diff --git a/.agents/pm/chores/pm-ey1zh7.toon b/.agents/pm/chores/pm-ey1zh7.toon
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca6e71c81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/pm/chores/pm-ey1zh7.toon
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+id: pm-ey1zh7
+title: "Refresh mature GitHub Action pins: CodeQL 4.39.1, CodSpeed action 5.6.0 and TruffleHog 3.99.7"
+description: "Adopt the five github-actions updates Dependabot proposed in GH PR #1651 once each upstream release cleared the seven-day age floor, and move the exact-pin workflow contracts with them."
+type: Chore
+status: closed
+priority: 2
+tags[3]: "area:ci",dependencies,supply-chain
+created_at: "2026-11-02T09:29:42.682Z"
+updated_at: "2026-11-02T10:30:25.507Z"
+closed_at: "2026-11-02T09:33:53.521Z"
+completed_at: "2026-11-02T09:33:53.521Z"
+author: "harness:claude-code"
+estimated_minutes: 45
+acceptance_criteria: "Every workflow pins github/codeql-action init, analyze and upload-sarif to 9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 (v4.39.1), CodSpeedHQ/action to 78102a468f96d8e0ccb92d0ec49425753fc42062 (v5.6.0) and trufflesecurity/trufflehog to 31ce31ee1abbcc7dc8eee5764c17121c3044c8b2 (v3.99.7), each SHA verified against its dereferenced release tag; The executed TruffleHog version input matches the action pin (3.99.7); GH PR #1651 is closed with a comment that links this item and the implementing PR; tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts pins the exact new CodSpeed and TruffleHog SHAs and the TruffleHog version and passes (its CodeQL assertions only require some 40-character SHA pin and it does not read scorecard.yml, so the CodeQL refresh is verified by the tag-to-SHA check and actionlint, not by the spec), and the dependency-cooldown, workflow-permissions and actionlint gates pass"
+parent: pm-ogzvx6
+risk: low
+confidence: high
+resolution: "Pinned github/codeql-action init/analyze/upload-sarif to v4.39.1 (9b3254085494), CodSpeedHQ/action to v5.6.0 (78102a468f96) and trufflesecurity/trufflehog to v3.99.7 (31ce31ee1abb) with version input 3.99.7. Every SHA was checked against its dereferenced release tag. All three releases are older than seven days. tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts moved its exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog pins and the TruffleHog version (24 passed). Its CodeQL checks accept any 40-character SHA pin and scorecard.yml is not inspected, so the CodeQL refresh rests on the tag check and actionlint. The cooldown, workflow-permissions and actionlint gates pass. Dependabot GH PR #1651 is closed with a comment linking this item and PR #1653."
+expected_result: "Workflows run the eligible CodeQL, CodSpeed and TruffleHog releases under exact SHA pins verified against their release tags, and the workflow contract spec enforces the exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog pins and the TruffleHog version (its CodeQL checks require only some SHA pin)"
+actual_result: "Workflows pin the eligible CodeQL, CodSpeed and TruffleHog releases by verified SHA. The workflow contract spec enforces the exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog pins and the TruffleHog version, and requires only some SHA pin for CodeQL"
+dependencies[1]{id,kind,created_at,author,source_kind,author_source}:
+  pm-8skz5z,related,"2026-11-02T09:31:47.070Z","harness:claude-code","cli:update:dep",detected
+files[5]{path,scope}:
+  .github/workflows/codeql.yml,project
+  .github/workflows/codspeed.yml,project
+  .github/workflows/scorecard.yml,project
+  .github/workflows/security.yml,project
+  tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts,project
+tests[1]{command,scope,timeout_seconds,provenance{author,created_at,source_kind,source_ref},note}:
+  pnpm exec vitest run tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts,project,300,"harness:claude-code","2026-11-02T09:33:52.761Z",local_mutation,chore/actions-refresh-and-triage-2026-11-02,exact action pins and TruffleHog version contract
+close_reason: "Shipped in PR #1653: all five action pins refreshed under verified SHAs with their workflow contracts"
+body: "Release ages verified on 2026-11-02 via the GitHub releases API: codeql-action v4.39.1 2026-10-21T15:48Z, CodSpeedHQ/action v5.6.0 2026-10-22T13:18Z, trufflehog v3.99.7 2026-10-24T06:04Z. Each proposed SHA equals the commit its tag dereferences to. Dependabot's own branch cannot pass because tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts pins the exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog SHAs and the TruffleHog version input, so the refresh lands with the contract update in a maintainer PR, as for pm-8skz5z."
diff --git a/.agents/pm/chores/pm-t3jxjj.toon b/.agents/pm/chores/pm-t3jxjj.toon
index b67f70381..c1e78241d 100644
--- a/.agents/pm/chores/pm-t3jxjj.toon
+++ b/.agents/pm/chores/pm-t3jxjj.toon
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ status: open
 priority: 3
 tags[3]: dependencies,sentry,telemetry
 created_at: "2026-09-27T21:20:34.332Z"
-updated_at: "2026-11-01T05:46:43.327Z"
+updated_at: "2026-11-02T09:30:12.233Z"
 author: "harness:codex"
 estimated_minutes: 240
 acceptance_criteria: "Revalidate the exact upstream publication timestamp and seven-day cooldown before choosing an eligible Sentry 11 version; Demonstrate Node 22/24/26 installed-consumer compatibility, telemetry delivery and expected-error classification with positive and negative controls; Pass static, exact coverage and release gates and document rollback to the prior supported major without losing queued telemetry"
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ dependencies[3]{id,kind,created_at,author,source_kind,author_source}:
   pm-u9qqip,discovered_from,"2026-09-27T21:20:34.332Z","harness:codex","cli:create:dep",detected
   pm-u9d0,implements,"2026-09-28T05:51:10.872Z","harness:codex","cli:update:dep",detected
   pm-2csj4k,related,"2026-11-01T05:46:42.755Z","harness:claude-code","cli:update:dep",detected
-comments[16]:
+comments[17]:
   - created_at: "2026-09-27T21:20:34.332Z"
     author: "harness:codex"
     text: "Duplicate check: all-status searches for Sentry 11 major migration and Sentry 11.0.0 found historical closed 10.x refresh and telemetry items but no major-upgrade owner. Registry metadata: @sentry/node latest 11.0.0, released 2026-09-23T12:38:30.858Z; engine range includes supported Node >=22.18.0. This item is open and unclaimed until the seven-day release-age policy allows adoption."
