fix(ci): grant id-token permissions to deploy-all.yml caller jobs

[cristim]

Summary

• deploy-all.yml declares no permissions: anywhere, so its four caller jobs (each invoking a reusable deploy workflow via uses:) cannot pass id-token: write down to the callee. id-token is never in the default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, so every OIDC-based cloud login (configure-aws-credentials, google-github-actions/auth, azure/login) run through deploy-all.yml fails.
• Adds a job-level permissions: {id-token: write, contents: read} block to each of the four caller jobs: deploy-aws-lambda, deploy-aws-fargate, deploy-gcp, deploy-azure.
• determine-deployment and notify are untouched: neither calls a reusable workflow or authenticates to anything, so neither should hold id-token: write.

Duplicate issues

#1665 and #1587 are duplicates of the same defect (same file, same missing permissions, same OIDC failure on the multi-cloud path). They differ only in the fix shape they each proposed:

• fix(ci): deploy-all.yml declares no permissions, so called deploy workflows cannot obtain an OIDC token #1665 recommends job-level permissions: on the four caller jobs specifically to avoid granting id-token: write to determine-deployment/notify.
• fix(ci): deploy-all.yml declares no permissions, so every multi-cloud deploy fails to obtain an OIDC token #1587 initially suggests a workflow-level block, but its own "Related" section explicitly separates this functional break from the general default-token hygiene question (that's tracked separately in INF-09: ci.yml has no workflow-level permissions block; most jobs run with default GITHUB_TOKEN scope #1196, rated P3/informational) — so the two issues converge on the same fix once you read past the first suggestion.

This PR fixes it once, per #1665's job-level shape, and closes both.

Caller -> callee permission mapping

Verified each callee's actual requirement by reading its own permissions: blocks on origin/main:

Caller job in deploy-all.yml	Callee workflow	Callee's own requirement	Granted here
deploy-aws-lambda	deploy-aws-lambda.yml	Workflow-level floor contents: read; its actual deploy job additionally declares id-token: write, contents: read (job-level, scoped to the job that assumes the AWS role)	id-token: write, contents: read
deploy-aws-fargate	deploy-aws-fargate.yml	Workflow-level id-token: write, contents: read	id-token: write, contents: read
deploy-gcp	deploy-gcp.yml	Workflow-level id-token: write, contents: read	id-token: write, contents: read
deploy-azure	deploy-azure.yml	Workflow-level id-token: write, contents: read	id-token: write, contents: read

GitHub's reusable-workflow contract: the effective permission set for a called workflow is the intersection of what the caller job grants and what the callee itself declares — a callee can only narrow, never escalate, what its caller passed down. Each of the four callees needs id-token: write for at least one of its own jobs, and none of them needs more than contents: read besides that, so granting exactly {id-token: write, contents: read} at the caller-job level is both necessary and sufficient — nothing is left under-provisioned, and nothing is over-granted.

determine-deployment and notify call no reusable workflow and perform no actions/checkout or cloud auth (both jobs just build a $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY from shell echoes), so they are left with no explicit permissions: block, unchanged from today. Locking down their ambient default-token scope is the separate least-privilege hygiene question tracked in #1196 (P3) and out of scope here.

Verification

• actionlint (v1.7.12) on the changed file: same 44 pre-existing shellcheck notices as the unmodified origin/main version (confirmed by diffing actionlint output with/without this change via git stash), zero new findings — the added permissions: blocks parse correctly and introduce nothing new.
• act -l -W .github/workflows/deploy-all.yml (workflow_dispatch) correctly parses the job graph with the new permissions in place:

  Stage  Job ID                Job name                       Workflow name         Events
  0      determine-deployment  Determine Deployment Strategy  Deploy to All Clouds  workflow_dispatch,release
  1      deploy-aws-lambda     Deploy AWS Lambda              Deploy to All Clouds  workflow_dispatch,release
  1      deploy-aws-fargate    Deploy AWS Fargate             Deploy to All Clouds  workflow_dispatch,release
  1      deploy-gcp            Deploy GCP Cloud Run           Deploy to All Clouds  release,workflow_dispatch
  1      deploy-azure          Deploy Azure Container Apps    Deploy to All Clouds  workflow_dispatch,release
  2      notify                Deployment Results             Deploy to All Clouds  workflow_dispatch,release
  

• Did not dispatch a real multi-cloud deploy (no cloud credentials available in this environment) — the caller/callee permission-intersection reasoning above is the primary verification, as requested.

Scope

permissions: blocks only. No restructuring, no concurrency groups (#1593), no other workflow files touched.

Closes #1665
Closes #1587

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[cristim]

Merging without a CodeRabbit verdict, deliberately, with the reasoning recorded rather than waived.

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