ci(pi): publish @tiny-fish/pi to npm (PF-3852)

[Zechereh]

Stacked on #41. Release control for @tiny-fish/pi, kept separate so the content PRs can merge independently.

Modelled on ux-labs CD_cli.yml rather than the PyPI workflows in this repo — it is the house pattern for npm publishing.

No NPM_TOKEN needed

Auth is npm Trusted Publisher (OIDC), same as the CLI. The job requests id-token: write and npm verifies the workflow identity directly, so this repo does not grow an npm secret. (An earlier revision of this PR asked for NPM_TOKEN; that ask is withdrawn.)

⚠️ Manual bootstrap, one-time

A trusted publisher cannot be configured against a package that does not exist yet, so the first release is by hand:

1. cd pi && npm publish --access public
2. npmjs.com → @tiny-fish/pi → Settings → Trusted Publisher → GitHub Actions
   repo tinyfish-io/tinyfish-web-agent-integrations, workflow pi-publish.yml
3. Every release after that is this workflow, triggered by a version bump

Steps 1–2 are yours to run — I can't publish to the @tiny-fish scope. The same steps are in the workflow header so the next person doesn't have to reconstruct them. @tiny-fish/pi is currently unclaimed (registry 404).

When it publishes

Gated on the version in pi/package.json not already existing on the registry, so content-only edits don't need a version bump and a re-run is a no-op rather than an error. An unexpected registry response fails the job instead of reading as "already published". workflow_dispatch is there as a re-run escape hatch.

Tarball verification — the part worth reviewing

Borrowed from CD_cli.yml's "Verify npm package contents" step, and it matters more here than there. This package ships no code, so a dropped files entry is the entire failure mode: the tarball still publishes, still installs, and pi just silently has fewer skills. Nothing else would catch it.

The job asserts mcp.json, the README, rules/security.md and all five SKILL.md files are present, plus that the references/ docs the skills link to came along — a skill pointing at a file that isn't in the tarball is worse than no pointer.

Negative-tested: removing rules from files fails the job with Missing from tarball: rules/security.md.

Smaller notes

• Node 24, for npm ≥ 11.5.1 which trusted publishing requires.
• Action refs use tags, matching every other hand-written workflow here. The one pinned SHA in this repo is in secrets-scanner.yml, which is Terraform-managed.
• concurrency with cancel-in-progress: false — a publish must never be cancelled mid-upload.

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• .github/workflows/pi-publish.yml

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