feat(harbor): feedback levers: failure transcripts, multi-fidelity screening, per-attempt detail#30
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…ck_transcripts) When enabled, collation attaches the last feedback_max_bytes bytes of a failed sample's trial transcript (agent/terminus_2.pane, falling back to agent/trajectory.json) to SampleResult.feedback: the first failed attempt only, passed samples carry nothing, missing transcripts are omitted silently. Exposure to the agent stays gated by the sidecar's tier routing (per-sample files are written only for viewable splits), so nothing can leak to non_viewable or no_access tiers. Plumbed build.yaml -> serve.json -> ServeConfig -> HarborRunner, mirroring score_baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…multifidelity) When enabled, the compiled instruction gains a section teaching the optimizer to triage rough ideas on subset evals (--num-samples / --sample-ids) and spend full-split evals only on survivors, stating the true economics: every eval debits one run-budget unit regardless of size, while the sample budget is debited only for the samples actually run, and subset aggregates are noisier. The section is gated on introspecting EvalRequest for the subset-eval fields (the same merge-order-truthfulness pattern as the free-baseline bullet), so it can never render against a sidecar that lacks subset evals. Plumbed build.yaml -> serve.json -> ServeConfig for contract parity; consumption is compile-time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…_detail)
When enabled, each collated sample's output carries an attempts list, one
{reward, exception} entry per attempt in stable attempt order: reward is
None when the attempt died before the verifier scored it, exception is the
recorded exception class name (None for clean attempts). Collation now
loads the attempt groups under 'best' aggregation too when a lever needs
them, without touching best-mode scoring. Exposure rides the same
viewable-only per-sample files as transcript feedback, so nothing reaches
non_viewable or no_access tiers. Plumbed build.yaml -> serve.json ->
ServeConfig -> HarborRunner, mirroring score_baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tlist pollution, and feedback-cap edge cases Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…igs (supersedes #20) BuildConfig and ServeConfig become discriminated unions on `mode`: a shared extra="forbid" base plus per-mode subclasses (BuildConfigA/B, ServeConfigA/B). A Mode-A config that sets a Mode-B-only field (feedback_transcripts, expose_attempt_detail, instruct_multifidelity, feedback_max_bytes, harbor, partition, inner_task) or a Mode-B config that sets a Mode-A-only field (sample_timeout, task, task_project, task_module, dataset) is now a load-time ValidationError instead of a silently-ignored no-op. A discriminated union is not a class, so the BuildConfig.from_file and ServeConfig.from_file classmethods become module-level loaders (load_build_config, load_serve_config) built on pydantic TypeAdapter, keeping the relative-path resolution and defaulting mode to "A" when omitted. Call sites in the CLI, compiler, and serve entrypoint updated; _serve_config and build_components narrow by isinstance / mode. Deletes PR #20's _warn_mode_b_sample_timeout and _warn_mode_a_ignores_feedback_levers (plus the compiler's Mode-A feedback-lever warning) and their tests: under the type split those conditions are structurally impossible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. Dead attempts count 0.0 in mean aggregation (n_dead in metrics). Attempts dying before the verifier scored were silently dropped from the mean, so the score estimated P(pass | attempt survived): measured live, a no-retry candidate won selection at an inflated 0.233 while its retry-hardened successors measured an honest ~0.19 and lost. All-dead samples error loudly instead of scoring 0.0 (an outage must stay visible). 2. 'best' trial ranking is monotone in the reward. The rank was (clean, has_rewards, recency), so with concurrent attempts 'best' meant 'last clean attempt to finish' and a later clean 0.0 clobbered an earlier clean 1.0, violating the never-clobber-a-passing-trial invariant the loader documents. Reward now precedes recency in the key. 3. Strict reward_key extraction. A configured reward_key missing from a rewards dict no longer falls back to 'pass'/'reward' (attempts within one mean could be scored on different metrics), and several unrecognized keys are refused instead of averaged (emitting easy auxiliary metrics beside the real one inflated the average). Sole-key dicts stay accepted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…follow-up) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…retries, fail-safe floor) Five gaps in the champion-selection/finalize path, all observed or provoked live: 1. Idempotent finalize: the first completed result is cached and replayed on any retry. Re-running would re-rank against a DB that now contains the first finalize's own admin evals, so a retried finalize could crown a different champion than the one already reported. 