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ comments[16]:
   - created_at: "2026-11-01T05:46:34.899Z"
     author: "harness:claude-code"
     text: "2026-11-01 registry measurement: eligible Sentry 11.9.0 (published 2026-10-23) replaces the OpenTelemetry SDK packages with @sentry/bundler-plugins (pulls the Sentry CLI package 'sentry' 0.45, 15.5 MB, plus oxc-parser native bindings), @sentry/server-utils (22.0 MB unpacked) and @sentry/server-runtime-injection (6.9 MB). The bundled runtime closure is capped at 25 MB unpacked by scripts/release/package-artifact-budget.json, so adopting @sentry/node 11 as-is would exceed the runtime budget several times over, on top of the enableLogs compile break recorded above. Adoption needs a lighter integration (for example a core-only transport) or an explicit budget decision, not a version bump. Upside recorded for the decision: Sentry 11 drops the OpenTelemetry 2.x packages whose <1.10.0 peer caps cause Bun's install warnings; pm-2csj4k removes those warnings now by pinning the tested peers, independent of this migration."
+  - created_at: "2026-11-02T09:30:12.232Z"
+    author: "harness:claude-code"
+    text: "Dependabot GH PR #1650 (@sentry/node 10.76.2 to 11.9.0, opened 2026-11-02) is closed under this item, following GH PRs #1403, #1448, #1503 and #1600. Verified 2026-11-02: 11.9.0 (published 2026-10-23, past the age floor) still fails the TypeScript build with TS2353 at src/core/sentry/instrument.ts:490, because enableLogs is absent from NodeOptions. It still depends on @sentry/bundler-plugins, @sentry/server-runtime-injection and @sentry/server-utils, the footprint recorded here against the runtime bundle budget. Nothing about this item's adoption blockers changed. Dependabot will re-propose on the next 11.x release."
 notes[1]{created_at,author,text,edited_at}:
   "2026-09-28T05:51:10.872Z","harness:codex","Readiness repair 2026-09-28: the complete active census found this as the sole item lacking acceptance criteria, estimate, risk, confidence and expected result. The 240-minute estimate covers compatibility investigation and verification, not a promised delivery date. Earliest adoption remains seven complete days after the recorded upstream release (2026-09-30T12:38:30.858Z), with live registry revalidation before dependency changes.","2026-09-28T07:22:06.053Z"
 files[4]{path,scope}:
diff --git a/.agents/pm/history/pm-ey1zh7.jsonl b/.agents/pm/history/pm-ey1zh7.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a1a09be2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agents/pm/history/pm-ey1zh7.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:29:42.682Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"create","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/body","value":"Release ages verified on 2026-11-02 via the GitHub releases API: codeql-action v4.39.1 2026-10-21T15:48Z, CodSpeedHQ/action v5.6.0 2026-10-22T13:18Z, trufflehog v3.99.7 2026-10-24T06:04Z. Each proposed SHA equals the commit its tag dereferences to. Dependabot's own branch cannot pass because tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts pins the exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog SHAs and the TruffleHog version input, so the refresh lands with the contract update in a maintainer PR, as for pm-8skz5z."},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/id","value":"pm-ey1zh7"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/title","value":"Refresh mature GitHub Action pins: CodeQL 4.39.1, CodSpeed action 5.6.0 and TruffleHog 3.99.7"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/description","value":"Adopt the five github-actions updates Dependabot proposed in GH PR #1651 once each upstream release cleared the seven-day age floor, and move the exact-pin workflow contracts with them."},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/type","value":"Chore"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/status","value":"in_progress"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/priority","value":2},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/tags","value":["area:ci","dependencies","supply-chain"]},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/created_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:29:42.682Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:29:42.682Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/author","value":"harness:claude-code"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/acceptance_criteria","value":"Every workflow pins github/codeql-action init, analyze and upload-sarif to 9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 (v4.39.1), CodSpeedHQ/action to 78102a468f96d8e0ccb92d0ec49425753fc42062 (v5.6.0) and trufflesecurity/trufflehog to 31ce31ee1abbcc7dc8eee5764c17121c3044c8b2 (v3.99.7), each SHA verified against its dereferenced release tag; The executed TruffleHog version input matches the action pin (3.99.7); tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts pins the new SHAs and version and passes, and the dependency-cooldown, workflow-permissions and actionlint gates pass; GH PR #1651 is closed with a comment that links this item and the implementing PR"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/parent","value":"pm-ogzvx6"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/risk","value":"low"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/confidence","value":"high"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/expected_result","value":"Workflows run the eligible CodeQL, CodSpeed and TruffleHog releases under exact SHA pins, and the contract spec enforces exactly those pins"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/actual_result","value":"Dependabot PR #1651 failed coverage shard 1/4 because the workflow contract spec still pinned CodSpeed 5.5.0 and TruffleHog 3.99.3; all three upstream releases (2026-10-21, 2026-10-22, 2026-10-24) are older than seven days"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/files","value":[{"path":".github/workflows/codeql.yml","scope":"project"},{"path":".github/workflows/codspeed.yml","scope":"project"},{"path":".github/workflows/scorecard.yml","scope":"project"},{"path":".github/workflows/security.yml","scope":"project"},{"path":"tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts","scope":"project"}]}],"before_hash":"3cc22dff72be7b14824654a7a64ea62b04799939b2fee54c1b5f52ca60bf6df0","after_hash":"6300a50306e28d70b0f980f981b53c9a44d9bbb15140b4ca072c668f46013409","item_hash_version":3,"message":"","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"6de070bfaf2037ef12bc4d8228a1c8f0bdfb97375431c9b81ed9b950fe8c24da"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:31:47.279Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:31:47.279Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/estimated_minutes","value":45},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/dependencies","value":[{"id":"pm-8skz5z","kind":"related","created_at":"2026-11-02T09:31:47.070Z","author":"harness:claude-code","source_kind":"cli:update:dep","author_source":"detected"}]}],"before_hash":"6300a50306e28d70b0f980f981b53c9a44d9bbb15140b4ca072c668f46013409","after_hash":"e30678ae2196aecfbd4c4aed8d4703914e336ca5fc0e12f42db05f8371983e5d","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Estimate, and relate the prior scanner-pin refresh the body