[tnsardesai]

Summary

Adds the caller for the shared pr-risk.yml workflow from kernel/security-workflows. When a PR is opened or marked ready, and on every push, it comments whether a PR would have been auto-approved and why. It does not approve anything, so the required human review is unchanged.

PRs that are drafts, come from forks, change more than 50 lines, or touch a deny-listed path are skipped with no comment. The deny-paths here add this repo's sensitive areas on top of the shared defaults (.github/**, dependency manifests and lockfiles, key and secret material).

Secrets are passed by name rather than inherited. This repo already has all three, because Semgrep and vuln-remediation use them.

Merge order

Merge after kernel/security-workflows#25. Until that lands, this workflow references a file that doesn't exist yet on main. This PR changes .github/**, so the classifier will skip it once it is live.

Testing

• actionlint is clean.
• Every deny-paths glob matches at least one file currently in the repo.
• The classifier was dry-run against recent merged PRs from this repo. Details are in Add shadow-mode PR risk classifier security-workflows#25.

---

Note

Low Risk
Adds a read-only CI workflow that comments on PRs; it does not change merge gates or application code.

Overview
Adds a shadow-mode PR risk GitHub Actions workflow that runs on PR open, ready-for-review, and sync. It reuses kernel/security-workflows/.github/workflows/pr-risk.yml@main to comment whether a small PR would have been auto-approved and why—without granting approval, so human review stays required.

Repo-specific deny-paths extend the shared defaults to always exclude deploy/**, lib/network/**, and lib/egressproxy/**. Three secrets (ADMIN_APP_ID, ADMIN_APP_PRIVATE_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) are passed explicitly instead of secrets: inherit when calling the external workflow.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 4c5c3ca. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.}

[tnsardesai]

Picked sjmiller609 to review these related PRs (kernel/security-workflows#25, kernel/infra#1825, kernel/kernel#5021, kernel/kernel-images-private#517, #531): recent commits in workflows; 2 pending

[sjmiller609]

can you double check we only auto approve for members of the kernel org?