Fix security vulnerabilities, register missing blueprint, and clean up codebase issues by Copilot · Pull Request #2 · amitdevx/FileFlow

Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:30:39Z

Repository audit identified security vulnerabilities in archive extraction, missing blueprint registration, and various code quality issues.

Security Fixes

Path traversal in compression service: Archive extraction (zip, tar, 7z) now validates all member paths before extraction
- Rejects absolute paths and .. references
- Uses tarfile.extractall(filter='data') on Python 3.11.4+
Input validation in rename_file: Now uses Validators.is_valid_filename() and sanitize_filename()
SECRET_KEY: Reads from env var; emits RuntimeWarning when falling back to random key

# Path traversal protection example
@staticmethod
def _safe_extract_member(archive_path, member_name, extract_to):
    if Path(member_name).is_absolute():
        raise ValueError(f"Absolute path in archive is not allowed: {member_name}")
    if '..' in Path(member_name).parts:
        raise ValueError(f"Path traversal attempt detected: {member_name}")

Bug Fixes

Register missing compression_bp blueprint in app.py
Remove unused datetime import
Fix stray </form> tags in dashboard.html
Fix file_management.js location (was nested in js/app.js/ directory)

Cleanup

Remove empty auth.js file
Remove duplicate READMED.md (typo)
Replace hardcoded paths in start.sh scripts with SCRIPT_DIR
Add missing aria-pressed attribute on grid-view button

Original prompt

find minor/mid/hard issues in this repo find issues create plan then exute plan in perfect order then recheck the mistakes if find any to the steps again like : find minor/mid/hard issues -> find issues -> create plan -> exute plan in perfect order

✨ Let Copilot coding agent set things up for you — coding agent works faster and does higher quality work when set up for your repo.

…lueprint, unused imports Co-authored-by: amitdevx <110670491+amitdevx@users.noreply.github.com>

…dd SECRET_KEY warning Co-authored-by: amitdevx <110670491+amitdevx@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot

Pull request overview

This PR addresses security vulnerabilities in archive extraction, adds missing blueprint registration, and cleans up various code quality issues. The changes focus on preventing path traversal attacks, improving input validation, and fixing HTML/JavaScript issues.

Changes:

Added path traversal protection to compression service for zip, tar, and 7z extraction
Implemented input validation and sanitization for file renaming operations
Registered missing compression_bp blueprint in app.py
Fixed shell scripts to use dynamic SCRIPT_DIR instead of hardcoded paths
Removed duplicate READMED.md file and empty auth.js file
Added missing aria attributes and removed stray form tags in dashboard.html

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 8 out of 10 changed files in this pull request and generated 7 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
FileFlow/backend/services/compression_service.py	Added security validation methods to prevent path traversal in archive extraction
FileFlow/backend/api/files.py	Added filename validation and sanitization to rename_file endpoint
FileFlow/backend/config.py	Updated SECRET_KEY to read from environment variable with warning for fallback
FileFlow/backend/app.py	Registered compression_bp blueprint and removed unused datetime import
FileFlow/frontend/js/file_management.js	Moved file from incorrect nested directory to proper location
FileFlow/frontend/templates/dashboard.html	Removed stray closing form tags and added aria attributes for accessibility
FileFlow/start.sh	Updated to use dynamic SCRIPT_DIR instead of hardcoded workspace path
start.sh	Updated to use dynamic SCRIPT_DIR for better portability
READMED.md	Removed duplicate file with typo in name
FileFlow/frontend/js/app.js/auth.js	Removed empty file

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Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:48:45Z

FileFlow/backend/services/compression_service.py

+            for member in zipf.namelist():
+                CompressionService._safe_extract_member(archive_path, member, extract_to)
            zipf.extractall(extract_to)

    @staticmethod
    def extract_tar(archive_path, extract_to):
        with tarfile.open(archive_path, 'r:*') as tarf:
-            tarf.extractall(extract_to)
+            # Validate all members before extraction to prevent path traversal
+            for member in tarf.getmembers():
+                CompressionService._safe_extract_member(archive_path, member.name, extract_to)
+            # Use data filter for Python 3.11.4+ or validate manually for earlier versions
+            try:
+                tarf.extractall(extract_to, filter='data')
+            except TypeError:
+                # Python < 3.11.4 doesn't support filter parameter, but we already validated
+                tarf.extractall(extract_to)

    @staticmethod
    def extract_7z(archive_path, extract_to, password=None):
        with py7zr.SevenZipFile(archive_path, 'r', password=password) as szf:
+            # Validate all members before extraction
+            for member in szf.getnames():
+                CompressionService._safe_extract_member(archive_path, member, extract_to)


The calls to _safe_extract_member pass archive_path as the first parameter, but this parameter is unused in the function. All three extraction methods (extract_zip, extract_tar, extract_7z) should be updated to remove this unnecessary parameter.

Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:48:46Z

FileFlow/backend/services/compression_service.py

+        Note: This validates the path string without resolving symlinks to prevent
+        symlink-based attacks. The check uses string comparison after normalization.
+        """
+        try:
+            base = Path(base_path).resolve()
+            # Normalize target without fully resolving to prevent symlink attacks
+            # Join base with target and check if it stays within base


The comment states "Normalize target without fully resolving to prevent symlink attacks" but the code then calls .resolve() on the full path on line 18, which does resolve symlinks. This creates a contradiction between the comment and the implementation. Either the comment should be updated to reflect that symlinks are resolved, or the implementation should be changed to avoid resolving symlinks (though resolving is actually the safer approach).

Suggested change

Note: This validates the path string without resolving symlinks to prevent

symlink-based attacks. The check uses string comparison after normalization.

"""

try:

base = Path(base_path).resolve()

# Normalize target without fully resolving to prevent symlink attacks

# Join base with target and check if it stays within base

Note: This resolves both the base path and the combined target path to

absolute, symlink-resolved paths and then verifies the target remains

within the base directory.

"""

try:

base = Path(base_path).resolve()

# Resolve the combined path and ensure it stays within the resolved base

Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:48:46Z

FileFlow/backend/config.py

+    SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY')
+    if not SECRET_KEY:
+        warnings.warn(
+            "SECRET_KEY not set in environment. Using random key. "
+            "Sessions will be invalidated on restart. "
+            "Set SECRET_KEY environment variable for production use.",
+            RuntimeWarning
+        )
+        SECRET_KEY = os.urandom(24)


The SECRET_KEY is regenerated on every restart when not set via environment variable, which will invalidate all existing user sessions. While the warning message mentions this, the implementation stores the random key in a class variable that persists for the app lifetime but is lost on restart. Consider using a persistent fallback (like storing in a file) for development environments, or make the warning more prominent to ensure production deployments always set the environment variable.

Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:48:46Z

FileFlow/backend/services/compression_service.py

+            # Join base with target and check if it stays within base
+            full_path = (base / target_path).resolve()
+            return full_path.is_relative_to(base)
+        except (ValueError, RuntimeError):


The exception handler on line 20 catches ValueError and RuntimeError but not AttributeError, which will be raised on Python versions before 3.9 when calling is_relative_to(). This method was only added in Python 3.9. The exception tuple should include AttributeError to handle older Python versions gracefully: except (ValueError, RuntimeError, AttributeError):

Suggested change

except (ValueError, RuntimeError):

except (ValueError, RuntimeError, AttributeError):

Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:48:46Z

FileFlow/backend/services/compression_service.py

+            return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _safe_extract_member(archive_path, member_name, extract_to):


The first parameter archive_path is not used in the function body. This parameter should be removed from the function signature as it serves no purpose in the validation logic.

Copilot · 2026-01-31T07:48:47Z

FileFlow/backend/services/compression_service.py

+            # Normalize target without fully resolving to prevent symlink attacks
+            # Join base with target and check if it stays within base
+            full_path = (base / target_path).resolve()
+            return full_path.is_relative_to(base)


The is_relative_to() method was added in Python 3.9. For compatibility with earlier Python versions, this will raise an AttributeError. Consider adding a compatibility check or documenting the minimum Python version requirement in requirements.txt or README.

Suggested change

return full_path.is_relative_to(base)

try:

# If full_path is not within base, this will raise ValueError

full_path.relative_to(base)

return True

except ValueError:

return False

Initial plan

9b66449

Copilot AI assigned Copilot and amitdevx Jan 31, 2026

Copilot started work on behalf of amitdevx January 31, 2026 07:30 View session

Copilot AI and others added 2 commits January 31, 2026 07:34

Fix multiple issues: security vulnerabilities, HTML syntax, missing b…

2c8fc49

…lueprint, unused imports Co-authored-by: amitdevx <110670491+amitdevx@users.noreply.github.com>

Address code review feedback: improve path traversal protection and a…

131d75b

…dd SECRET_KEY warning Co-authored-by: amitdevx <110670491+amitdevx@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot AI changed the title ~~[WIP] Identify and resolve issues in repository~~ Fix security vulnerabilities, register missing blueprint, and clean up codebase issues Jan 31, 2026

Copilot AI requested a review from amitdevx January 31, 2026 07:38

Copilot finished work on behalf of amitdevx January 31, 2026 07:38

amitdevx marked this pull request as ready for review January 31, 2026 07:43

Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings January 31, 2026 07:43

Copilot started reviewing on behalf of amitdevx January 31, 2026 07:43 View session

amitdevx approved these changes Jan 31, 2026

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amitdevx merged commit 31d7479 into main Jan 31, 2026
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Copilot AI reviewed Jan 31, 2026

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Fix security vulnerabilities, register missing blueprint, and clean up codebase issues#2

Fix security vulnerabilities, register missing blueprint, and clean up codebase issues#2
amitdevx merged 3 commits intomainfrom
copilot/find-issues-and-execute-plan

Copilot AI commented Jan 31, 2026 •

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	except (ValueError, RuntimeError):
	except (ValueError, RuntimeError, AttributeError):

-            return full_path.is_relative_to(base)
+            try:
+                # If full_path is not within base, this will raise ValueError
+                full_path.relative_to(base)
+                return True
+            except ValueError:
+                return False

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Copilot AI commented Jan 31, 2026 •

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