[agent] Found by the scheduled pnpm bug-hunt routine (ledger #303).
Summary
With sharedWorkspaceLockfile: false (shared-workspace-lockfile=false in .npmrc on older majors), pnpm writes one pnpm-lock.yaml per workspace package (packages/a/pnpm-lock.yaml, packages/b/pnpm-lock.yaml, …). The root pnpm-lock.yaml covers only the root importer, and is often just importers: .: {}.
scan --mode hosted from the workspace root finds the vulnerable package in node_modules, then reads only the root lock (plus the Rush locks when rush.json exists). The member locks that pnpm actually installs from are never opened. The run ends with exit 0, status: success, redirect.redirected: 0, rewrittenFiles: [], and one redirect_pnpm_entry_not_found warning ("no resolution for is-number@7.0.0"). Every package in the workspace keeps installing the unpatched registry tarball.
Impact
- Hosted mode silently does nothing on this documented pnpm layout.
success / exit 0 tells CI and users the project is patched when no lock was changed.
- VEX stays honest: with nothing pinned,
vex finds nothing to attest. So the failure is "unpatched, but reported as a successful hosted scan", not a false attestation.
- The obvious workaround fails on pnpm 11+. Running
scan --mode hosted --cwd packages/a does pin packages/a/pnpm-lock.yaml, but it also creates packages/a/pnpm-workspace.yaml (packages: ['.'] + trustLockfile: true). That turns the member into a nested workspace root, and pnpm ignores the file when installing from the real root. A fresh pnpm install --frozen-lockfile from the root on pnpm 12.8.1 then fails with ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH.
- Vendored mode on the same layout refuses loudly (
vendor_lock_entry_not_found, partialFailure, exit 1), which is acceptable fail-closed behaviour.
Repro
mkdir -p ws/packages/a ws/packages/b && cd ws
echo '{"name":"root","version":"0.0.0","private":true}' > package.json
echo '{"name":"a","version":"1.0.0","dependencies":{"is-number":"7.0.0"}}' > packages/a/package.json
echo '{"name":"b","version":"1.0.0","dependencies":{"to-regex-range":"5.0.1"}}' > packages/b/package.json # is-number@7.0.0 transitively
printf "packages:\n - 'packages/*'\nsharedWorkspaceLockfile: false\n" > pnpm-workspace.yaml
echo 'shared-workspace-lockfile=false' > .npmrc # pnpm <= 10 reads this
pnpm install
ls pnpm-lock.yaml packages/*/pnpm-lock.yaml # three locks; the root one is `importers: .: {}`
socket-patch scan --mode hosted --json --yes ... # patch for pkg:npm/is-number@7.0.0 is available
# status: success, exit 0, redirect.redirected: 0, rewrittenFiles: [],
# warnings: [{code: redirect_pnpm_entry_not_found, detail: "no resolution for is-number@7.0.0"}]
grep -c 'tarball:' packages/*/pnpm-lock.yaml # 0 everywhere
# fresh checkout + pnpm install --frozen-lockfile -> both a and b load the upstream bytes
(I ran this against a local mock of the patch API: batch / by-package / package grant / view / hosted tarball, with SOCKET_PATCH_SERVER_URL and SOCKET_NPM_REGISTRY pointed at it, the same harness as the repo's e2e_redirect_pnpm_build.rs. The oracle is a marker prepended to is-number/index.js.)
Expected vs actual
- Expected: docs/ecosystems.md (npm hosted-mode notes) says pnpm "workspaces … are handled. Every matching package instance is rewritten; an unsupported instance prevents confirming that dependency across the lockfile set." A pnpm workspace's lockfile set includes its per-package locks when
sharedWorkspaceLockfile is false, so each packages/*/pnpm-lock.yaml that resolves the package should be pinned, with trustLockfile going into the root pnpm-workspace.yaml. At minimum, the run should fail closed (partialFailure / non-zero, as vendored does) instead of reporting success.
- Actual: only the root lock is read, nothing is rewritten, and the status is
success, exit 0.
Matrix (Linux, main 61cfb9b)
| OS |
pnpm |
lock |
hosted from the workspace root |
vendored from the root |
| Linux |
8.15.9 |
6.0 |
fail (success, 0 redirected) |
not run |
| Linux |
9.15.9 |
9.0 |
fail (2/2) |
refuses vendor_lock_entry_not_found (OK) |
| Linux |
10.34.5 |
9.0 |
fail |
refuses (OK) |
| Linux |
11.28.3 |
9.0 |
fail |
refuses (OK) |
| Linux |
12.8.1 |
9.0 |
fail (2/2) |
refuses (OK) |
| Linux |
12.8.1 |
9.0 |
workaround --cwd packages/a: lock pinned, but the root frozen install fails with ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH |
|
Control: the same workspace with the default shared lock is redirected, installs patched bytes in both members, and rolls back byte for byte (passes on 9.15.9 / 10.34.5 / 11.28.3 / 12.8.1). macOS and Windows weren't probed, but the code path is OS-independent.