2. Pooled shortlisting: recorded evals of the same commit average (not max), and commits with identical git TREES collapse into one candidate group. Max-over-rows made every re-measurement an independent lottery draw; one live optimizer farmed empty re-commits as 'clean independent lottery tickets', another refused to re-measure its champion to protect a lucky draw. Pooling makes re-measurement variance-reducing and stops identical content from stuffing the top-K shortlist. 3. Every reward-critical finalize eval (targets, shortlist re-scores, floor, baseline) retries transient failures; targets that persistently fail are floored WITH a durable target_errors marker instead of aborting finalize (a trial that ships no reward.json loses its result: happened live to an 8-hour run on a disk-full host). 4. All-error evals (score(fill_score=None) is None) retry like exceptions: an outage must never quietly become a measured 0.0. 5. Fail-safe floor: when the baseline itself cannot be measured, revert to the seed rather than shipping an unverified candidate (the floor exists to stop shipped regressions; skipping it re-opens that hole). Plus: verifier_timeout build field sizes Harbor's [verifier] timeout_sec for the whole finalize battery (the old value covered ~one eval, so Harbor could kill finalize mid-flight), and GitWorkspace.tree_hash() resolves commit content identity for the pooling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…the loop (review follow-up) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ity floor, trusted nested CLI) Four related fixes to keep hidden-split information and scoring authority where they belong: 1. The free baseline eval no longer rides the admin flag. engine.evaluate gains a distinct `free` parameter that waives only the budget debit; admin=True also bypassed the no_access tier gate, so the agent's one free eval could target the held-out test split and read its aggregate score off the response. The freebie is also now consumed only after a successful eval, so an infra failure no longer burns it. 2. serve.py now passes split_accesses into the EvaluationEngine. Without it the engine-side no_access gate was dormant and the budget ledger (no_access splits are unbudgeted) was the only gate, which is exactly what every unmetered path skipped. 3. k-anonymity floor on subset evals of non_viewable splits (default 5, configurable via build.yaml / serve.json). EvalSummary.mean_score over an agent-chosen singleton subset is that sample's label-derived score verbatim, so n singleton evals reconstructed a hidden split's labels wholesale. Full-split evals always pass (their aggregate is the intended surface), so splits smaller than the floor stay evaluable. The floor is advertised in status() as min_subset_samples. 4. HarborConfig.harbor_requirement: when set, the nested `harbor run` is layered over the candidate env with `uv run --with <spec>`, so the orchestrator that produces trial result.json resolves from the trusted spec, not from the candidate's own pyproject/uv.lock (one edited line there could point at a fork that fabricates results). Verified that uv's ephemeral overlay takes precedence over a conflicting project pin for both the console script and sys.path. This raises the bar, not a full boundary: agent code still imports into the nested harbor process; out-of-process verification is tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…alue, versioned re-evals, dead-attempt causes)
Four small fixes so recorded numbers say what they are:
1. summary.json now carries n_scored, n_errored, and score_se beside
mean_score: a mean over 3-of-18 scored samples, or one dominated by
errored zero-fills, is a different measurement than a clean
full-split mean, and both the agent and any auditor should see that
without per-sample access. All three are label-safe aggregates.
2. summary.json status now writes the enum VALUE ("success"), not
str(enum) ("ExperimentResultStatus.SUCCESS").
3. Result dirs are versioned per eval ({split}__{commit12}__eN instead
of wipe-and-rewrite keyed on (split, commit)): repeat measurements of
one commit (multifidelity confirms, champion re-evals) are exactly
the evidence worth comparing, and the second eval erased the first.
