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feat: Tailscale remote-access profile for secure smartphone-to-container connectivity#127

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feat: Tailscale remote-access profile for secure smartphone-to-container connectivity#127
Copilot wants to merge 4 commits intomasterfrom
copilot/execute-plan-docker-connectivity

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Copilot AI commented Mar 25, 2026

Adds a remote Docker Compose profile that enables secure smartphone access to a locally-running container from anywhere — no port-forwarding, no Azure, no static IP. Uses Tailscale (WireGuard) as the VPN mesh with Tailscale Serve for automatic TLS termination and Let's Encrypt cert provisioning.

Architecture

Smartphone → WireGuard (Tailscale) → tailscale sidecar
                                        Tailscale Serve: TLS :443 (auto Let's Encrypt)
                                        → HTTP proxy → app:3000

Changes

Infrastructure

  • docker-compose.yml — adds tailscale sidecar service under profiles: [remote] with healthcheck and a custom entrypoint
  • docker-compose.remote.yml (new) — compose override that switches app to NODE_ENV=production, correct BASE_URL, and TRUST_PROXY=1; applied only when enabling HTTPS in phase 2
  • scripts/tailscale-entrypoint.sh (new) — generates tailscale serve JSON config from $TS_DOMAIN at container startup, then execs into containerboot as PID 1. Bootstrap mode (empty TS_DOMAIN) skips serve config so the device registers first and you discover its FQDN before enabling TLS

App server

  • server.js — when TRUST_PROXY=1, sets ADDRESS_HEADER=X-Forwarded-For and XFF_DEPTH=1 so SvelteKit adapter-node honours the real client IP and HTTPS protocol from Tailscale Serve (needed for rate-limiting, secure cookies, and CSRF)

Optional / advanced

  • Caddyfile (new) — reference config for users who want Caddy as an HTTP-layer proxy on top; not used by the default setup

Docs & config

  • .env.example — documents TS_AUTHKEY, TS_HOSTNAME, TS_DOMAIN
  • docs/REMOTE-ACCESS.md (new) — full guide: two-phase setup flow, PWA install, push notifications, Tailscale ACLs, ALLOWED_GITHUB_USERS, troubleshooting

Two-phase setup

Phase 1 (bootstrap — no TS_DOMAIN needed):

docker compose --profile remote up -d --build
# → device registers; find FQDN at login.tailscale.com/admin/machines

Phase 2 (enable HTTPS after setting TS_DOMAIN + BASE_URL):

docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.remote.yml \
  --profile remote up -d --force-recreate
# → Tailscale provisions Let's Encrypt cert, app served over HTTPS

Type of Change

  • 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
  • ✨ New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
  • 💥 Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change)
  • ♻️ Refactoring (no functional changes)
  • 📝 Documentation
  • 🔧 CI/Build/Infrastructure
  • 🔒 Security fix

Testing

  • I have added/updated unit tests for my changes (npm run test:unit)
  • I have added/updated E2E tests if this changes UI behavior (npx playwright test)
  • All existing tests pass
  • I have tested on all 3 device profiles (desktop, mobile, iPhone) if UI changed
  • I have updated docs/TEST-MATRIX.md if this PR adds or modifies a feature

Quality Checklist

  • My code follows the project conventions (TypeScript strict, Svelte 5 runes, factory functions)
  • I have run npm run check with no new errors
  • I have run npm run build successfully
  • Self-reviewed my own code for clarity and correctness
  • Added comments only where the code needs clarification
  • No console.log or debug code left in

Security (for public repo)

  • No secrets, API keys, or credentials in code or comments
  • No references to private repos, internal infrastructure, or deployment details
  • Input validation added for any new user-facing inputs
  • XSS prevention maintained (DOMPurify for HTML rendering)
  • SSRF protection maintained for any new URL inputs

Screenshots / Recordings

No UI changes. Infrastructure and server-layer only.

