opencode-go-proxy is an independent, single-user local adapter between Codex and user-selected model providers. It is not affiliated with, sponsored by, or endorsed by OpenAI or OpenCode.

The project is not an account-sharing service. It does not provide pooled accounts, shared credentials, subscription resale, or rate-limit circumvention. Users must use accounts and credentials they are authorized to use and remain responsible for current provider terms and policies.

The proxy never needs credentials committed to the repository. It resolves the upstream API key in this order:

1. The configured environment variable, defaulting to OPENCODE_GO_API_KEY.
2. The macOS keychain entry opencode-go-api-key (override with CODEX_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE).

Only credential-source metadata is traced. Credential values are retained only in process memory and are not written to the proxy's meter, trace, catalog, or support bundle.

Native OpenAI requests are a separate path. If a requested model is in the captured native Codex catalog, the proxy relays the client's existing authorization to the configured native HTTPS endpoint. It does not store that authorization, convert it into an OpenCode credential, or send the OpenCode key to the native endpoint. Only set OPENCODE_GO_PROXY_NATIVE_BASE_URL to an endpoint you trust with that native authorization.

The default bind is 127.0.0.1. Requests are checked against both their Host header and the actual socket peer address, and browser-originated requests are rejected.

A non-loopback bind fails closed unless:

1. OPENCODE_GO_PROXY_ALLOW_REMOTE=1 is set.
2. OPENCODE_GO_PROXY_CALLER_TOKEN contains at least 32 characters.
3. Every non-loopback client sends that value in X-OpenCode-Go-Proxy-Token.

The caller token protects access to the proxy; it is not an upstream provider credential. The proxy does not forward X-OpenCode-Go-Proxy-Token to native or routed providers. Use a random token, TLS, and network-level access controls for any deliberate remote deployment. Do not expose a plaintext listener to the public internet.

For OpenCode routes, the proxy constructs upstream authorization from the user-owned environment or keychain credential; it does not forward the client's bearer token. Native relaying has an explicit header allowlist and excludes hop-by-hop and proxy-control headers.

Image URLs in conversation content are validated — only data:image/ and https:// schemes are allowed. file://, http://, ftp://, and other schemes are rejected to prevent server-side request forgery.

The proxy does not fetch image URLs itself — it forwards them to the upstream Chat Completions API, which is responsible for fetching and processing them. The scheme check prevents the proxy from passing file:// or http:// URLs that could be used to probe internal services via the upstream.

Open a private security advisory or contact the maintainers before publishing a bug report involving credentials, prompts, tool outputs, or request traces. Never include live credentials or authorization headers in a report.