Not bisected. The 4.0.0 release can't be driven against the v5-shaped mock, and the candidate-file list has never included member locks.
Suspect code
crates/socket-patch-core/src/hosted/engine.rs:404 (read_candidate_files): it reads REDIRECT_CANDIDATE_FILES (root pnpm-lock.yaml), Cargo members, Python locks and the Rush locks (:449, rush_repo), but it never expands the pnpm-workspace.yaml packages: globs into per-member pnpm-lock.yaml keys. The comment there notes that the pnpm rewriter is already basename-generalized for nested keys, so adding member locks (and pointing the trust edit at the root workspace file) looks like the shape of a fix.
crates/socket-patch-core/src/formats/pnpm/hosted.rs:393: redirect_pnpm_entry_not_found is a warning only, so the miss doesn't affect the status.
Backlog review — 2026-10-08
Priority: P1 → P2. Nonshared pnpm workspace locks are missed; scan pins nothing and VEX does not falsely attest.
[agent] Found by the scheduled pnpm bug-hunt routine (ledger #303).
Summary
With
sharedWorkspaceLockfile: false(shared-workspace-lockfile=falsein.npmrcon older majors), pnpm writes onepnpm-lock.yamlper workspace package (packages/a/pnpm-lock.yaml,packages/b/pnpm-lock.yaml, …). The rootpnpm-lock.yamlcovers only the root importer, and is often justimporters: .: {}.scan --mode hostedfrom the workspace root finds the vulnerable package innode_modules, then reads only the root lock (plus the Rush locks whenrush.jsonexists). The member locks that pnpm actually installs from are never opened. The run ends with exit 0,status: success,redirect.redirected: 0,rewrittenFiles: [], and oneredirect_pnpm_entry_not_foundwarning ("no resolution for is-number@7.0.0"). Every package in the workspace keeps installing the unpatched registry tarball.Impact
success/ exit 0 tells CI and users the project is patched when no lock was changed.vexfinds nothing to attest. So the failure is "unpatched, but reported as a successful hosted scan", not a false attestation.scan --mode hosted --cwd packages/adoes pinpackages/a/pnpm-lock.yaml, but it also createspackages/a/pnpm-workspace.yaml(packages: ['.']+trustLockfile: true). That turns the member into a nested workspace root, and pnpm ignores the file when installing from the real root. A freshpnpm install --frozen-lockfilefrom the root on pnpm 12.8.1 then fails withERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCH.vendor_lock_entry_not_found, partialFailure, exit 1), which is acceptable fail-closed behaviour.Repro
(I ran this against a local mock of the patch API: batch / by-package / package grant / view / hosted tarball, with
SOCKET_PATCH_SERVER_URLandSOCKET_NPM_REGISTRYpointed at it, the same harness as the repo'se2e_redirect_pnpm_build.rs. The oracle is a marker prepended tois-number/index.js.)Expected vs actual
sharedWorkspaceLockfileis false, so eachpackages/*/pnpm-lock.yamlthat resolves the package should be pinned, withtrustLockfilegoing into the rootpnpm-workspace.yaml. At minimum, the run should fail closed (partialFailure / non-zero, as vendored does) instead of reportingsuccess.success, exit 0.Matrix (Linux, main
61cfb9b)vendor_lock_entry_not_found(OK)--cwd packages/a: lock pinned, but the root frozen install fails withERR_PNPM_TARBALL_URL_MISMATCHControl: the same workspace with the default shared lock is redirected, installs patched bytes in both members, and rolls back byte for byte (passes on 9.15.9 / 10.34.5 / 11.28.3 / 12.8.1). macOS and Windows weren't probed, but the code path is OS-independent.
Not bisected. The 4.0.0 release can't be driven against the v5-shaped mock, and the candidate-file list has never included member locks.
Suspect code
crates/socket-patch-core/src/hosted/engine.rs:404(read_candidate_files): it readsREDIRECT_CANDIDATE_FILES(rootpnpm-lock.yaml), Cargo members, Python locks and the Rush locks (:449,rush_repo), but it never expands thepnpm-workspace.yamlpackages:globs into per-memberpnpm-lock.yamlkeys. The comment there notes that the pnpm rewriter is already basename-generalized for nested keys, so adding member locks (and pointing the trust edit at the root workspace file) looks like the shape of a fix.crates/socket-patch-core/src/formats/pnpm/hosted.rs:393:redirect_pnpm_entry_not_foundis a warning only, so the miss doesn't affect the status.Backlog review — 2026-10-08
Priority: P1 → P2. Nonshared pnpm workspace locks are missed; scan pins nothing and VEX does not falsely attest.