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Please report security issues privately (do not open a public issue with exploit details).

Include:

• Affected component (rynixc, rt/, MCP server, etc.)
• Reproduction steps or proof-of-concept
• Impact assessment

We aim to acknowledge reports within 7 days.

See docs/SECURITY_THREAT_MODEL.md (STRIDE summary).

• rynixc mcp-serve reads arbitrary source from the MCP client and writes diagnostics/fixes — run only with trusted clients.
• Runtime (rt/) is C with ASan coverage in CI; production deployments should enable sanitizers during development.
• Compiler defaults to host clang link (--sandbox=none); opt-in --sandbox=docker isolates the link step when Docker is available (ADR-0022). Treat untrusted .ryx like untrusted C.

• CI runs cargo test --workspace on Ubuntu and Windows.
• Runtime fiber/TCP/load paths run under ASan on Ubuntu CI.
• Suite5 checksum gate on Ubuntu CI prevents silent benchmark drift.