Report vulnerabilities privately through either channel:
- GitHub private vulnerability reporting: https://github.com/unempyd/sealstack-sdk/security/advisories/new
- Email:
SealStack@icloud.com(copy the address; it is shown as text, not a link)
Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Include the affected component (SDK, reference server, verifier), a reproduction, and the impact you observed. You will receive an acknowledgement, and a fix or a decision, before any public disclosure.
sdk/sealstack: the Python SDK, local identity file, SQLite queue, uploader, the offline verifier (sealstack verify) and the exporters (sealstack export).sdk/productis the pre-0.1.3 import name, kept as an alias of that package.reference-server/: the single-tenant reference server. It exists so the SDK can be exercised end to end without any other server deployment; it is an evaluation implementation and is not hardened for a reachable deployment.
Reports about the SealStack service implementation whose code is not in this repository are welcome through the same channels.
The product assumes the customer host that runs the SDK is not compromised, the agent private key is not stolen, and the operator provisions service verification keys over an independently trusted channel. It does not assume the network, the service database, or the exported bundle are trusted; those are covered by signatures and hashes.
- Modification, reordering or deletion of accepted events inside a runtime chain, detected by hash-chain and signature verification.
- Forged events for a registered agent without its private key.
- Forged or altered service receipts without the service signing key.
- Replay of an accepted event: it is answered as a duplicate with the original receipt, never re-accepted.
- A compromised agent host or a stolen agent private key signing false events. Revocation stops new ingestion; it does not retract history.
- Deletion of the final tail event of a runtime before upload.
- Untruthful inputs or outputs: digests commit to values, they do not attest to them.
- Uninstrumented actions.
- Compromise of the service signing key.
- Agent key rotation is disabled in the SDK and CLI in V1.
- The reference server is single-process and single-tenant, has no key rotation, revocation or retirement, and keeps its signing seed in a file. Run it on a private network for evaluation only.
The latest tagged release on main receives security fixes.