fair-division

Shapley value cooperative game theory engine computing axiomatic fair profit allocation across collaborating agents.

Shapley value cooperative game attribution and coalitional marginal contribution calculation

Shapley value cooperative game attribution and coalitional marginal contribution calculation

Shapley value cooperative game theory engine computing axiomatic fair profit allocation across collaborating agents.

Code for the paper “Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Asymmetric Agents” by Yushi Bai and Paul Gölz.

Interactive step-through visualiser for cake cutting algorithms with a custom graph editor.

Simulations for the paper Fairly Dividing Non-identical Random Items: Just Sample or Match

Splitting of groups with equivalent averages based of list of names and scores

PreTeXt code for college course on Mathematics of Democracy

Lean 4 formalization of Hollender-Rubinstein envy-free cake-cutting for four agents (TUM bachelor thesis, instrumented LLM-assisted workflow)

Fair division of household chores using EF1 algorithms. Live demo.

Solutions, code, and documentation for the Economic Algorithms (course 5785) module at Ariel University.

Split the rent fairly: envy-free rent, cake and chore division with Sperner's lemma. Flatmates only answer which room they would take at given prices.

Fairly distribute weighted items into capacity-bounded bins.

Some functions to algorithmically check whether an allocation is envy-free.

Offline, single-file clone of the NYT 2014 'Divide Your Rent Fairly' calculator. Envy-free rent division via Sperner's Lemma (Su 1999).

Lean 4 formalization: strong EFX allocations exist when every agent values at most two goods

Splitting Planar Necklaces with Few Straight Cuts