, backups, and service disks. If Studio cannot determine the last-known-good image set, it retains image references rather than deleting uncertain data.

Saved diagnostic logs remain inside the sandbox, with owner-only permissions and a 4 MiB retention limit. Service output is not guaranteed to be secret-free; review it before sharing. Logs are not uploaded automatically, and diagnostics require no additional entitlements.

Embedded web content

Studio adds App Transport Security HTTP exceptions only for the exact cbk-apps.localhost and cbk-labs.localhost names through per-domain exceptions. These local services do not use TLS. The exceptions do not include subdomains or disable ATS for other web content. Packaging verifies the complete policy; no sandbox entitlements are added for these exceptions.

The local platform is treated as Studio's trusted application origin. Same-origin new-window requests open in another Studio window; external destinations open in the default browser. WebKit still controls user-activation and page security rules.

Microphone use is automatically accepted at the page layer only for the trusted local origin. macOS continues to present and enforce Studio's system privacy permission.

Updates

Public releases use Developer ID signing, Apple notarization, a stapled application bundle, and Ed25519 verification of update archives. Studio waits for a graceful VM shutdown before an update replaces the running application. A shutdown failure blocks installation rather than risking runtime data.