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fix(ci): cache tflint plugins + retried init to survive GitHub release-API 503s
…-cache fix(ci): scope trivy config scan to skip gitignored .terraform cache dirs
…ermissions fix(api): enforce user API key scoped permissions in requirePermission
fix(security): replace real AWS account ID with placeholder
fix(purchase): surface save error on failed-status execution record
fix(docker): align migrate to v4.19.1 and cross-compile builder natively
test(frontend): replace JSON structuredClone polyfill with faithful one
fix(ci): restrict staging ECR cleanup to cudly-staging repos
fix(cmd): respect LifecycleSupportEndDate in extended-support check
fix(scheduler): propagate ambient fallback GetRecommendations error
fix(purchases): mask idempotency token in EC2 RI re-drive log (closes #656)
fix(cli): log dropped recs from --min-pool-size filter (closes #359)
fix(ux): show account display name in Opportunities for non-admin users
…-undo fix: RI Exchange active-RI column filters + immediate override-delete Undo toast
…r in CI (#1439) The gosec pre-commit hook (scripts/gosec-hook.sh) is designed to scan only a local commit's changed packages, but 'pre-commit run --all-files' (the CI job) feeds it every .go file across all six modules at once. gosec's whole-repo analysis exhausts the runner memory and the pre-commit job dies with 'The runner has received a shutdown signal' at that exact step on every run (verified on multiple main runs after the tflint fix landed - tflint itself now passes). gosec is NOT dropped from CI: the dedicated 'Security Scanning' job in ci.yml runs gosec v2.28.0 per-module (SARIF) as the authoritative gate. This only removes the CI duplicate that OOMs the runner - the same dedup rationale as the already-skipped terraform_validate (covered by the Validate Terraform job). Local devs keep the fast per-changed-package gosec hook.
…#292) (#808) * feat(marketplace): sell/cancel Standard RIs on AWS Marketplace - backend (closes #292) Add sell-on-Marketplace support for Standard Reserved Instances: - migration 000060: add offering_class, listing_id, listing_state to purchase_history - auth: sell-any and sell-own actions; sell-own added to DefaultUserPermissions - config: extend PurchaseHistoryRecord, StoreInterface with GetPurchaseHistoryByPurchaseID + UpdatePurchaseHistoryListing - ec2 client: CreateReservedInstancesListing, DescribeReservedInstancesListings, CancelReservedInstancesListing - api: handler_marketplace.go with marketplaceList/Cancel, authorizeSessionSell (sell-any/sell-own RBAC), default price schedule (95% of residual value) - router: POST /api/purchases/{id}/marketplace-list + /marketplace-cancel routes - all tests updated for the new interface methods and permission count * feat(marketplace): sell/cancel Standard RIs on AWS Marketplace - frontend (closes #292) Add Sell on Marketplace / Cancel listing buttons to purchase history rows: - types.ts: extend HistoryPurchase with offering_class, listing_id, listing_state - api/purchases.ts: createMarketplaceListing + cancelMarketplaceListing; re-export from api/index.ts - history.ts: canSellOnMarketplace / canCancelMarketplaceListing predicates; renderActionCell renders Sell/Cancel buttons for Standard RI completed rows; wireRowActionHandlers wires confirm-dialog + API + toast + reload for both buttons * fix(history): address CR wave4 frontend marketplace findings - canSellOnMarketplace: gate on remaining term >= 1 month computed from purchase timestamp + total term; matured Standard RIs no longer show Sell - sell click handler: open pricing/schedule modal before calling createMarketplaceListing so users see RI summary, default list price, and 12% fee breakdown before confirming - lineage actions cell: build trailingActions[] first then combine with lineage[] so Sell/Cancel buttons render on retry-descendant rows * fix(marketplace): address CR wave4 Go handler findings - Compute actual remaining months from purchase timestamp and total term via computeRemainingMonths; removes overpricing of older RIs in the default price schedule (was using full contract term) - Map AWS errors via mapAWSMarketplaceError: inspect smithy.APIError code and fault; client-fault errors return 4xx instead of blanket 502 - On DB failure after successful listing creation, attempt compensating rollback via