Original prompt

execute the plan after creating a dedicated issue containing full plan

**Chronological Review:** 1. User requested a plan for secure smartphone-to-local-container connectivity, noting "maybe not everyone has Azure" 2. Two background explore agents were launched to analyze: (a) networking/security architecture, (b) PWA/mobile support 3. Both agents completed after ~90-97 seconds with comprehensive findings 4. Five clarifying questions were asked via ask_user tool 5. Plan was created and saved to plan.md file 6. 8 todos with 12 dependencies were inserted into SQL tables 7. Plan mode was exited with a summary

Intent Mapping:

  • User wants secure smartphone access to locally-running Docker container without Azure dependency
  • Wants "very strong and safe connection"
  • Selected: remote access from anywhere, full PWA with push, Tailscale approach, all-in-docker-compose, device-restricted access

Technical Inventory:

  • Current app: SvelteKit + adapter-node, HTTP-only, Express server.js, WebSocket support
  • Docker: single container with port 3000, NODE_ENV=development default
  • PWA: Full manifest, service worker, push notifications (all require HTTPS)
  • Security: CSRF, WS origin check, secure cookies — all tied to BASE_URL/ORIGIN env vars
  • Planned: Tailscale sidecar + Caddy reverse proxy in docker-compose profiles

Code Archaeology:

  • server.js: HTTP-only, binds 0.0.0.0, ORIGIN defaults to BASE_URL or localhost
  • hooks.server.ts: CSRF check compares Origin vs BASE_URL, skipped in dev
  • ws/handler.ts: WebSocket origin validation, skipped in dev
  • config.ts: BASE_URL, isDev, VAPID config
  • ws.svelte.ts: buildWsUrl() derives from window.location (relative)
  • manifest.json: Complete PWA manifest with all required icons
  • sw.js: Push support, network-first caching, precaches 3 URLs
  • app.html: Full mobile/PWA meta tags including Apple-specific

Progress Assessment:

  • Codebase analysis: COMPLETE
  • Clarifying questions: COMPLETE (5/5 answered)
  • Plan creation: COMPLETE (saved to plan.md)
  • Todo tracking: COMPLETE (8 todos, 12 deps in SQL)
  • Implementation: NOT STARTED (exited to interactive mode)

Context Validation:

  • All user choices captured
  • Architecture diagram and security model documented
  • Dependency chain established
  • Plan file path recorded

Recent Commands Analysis:

  • Last commands: create (plan.md), sql (insert todos), sql (insert deps), exit_plan_mode
  • Results: All successful, plan approved, now in interactive mode awaiting user prompt
1. Conversation Overview: - Primary Objectives: User asked "how it would be possible to have a very strong and safe connection between my smartphone and the local running container of this solution? Because maybe not everyone has Azure" — seeking a secure remote access plan for the self-hosted Copilot Unleashed app running in Docker - Session Context: Plan-mode session that progressed through codebase analysis → clarifying questions → plan creation → todo tracking → exit to interactive mode - User Intent Evolution: Started with an open question about smartphone connectivity → refined through 5 clarifying questions to: Tailscale sidecar + Caddy in docker-compose, remote access from anywhere, full PWA with push, device-restricted ACLs
  1. Technical Foundation:

    • SvelteKit + adapter-node: App framework, server.js uses http.createServer() (HTTP only, no TLS), binds 0.0.0.0:3000
    • Docker: Single container, docker-compose.yml with NODE_ENV=development, BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000, port mapping 3000:3000
    • PWA: Complete manifest.json (standalone, all icon sizes including maskable), service worker with push support, Apple meta tags — all require HTTPS except on localhost
    • Security Stack: CSRF origin check (hooks.server.ts), WS origin validation (ws/handler.ts), secure cookies (secure: !isDev), rate limiting (200/15min), CSP headers — all security checks skipped in dev mode
    • Auth: GitHub Device Flow (no HTTPS required on app side), AES-256-GCM encrypted auth cookie
    • WebSocket: Client builds URL from window.location (relative, auto-adapts to any origin), heartbeat with missed ping tracking
    • Planned Architecture: Tailscale sidecar (WireGuard VPN) → Caddy (TLS termination with Tailscale-provisioned Let's Encrypt certs) → App (HTTP :3000)
  2. Codebase Status:

