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The generic-api-key rule matched the SHA256 fingerprint that git prints when it checks an SSH commit signature, for example the output of git log --show-signature. A fingerprint is a hash of a public key, not a credential, so the redaction replaced it and the no-secrets policy reported a false positive. Add an allowlist for an OpenSSH SHA256 fingerprint: SHA256: and exactly 43 base64 characters at the end of the match. A longer value after the same prefix is still redacted. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Miguel Martinez Trivino <miguel@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 34d67f3d-296c-4dce-b668-3a73637e6a43
Contributor
PR validation —
|
| Status | Policy | Material | Messages |
|---|---|---|---|
pr-min-approvals |
pr-info |
PR/MR #3712 has 0 approving reviews, 1 required. | |
| ✅ Passed | pr-description-required |
pr-info |
- |
pr-user-story-linked |
pr-info |
PR/MR #3712 does not reference a user story or issue in title, description, or branch 'fix(trace): keep SSH key fingerprints in redacted sessions'. Expected patterns: ["(?i)[A-Z]+-[0-9]+", "#[0-9]+", "(?i)gh-[0-9]+", "(?i)\\[[A-Z]+-[0-9]+\\]"] |
AI Session Checks — 🟢 87% · ⚠️ 1 failing
| Avg score | Sessions | Failing policies | Attribution | Files | Lines | Total Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🟢 87% | 1 | 100% AI / 0% Human | 2 | +50 / -0 | 31m34s |
🟢 87% — 100% AI — ⚠️ 1 policies failing
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Oct 24, 2026 12:56 UTC · 31m34s · $20.48 · 620 in / 240.6k out · claude-code 2.1.310 (claude-opus-5-5)
Change Summary
-
- Adds an OpenSSH fingerprint allowlist to
internal/redaction/betterleaks.toml. - Extends
internal/redaction/precision_test.gowith kept-fingerprint and still-redacted guard cases. - Re-runs the redaction package and an AI-session consumer package after the fix.
- Adds an OpenSSH fingerprint allowlist to
AI Session Overall Score
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🟢 87% — Focused redaction fix with strong tests, but no explicit user confirmation.
AI Session Analysis Breakdown
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🟢 96% · scope-discipline
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🟢 AI split the false-positive fix from the earlier SEC-634 work. · High Impact
🟢 92% · alignment
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No notes.
🟢 91% · solution-quality
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🟢 The allowlist targets exact OpenSSH fingerprint shape instead of a broad bypass. · High Impact
🟢 86% · user-trust-signal
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No notes.
🟢 84% · context-and-planning
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No notes.
🟡 76% · verification
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🟢 AI ran failing tests first, then reran redaction and consumer packages successfully. · High Impact
🟠 Tests passed in-session, but the user never explicitly confirmed the final redaction behavior. · Medium Severity
💡 When the user is present, ask for a quick confirm after the last passing run.
-
File Attribution
████████████████████100% AI / 0% HumanStatus Attribution File Lines modified ai internal/redaction/precision_test.go+39 / -0 modified ai internal/redaction/betterleaks.toml+11 / -0
Policies (4, 1 failing)
Status Policy Material Messages ✅ Passed ai-config-ai-agents-allowedai-coding-session-34d67f- ✅ Passed ai-config-no-dangerous-commandsai-coding-session-34d67f- ⚠️ Failedai-config-no-secretsai-coding-session-34d67f- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1003, source=tool_result, line=59]: |
⚠️ Failed |ai-config-no-secrets| [ai-coding-session-34d67f](https://app.chainloop.dev/u/chainloop/projects/chainloop/versi... - Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1049, source=user-message, line=1]: see Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=927, source=tool_result, line=2]: Good "git" signature for miguel@chainloop.dev with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic...
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1075, source=assistant-text, line=10]: Good "git" signature for miguel@chainloop.dev with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1173, source=tool_result, line=31]: "password: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]\napi_key: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n",
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1224, source=tool_result, line=11]: actual : "Good \"git\" signature for sarah@chainloop.local with RSA key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1224, source=tool_result, line=16]: Error: "Good \"git\" signature with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\napi_key: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n" does not contain "SHA256:q3Rk8vLm2+Zx7Pw...
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1224, source=tool_result, line=5]: actual : "Good \"git\" signature for sarah@chainloop.local with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1308, source=tool_result, line=11]: DEF: "with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1308, source=tool_result, line=5]: DEF: "key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1308, source=tool_result, line=6]: OUR: "key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1308, source=tool_result, line=8]: DEF: "with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=1308, source=tool_result, line=9]: OUR: "with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n"
- Secret (generic-api-key) detected in session content [turn=927, source=tool_result, line=2]: Good "git" signature for miguel@chainloop.dev with ED25519 key SHA256:[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]
- Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=1109, source=tool_result, line=105]: text:
text: "host: localhost\\nuser: admin\\npassword: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]\\nport: 5432\\n",+ "\n", - Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=1124, source=tool_result, line=1]: text:
text: "host: localhost\\nuser: admin\\npassword: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]\\nport: 5432\\n",+ "\n", - Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=1124, source=tool_result, line=64]: text := "const AUTH0 = {\n email: 'input[name=\"login\"]',\n password: '[CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]',\n};\n"
- Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=1173, source=tool_result, line=30]: "| ai-config-no-secrets | fail | Secret (generic-password) detected [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password] |\n",
- Secret (generic-password) detected in session content [turn=1173, source=tool_result, line=31]: "password: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-password]\napi_key: [CHAINLOOP_TRACE_REDACTED:generic-api-key]\n",
✅ Passed ai-config-mcp-servers-allowedai-coding-session-34d67f- -
Security Checks — ✅ 5 passing
✅ secret-scan
| Status | Policy | Messages |
|---|---|---|
| ✅ Passed | secrets-detection |
- |
✅ sast-scan
| Status | Policy | Messages |
|---|---|---|
| ✅ Passed | owasp-top10-2025 |
- |
| ✅ Passed | sast |
- |
| ✅ Passed | cwe-top25 |
- |
| ✅ Passed | cwe-top26-40-cusp |
- |
Scans not applied (3)
| Scan | Reason |
|---|---|
vulnerability-scan |
no manifest/lockfile changed |
github-actions-scan |
no workflow files changed |
iac-scan |
no IaC files changed |
Security context
✅ Nothing this change touches has a recorded security-fix history.
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View guided diff | Re-trigger cubic
A key that went on after the 43 fingerprint characters with a - . or _ was kept, because any non-base64 character counted as the end. Only the terminator the generic-api-key rule adds to its match can now follow. Assisted-by: Claude Code Signed-off-by: Miguel Martinez Trivino <miguel@chainloop.dev> Chainloop-Trace-Sessions: 34d67f3d-296c-4dce-b668-3a73637e6a43
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Chainloop Trace redacted the SHA256 fingerprint that git prints when it checks an SSH commit signature, for example in the output of
git log --show-signature. The betterleaksgeneric-api-keyrule matches it, so the session showed a redaction placeholder and theai-config-no-secretspolicy reported a secret. A fingerprint is a hash of a public key, not a credential.This adds an allowlist to the redaction ruleset for an OpenSSH SHA256 fingerprint:
SHA256:followed by exactly 43 base64 characters at the end of the match. A longer value after the same prefix, and other secrets in the same text, are still redacted.AI disclosure: this change was produced with assistance from Claude Code.