CancelMarketplaceListing to prevent AWS/DB desync; return internal error rather than false success to the caller - Same DB-failure fix for cancel handler: return error on UpdatePurchaseHistoryListing failure so the caller knows the state is out of sync * fix(migrations): add settlement columns to 000060 marketplace migration Add listed_at, listing_price_schedule, listing_proceeds_received, and listing_fee_paid columns for marketplace settlement tracking. All nullable, consistent with existing offering_class/listing_id/listing_state nullability. Down migration updated to drop the new columns. * fix(ec2): validate non-empty listing ID from CreateReservedInstancesListing Return an error when AWS returns a listing with an empty ReservedInstancesListingId rather than propagating a blank ID that would silently make rollback and describe calls fail. * fix(pr-808): compile + CR findings + pre-commit Repair the stalled marketplace sell/cancel work: - Add the three missing marketplace methods to MockEC2Client so the ec2 package compiles against the extended EC2API interface (CreateReservedInstancesListing, DescribeReservedInstancesListings, CancelReservedInstancesListing). - Extract validateMarketplaceListRequest from marketplaceList to bring its cyclomatic complexity back under the gocyclo threshold. - Regenerate frontend/src/permissions.generated.ts to include the new sell-own:purchases permission (pre-commit codegen check). - Harden Describe/Cancel marketplace paths to fall back to the caller-supplied listing ID when AWS omits ReservedInstancesListingId, so downstream persistence never stores an empty ID (CR finding). * fix(marketplace): adapt to nullable PurchaseHistoryRecord.MonthlyCost After rebasing onto feat/multicloud-web-frontend, base PR #258 made PurchaseHistoryRecord.MonthlyCost a *float64 (nullable). The marketplace default price-schedule path passed it as a float64. Dereference it nil-safely at the call site, treating an absent monthly breakdown as a zero recurring contribution to residual value (per the nullable-not-zero convention: nil means "no breakdown recorded", which contributes nothing to the residual list price). * refactor(config): extract scanPurchaseHistoryRow to fix gocyclo budget queryPurchaseHistory reached cyclomatic complexity 11 (budget 10) after the nullable marketplace columns (offering_class, listing_id, listing_state) and the nullable monthly_cost handling were added to the per-row scan. Pull the scan plus nullable-column reconciliation into scanPurchaseHistoryRow so the parent function drops back under the limit. Behavior is unchanged. * fix(api/marketplace): prorate upfront cost to remaining term in default schedule When the caller omits a price schedule, the default was computing total value as (full_upfront + recurring * remaining_months). For an older RI this overprices the upfront component because only (remaining/original) of the upfront has not yet been amortized. Change to: upfront_remaining = upfront_cost * (remaining / original_term) total_value = upfront_remaining + recurring * remaining_months Pass row.Term as originalTerm through resolveMarketplacePriceSchedule. Addresses CR finding on handler_marketplace.go. * fix(marketplace): multi-count listing, handler tests, descope poller columns (closes #292 partial) Address adversarial-review gaps on the RI Marketplace sell/cancel PR: - Multi-count fix: CreateMarketplaceListing now lists every RI in the row (purchase_history.count) instead of a hardcoded InstanceCount=1, so a row of N Standard RIs lists all N. The EC2 client rejects a non-positive count before the outbound call; the handler passes row.Count (floored at 1 for legacy rows). Adds EC2 client tests for create (multi-count + guards), describe, and cancel via the SDK mock. - Tests: add handler_marketplace_test.go covering convertible -> 400, sell-own allow + deny (account scoping), duplicate active listing -> 409, AWS error mapping (client fault -> 400, server/unknown -> 502), DB-failure compensating rollback, and default-schedule proration math. - Descope poller: migration 000060 keeps only the columns the implemented flow reads/writes (offering_class, listing_id, listing_state). The settlement/poller columns (listed_at, listing_price_schedule, listing_proceeds_received, listing_fee_paid) are removed so the schema never carries columns nothing