4. Mean-mode collation records dead_exception_types per sample: n_dead
alone hides WHY attempts died, and cause matters (rate-limit deaths
are infra noise, crashes point at the candidate; measured live,
110/129 UnicodeDecodeError deaths sat on two never-solved tasks).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…fails closed on corrupt restore) Two operational fixes: 1. instruct_exhaust_budget (default True): the instruction's "unspent budget is wasted" persistence bullet becomes a build-config lever, like instruct_multifidelity. On preserves current behavior; off makes stopping-early the agent's own choice, which is the ablation arm for measuring what the exhortation itself contributes to optimizer persistence. The "scores are noisy" fact stays unconditional. 2. _load_or_build_ledger fails CLOSED on a persisted ledger that exists but cannot be parsed: metered budgets restore with zero remaining, and the unreadable file is preserved as ledger.corrupt for the operator. The old fallback restored the CONFIGURED budgets, which refunded the agent everything already spent, so any crash that corrupted the flush minted budget. A missing file is still a fresh boot; admin and finalize are unaffected either way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two Greptile P2s on #30, fixed at the stack tip: - An empty transcript file no longer surfaces as "" feedback: empty candidates are skipped (an empty pane falls through to the trajectory), and if everything is empty the search moves to the next failed attempt rather than short-circuiting on "". - The no-verifier-rewards error branch (agent died before scoring) now attaches the failure transcript like any failed sample: a candidate edit that crashes the agent lands exactly here, and the transcript is the only way the optimizer can see the crash it caused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… floor default, ordinal resume, SE naming) - Free-baseline flag is claimed BEFORE the eval await and refunded on failure: setting it only after success reopened a window where two concurrent baseline evals both resolved free (asyncio interleaves at await points). Claim-then-refund keeps both properties: concurrent callers see the claim, and a failed eval does not burn the freebie. - build_status defaults k_anonymity_floor to 5, matching the sidecar's enforcement default: a caller that forgets to pass the floor must not advertise a laxer one than gets enforced. - _route_results resumes the eval ordinal past surviving __eN dirs on a reused volume: a restarted sidecar started back at e1 and silently wiped the prior session's evidence, the exact erasure the versioned dirs exist to prevent. - score_se renamed to mean_score_se and documented: it is the SE of the zero-filled mean_score over n_samples, not of the n_scored subset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e crash vs infra outage)
Measured live in the transfer matrix: three champions scored 0/72 on an
off-model executor because their optimizers hardcoded temperature=0,
which that provider rejects. The harness handled it safely (rewards
floored, finalize shipped) but the durable record could not say WHY, and
"why" decides opposite actions: a deterministic candidate crash is a
real, reportable portability failure; an infra outage means invalidate
and re-run. Two changes:
- Collation's no-verifier-rewards error string now names the dead
attempts' exception types ("attempts died: UnsupportedParamsError
x6"). The error string is the one field that flows to the DB, the
per-sample files, and the verifier.
- _admin_eval_score returns (score, failure_cause); a floored target's
target_errors entry carries the dominant per-sample causes (frequency
summary, top 3). Diagnostics are fail-safe: any surprise result shape
degrades to a fixed string, never fails finalize.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ask crashes cluster Greptile follow-up on #37: _dominant_sample_errors keyed on the raw error string, which embeds the task name, so identical exceptions across a multi-task slice landed in 1x singletons instead of one dominant cause. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… finalize Home-model evals cannot see model-specific couplings the optimizer bakes in. Measured live in the wave-1 transfer matrix: three of five champions independently hardcoded temperature=0 (a variance trick on their home model, gpt-4.1-mini) and scored 0/72 on claude-opus-4-8, which rejects it, while looking healthy on every eval the optimization loop ever ran. The portability failure was invisible until a separate, manual, after-the-fact probe. VerificationTarget gains `model`: a target with an executor override scores the selected commit under a model it was NOT optimized on, in the same finalize battery as its home-model reward. The baseline is scored under the same override so the comparison stays like-for-like. Plumbing: build.yaml TargetSpec -> compiler -> serve.json _TargetCfg -> VerificationTarget -> engine.evaluate_admin(model=...) -> task_params ["harbor_model_override"] -> HarborRunner -m flag. The override rides task_params, so Mode A ignores it and the runner needs no new state; the shared run_constraints are copied, never mutated. Test fakes of evaluate_admin widened to accept the new kwarg (a strict signature turned the new call into a retried TypeError, flooring rewards, which is itself a nice demonstration of the floor's fail-safe). