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deps: certifi 2026.10.19, dropping the compromised eMudhra roots - #3
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The forwarder takes every sweep's destination from Kraken's DepositAddresses response, fetched with requests, which verifies against certifi's bundle rather than the host's. certifi 2026.1.4 still trusts "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" (and "AAA Certificate Services", which cross-signs it), under which the private keys of eight eMudhra intermediates were disclosed as compromised on 2026-10-20. A holder of one of those keys who can intercept the connection could present a certificate for api.kraken.com that verifies, and hand back their own deposit address. certifi 2026.10.19 removes both roots. Lock-only change, made with the Poetry that wrote the lock (poetry update --lock certifi); nothing else moves. See https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
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Bumps
certififrom 2026.1.4 to 2026.10.19 inpoetry.lock. Lock-only, made with the Poetry that wrote the lock (poetry update --lock certifi, Poetry 2.2.1). Nothing else moves, and the hashes match PyPI.Why
On 2026-10-20 the private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CAs were disclosed as compromised (https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/). They chain to "emSign ECC Root CA - G3", which certifi 2026.1.4 still trusts. They also chain through the Sectigo cross-sign to "AAA Certificate Services", which 2026.1.4 trusts too.
The forwarder takes every sweep's destination address from Kraken's
/0/private/DepositAddressesresponse (get_new_kraken_address→util.kraken_request→requests.post).requestsverifies against certifi's bundle, not the host's, so updating the host's ca-certificates does not protect this container. Someone holding one of those keys who can MITM or DNS-spoof the connection could present a certificate for api.kraken.com that verifies, then return their own deposit address. certifi 2026.10.19 removes both roots.Verification
I built the app image (
docker build --platform linux/amd64 .) twice: once from 21954da (the commit deployed now) and once from this branch. In each image I ran the same script, which prints certifi's version, checks whether the bundle still has the root, then callsrequests.geton eMudhra's demo site (its certificate comes from the compromised "EM DV TLS CA - G3B") and on Kraken.The demo site now fails with
CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED: unable to get local issuer certificate. In the new bundle, "AAA Certificate Services" is gone too, and the emSign roots left are C1, C3 and G1, none of them in the disclosed chain. Kraken still verifies.Deploying
This moves the app image's commit, so on the next
autoforward.yamlrunautoforwardandautoconvertare recreated (the wallet images are tagged by their own build contexts and stay as they are). A recreatedautoforwardstarts a pass right away. The ansible PR that movesautoforward_versioncarries this warning too.