Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>

Author: serhiy-storchaka

Doc/library/shutil.rst

@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ provided.  They rely on the :mod:`zipfile` and :mod:`tarfile` modules.
 
       Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
       It is possible that files are created outside of the path specified in
-      the *extract_dir* argument, e.g. members that have absolute filenames
+      the *extract_dir* argument, for example, members that have absolute filenames
       or filenames with ".." components.
 
       Since Python 3.14, the defaults for both built-in formats (zip and tar

Doc/library/zipfile.rst

@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ ZipFile objects
    .. warning::
 
       Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
-      It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members
+      It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, for example, members
       that have absolute filenames or filenames with ".." components.
       This module attempts to prevent that.
       See :meth:`extract` note.
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ Path objects
       The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike
       the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the
       caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
-      vulnerabilities (e.g., absolute paths or paths with ".." cmponents). When handling
+      vulnerabilities (for example, absolute paths or paths with ".." components). When handling
       untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath`
       and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.