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…utage retry, key-budget alarm Three infra failure modes measured live in the E5 matrix runs, fixed at the measurement layer: - Dead attempts are classified infra vs candidate (conservative exception-type allowlist + the litellm key-budget message signature). Labels flow into dead_exception_types, error strings, and a new n_dead_infra metric. Classification never moves a score: every dead attempt still zero-fills, or faking infra would excuse failures. Exception type names are candidate-authored, so brackets are neutralized before labeling (a class named 'XError[infra]' cannot walk in pre-suffixed). - An OPT-IN, bounded, backoff-spaced within-eval retry re-measures samples whose every attempt died of a transient infra cause (the 65-second DNS blip that killed 44/72 attempts of one eval). Off by default: against an adversarial optimizer the qualifying predicate is a re-roll lever, since a stochastic candidate that raises allowlisted exceptions on failing attempts converts all-bad rounds into fresh draws. Retry rounds run in fresh sibling jobs dirs (nesting would pool dead attempts into later resumed means) and recovered samples carry an infra_retry audit marker naming the discarded attempts. - An ERROR-level alarm names key-budget exhaustion (a spent key fails every later call identically; two matrix cells of budget-exceeded zeros were nearly booked as a portability finding), with hedged wording since the signature reads candidate-process exceptions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d audit history - HarborConfig rejects infra_retry_delay_s <= 0 when retries are enabled (a zero delay silently nullified the backoff) and negative infra_retry_rounds. - The infra_retry audit marker now lists EVERY discarded round in order (discarded_rounds), not just the one immediately before recovery; recovered_round names when the sample finally measured. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat: [no-ticket] harbor - infra resilience (dead-attempt classification, opt-in outage retry, key-budget alarm)
feat: [no-ticket] harbor - transfer targets (per-target executor-model override at finalize)
fix: [no-ticket] harbor - floored rewards name their cause (candidate crash vs infra outage)
fix: [no-ticket] harbor - ops integrity (exhaust-budget instruction lever, fail-closed ledger restore)
fix: [no-ticket] harbor - honest measurement signals (summary qualifiers, versioned re-evals, dead-attempt causes)
fix: [no-ticket] harbor - access-tier integrity (free-baseline privilege, k-anonymity floor, trusted nested CLI)
fix: [no-ticket] harbor - selection/finalize integrity (idempotency, tree pooling, retries, fail-safe floor)
fix: [no-ticket] harbor - scoring integrity (dead attempts, best-rank monotonicity, strict reward key)
refactor(harbor): split Mode A / Mode B into discriminated-union configs
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Adds three opt-in feedback levers to Mode B, answering the question this stack kept circling: the optimizer only gets one score per paid eval, which is very thin signal. Each lever is a
build.yamlswitch, default off, byte-identical behavior when off.feedback_transcripts(+feedback_max_bytes, default 3000): every FAILED sample of an eval carries the tail of its rollout transcript in the per-samplefeedbackfield. Rides the per-sample result files the sidecar writes ONLY forviewablesplits, so it can never surface fornon_viewable/no_accesstiers.instruct_multifidelity: the compiled instruction teaches subset-eval screening (triage rough ideas cheaply, confirm survivors on the full split). Renders only when a viewable split exists (see leak fix below).expose_attempt_detail: per-sampleattemptslist with{reward, exception}per attempt, same viewable-only exposure.The final commit closes what adversarial review found: a multi-fidelity hidden-split leak (1-sample subset evals could recover per-sample labels on
non_viewablesplits; the instruction is now gated to viewable splits), subset evals polluting the auto_best shortlist (ranking now prefers full-split evals),feedback_max_bytes <= 0returning the whole transcript (now means "no feedback"), symlink/path-escape containment on transcript reads, typo-safe config keys (extra="forbid"), and attempt-ordering.Live experimental evidence (2026-07-06). Three arms on the same substrate (the VeRO paper's minimal Pawn agent on gpt-4.1-mini, baseline 0.20, ceiling ~0.43), same optimizer (opus), same 10-eval budget, only the levers differ:
Transcripts changed the optimizer from prompt-tweaker (which never moves the score; see the campaign doc's 6-model flatness result) into code-fixer, which is where all measured gains come from. n=1 per arm; a replication and a 25-eval run are in flight.
Stacked on the harbor stack (base:
harbor-all-fixes, the integration union of the open PRs; will re-target as the stack merges).🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Greptile Summary
This PR adds three opt-in feedback levers to Mode B Harbor evaluations and closes several adversarially-identified integrity gaps: the
free/adminauthority conflation (no_access split bypass on the free baseline), the multi-fidelity hidden-split leak, subset evals polluting theauto_bestshortlist, and missing path-containment on transcript reads.feedback_transcripts,expose_attempt_detail,instruct_multifidelity): each is abuild.yamltoggle defaulting to off; existing behavior is byte-identical when all three are off, and transcript exposure is gated to viewable splits through the sidecar's existing tier routing.engine.evaluate()now distinguishesfree(budget-only waiver) fromadmin(full bypass), closing the no_access escape;_best_from_dbprefers full-split evals for shortlisting when any exist;auto_best_baseline_floorprevents shipping regressions;BuildConfig/ServeConfigare split into typed A/B variants withextra=\"forbid\"so a mistyped lever fails loudly at load time rather than silently disabling the feature.Confidence Score: 5/5
Safe to merge. All three levers default to off, so existing deployments are byte-identical. The integrity fixes are defensive and fail-closed.
