Girici is a web proxy, so its security posture matters to everyone who runs it. Thank you for helping keep it safe.
Girici v2 is under active development on the main branch; security fixes land there. Girici v1 is no
longer maintained and will not receive fixes. Run a current v2 build.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
v2 (main) |
Yes |
| v1 | No |
Please report security issues privately, not in a public issue or pull request.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability. Include the affected version or commit, steps to reproduce, and the impact you observed. If you have a proposed fix, a draft PR against a private advisory is welcome.
We aim to acknowledge a report within a few days and to coordinate a fix and disclosure timeline with you. Please give us a reasonable window to release a fix before any public disclosure.
Some properties are design trade-offs, documented so reports can focus on real issues:
- Single origin. Every proxied site shares one browser origin, so a malicious proxied page can
reach another site's cookies and storage.
HttpOnlyis not a security boundary here. Site isolation is a known limitation, mitigated by in-app warnings and per-site data clearing. - The operator sees traffic. The HTTP relay terminates TLS at the server, so the operator can see proxied traffic. End-to-end transport is future work.
- Open public access is opt-in. With public access enabled the proxy is reachable without signing in, which invites abuse. The default is private, behind an admin login.
Reports that demonstrate a bypass of the SSRF guard, the CSRF checks, the auth gate, or the service worker's isolation are especially valuable.