fix(analyzer): make E2 whitespace-tolerant and detect all os.environ read forms

src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/static_patterns_data_exfiltration.py

@@ -58,18 +58,37 @@
     ),
 ]
 E2_PYTHON_FALLBACK_PATTERNS = [
+    # Python: for k, v in os.environ.items() — whitespace-tolerant
     (r"for\s+\w+\s*,\s*\w+\s+in\s+os\s*\.\s*environ\s*\.\s*items\s*\(\s*\)", 0.7),
+    # Python: os.environ["KEY"] / os.environ['SECRET']
+    (
+        r"os\s*\.\s*environ\s*\[\s*['\"][^'\"]*(?:KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL)[^'\"]*['\"]\s*\]",
+        0.8,
+    ),
+    # Python: os.environ.get("KEY")
+    (r"os\s*\.\s*environ\s*\.\s*get\s*\([^)]*(?:KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL)", 0.7),
+    # Python: os.environ.copy() — full environ read
     (r"os\s*\.\s*environ\s*\.\s*copy\s*\(\s*\)", 0.6),
+    # Python: dict(os.environ) — full environ read via dict()
     (r"dict\s*\(\s*os\s*\.\s*environ\s*\)", 0.6),
+    # Python: {**os.environ} — full environ read via spread (mapping-unpack boundaries
+    # only: bare `**os.environ` is also exponentiation and must not be flagged)
     (r"\{\s*\*\*\s*os\s*\.\s*environ\s*\}", 0.6),
+    # Generic keyword-in-var check
 ]
 E2_OTHER_PATTERNS = [
     (r"(?:API_KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL)\s+in\s+(?:key|name|var)", 0.8),
+    # Node.js: process.env["KEY"]
     (r"process\.env\s*\[\s*['\"][^'\"]*(?:KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD)[^'\"]*['\"]\s*\]", 0.7),
+    # Node.js: Object.keys(process.env)
     (r"Object\.keys\s*\(\s*process\.env\s*\)", 0.6),
+    # Shell: env | grep key
     (r"env\s*\|\s*grep\s+(?:-i\s+)?(?:key|secret|token|password)", 0.8),
+    # Shell: printenv KEY
     (r"printenv\s+(?:\w*(?:KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD)\w*)", 0.7),
+    # Natural language: "collect all environment variables"
     (r"collect\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:environment\s+variables?|env\s+vars?)", 0.7),
+    # Natural language: "extract/harvest/gather API keys from environment"
     (r"(?:extract|harvest|gather)\s+(?:api\s+)?keys?\s+from\s+environment", 0.8),
 ]
 E2_PATTERNS = E2_PYTHON_FALLBACK_PATTERNS + E2_OTHER_PATTERNS

tests/unit/test_patterns.py

@@ -185,6 +185,28 @@ def test_e2_unparseable_python_uses_regex_fallback(self) -> None:
 
         assert any(finding.rule_id == "E2" for finding in findings)
 
+    def test_e2_malformed_python_exponentiation_not_flagged(self) -> None:
+        """Malformed-Python fallback must not flag bare `** os.environ` exponentiation.
+
+        `2 ** os.environ` is an exponentiation expression, not a mapping unpack;
+        only `{**os.environ}`-style spreads are harvesting signals. The fallback
+        regex runs because the file has an unrelated syntax error, so this
+        exercises the fallback path specifically (AST is unavailable).
+        """
+        content = "import os\nresult = 2 ** os.environ\ndef broken(\n"
+
+        findings = data_exfiltration_module.analyze(content, "script.py", "python")
+
+        assert not any(finding.rule_id == "E2" for finding in findings), findings
+
+    def test_e2_malformed_python_mapping_spread_still_flagged(self) -> None:
+        """Malformed-Python fallback still detects real `{**os.environ}` spread."""
+        content = "import os\npayload = {**os.environ}\ndef broken(\n"
+
+        findings = data_exfiltration_module.analyze(content, "script.py", "python")
+
+        assert any(finding.rule_id == "E2" for finding in findings), findings
+
     @pytest.mark.parametrize(
         "expression",
         [