populates; they land with the poller in the #292 follow-up (#966). - Repair a stale Session.Role="admin" reference in a pre-existing purchases test (removed in the group-only auth migration) so the api test package compiles after rebasing onto the current base. * fix(migrations): renumber to 000065 to avoid base conflict 000060 is taken by 000060_cleanup_universal_plans on base. * fix(migrations): renumber marketplace migration to 000068 to clear base conflict The marketplace listing migration was numbered 000065, colliding with 000065_enforce_min_one_admin which has since landed on feat/multicloud-web-frontend. The check-migration-conflicts pre-commit hook fails on the merge ref with "Duplicate migration number(s): 000065". Renumber to 000068 (one past base's highest, 000067) so the number is unique on the merge ref, and update the two stale in-file comment references from 000060 to 000068. * fix(marketplace): reconcile mock + permission tests and gocyclo after #804 rebase Rebasing the marketplace sell/cancel work (#292) onto the in-app revocation base (#804) left integration gaps that only surface once both feature sets coexist: - internal/analytics/collector_test.go declared GetPurchaseHistoryByPurchaseID twice: #804 added the func-override version and the marketplace commit added a no-op stub. Drop the marketplace stub; keep the override and the unique UpdatePurchaseHistoryListing stub so the mock builds. - frontend permissions.test.ts asserted the user role grants 12 verbs; the merged DefaultUserPermissions now grants 13 (revoke-own from #804 plus sell-own from #292). Add sell-own:purchases to the expected set. - store_postgres.go: merging the revocation columns (#290) into the marketplace gocyclo refactor pushed scanPurchaseHistoryRow and GetPurchaseHistoryByPurchaseID back over the cyclomatic budget. Extract the shared NULL reconciliation into a purchaseHistoryNullables struct + applyTo, so both readers stay under 10 and the NULL handling lives in one place. The conflict resolution itself (handlers, store SELECT/scan column order, auth defaults, mocks, frontend history buttons) was applied additively during the rebase; both feature sets are independent (marketplace sell/cancel vs revocation). Marketplace migration stays at 000068 (free gap vs the new base, which tops out at 000070). * fix(marketplace): gate sell actions on sell verbs and prorate default price (CR #808) Address CodeRabbit findings on the issue #292 marketplace sell/cancel flow: - Gate canSellOnMarketplace / canCancelMarketplaceListing on the sell-own / sell-any (or admin) verbs instead of bare sign-in, so the UX gate matches the backend authorizeSessionSell and avoids frontend/backend auth drift. Adds sell-own / sell-any to the Action union, mirroring the backend ActionSellOwn / ActionSellAny constants. - Prorate the upfront cost to its residual value in the sell modal's default price estimate (upfront * remaining/term), matching the backend resolveMarketplacePriceSchedule. Using the full upfront overstated the listing value for partially elapsed RIs. Also correct stale "migration 000060" comments (the columns ship in 000068) and add pgxmock coverage for GetPurchaseHistoryByPurchaseID asserting its distinct 25-column scan order (revocation_in_flight at position 22). * fix(marketplace): name fee/discount constants and restore gocyclo baseline - Introduce awsMarketplaceFeePercent (12), awsMarketplaceNetFactor (0.88), and awsMarketplaceBuyerDiscountFactor (0.95) as named Go constants in handler_marketplace.go; replace the matching TS literals with AWS_MARKETPLACE_FEE_PERCENT / AWS_MARKETPLACE_NET_FACTOR / AWS_MARKETPLACE_BUYER_DISCOUNT in history.ts. Eliminates silent ratios on a money-affecting display path per the no-hardcoded-magic-values rule. - Restore store_postgres_recommendations.go to main's lower-complexity form (recEffectiveSavingsPct + recOnDemandBaseline split); the rebase picked up an inlined variant from an earlier PR commit that cyclomatic-scored 12. * refactor(api): derive awsMarketplaceNetFactor from fee percent Replace the hardcoded 0.88 literal with a computed constant expression (1 - awsMarketplaceFeePercent/100.0) so the net factor stays in sync with the fee percent automatically. The Go constant evaluator uses arbitrary precision, so the resulting float64 value is identical to the literal it replaces; no money-math