cites","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"b66ddbfcb1b9b40e849d441193a1283cff98f672d3e6e5c0172be5eb81cad81d"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:33:52.796Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:33:52.796Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/tests","value":[{"command":"pnpm exec vitest run tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts","scope":"project","timeout_seconds":300,"provenance":{"author":"harness:claude-code","created_at":"2026-11-02T09:33:52.761Z","source_kind":"local_mutation","source_ref":"chore/actions-refresh-and-triage-2026-11-02"},"note":"exact action pins and TruffleHog version contract"}]}],"before_hash":"e30678ae2196aecfbd4c4aed8d4703914e336ca5fc0e12f42db05f8371983e5d","after_hash":"3cc83b83fddc38fa7d6a0bd08cb5c3e1ebb4fd7db84775a33fc1000ddaca924a","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Link the contract spec that pins the refreshed actions","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"maintenance","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"aedb4cc445f78f899509a1ab940dae97cc65a5d629e7b3e20ae456338fbe991c"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:33:53.542Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"close","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/actual_result","value":"Workflows pin the eligible CodeQL, CodSpeed and TruffleHog releases by verified SHA, and the workflow contract spec enforces exactly those pins and the TruffleHog version"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:33:53.542Z"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/status","value":"closed"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/closed_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:33:53.521Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/completed_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:33:53.521Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/resolution","value":"Pinned github/codeql-action init/analyze/upload-sarif to v4.39.1 (9b3254085494), CodSpeedHQ/action to v5.6.0 (78102a468f96) and trufflesecurity/trufflehog to v3.99.7 (31ce31ee1abb) with version input 3.99.7. Every SHA was checked against its dereferenced release tag. All three releases are older than seven days. The exact-pin assertions in tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts moved with them (24 passed). The cooldown, workflow-permissions and actionlint gates pass. Dependabot GH PR #1651 is closed with a comment linking this item and PR #1653."},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/close_reason","value":"Shipped in PR #1653: all five action pins refreshed under verified SHAs with their workflow contracts"}],"before_hash":"3cc83b83fddc38fa7d6a0bd08cb5c3e1ebb4fd7db84775a33fc1000ddaca924a","after_hash":"3e2718d3aca903fc6f0a40aa299688537b9244bb328ab85b35ec06ed8c10d626","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"completion":{"timestamp":"2026-11-02T09:33:53.521Z","source":"close_time"},"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"f470320a897f10b414352615cdbec3326a0ce3c69a9a39db6b3ae3c95fb56a3e"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:40:16.876Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/actual_result","value":"Workflows pin the eligible CodeQL, CodSpeed and TruffleHog releases by verified SHA. The workflow contract spec enforces the exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog pins and the TruffleHog version, and requires only some SHA pin for CodeQL"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/resolution","value":"Pinned github/codeql-action init/analyze/upload-sarif to v4.39.1 (9b3254085494), CodSpeedHQ/action to v5.6.0 (78102a468f96) and trufflesecurity/trufflehog to v3.99.7 (31ce31ee1abb) with version input 3.99.7. Every SHA was checked against its dereferenced release tag. All three releases are older than seven days. tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts moved its exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog pins and the TruffleHog version (24 passed). Its CodeQL checks accept any 40-character SHA pin and scorecard.yml is not inspected, so the CodeQL refresh rests on the tag check and actionlint. The cooldown, workflow-permissions and actionlint gates pass. Dependabot GH PR #1651 is closed with a comment linking this item and PR #1653."},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/acceptance_criteria","value":"Every workflow pins github/codeql-action init, analyze and upload-sarif to 9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 (v4.39.1), CodSpeedHQ/action to 78102a468f96d8e0ccb92d0ec49425753fc42062 (v5.6.0) and trufflesecurity/trufflehog to 31ce31ee1abbcc7dc8eee5764c17121c3044c8b2 (v3.99.7), each SHA verified against its dereferenced release tag; The executed TruffleHog version input matches the action pin (3.99.7); GH PR #1651 is closed with a comment that links this item and the implementing PR; tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts pins the exact new CodSpeed and TruffleHog SHAs and the TruffleHog version and passes (its CodeQL assertions only require some 40-character SHA pin and it does not read scorecard.yml, so the CodeQL refresh is verified by the tag-to-SHA check and actionlint, not by the spec), and the dependency-cooldown, workflow-permissions and actionlint gates pass"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:40:16.876Z"}],"before_hash":"3e2718d3aca903fc6f0a40aa299688537b9244bb328ab85b35ec06ed8c10d626","after_hash":"cd059b207cd3fc63e4f7e122e746a35ce2419e1755baec83c3d2dd06c20c7fd8","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Narrow the verification claim to what the contract spec actually enforces (Codex review of PR #1653)","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"91866c33a8a7071902e3c1d1ed34d6cb6a6e436efdd1addb5c37ce0b3ef551f1"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T10:30:25.507Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/expected_result","value":"Workflows run the eligible CodeQL, CodSpeed and TruffleHog releases under exact SHA pins verified against their release tags, and the workflow contract spec enforces the exact CodSpeed and TruffleHog pins and the TruffleHog version (its CodeQL checks require only some SHA pin)"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T10:30:25.507Z"}],"before_hash":"cd059b207cd3fc63e4f7e122e746a35ce2419e1755baec83c3d2dd06c20c7fd8","after_hash":"ef7086bcb497ac9b3d3ac1d2fde354e52642ac3d9daf38e568a090d13fb3ef24","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Align expected_result with the narrowed verification claim (Codex review)","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"maintenance","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"be830d18226584a36a82e7554c9478a531c3f88b68fafeac4ed2d5ea14d463ac"}
diff --git a/.agents/pm/history/pm-jd2zim.jsonl b/.agents/pm/history/pm-jd2zim.jsonl
index be86aed7a..82528a493 100644
--- a/.agents/pm/history/pm-jd2zim.jsonl
+++ b/.agents/pm/history/pm-jd2zim.jsonl
@@ -2,3 +2,8 @@
 {"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-01T15:44:51.871Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"489489c9e2938b0738fed20a","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-01T15:44:51.871Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/estimated_minutes","value":360}],"before_hash":"c59f5f0b59f9254b836b8b55d174fe2ea9aec809b77102758c2ee6c005b52591","after_hash":"f6b9795cda3f519e01a40d23520d961747ccc8ff85049863786afdfcd96b652e","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"972975b8f258b26e3a358bf230e449ec4b058bcaed213aa3e01854d5e77ba725"}
