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Merged
loadingalias merged 1 commit into from
Jul 19, 2026
Merged

crypto: bind secret equality to fixed-size owners #53

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8 changes: 8 additions & 0 deletions .changes/owned-secret-equality.md
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---
"rscrypto" = "minor"
---

Secret equality is now owned by fixed-size cryptographic key, tag, and
shared-secret types. The public generic `ConstantTimeEq` trait, arbitrary-slice
comparison helper, and slice/array implementations have been removed;
`SecretBytes` and `SecretVec` no longer provide equality.
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions THREAT_MODEL.md
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Expand Up @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Review the `ct-intended` candidate core before the rest of the repository:
5. ML-KEM secret-noise key generation, encapsulation coins, decapsulation
secret-key material, and implicit rejection.
6. AEAD authentication and failed-open cleanup.
7. MAC/tag verification, constant-time byte equality, and selected
7. MAC/tag verification, fixed-size owner equality, and selected
password-verification comparisons.

Public parsing, raw hashes, checksums, non-cryptographic hashes, public-key
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Ordered by exposure to untrusted input:
| Wrong output from accelerated kernels | Portable path is the byte-for-byte authority | Portable-vs-accelerated differential tests and native CI |
| Timing leakage | Constant-time coding rules on claimed paths | `ct.toml` evidence gate: timing tests, generated-code review, binary checks where supported |
| Oracle behavior | Opaque errors, failed-open output wipe, single-bit failure shape | AEAD and verification tests, fuzz targets |
| Secret exposure at rest | Zeroize on drop, masked `Debug`, constant-time equality on secret types | `src/secret.rs` and per-type tests |
| Secret exposure at rest | Zeroize on drop, masked `Debug`, and fixed-size equality only on semantic secret owners | `src/secret.rs`, `ct.toml`, and per-owner tests |
| Supply chain | Minimal optional runtime dependencies, `cargo deny`, `cargo audit`, signed tags, Trusted Publishing, release attestations | `deny.toml`, `.github/workflows/release.yaml`, `docs/release.md` |

## Known Gaps
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