change. * fix(marketplace): guard concurrent RI listing creates with atomic slot claim Two concurrent marketplace-list requests for the same RI could both pass the read-only listing_state check in validateMarketplaceListRequest and both call AWS CreateReservedInstancesListing (each with a fresh ClientToken, so AWS does not dedup them), leaving two live listings for one RI and overwriting the DB row. Reserve the listing slot with a single atomic conditional UPDATE (ClaimMarketplaceListingSlot, modeled on FlipPurchaseRevocationInFlight) before the AWS call so exactly one racing request proceeds; the loser gets a 409. The claim is released back to the prior state on every post-claim failure path so a failed attempt never leaves the row stuck in the transient pending state. Also on this money path: - reject an implausibly large purchase count instead of silently truncating it into int32 (gosec G115) so the wrong number of RIs can never be listed; - add listing-state constants matching the AWS ListingStatus enum and use them in place of scattered string literals; - fix US-locale spellings flagged by misspell in comments and log/error text. Adds regression tests reproducing the concurrent-create race (claim loses -> 409, no AWS call) and the claim-error path, plus release-on-failure assertions. Closes #292 CR concurrent-create finding. * fix(marketplace): resolve 3 blocking defects in #808 RI sell flow Defect 1 -- migration number collision: Renumber marketplace migration from 000068 (already deployed, skipped by golang-migrate on prod) to 000084 (next free after main's 000083). Verified: main tops at 000083; #1277 uses 000082; no open PR holds 000084. All "000068" references in SQL comments and types.go updated to 000084. Defect 2 -- offering_class never written: CUDly's EC2 client hardwires OfferingClassTypeConvertible; savePurchaseHistory never stamped the field, so every row landed with offering_class=NULL and the Sell button never rendered. Fix: (a) stamp offering_class='convertible' in savePurchaseHistory for all AWS EC2 purchases so future CUDly-bought rows are correctly classified at write time; (b) add FetchOfferingClass to the marketplaceEC2Client interface and implement it via DescribeReservedInstances so the marketplace-list handler can lazily populate offering_class for pre-migration rows and for externally-created Standard RIs (purchased before CUDly existed); (c) add StampOfferingClass to ConfigStore + PostgresStore + mock to persist the fetched class so subsequent requests skip the extra AWS call; (d) a new populateOfferingClass helper in the handler ties it together -- it runs when offering_class is empty after validateMarketplaceListRequest and before the definitive "standard only" gate. How a 'standard' row comes to exist: an externally-created Standard RI will get its offering_class populated from AWS DescribeReservedInstances on the first POST .../marketplace-list call and the value persisted for future calls. Rows purchased by CUDly are stamped 'convertible' at write time (CUDly only ever buys Convertible EC2 RIs). Defect 3 -- $0 price guardrail gap: resolveMarketplacePriceSchedule accepted Price >= 0, allowing zero-dollar listings. Fix: reject Price <= 0 with a clear error; add a named constant awsMarketplaceMinPriceFloorFraction (5%) and a total-schedule floor check so a schedule that sums to less than 5% of the prorated residual value is also rejected with an explicit message. Extract floor check into checkSuppliedScheduleFloor and the class-check predicate into isKnownNonStandardOfferingClass to keep all touched functions below gocyclo 10. Regression tests: - TestMigration084_MarketplaceColumns: integration test proves the three new columns exist and round-trip after migrating a fresh DB through 000084. - TestMarketplaceList_EmptyOfferingClassFetchedStandard: proves an externally-created Standard RI (offering_class="") is listable after the lazy-populate path fetches and stamps 'standard' from AWS. - TestMarketplaceList_EmptyOfferingClassFetchedConvertible: proves the gate still rejects when AWS reports 'convertible' even if DB had no class. - TestResolveMarketplacePriceSchedule_ZeroPriceRejected: Price=0 rejected. - TestResolveMarketplacePriceSchedule_BelowFloorRejected: sub-floor rejected. * fix(marketplace): renumber migration 000084 -> 000085 to avoid #1277 collision