 {"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-01T16:32:37.087Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"489489c9e2938b0738fed20a","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-01T16:32:37.087Z"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/description","value":"Lock GC sweep, post-EEXIST stale reclaim and the post-create entry check re-resolve lock paths after pm-gh1647's one-time confinement check, so a concurrent lock-directory swap can make pm read or unlink outside the tracker. Bind those steps to the verified directory (Linux procfs dirfd) or refuse when its identity changed."}],"before_hash":"f6b9795cda3f519e01a40d23520d961747ccc8ff85049863786afdfcd96b652e","after_hash":"8c4b91fd54ba0797203b841a61fd9774fc3562b9d8cb510da5b6e13ab9ee547f","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"35e4d398e038b913211fb8da4c974be755fc0dc51a68890ef49287f80687fe6a"}
 {"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-01T17:04:44.866Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"489489c9e2938b0738fed20a","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/body","value":"Discovered from pm-gh1647 during the PR 1648 CodeRabbit review (two Major and two Minor follow-ups, all present at the merge base before pm-gh1647).\n\npm-gh1647 refuses a lock directory that is ALREADY a symlink or non-directory, and detects a swap between its confinement check and `open(wx)` by comparing dev/ino identity. Every later step still acts by pathname, so a concurrent writer that swaps `locks/` (or a parent) for a symlink in the window can make pm act outside the tracker:\n\n1. **`pm gc --scope locks` sweep** (`src/core/lock/lock-gc.ts`): `inspectConfinedLockDirectory` runs once before `readdir`. The per-entry `readFile`, the cleanup gate in `removeObservedLock` and `fs.unlink(lockPath)` all re-resolve the path. A mid-scan swap can unlink an expired `*.lock` in an outside directory and report it as `locks/<file>`.\n2. **Post-EEXIST stale reclaim** (`src/core/lock/lock.ts`, acquire loop): after `EEXIST`, `assertLockCreateContention` checks only that the final entry is not a symlink. The reclaim then reads `lockPath`, takes the stale cleanup gate and unlinks `lockPath` by pathname. If the directory was swapped before `open(wx)`, `EEXIST` can come from an outside `<id>.lock`, and a stale or dead-owner outside file can be deleted.\n3. **Post-create entry check** (`verifyConfinedLockCreation`): the directory identity is re-inspected by pathname and then `lstat(lockPath)` runs separately. A swap between the two calls to an outside directory that holds a hard link to the created inode passes the identity check. The returned lease then releases and fences by pathname.\n4. **lstat failure treated as absent** (`assertLockEntryNotSymlink`): every lstat error returns early, so a transient non-ENOENT failure after `EEXIST` lets `readLockInfo` read the entry with a symlink-following `readFile`. Windows `EPERM`/`EACCES`/`EBUSY` delete-pending waits (recognized by `isLockCreateContention`) must keep waiting rather than become failures.\n\nThreat model: a pre-existing symlink committed into a cloned repository is already refused by pm-gh1647. These windows need a concurrent local writer that can modify `.agents/pm/` while pm runs, which is the same actor that could edit items directly, so the impact is narrower. It still contradicts the documented confinement guarantee.\n\nApproach: Node has no `openat` / `unlinkat`. On Linux, open the verified directory with `O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW` and address entries through `/proc/self/fd/<dirfd>/<name>`; the magic link stays bound to the verified directory inode even if the path is swapped, which gives `*at` semantics for read, gate creation and unlink. A pathname re-check is NOT a fix, because a writer can swap the directory between the check and the unlink. Where a directory-bound operation is unavailable (no procfs, other platforms), refuse the destructive step (typed `lock_path_unsafe` / `lock_directory_replaced`) rather than proceeding by pathname: `pm gc --scope locks` refuses to sweep, stale reclaim refuses and waits or fails with the typed refusal, and creation verification refuses when it cannot bind the entry check."},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-01T17:04:44.866Z"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/description","value":"Lock GC sweep, post-EEXIST stale reclaim and the post-create entry check re-resolve lock paths after pm-gh1647's one-time confinement check, so a concurrent lock-directory swap can make pm read or unlink outside the tracker. Bind those steps to the verified directory (Linux procfs dirfd) and refuse wherever binding is unavailable; a pathname re-check is not a fix."}],"before_hash":"8c4b91fd54ba0797203b841a61fd9774fc3562b9d8cb510da5b6e13ab9ee547f","after_hash":"c45c51bd634c7c6b8f1501af0cbbb076b3c58ed75e0893b91ebef50b8034cc3a","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"783e8d7056abc325cd333f5a6bfd2b2de91f4dfb8fa823438cc343b310de5a51"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:29:57.014Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/acceptance_criteria","value":"pm gc --scope locks never unlinks or reads a lock entry outside the tracker when locks/ is swapped for a symlink during the sweep, proven by a regression test that swaps the directory between readdir and removal; The post-EEXIST stale-lock reclaim never reads, gates or unlinks through a replaced lock directory and refuses with lock_path_unsafe when the directory identity changed since creation, proven by a swap regression test; verifyConfinedLockCreation binds its entry check to the verified directory (Linux procfs dirfd) so a hard-linked inode in a swapped outside directory cannot pass, and other platforms refuse when identity cannot be bound; assertLockEntryNotSymlink treats only ENOENT as absent while preserving the Windows EPERM, EACCES and EBUSY delete-pending waits; docs/SDK.md states the exact confinement guarantee per operation and platform; When the post-open entry check refuses with lock_path_unsafe after a late swap, the SDK removes the lock file it just created only if that path still names the inode of the opened descriptor (verified through the bound directory, never by a fresh pathname lookup), so no empty lock file is left outside the tracker and no file pm did not create is ever unlinked, proven by the GH-1652 late-swap regression (fs.open mocked to swap locks/ just before the wx open)"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:29:57.014Z"}],"before_hash":"c45c51bd634c7c6b8f1501af0cbbb076b3c58ed75e0893b91ebef50b8034cc3a","after_hash":"6108dbd8bb40d289275484333a9b1cd410471d250d4029ffb1e06ba467586412","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Extend the post-create confinement scope with the GH-1652 debris-on-refusal case","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"7a196e37c053ed8c0b61d9923dfd61cce017352e41d80e9021a922be2373f1ac"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:29:57.622Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":null,"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"comment_add","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:29:57.622Z"},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/comments","value":[{"created_at":"2026-11-02T09:29:57.622Z","author":"harness:claude-code","text":"GH-1652 (opened 2026-11-02, reproduced against SDK 2026.11.2 on Node 26) maps here. pm-gh1647's post-open check correctly refuses with lock_path_unsafe when locks/ is swapped for a symlink between the confinement checks and the exclusive open. But the 0-byte <id>.lock that the open created stays in the symlink target, outside the tracker. This is the refusal-side half of the post-create entry seam (body item 3): the cleanup must be bound to the same verified directory and inode identity as the check, or it becomes a pathname unlink outside the tracker. Added as an acceptance criterion instead of filing a separate item, because the fix shares the dirfd binding this item already prescribes. Linux procfs dirfd: unlink only when the opened descriptor's dev/ino still matches the bound entry. Elsewhere: refuse, and report the residue path in the refusal context so the caller can remove it."