Security fixes are applied to the latest minor release line. Older minor versions may receive fixes for critical issues at the maintainers' discretion — when in doubt, please upgrade to the latest v1.x tag.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
1.7.x |
✅ |
1.x (older) |
|
< 1.0 |
❌ (please upgrade) |
Because this is a GitHub Action, consumers pin to a major (@v1) or specific tag. Fixes ship as new patch/minor tags on the supported line.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.
Use GitHub Security Advisories to report privately. This lets us discuss, fix, and coordinate disclosure before details become public.
When reporting, please include:
- A description of the issue and its potential impact.
- Steps to reproduce, or a minimal proof-of-concept workflow.
- The action version (tag or SHA) affected.
- Runner OS and any non-default inputs.
- Any suggested fix or mitigation (optional).
- Acknowledgement: within 5 business days.
- Initial assessment: within 10 business days.
- Fix timeline: depends on severity. Critical issues get prioritized; lower-severity issues may be batched into the next regular release.
We'll keep you updated on progress and credit you in the advisory unless you'd prefer to stay anonymous.
Things in scope for this project:
- Command injection, argument injection, or shell-quoting bugs in the action's bash scripts (
scripts/*.sh) that allow PR or commit metadata to execute attacker-controlled commands on the runner. - Privilege escalation or token misuse — e.g., the action handling
github-tokenornpm-tokenin a way that leaks them to logs, artifacts, or untrusted contexts. - Release-integrity issues — e.g., the action publishing the wrong commit, producing a tag that doesn't match the released content, or skipping checks that would otherwise gate a release.
- Trusted Publishers / OIDC flow defects that let an unauthorized workflow obtain a publish token.
- Changelog or release-note generation bugs that allow injection of malicious markup into GitHub releases or
CHANGELOG.md.
Things not in scope (please report upstream or with the relevant project):
- Vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions itself, the GitHub API, or the npm registry.
- Misconfigured workflows in consuming repositories (e.g., overly broad
permissions:, exposing secrets to forked PRs, running the action on untrustedpull_request_targettriggers without review). - Vulnerabilities in user-supplied
npm-build-commandscripts. - Compromise of a maintainer's own GitHub or npm account (report to the respective platform).
Once a fix is published, we will:
- Publish a GitHub Security Advisory with details and credit.
- Tag a patch release and update the
v1major-version tag. - Update the changelog with a brief mention (without exploit details prior to the disclosure window).
Thanks for helping keep the project and its users safe.