PR #1277 (cancelled->canceled rename) was concurrently renumbered to 000084 and merges before #808. Once it lands, main will hold 000084, so #808's 000084 would collide on the merge ref (pre-commit --all-files migration check) and give golang-migrate two version-84 migrations. Since #1277 takes the lower number and merges first, #808 moves to 000085. - git mv the up/down/test migration files 000084_* -> 000085_* - update the "-- Migration" header in the up.sql and "-- Revert migration" in the down.sql to 000085 - update every 000084 reference in comments: config/types.go (x3), config/interfaces.go, config/store_postgres.go, api/handler_marketplace.go (x2), providers/aws/services/ec2/client.go - rename TestMigration084_MarketplaceColumns -> TestMigration085_* and its fixture identifiers (ri-085-test, ril-085-test) Also fix the integration-test fixture surfaced by running it against a real testcontainer PG: plan_id is a UUID FK, so the literal 'plan-085' failed with SQLSTATE 22P02. The INSERT now lists only NOT-NULL-without-default columns plus the three new marketplace columns and omits plan_id/plan_name/ramp_step/ source (nullable or defaulted), so the test needs no purchase_plans fixture. Verified: migrations apply cleanly through version 85 and the three columns round-trip. * fix(marketplace): correct RI listing price-floor math and reachability Round-3 money-path review fixes for the Sell-on-Marketplace flow (#808). Price floor (was arithmetically wrong): - Enforce the floor PER TIER on the one-time sale Price. AWS PriceScheduleSpecification.Price is the lump-sum a buyer pays when TermMonths remain, not a per-month rate; the old code compared Price*TermMonths against the floor, over-crediting a cheap schedule up to ~term-fold so a $5 tier passed a $60 floor on a $1,200 residual. - Reject any tier whose TermMonths exceeds the RI's remaining months (was unvalidated and arbitrarily inflatable). - Per-instance basis: purchase_history.UpfrontCost is the row total for all Count instances, but Marketplace prices are per instance, so divide the residual by Count in both the floor and the default schedule. - Upfront-only residual: drop recurring (monthly) cost from the residual basis. In the RI Marketplace the buyer assumes recurring charges after transfer, so the seller recovers only the upfront remainder; including recurring overpriced partial-upfront RIs and made no-upfront RIs unpriceable. - Extract marketplaceResidualPerUnit as the shared per-unit basis so the default schedule and the floor cannot drift. Reachability: render the Sell button for completed AWS EC2 rows whose offering_class is empty (unknown), not just "standard". CUDly stamps "convertible" on its own EC2 purchases and externally-created Standard RIs arrive with an empty class until the backend lazily populates it; gating the UI on "standard" alone made the feature unreachable end to end. Provider and service are now checked so unknown-class non-EC2 rows never show the button. Nits: - Use SDK enum constants string(ec2types.OfferingClassType{Standard,Convertible}) instead of raw "standard"/"convertible" literals in the offering-class gate, the isKnownNonStandardOfferingClass predicate, and the purchase-history stamp. - Route populateOfferingClass errors through mapAWSMarketplaceError so an AWS client fault (e.g. InvalidReservedInstancesID.NotFound) surfaces as a 400, not a generic 500. Migration: renumber 000085 -> 000087 to stay above #1422's 000086 (main tops at pre-84; #1422 takes 000086, so this PR takes 000087). Regression tests (fail-before / pass-after verified): - TestResolveMarketplacePriceSchedule_BelowFloorRejected: a {12mo, $5} tier on a $1,200 per-unit residual (Count=1) is now rejected; passed under the old Price*TermMonths floor. - TestResolveMarketplacePriceSchedule_PerUnitFloor: on a $1,200 row-total with Count=3 the per-unit floor is $20, so $19 is rejected and $21 accepted. - TestResolveMarketplacePriceSchedule_TermExceedsRemainingRejected: a tier term beyond the remaining months is rejected. - history-marketplace-sell-button.test.ts: the Sell button renders for a completed AWS EC2 row with an empty offering_class and stays hidden for convertible, non-EC2, non-AWS, active-listing, and anonymous cases. - TestMigration087_MarketplaceColumns: fresh DB migrates cleanly through 000087 and the three columns round-trip.