    • server.js:
      • Purpose: Main HTTP/WS server entry point
      • Current State: HTTP-only, ORIGIN defaults to BASE_URL or http://localhost:${port}, no trust-proxy support
      • Key Detail: Needs ~2 lines added for TRUST_PROXY env var to read X-Forwarded-* headers from Caddy
    • docker-compose.yml:
      • Purpose: Container orchestration
      • Current State: Single app service, NODE_ENV=development, BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
      • Planned: Add tailscale and caddy services under a remote profile
    • src/hooks.server.ts:
      • Purpose: CSRF ...

Created from Copilot CLI via the copilot delegate command.


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Copilot AI changed the title [WIP] Execute plan for secure smartphone-to-local-container connectivity feat: Tailscale remote-access profile for secure smartphone-to-container connectivity Mar 25, 2026
Copilot AI requested a review from devartifex March 25, 2026 23:13
@github-actions github-actions bot added documentation Improvements or additions to documentation backend ci labels Mar 25, 2026
devartifex and others added 2 commits March 26, 2026 02:02
- docker-compose.remote.yml: restrict port binding to 127.0.0.1 to
  prevent LAN devices from spoofing X-Forwarded-For and bypassing rate
  limiting when TRUST_PROXY=1 is active
- Caddyfile: change admin bind from 0.0.0.0:2019 to localhost:2019 to
  prevent exposing Caddy's runtime config API to the network
- Caddyfile: move header_up directives inside reverse_proxy blocks;
  they are subdirectives of reverse_proxy in Caddy v2, not site-level
  directives — the previous placement caused a parse error on startup

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
The remote-access profile uses Tailscale Serve for TLS termination —
no Caddy container is wired into any compose file. The Caddyfile was
documented as optional but contained syntax errors (header_up at site
scope, admin on 0.0.0.0) and added confusion without adding value.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Pull request overview

Adds an optional “remote” Docker Compose profile to expose the locally running app securely over Tailscale (WireGuard mesh) with Tailscale Serve providing HTTPS, plus minimal server-side proxy-awareness and supporting docs/scripts.

Changes:

  • Add tailscale sidecar service under a remote compose profile and a docker-compose.remote.yml override for production/proxy settings.
  • Add a Tailscale entrypoint script that generates a Serve config from TS_DOMAIN.
  • Add remote-access documentation and .env.example entries; update server.js to enable forwarded-header handling when TRUST_PROXY=1.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 6 out of 6 changed files in this pull request and generated 7 comments.

Show a summary per file
File Description
server.js Adds TRUST_PROXY=1 behavior to configure adapter-node forwarded IP handling before importing the built handler.
docker-compose.yml Introduces tailscale sidecar service under the remote profile and a new persistent volume for Tailscale state.
docker-compose.remote.yml Overrides the app service for remote mode (production, localhost-only port bind, BASE_URL, TRUST_PROXY).
scripts/tailscale-entrypoint.sh Generates a Tailscale Serve JSON config at startup when TS_DOMAIN is set.
docs/REMOTE-ACCESS.md Step-by-step guide for two-phase setup (bootstrap + HTTPS) and operational/security notes.
.env.example Documents new Tailscale-related env vars used by the remote profile.

Comment on lines +8 to +15
This guide explains how to securely access your locally-running **Copilot Unleashed**
container from a smartphone (or any device) **anywhere in the world** — without opening
firewall ports, without a static IP, and without Azure.

The approach uses **Tailscale** (a WireGuard-based VPN mesh) with its built-in
**HTTPS/TLS serving** capability. Tailscale handles WireGuard encryption, TLS
termination, and Let's Encrypt certificate provisioning automatically.

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PR description mentions adding an optional Caddyfile, but there’s no Caddyfile in this PR. Either add it as described or remove the reference from the PR description to avoid confusion for users following the docs.