}]}],"before_hash":"6108dbd8bb40d289275484333a9b1cd410471d250d4029ffb1e06ba467586412","after_hash":"ac7c0c02897518d8f769eeab9df32487a814e5762f49439d5cea3c7c0c97c194","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"95fa6d4f7a7dc5775fd71a825e8d91143debc6e9eb9c7d004db788c8aa58417d"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T10:22:49.344Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"argv"},"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/acceptance_criteria","value":"pm gc --scope locks never unlinks or reads a lock entry outside the tracker when locks/ is swapped for a symlink during the sweep, proven by a regression test that swaps the directory between readdir and removal; The post-EEXIST stale-lock reclaim never reads, gates or unlinks through a replaced lock directory and refuses with lock_path_unsafe when the directory identity changed since creation, proven by a swap regression test; verifyConfinedLockCreation binds its entry check to the verified directory (Linux procfs dirfd) so a hard-linked inode in a swapped outside directory cannot pass, and other platforms refuse when identity cannot be bound; assertLockEntryNotSymlink treats only ENOENT as absent while preserving the Windows EPERM, EACCES and EBUSY delete-pending waits; docs/SDK.md states the exact confinement guarantee per operation and platform; When the post-open entry check refuses with lock_path_unsafe after a late swap, the refusal leaves the created entry in place and names it: the refusal context carries the residue path and the opened descriptor's dev/ino so the caller can verify and remove the file, and docs/SDK.md states that pm never deletes it because Node has no descriptor-relative conditional unlink and any check-then-unlink (even through a bound directory) could remove a concurrently replaced peer lock, proven by the GH-1652 late-swap regression (fs.open mocked to swap locks/ just before the wx open)"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T10:22:49.344Z"}],"before_hash":"ac7c0c02897518d8f769eeab9df32487a814e5762f49439d5cea3c7c0c97c194","after_hash":"d3ab58d4e9780674991378b7e23ecee889cc14172174c4709efbc6ce54f9e957","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Revise the GH-1652 criterion: report the residue instead of a racy cleanup (PR #1653 review)","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"e967c1192ab5dfe5abedaa11dfe24cb06500ef359c3591971491d8c7d492b158"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T10:22:50.002Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":null,"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"comment_add","patch":[{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/comments/1","value":{"created_at":"2026-11-02T10:22:50.002Z","author":"harness:claude-code","text":"Revision (2026-11-02, PR #1653 review): the GH-1652 criterion no longer asks pm to delete the created entry. A cleanup that checks the inode and then unlinks by name is racy, even through a procfs-bound directory. A peer can replace the entry between the check and the unlink, and pm would delete the peer's lock. A quarantine rename cannot be safely undone either: Node has no RENAME_NOREPLACE, and renaming back can clobber a newer entry. The criterion now matches what verifyConfinedLockCreation already does for its other refusals. Refuse, leave the entry in place, and report the residue path plus the opened dev/ino so a caller can verify and remove it. Document why pm does not delete it."}},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T10:22:50.002Z"}],"before_hash":"d3ab58d4e9780674991378b7e23ecee889cc14172174c4709efbc6ce54f9e957","after_hash":"c8c01aa3d0c823f2d98272ee09b83d5e31c93694c17b4760b71c60efe2e4c3fe","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"def612f88efaf31278b635653a29612859a73d0efd0f30341870cd90c35ebb40"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T10:30:26.081Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":null,"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"comment_add","patch":[{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/comments/2","value":{"created_at":"2026-11-02T10:30:26.080Z","author":"harness:claude-code","text":"Clarification to the 2026-11-02 revision: only half of the revised criterion exists today. verifyConfinedLockCreation and acquireLock already leave the entry in place when they refuse (lock.ts closes the handle and rethrows). But the refusal carries neither the residue path nor the opened descriptor's dev/ino, although the function computes that identity. Adding both to the refusal context, plus the docs/SDK.md statement, is new implementation work this item owns."}},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T10:30:26.081Z"}],"before_hash":"c8c01aa3d0c823f2d98272ee09b83d5e31c93694c17b4760b71c60efe2e4c3fe","after_hash":"6cac321355d3d51fce4d83c275f4d012a792bcc023f4946496d08006156fc6a2","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"15509475c9b6e37d8150c029c59ecab5647c49c2f2cdbbda7bb96531162ec6fd"}
diff --git a/.agents/pm/history/pm-t3jxjj.jsonl b/.agents/pm/history/pm-t3jxjj.jsonl
index ad61c0494..d458627a8 100644
--- a/.agents/pm/history/pm-t3jxjj.jsonl
+++ b/.agents/pm/history/pm-t3jxjj.jsonl
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@
 {"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-10-26T04:33:26.677Z","author":"harness:codex","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"codex","agent_model":"gpt-6.1-sol","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"9a3d0027739dfadbcc41b040","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"gpt-6.1-sol","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"probe"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"inferred","confidence":"medium","rule_version":"v2","evidence":["claim:pm-8skz5z","claim:pm-gh1593","lineage:pm-8skz5z","lineage:pm-wb25c1","lineage:pm-u9d0","lineage:pm-doxj"]},"topic":{"value":"workset:pm-8skz5z+pm-gh1593","source":"inferred","confidence":"medium","rule_version":"v2","evidence":["claim:pm-8skz5z","claim:pm-gh1593","lineage:pm-8skz5z","lineage:pm-wb25c1","lineage:pm-u9d0","lineage:pm-doxj"]}},"op":"comment_edit","patch":[{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/comments/14/text","value":"Fresh PR1600 head d098cf978167b589301a1d57ddeb4b673439bf46 proposes 11.8.0 and reproduces TS2353 at src/core/sentry/instrument.ts:461: enableLogs is absent from NodeOptions. Age and Node22 engine admission are satisfied; compilation plus the previously recorded portable-artifact/privacy/telemetry acceptance remain unfulfilled. Added the canonical PM-link comment and closed the unready proposal without an ignore rule, policy bypass or false compatibility claim. This major migration remains open and unclaimed."},{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/comments/14/edited_at","value":"2026-10-26T04:33:26.676Z"},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-10-26T04:33:26.677Z"}],"before_hash":"3ad5781e8b5e693a32094ea6825cb1a4023889b7b5873c59654595be51dad381","after_hash":"bb48fabb796dc244a7952494529dac4a0f293bc2191d2b6aeefa7ce1976a9c4b","item_hash_version":3,"message":"Correct accidental head abbreviation using the exact live GitHub commit","context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"codex_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"effort":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"codex_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"unavailable","reason":"harness_unavailable","resolver":"ai_agent_version","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"9f361bf3aead9d2ae3b44405bd186fdf22a23dd8dc947ced4a4ee3a5996d9242"}