… (#1444) Root cause: CreateAPIKeyAPI did req.(auth.APICreateAPIKeyRequest) to decode the incoming request. The HTTP handler (internal/api package) unmarshals the request body into api.CreateAPIKeyRequest - a distinct Go type that carries the same json field names but is not auth.APICreateAPIKeyRequest. The type assertion always failed, returning "invalid request type", which bubbled up as a 500 "Internal server error" on every POST /api/api-keys call. Fix: replace the direct type assertion with a type switch. The fast path handles auth.APICreateAPIKeyRequest directly (existing service tests). The default path JSON-encodes the incoming value and decodes it into APICreateAPIKeyRequest; this accepts any struct whose json tags are compatible (including api.CreateAPIKeyRequest), without requiring a cross-package import. Also fix TestAuthServiceAdapter_CreateAPIKeyAPI in internal/server which was missing GetUserByID and GetGroup mocks: the test silently passed before because the type assertion failure returned early; now the full call chain executes and the mocks must be complete. Regression test: TestService_CreateAPIKeyAPI_CrossPackageType passes an anonymous struct (same json tags, different Go type) to CreateAPIKeyAPI and asserts success. This test would have failed against the pre-fix code.
…ited (closes #1441) (#1445) isUnsavedChanges() compared live DOM values against savedSnapshot, which starts as an empty object ({}) before loadGlobalSettings() resolves. Since any non-undefined DOM value differs from undefined, the comparison always returned true, so the "You have unsaved settings changes. Leave without saving?" prompt fired on every Admin-tab navigation -- even for read-only users who had made no edits and even before the async settings load completed. Fix: guard with Object.keys(savedSnapshot).length === 0 at the top of isUnsavedChanges(). When the snapshot is empty the form is still loading and no edit is possible; return false immediately. snapshotAllFields() (called inside the loadGlobalSettings() try block after all fields are populated) sets the snapshot, enabling normal dirty-comparison for subsequent checks. Add three regression tests: the empty-snapshot path (via jest.isolateModules to get a fresh module instance), pristine-load navigation (no prompt), and edit-then-navigate (prompt shown correctly).
… page (closes #1442) (#1443) canDisablePlan in plans.ts required delete:purchases, which Standard users do not hold. PR #1421 updated the backend (deletePlannedPurchase) and the Home-page widget (canCancelUpcomingPurchase) to accept cancel-own:purchases, but the Plans-page Disable-button gate was not updated. The creator's canManagePurchase was already true via canManageScheduledPurchase; only the verb check was wrong. Accept cancel-own:purchases and cancel-any:purchases alongside delete:purchases in canDisablePlan, mirroring the backend requireDeleteOrCancelPurchasePermission gate and the dashboard canCancelUpcomingPurchase logic from PR #1421. Regression tests added to plans-ownership-950.test.ts: - Creator with cancel-own (no delete) sees Disable on their own row - Non-creator with cancel-own does not see Disable (ownership gate holds) - Legacy NULL-creator row shows no Disable for cancel-own user - cancel-any creator also sees Disable (backend supports it)
…1006) (#1446) * fix(ui): restore resource-row expand chevron to leading edge (closes #1006) The expand/collapse chevron on multi-variant cell summary rows was rendered inline inside the content cell (before the Resource Type text) for readonly/viewer sessions because buildListMarkup zeroed out the leading td.checkbox-col when showCheckboxes was false. Restore the chevron to the far-left column (before Provider) for all roles by: - Always emitting td.checkbox-col as the first cell in cell summary rows (contains the chevron button; no change for admin/editor). - Always emitting an empty th.checkbox-col in the table header for viewers, keeping column alignment consistent. - Always emitting an empty td.checkbox-col in variant rows for viewers, so expanded row columns align with the header and summary rows. - Updating the zero-rows empty-hint colspan to always include 1 for the leading column. SP-group parent rows were already correct (they always emitted the leading cell). This change makes non-SP cell summary rows consistent. Owner decision: chevron belongs at the table's far-left edge, before the Provider column, matching the standard row-expander control placement (QA row 568, issue #1006). Tests updated: readonly grouped-row test now asserts the chevron lives in td.checkbox-col; SP-group variant-row test updated to expect one empty td.checkbox-col per row (no checkbox input). * test(ui): strengthen readonly DOM contract assertions per CR #1446 Assert that th.checkbox-col and td.checkbox-col are the first cells in their respective rows (not just present), and that variant rows' leading td.checkbox-col has empty text content. Addresses CodeRabbit finding on PR #1446 (actionable comment, minor).
