Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories. Don't open a public issue for security problems.

GitBell follows Tauri's trust-boundary model: the webview is treated as untrusted, Rust is the authority.

• Token storage. The GitHub token is stored in the OS keyring (Secret Service / KWallet, Windows Credential Manager, macOS Keychain), never in a plaintext file. The webview reads it through a Rust command and never persists it.
• Capabilities. The main window gets the minimum permission set. The opener plugin is scoped to https://github.com/*; there is no filesystem or shell access from the webview.
• Asset protocol. Scoped to $APPDATA/sounds/**. User-picked audio files are copied there by Rust after extension and size validation; the webview cannot read arbitrary paths.
• CSP. default-src 'self', network only to api.github.com, images only from GitHub avatars, media only from the asset protocol.
• Rendering untrusted content. Commit messages, PR titles and comments come from strangers. They are inserted with textContent, never innerHTML.
• Links. URLs opened from toasts are validated in Rust to start with https://github.com/ regardless of what the webview sends.
• Single instance, no remote code. The app bundles all its JS; nothing is loaded from the network at runtime.
• Dependencies. cargo audit runs on lockfile changes and weekly; Dependabot watches Cargo, npm and Actions.

• Tauri's isolation pattern (no third-party runtime JS, so the added complexity buys little today).
• Signed auto-updates (planned together with macOS notarization).