Security: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Twitter API endpoint - #218
Open
tomaioo wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Conversation
In pages/api/twitter.js, the endpoint header from the request is used directly to make API calls without validation. An attacker can manipulate the 'endpoint' header to make the server request arbitrary URLs, potentially accessing internal services or exfiltrating data. Signed-off-by: tomaioo <203048277+tomaioo@users.noreply.github.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Security: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Twitter API endpoint
Problem
Severity:
Critical| File:pages/api/twitter.js:L1In pages/api/twitter.js, the endpoint header from the request is used directly to make API calls without validation. An attacker can manipulate the 'endpoint' header to make the server request arbitrary URLs, potentially accessing internal services or exfiltrating data.
Solution
Add whitelist validation for allowed Twitter API endpoints. Only allow requests to known Twitter API domains (e.g., api.twitter.com). Remove the ability for clients to specify arbitrary endpoints.
Changes
pages/api/twitter.js(modified)