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Distrust the compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys (#93 on current main) - #96
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The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CAs were compromised in October 2026. On macOS and Windows the default roots come from Julia's bundled `cert.pem`, which still trusts chains through them and can only be updated by a Julia release. Removing roots would not be enough anyway, because the intermediates are also cross-signed under another root. After a verified `connect`, check the public key of every certificate in the verified chain against the eight keys, and fail the connection on a match. This is the same list that Go and Reseau.jl use. Bump the version to 1.7.1. Fixes #92 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
If the second i2d_X509_PUBKEY call failed, the hash was taken over uninitialized bytes, which match no distrusted key, so the check passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ian Butterworth's #93 on top of today's
main, so it can be merged and released as 1.7.1. #93 conflicts with #87, #94 and #95 only intest/runtests.jl(both sides append testsets at the end); this keeps both.460d931is Ian's commit, cherry-picked unchanged (his authorship kept): after a verifiedconnect, the SHA-256 of every verified-chain certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo is checked against the eight compromised eMudhra intermediate keys, and a match fails the connection. Bumps the version to 1.7.1.d26daff(new): if the secondi2d_X509_PUBKEYcall fails,spki_sha256now throws. Before, it hashed uninitialized bytes, which match no distrusted key, so the check passed.Review notes:
crypto/x509denylist), and the names in the comments match the certificate subjects.opensslCLI: all 16 fixture intermediates (each key under two issuers) hash to the publishedspki-sha256.txtvalues.require_ssl_verification=true, afterSSL_get_verify_resultis OK. OpenSSL.jl's client never resumes sessions, so the verified chain is always present after a successful verification.Verification:
DistrustedKeys37/37.has_distrusted_keystubbed to returnfalse, the end-to-end handshake test fails.Fixes #92
Co-authored-by: Ian Butterworth i.r.butterworth@gmail.com
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