Static security scanner for MCP tool definitions
Trust grades (A–F) before your agent calls a tool — run as an MCP server, CLI, or CI check.
Every MCP tool your agent calls is an attack surface — prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply-chain backdoors. ToolTrust scans tool definitions before your agent trusts them and assigns a trust grade (A–F) so you know the risk. ToolTrust is an MCP Server and a CLI/CI tool — not a host, gateway, or runtime proxy. Coverage is expanding beyond today’s MCP-focused workflows; skills and additional agent tool formats are on the roadmap.
Browse the live ToolTrust Directory — trust grades and scan-backed reports before you install.
MCP demo: run a full config scan from your agent.
Add ToolTrust as an MCP server and let your agent audit its own tools (stdio transport — no network listener; your host launches it as a subprocess):
{
"mcpServers": {
"tooltrust": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "tooltrust-mcp"]
}
}
}Then ask your agent: "Run tooltrust_scan_config"
It reads your MCP config, connects to each server in parallel, scans every tool, and returns a risk report with grades and enforcement decisions — all in seconds.
Or use the CLI:
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash
tooltrust-scanner scan --server "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp"The public ToolTrust Directory holds current grades and aggregates as scanning scales. One published research pass illustrates the shape of the problem — 207 MCP servers, 3,235 tools — not an exhaustive count of everything we scan today:
| Metric | Count |
|---|---|
| MCP servers in cohort | 207 |
| Individual tools analyzed | 3,235 |
| Total security findings | 3,613 |
| Servers with at least one finding | 145 (70%) |
| Servers with a clean Grade A | 22 (10%) |
| Servers with arbitrary code execution | 16 |
Only 10% of servers in that cohort had a clean Grade A. See tooltrust.dev for up-to-date directory-wide results (and use this table only as a labeled snapshot).
ToolTrust runs 16 static analysis rules against every tool definition in this repo (AS-001–AS-011, AS-013–AS-017). AS-012 (tool drift) is evaluated in the ToolTrust Directory when new scan results are compared to previous runs.
| Threat | Rule | What it detects |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection | AS-001 | Malicious instructions hidden in tool descriptions that hijack agent reasoning |
| Excessive permissions | AS-002 | Tools requesting exec, network, db, or fs access beyond their stated purpose |
| Scope mismatch | AS-003 | Tool names that contradict their actual permissions |
| Supply-chain CVEs | AS-004 | Known vulnerabilities via the OSV database |
| Privilege escalation | AS-005 | Tools requesting admin, root, or sudo scopes |
| Arbitrary code execution | AS-006 | Tools that can run arbitrary scripts or shell commands on your machine |
| Missing metadata | AS-007 | Tools with no description or input schema |
| Known malware | AS-008 | Confirmed compromised package versions (offline blacklist) |
| Typosquatting | AS-009 | Tool names that impersonate legitimate tools via edit-distance |
| Insecure secret handling | AS-010 | Tools whose inputs appear designed to accept API keys, tokens, or passwords in plaintext |
| Missing rate limits | AS-011 | Tools with no timeout or rate-limit configuration |
| Tool shadowing | AS-013 | Duplicate tool names designed to hijack agent behavior |
| Dependency inventory gaps | AS-014 | Tools with no dependency metadata and no repo URL, limiting supply-chain analysis |
| Suspicious npm lifecycle scripts | AS-015 | Dependency versions that run install-time scripts with risky remote-fetch or execution patterns |
| Suspicious npm IOC dependency | AS-016 | Registry metadata or scripts referencing known malicious IOC patterns |
| Suspicious data exfil description | AS-017 | Descriptions suggesting forwarding user data to external endpoints (complements AS-001) |
Full rule details: docs/RULES.md
- Parse — Connects to a live MCP server (or reads a JSON file) and extracts every tool definition
- Analyze — Runs all 16 rules against each tool's name, description, schema, and permissions
- Grade — Assigns a numeric risk score and letter grade (A–F) per tool
- Enforce — Maps each grade to a gateway policy:
ALLOW,REQUIRE_APPROVAL, orBLOCK
Pure static analysis. No LLM calls. No data leaves your machine (except optional CVE lookups). Runs in milliseconds. Deterministic and reproducible.
# One-line install (macOS / Linux)
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash
# Go
go install github.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/cmd/tooltrust-scanner@latest
# npx (no install needed)
npx -y tooltrust-mcpWhen running as an MCP server, ToolTrust exposes these tools to your agent:
| Tool | What it does | Data access |
|---|---|---|
tooltrust_scan_config |
Scan all MCP servers in your .mcp.json or ~/.claude.json |
Reads local config; spawns each server as subprocess |
tooltrust_scan_server |
Launch and scan a specific MCP server by command | Runs user-supplied command as subprocess (stdio) |
tooltrust_scanner_scan |
Scan a raw JSON blob of tool definitions | In-memory only; no subprocess or network |
tooltrust_lookup |
Look up a server's trust grade from the ToolTrust Directory | Network request to ToolTrust Directory API |
tooltrust_list_rules |
List all built-in security rules | Local catalog only |
Block risky MCP servers in your pipeline:
- name: Audit MCP Server
uses: AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner@main
with:
server: "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp"
fail-on: "approval"Never add an untrusted MCP server to your config again:
# Scans the server, then auto-installs if Grade A/B, prompts on C/D, blocks on F
tooltrust-scanner gate @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory -- /tmp
# Replace `claude mcp add` with a scanned install
alias mcp-add='tooltrust-scanner gate'Full gate options and pre-commit hook setup: docs/USAGE.md
If your MCP server passes ToolTrust, let people know:
[](https://www.tooltrust.dev/)Supply-chain alert: ToolTrust detects and blocks confirmed compromised packages including LiteLLM v1.82.7/8 (TeamPCP backdoor), Trivy v0.69.4–v0.69.6, and Langflow < 1.9.0. If you encounter a Grade F with rule AS-008, remove the package immediately and rotate all credentials.
Usage guide · Developer guide · Contributing · Deployment & security · Changelog · Security · License: MIT
