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Device Code Phishing Forensics What We Learned Investigating... - #487
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carlospolop merged 2 commits intoOct 18, 2026
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Decision: keep Microsoft documents that authentication-flow policies apply to Device Registration Service only when they target All resources. Microsoft documents a 15-minute default device-code lifetime; the base phishing page listed expires_in but did not explain its effect on delayed lures. The existing PRT page covers the Broker-to-DRS token flow, so the new Conditional Access section links to it rat… Head: |
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October 18, 2026 11:23
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Blog URL
https://research.eye.security/device-code-phishing-forensics
Blog Title
Device Code Phishing Forensics: What We Learned Investigating BEC in the Wild
Blog high summary
Documents a scaled device-code phishing BEC technique: an attacker places a short-lived code on a DocuSign/OneDrive-themed page, then the victim enters it on genuine Microsoft and completes MFA, authorizing attacker-controlled M365 access. The real domain, form, and MFA defeat common AitM indicators; tokens can enable Exchange compromise and further token abuse.
Provides browser detections for static pages, SPA
fetch/XMLHttpRequest/window.openflows, and EvilTokens AES-GCM loaders; Sentinel KQL for device-code sign-ins and suspicious registrations; and forensics correlating non-interactive logs, linkable token IDs, IP/user-agent, and shared-session UAL activity. Conditional Access must block Device code flow across All resources to prevent Auth Broker bypass and PRT persistence.PR changes
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