 {"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-01T05:46:34.900Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"8a4268fe12c2a5f9fcd4da8d","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"inferred","confidence":"medium","rule_version":"v2","evidence":["claim:pm-2csj4k","claim:pm-8g06ma","claim:pm-fokyhh","lineage:pm-8g06ma","lineage:pm-92if","lineage:pm-doxj"]},"topic":{"value":"workset:pm-2csj4k+pm-8g06ma+pm-fokyhh","source":"inferred","confidence":"medium","rule_version":"v2","evidence":["claim:pm-2csj4k","claim:pm-8g06ma","claim:pm-fokyhh","lineage:pm-8g06ma","lineage:pm-92if","lineage:pm-doxj"]},"version":{"value":"2.1.314","source":"probe"}},"op":"comment_add","patch":[{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/comments/15","value":{"created_at":"2026-11-01T05:46:34.899Z","author":"harness:claude-code","text":"2026-11-01 registry measurement: eligible Sentry 11.9.0 (published 2026-10-23) replaces the OpenTelemetry SDK packages with @sentry/bundler-plugins (pulls the Sentry CLI package 'sentry' 0.45, 15.5 MB, plus oxc-parser native bindings), @sentry/server-utils (22.0 MB unpacked) and @sentry/server-runtime-injection (6.9 MB). The bundled runtime closure is capped at 25 MB unpacked by scripts/release/package-artifact-budget.json, so adopting @sentry/node 11 as-is would exceed the runtime budget several times over, on top of the enableLogs compile break recorded above. Adoption needs a lighter integration (for example a core-only transport) or an explicit budget decision, not a version bump. Upside recorded for the decision: Sentry 11 drops the OpenTelemetry 2.x packages whose <1.10.0 peer caps cause Bun's install warnings; pm-2csj4k removes those warnings now by pinning the tested peers, independent of this migration."}},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-01T05:46:34.900Z"}],"before_hash":"bb48fabb796dc244a7952494529dac4a0f293bc2191d2b6aeefa7ce1976a9c4b","after_hash":"e834dbdecba415a268ba3bf8c8bf828ea429d308b69cd78eb762caeb1d5ab541","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"bcb06d1b8e346d96dab22f2fda5913a218afafe5f63c0b4cdede44bb7b3a32fe"}
 {"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-01T05:46:43.327Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"8a4268fe12c2a5f9fcd4da8d","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":{"value":"implementer","source":"inferred","confidence":"medium","rule_version":"v2","evidence":["claim:pm-2csj4k","claim:pm-8g06ma","claim:pm-fokyhh","lineage:pm-8g06ma","lineage:pm-92if","lineage:pm-doxj"]},"topic":{"value":"workset:pm-2csj4k+pm-8g06ma+pm-fokyhh","source":"inferred","confidence":"medium","rule_version":"v2","evidence":["claim:pm-2csj4k","claim:pm-8g06ma","claim:pm-fokyhh","lineage:pm-8g06ma","lineage:pm-92if","lineage:pm-doxj"]},"version":{"value":"2.1.314","source":"probe"}},"op":"update","patch":[{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/dependencies/2","value":{"id":"pm-2csj4k","kind":"related","created_at":"2026-11-01T05:46:42.755Z","author":"harness:claude-code","source_kind":"cli:update:dep","author_source":"detected"}},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-01T05:46:43.327Z"}],"before_hash":"e834dbdecba415a268ba3bf8c8bf828ea429d308b69cd78eb762caeb1d5ab541","after_hash":"53dc02ffb6563032bf3c589b406465ccfdc4434126e938c075f622841ebc8776","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"maintenance","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"7a10dc7d5751304425ef9ae647dba8510fcaecd2ef9c8db22fe8eb423719bc8b"}
+{"hash_algorithm":"sha256","ts":"2026-11-02T09:30:12.233Z","author":"harness:claude-code","author_source":"detected","agent_harness":"claude-code","agent_model":"claude-opus-5-5","agent_model_source":"probe","agent_instance":"b343c237d9dd86b74913bb91","agent_provenance":{"model":{"value":"claude-opus-5-5","source":"probe"},"effort":{"value":"xhigh","source":"environment"},"role":null,"topic":null,"version":{"value":"2.1.316","source":"probe"}},"op":"comment_add","patch":[{"op":"add","path":"/metadata/comments/16","value":{"created_at":"2026-11-02T09:30:12.232Z","author":"harness:claude-code","text":"Dependabot GH PR #1650 (@sentry/node 10.76.2 to 11.9.0, opened 2026-11-02) is closed under this item, following GH PRs #1403, #1448, #1503 and #1600. Verified 2026-11-02: 11.9.0 (published 2026-10-23, past the age floor) still fails the TypeScript build with TS2353 at src/core/sentry/instrument.ts:490, because enableLogs is absent from NodeOptions. It still depends on @sentry/bundler-plugins, @sentry/server-runtime-injection and @sentry/server-utils, the footprint recorded here against the runtime bundle budget. Nothing about this item's adoption blockers changed. Dependabot will re-propose on the next 11.x release."}},{"op":"replace","path":"/metadata/updated_at","value":"2026-11-02T09:30:12.233Z"}],"before_hash":"53dc02ffb6563032bf3c589b406465ccfdc4434126e938c075f622841ebc8776","after_hash":"be670c80a276e7bbac50863e90b554e752f74d0fa6fc6452d1a3a1b6fba801c5","item_hash_version":3,"context":{"agent_provenance_outcomes":{"model":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"},"version":{"status":"resolved","resolver":"claude_session_file","rule_version":"v1"}}},"event_class":"substantive","record_hash_version":1,"record_hash":"b55e07e2d86d22a778ac2f7c27bf0c086bbfd4aeee0731d7177e52ea2979af5e"}
diff --git a/.agents/pm/issues/pm-jd2zim.toon b/.agents/pm/issues/pm-jd2zim.toon
index b49b03b5b..fb71d57ab 100644
--- a/.agents/pm/issues/pm-jd2zim.toon
+++ b/.agents/pm/issues/pm-jd2zim.toon
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ status: open
 priority: 2
 tags[4]: confinement,locks,sdk,security
 created_at: "2026-11-01T15:40:08.751Z"
-updated_at: "2026-11-01T17:04:44.866Z"
+updated_at: "2026-11-02T10:30:26.081Z"
 author: "harness:claude-code"
 estimated_minutes: 360
-acceptance_criteria: "pm gc --scope locks never unlinks or reads a lock entry outside the tracker when locks/ is swapped for a symlink during the sweep, proven by a regression test that swaps the directory between readdir and removal; The post-EEXIST stale-lock reclaim never reads, gates or unlinks through a replaced lock directory and refuses with lock_path_unsafe when the directory identity changed since creation, proven by a swap regression test; verifyConfinedLockCreation binds its entry check to the verified directory (Linux procfs dirfd) so a hard-linked inode in a swapped outside directory cannot pass, and other platforms refuse when identity cannot be bound; assertLockEntryNotSymlink treats only ENOENT as absent while preserving the Windows EPERM, EACCES and EBUSY delete-pending waits; docs/SDK.md states the exact confinement guarantee per operation and platform"
