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π‘οΈ Sentinel: Enforce payload size limit on mod pack imports - #141
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Co-authored-by: TheDragonSoft <75906592+TheDragonSoft@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: MEDIUM
π‘ Vulnerability: Uncontrolled resource allocation / memory exhaustion DoS vulnerability during mod pack import.
π― Impact: An oversized payload string passed to pack import could cause high memory consumption and application crashes.
π§ Fix: Added a 2 MB size limit (
MAX_PACK_CODE_LEN) inimport_packandimport_pack_base64before parsing JSON or decoding Base64 payloads.β Verification: Added unit test
base64_import_fails_on_oversized_inputverifying oversized payloads are safely rejected.PR created automatically by Jules for task 2577023773017839190 started by @TheDragonSoft