From aae9ae077782c934b73d179107f50e29209dd6d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Serhiy Storchaka Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 11:36:12 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] gh-146581: Update docs for dangerous filenames in ZIP files (GH-149994) (cherry picked from commit ba0aca3bffce431fe2fbd53ca4cd6a717a2e2c19) Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka Co-authored-by: Sebastian Gassner --- Doc/library/shutil.rst | 4 ++-- Doc/library/zipfile.rst | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Doc/library/shutil.rst b/Doc/library/shutil.rst index 4e4d7927da7703..396e699384d7d1 100644 --- a/Doc/library/shutil.rst +++ b/Doc/library/shutil.rst @@ -728,8 +728,8 @@ provided. They rely on the :mod:`zipfile` and :mod:`tarfile` modules. Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. It is possible that files are created outside of the path specified in - the *extract_dir* argument, e.g. members that have absolute filenames - starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..". + the *extract_dir* argument, for example, members that have absolute filenames + or filenames with ".." components. .. versionchanged:: 3.7 Accepts a :term:`path-like object` for *filename* and *extract_dir*. diff --git a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst index 32081d66fe3a11..7e0eae9d681163 100644 --- a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst +++ b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst @@ -374,9 +374,9 @@ ZipFile objects .. warning:: Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. - It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members - that have absolute filenames starting with ``"/"`` or filenames with two - dots ``".."``. This module attempts to prevent that. + It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, for example, members + that have absolute filenames or filenames with ".." components. + This module attempts to prevent that. See :meth:`extract` note. .. versionchanged:: 3.6 @@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ Path objects The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal - vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling + vulnerabilities (for example, absolute paths or paths with ".." components). When handling untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath` and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.