+acceptance_criteria: "pm gc --scope locks never unlinks or reads a lock entry outside the tracker when locks/ is swapped for a symlink during the sweep, proven by a regression test that swaps the directory between readdir and removal; The post-EEXIST stale-lock reclaim never reads, gates or unlinks through a replaced lock directory and refuses with lock_path_unsafe when the directory identity changed since creation, proven by a swap regression test; verifyConfinedLockCreation binds its entry check to the verified directory (Linux procfs dirfd) so a hard-linked inode in a swapped outside directory cannot pass, and other platforms refuse when identity cannot be bound; assertLockEntryNotSymlink treats only ENOENT as absent while preserving the Windows EPERM, EACCES and EBUSY delete-pending waits; docs/SDK.md states the exact confinement guarantee per operation and platform; When the post-open entry check refuses with lock_path_unsafe after a late swap, the refusal leaves the created entry in place and names it: the refusal context carries the residue path and the opened descriptor's dev/ino so the caller can verify and remove the file, and docs/SDK.md states that pm never deletes it because Node has no descriptor-relative conditional unlink and any check-then-unlink (even through a bound directory) could remove a concurrently replaced peer lock, proven by the GH-1652 late-swap regression (fs.open mocked to swap locks/ just before the wx open)"
 parent: pm-doxj
 risk: medium
 confidence: high
@@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ expected_result: "Every destructive lock step (gc sweep unlink, stale reclaim re
 actual_result: "Only the initial lock-directory check and the post-create identity comparison are confined. Later reads, gates and unlinks re-resolve the pathname and follow a directory swapped mid-operation"
 dependencies[1]{id,kind,created_at,author,source_kind,author_source}:
   pm-gh1647,discovered_from,"2026-11-01T15:40:08.751Z","harness:claude-code","cli:create:dep",detected
+comments[3]{created_at,author,text}:
+  "2026-11-02T09:29:57.622Z","harness:claude-code","GH-1652 (opened 2026-11-02, reproduced against SDK 2026.11.2 on Node 26) maps here. pm-gh1647's post-open check correctly refuses with lock_path_unsafe when locks/ is swapped for a symlink between the confinement checks and the exclusive open. But the 0-byte <id>.lock that the open created stays in the symlink target, outside the tracker. This is the refusal-side half of the post-create entry seam (body item 3): the cleanup must be bound to the same verified directory and inode identity as the check, or it becomes a pathname unlink outside the tracker. Added as an acceptance criterion instead of filing a separate item, because the fix shares the dirfd binding this item already prescribes. Linux procfs dirfd: unlink only when the opened descriptor's dev/ino still matches the bound entry. Elsewhere: refuse, and report the residue path in the refusal context so the caller can remove it."
+  "2026-11-02T10:22:50.002Z","harness:claude-code","Revision (2026-11-02, PR #1653 review): the GH-1652 criterion no longer asks pm to delete the created entry. A cleanup that checks the inode and then unlinks by name is racy, even through a procfs-bound directory. A peer can replace the entry between the check and the unlink, and pm would delete the peer's lock. A quarantine rename cannot be safely undone either: Node has no RENAME_NOREPLACE, and renaming back can clobber a newer entry. The criterion now matches what verifyConfinedLockCreation already does for its other refusals. Refuse, leave the entry in place, and report the residue path plus the opened dev/ino so a caller can verify and remove it. Document why pm does not delete it."
+  "2026-11-02T10:30:26.080Z","harness:claude-code","Clarification to the 2026-11-02 revision: only half of the revised criterion exists today. verifyConfinedLockCreation and acquireLock already leave the entry in place when they refuse (lock.ts closes the handle and rethrows). But the refusal carries neither the residue path nor the opened descriptor's dev/ino, although the function computes that identity. Adding both to the refusal context, plus the docs/SDK.md statement, is new implementation work this item owns."
 body: "Discovered from pm-gh1647 during the PR 1648 CodeRabbit review (two Major and two Minor follow-ups, all present at the merge base before pm-gh1647).\n\npm-gh1647 refuses a lock directory that is ALREADY a symlink or non-directory, and detects a swap between its confinement check and `open(wx)` by comparing dev/ino identity. Every later step still acts by pathname, so a concurrent writer that swaps `locks/` (or a parent) for a symlink in the window can make pm act outside the tracker:\n\n1. **`pm gc --scope locks` sweep** (`src/core/lock/lock-gc.ts`): `inspectConfinedLockDirectory` runs once before `readdir`. The per-entry `readFile`, the cleanup gate in `removeObservedLock` and `fs.unlink(lockPath)` all re-resolve the path. A mid-scan swap can unlink an expired `*.lock` in an outside directory and report it as `locks/<file>`.\n2. **Post-EEXIST stale reclaim** (`src/core/lock/lock.ts`, acquire loop): after `EEXIST`, `assertLockCreateContention` checks only that the final entry is not a symlink. The reclaim then reads `lockPath`, takes the stale cleanup gate and unlinks `lockPath` by pathname. If the directory was swapped before `open(wx)`, `EEXIST` can come from an outside `<id>.lock`, and a stale or dead-owner outside file can be deleted.\n3. **Post-create entry check** (`verifyConfinedLockCreation`): the directory identity is re-inspected by pathname and then `lstat(lockPath)` runs separately. A swap between the two calls to an outside directory that holds a hard link to the created inode passes the identity check. The returned lease then releases and fences by pathname.\n4. **lstat failure treated as absent** (`assertLockEntryNotSymlink`): every lstat error returns early, so a transient non-ENOENT failure after `EEXIST` lets `readLockInfo` read the entry with a symlink-following `readFile`. Windows `EPERM`/`EACCES`/`EBUSY` delete-pending waits (recognized by `isLockCreateContention`) must keep waiting rather than become failures.\n\nThreat model: a pre-existing symlink committed into a cloned repository is already refused by pm-gh1647. These windows need a concurrent local writer that can modify `.agents/pm/` while pm runs, which is the same actor that could edit items directly, so the impact is narrower. It still contradicts the documented confinement guarantee.\n\nApproach: Node has no `openat` / `unlinkat`. On Linux, open the verified directory with `O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW` and address entries through `/proc/self/fd/<dirfd>/<name>`; the magic link stays bound to the verified directory inode even if the path is swapped, which gives `*at` semantics for read, gate creation and unlink. A pathname re-check is NOT a fix, because a writer can swap the directory between the check and the unlink. Where a directory-bound operation is unavailable (no procfs, other platforms), refuse the destructive step (typed `lock_path_unsafe` / `lock_directory_replaced`) rather than proceeding by pathname: `pm gc --scope locks` refuses to sweep, stale reclaim refuses and waits or fails with the typed refusal, and creation verification refuses when it cannot bind the entry check."
diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
index 232c89aa7..7dcf84b93 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml
@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
 
       - name: Initialize CodeQL
-        uses: github/codeql-action/init@6f2ac81f5cd81fe351a197ba0b00d91d03cd2aee # v4.39.0
+        uses: github/codeql-action/init@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
         with:
           languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
 
       - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
-        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@6f2ac81f5cd81fe351a197ba0b00d91d03cd2aee # v4.39.0
+        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
diff --git a/.github/workflows/codspeed.yml b/.github/workflows/codspeed.yml
index 8ea30cec3..8a0fe9623 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/codspeed.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/codspeed.yml
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ jobs:
           done
 
       - name: Run benchmarks
-        uses: CodSpeedHQ/action@821a40cd6c80e3cfe387caf55668287addd808da # v5.5.0
+        uses: CodSpeedHQ/action@78102a468f96d8e0ccb92d0ec49425753fc42062 # v5.6.0
         with:
           mode: simulation
           # Install instruments against this runner instead of restoring
diff --git a/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml b/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml
index 2d8309da1..e05c7ede0 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml
@@ -49,6 +49,6 @@ jobs:
           retention-days: 5
 
       - name: Upload results to code scanning
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@6f2ac81f5cd81fe351a197ba0b00d91d03cd2aee # v4.39.0
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
         with:
           sarif_file: results.sarif
diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml
index 8d8b64fdb..483766d6d 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/security.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ jobs:
       # since-redacted quote of that same fixture. Never add entries to
       # silence a real finding.
       - name: TruffleHog scan
-        uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@e63326d6545de8f425d93ce24078c6e68d83f70e # v3.99.3
+        uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@31ce31ee1abbcc7dc8eee5764c17121c3044c8b2 # v3.99.7
         with:
-          version: "3.99.3"
+          version: "3.99.7"
           extra_args: --results=verified --fail-on-scan-errors --exclude-paths=.trufflehog-exclude-paths.txt
 
   shellcheck:
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 9bbf14b02..1a398a856 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
 - Typed refusals keep their own headline in human output: a likely_duplicate create refusal no longer reads as an invalid flag value ([pm-btv6x7](https://github.com/unbraind/pm-cli/blob/main/.agents/pm/issues/pm-btv6x7.toon))
 - Preserve surrogate pairs in bounded extension error diagnostics ([pm-y4v90c](https://github.com/unbraind/pm-cli/blob/main/.agents/pm/issues/pm-y4v90c.toon))
 
+### Other
+
+- Refresh mature GitHub Action pins: CodeQL 4.39.1, CodSpeed action 5.6.0 and TruffleHog 3.99.7 ([pm-ey1zh7](https://github.com/unbraind/pm-cli/blob/main/.agents/pm/chores/pm-ey1zh7.toon))
+
 ## 2026.11.2 - 2026-11-02
 
 ### Fixed
diff --git a/tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts b/tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts
index 05c2a689e..d1ea90a82 100644
--- a/tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts
+++ b/tests/integration/ci-workflow-contract.spec.ts
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ describe("GitHub workflow contract", () => {
     expect(benchmarkJob?.["runs-on"]).toBe("ubuntu-22.04");
     expect(setupNodeStep?.with).toMatchObject({ "node-version": 24 });
     expect(codSpeedStep?.uses).toBe(
-      "CodSpeedHQ/action@821a40cd6c80e3cfe387caf55668287addd808da",
+      "CodSpeedHQ/action@78102a468f96d8e0ccb92d0ec49425753fc42062",
     );
     expect(codSpeedOptions).toMatchObject({
       mode: "simulation",
@@ -1630,7 +1630,7 @@ describe("GitHub workflow contract", () => {
       "trivyignores: .trivyignore",
       "skip-dirs: node_modules,dist,coverage,.pnpm-store",
       "extra_args: --results=verified --fail-on-scan-errors --exclude-paths=.trufflehog-exclude-paths.txt",
-      "uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@e63326d6545de8f425d93ce24078c6e68d83f70e # v3.99.3",
+      "uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@31ce31ee1abbcc7dc8eee5764c17121c3044c8b2 # v3.99.7",
       "shellcheck --version",
       "shellcheck --severity=style",
       "$moduleVersion = '1.24.0'",
@@ -1656,8 +1656,8 @@ describe("GitHub workflow contract", () => {
     const scanners = securitySteps.filter(({ uses }) => uses?.startsWith("trufflesecurity/trufflehog@"));
     expect(scanners.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
     for (const scanner of scanners) {
-      expect(scanner.uses).toBe("trufflesecurity/trufflehog@e63326d6545de8f425d93ce24078c6e68d83f70e");
-      expect(scanner.with?.version).toBe("3.99.3");
+      expect(scanner.uses).toBe("trufflesecurity/trufflehog@31ce31ee1abbcc7dc8eee5764c17121c3044c8b2");
+      expect(scanner.with?.version).toBe("3.99.7");
     }
     const trivyStep = securitySteps.find(({ name }) => name === "Trivy repository scan");
     expect(trivyStep?.env).toEqual({ TRIVY_INCLUDE_DEV_DEPS: "true" });