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echo " Then set TS_DOMAIN and BASE_URL in .env and restart."
exec /usr/local/bin/containerboot
fi

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The serve config is generated directly from TS_DOMAIN without validation. A common mistake is setting TS_DOMAIN to a full URL (e.g. including https://) or adding a trailing slash, which will produce an invalid serve config. Consider validating TS_DOMAIN is a bare hostname (no scheme/port/path) and failing with a clear error message.

Suggested change
# Validate TS_DOMAIN is a bare hostname (no scheme, port, or path).
case "$TS_DOMAIN" in
*://*|*/*|*:* )
echo "[tailscale-entrypoint] ERROR: TS_DOMAIN must be a bare hostname (no scheme, port, or path)."
echo " Current value: '$TS_DOMAIN'"
echo " Example: copilot-unleashed.tail1234.ts.net"
exit 1
;;
esac

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// Set automatically by docker-compose.remote.yml for the remote-access profile.
if (process.env.TRUST_PROXY === '1') {
process.env.ADDRESS_HEADER = 'X-Forwarded-For';
process.env.XFF_DEPTH = process.env.XFF_DEPTH || '1';
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The comment says TRUST_PROXY enables trusting X-Forwarded-Proto, but the code only configures ADDRESS_HEADER / XFF_DEPTH. Either remove the X-Forwarded-Proto mention or also set the adapter-node env var(s) needed for protocol forwarding so the comment matches actual behavior.

Suggested change
process.env.XFF_DEPTH = process.env.XFF_DEPTH || '1';
process.env.XFF_DEPTH = process.env.XFF_DEPTH || '1';
process.env.PROTOCOL_HEADER = process.env.PROTOCOL_HEADER || 'X-Forwarded-Proto';

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# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tailscale:
image: tailscale/tailscale:latest
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Using tailscale/tailscale:latest makes the remote-access profile non-reproducible and can break unexpectedly on upstream releases. Consider pinning to a specific (known-good) Tailscale image tag (and optionally documenting how/when to bump it).

Suggested change
image: tailscale/tailscale:latest
image: tailscale/tailscale:v1.70.0 # pinned; bump only after verifying new Tailscale releases

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- TS_USERSPACE=false
volumes:
- tailscale-data:/var/lib/tailscale
- ./scripts/tailscale-entrypoint.sh:/entrypoint.sh:ro
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/dev/net/tun is currently added via a bind mount under volumes. For TUN access, Docker Compose typically uses a devices: mapping so permissions and device semantics are correct across environments. Switching to devices: - /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun will make the sidecar more reliable.

Suggested change
- ./scripts/tailscale-entrypoint.sh:/entrypoint.sh:ro
- ./scripts/tailscale-entrypoint.sh:/entrypoint.sh:ro
devices:

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# BASE_URL must be the full HTTPS URL of your Tailscale hostname.
# Set this in your .env file — compose reads it from there.
# Example: BASE_URL=https://copilot-unleashed.tail1234.ts.net
- BASE_URL=${BASE_URL:-https://copilot-unleashed.example.ts.net}
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BASE_URL falls back to a placeholder https://copilot-unleashed.example.ts.net, which can mask misconfiguration and lead to confusing 403 CSRF / WS origin failures in production. Consider making BASE_URL required in this override (fail fast) or removing the default so users must set it explicitly when enabling the remote profile.

Suggested change
- BASE_URL=${BASE_URL:-https://copilot-unleashed.example.ts.net}
- BASE_URL=${BASE_URL}

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Comment on lines +3 to +7
> **TL;DR** — Complete the one-time Tailscale setup below, then run:
> ```bash
> docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.remote.yml --profile remote up -d --build
> ```

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This doc’s TL;DR and Phase 1 command both include docker-compose.remote.yml, which forces NODE_ENV=production + Secure cookies. In the described bootstrap mode (no HTTPS serving yet), users won’t be able to sign in over plain HTTP, so it’s worth clarifying that Phase 1 is only for device registration (or adjusting the Phase 1 command to omit the remote override until TLS is enabled).

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