The feedback levers are cleanly isolated behind instance-variable flags. The security fixes are narrow, well-tested, and the existing tier routing provides the primary exposure gate independently of the new code. Test coverage for the new levers and verifier ranking changes is thorough.
vero/src/vero/harbor/runner.py — the _read_transcript_tail TOCTOU gap and duplicated feedback_max_bytes default are minor polish items.
Important Files Changed
Sequence Diagram
%%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%% sequenceDiagram participant Agent participant Sidecar as EvaluationSidecar participant Engine as EvaluationEngine participant Runner as HarborRunner participant Verifier Agent->>Sidecar: POST /eval (commit, split) Sidecar->>Sidecar: k-anonymity check (non_viewable subsets) Sidecar->>Sidecar: _transfer_commit() alt first eval of base_commit (free baseline) Sidecar->>Engine: "evaluate(req, free=True)" note over Engine: tier gate applies, budget skipped else normal agent eval Sidecar->>Engine: "evaluate(req, free=False)" Engine->>Engine: tier gate (no_access reject) Engine->>Engine: budget.reserve() end Engine->>Runner: produce_sample_results() Runner->>Runner: harbor run (nested) Runner->>Runner: _collate() opt "feedback_transcripts=True and score==0.0" Runner->>Runner: _failure_feedback() _read_transcript_tail() note over Runner: symlink check + path containment before read end opt "expose_attempt_detail=True" Runner->>Runner: _attempt_detail() end Sidecar->>Sidecar: _route_results() by split tier Sidecar-->>Agent: EvalSummary (aggregate only) Note over Verifier: At trial end (finalize) Verifier->>Verifier: _best_from_db(): prefer full-split evals Verifier->>Engine: evaluate_admin() x rescore_top_k opt auto_best_baseline_floor Verifier->>Engine: evaluate_admin() baseline end Verifier->>Engine: evaluate_admin() x targets Verifier-->>Agent: reward.json%%{init: {'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': {"darkMode": true, "background": "#0d1117", "primaryColor": "#21262d", "primaryTextColor": "#e6edf3", "primaryBorderColor": "#8b949e", "lineColor": "#8b949e", "textColor": "#e6edf3", "edgeLabelBackground": "#161b22", "actorBkg": "#21262d", "actorBorder": "#8b949e", "actorTextColor": "#e6edf3", "actorLineColor": "#8b949e", "signalColor": "#8b949e", "signalTextColor": "#e6edf3", "noteBkgColor": "#373320", "noteBorderColor": "#d4a72c", "noteTextColor": "#f0e6c0", "labelBoxBkgColor": "#21262d", "labelBoxBorderColor": "#8b949e", "labelTextColor": "#e6edf3", "loopTextColor": "#e6edf3", "activationBkgColor": "#30363d", "activationBorderColor": "#8b949e"}}}%% sequenceDiagram participant Agent participant Sidecar as EvaluationSidecar participant Engine as EvaluationEngine participant Runner as HarborRunner participant Verifier Agent->>Sidecar: POST /eval (commit, split) Sidecar->>Sidecar: k-anonymity check (non_viewable subsets) Sidecar->>Sidecar: _transfer_commit() alt first eval of base_commit (free baseline) Sidecar->>Engine: "evaluate(req, free=True)" note over Engine: tier gate applies, budget skipped else normal agent eval Sidecar->>Engine: "evaluate(req, free=False)" Engine->>Engine: tier gate (no_access reject) Engine->>Engine: budget.reserve() end Engine->>Runner: produce_sample_results() Runner->>Runner: harbor run (nested) Runner->>Runner: _collate() opt "feedback_transcripts=True and score==0.0" Runner->>Runner: _failure_feedback() _read_transcript_tail() note over Runner: symlink check + path containment before read end opt "expose_attempt_detail=True" Runner->>Runner: _attempt_detail() end Sidecar->>Sidecar: _route_results() by split tier Sidecar-->>Agent: EvalSummary (aggregate only) Note over Verifier: At trial end (finalize) Verifier->>Verifier: _best_from_db(): prefer full-split evals Verifier->>Engine: evaluate_admin() x rescore_top_k opt auto_best_baseline_floor Verifier->>Engine: evaluate_admin() baseline end Verifier->>Engine: evaluate_admin() x targets Verifier-->>Agent: reward.jsonReviews (2): Last reviewed commit: "Merge pull request #31 from scaleapi/har..." | Re-trigger Greptile