…elds for read-only users (#1428) Root cause for issues #1401, #1410, and #1413: GET /api/config and GET /api/ri-exchange/config both require view:config, but Standard Users and Read-Only Users lacked this permission. The cascade: - #1401: only the section header rendered; the config form was never shown because loadGlobalSettings returned early on 403. - #1410: applyReadOnlySettings was never called, so Purchasing Policies inputs stayed enabled for non-admin sessions. - #1413: a "permission denied" error paragraph appeared inside the Exchange Automation container instead of degrading gracefully. Fix: - internal/auth/types.go: add view:config to DefaultUserPermissions() and DefaultReadOnlyPermissions() (write gate update:config is still admin-only). - migration 000088: SQL UPDATE grants view:config to Standard Users (00000000-...-0005) and Read-Only Users (00000000-...-0006) with an idempotent NOT EXISTS guard; down migration removes it via jsonb_agg. - frontend/src/permissions.generated.ts: regenerated to include view:config in USER_PERMS and READONLY_PERMS. - frontend/src/settings.ts: export isPermissionDeniedError so sibling modules can reuse it without duplicating the detection logic. - frontend/src/riexchange.ts: graceful-degrade on permission denied in loadAutomationSettings (clears container, no error paragraph). Tests: - internal/auth/types_test.go + service_group_test.go: updated counts (11 -> 12 for users, 3 -> 4 for read-only) plus positive view:config and negative update:config assertions. - internal/api/handler_config_test.go: new test asserts updateConfig returns 403 for a session that holds view:config but not update:config. - internal/database/postgres/migrations/000088_..._test.go: integration tests cover grant, write-gate exclusion, sibling preservation, down migration, and idempotency. - frontend/__tests__/permissions.test.ts: updated expected permission sets to include view:config; renamed readonly describe to reflect the 4-permission set. - frontend/__tests__/settings-permissions.test.ts: 6 new tests verify the form is visible (not just the header) after getConfig succeeds for standard and read-only users, and that Purchasing Policies inputs are disabled. - frontend/__tests__/riexchange-automation-settings.test.ts: new file with 5 tests covering permission-denied graceful degradation. Closes #1401 Closes #1410 Closes #1413
…ck (#1229) The auto-exchange daily-cap check warned and counted $0 toward the MaxPaymentDailyUSD guardrail when paymentDueStr failed to parse, in contrast to the dailySpent parse failure five lines above which aborts with a failed record. A silent $0 coercion on a money path undercounts the daily spend cap if any future caller produces a non-decimal value. Make the parse failure abort the exchange and persist a failed record, mirroring the dailySpent branch. The documented nil-means-zero-cost quote case stays separate: processRecommendation still maps a nil PaymentDueUSD to the explicit "0" string before the parse. Regression test exercises processAutoExchange with unparseable and empty PaymentDue values; confirmed failing pre-fix (exchange executed with $0 counted) and passing post-fix (aborted, failed record saved, Execute never called). Closes #1166
* sec(oidc): switch JWT signing from PKCS1v15 to ES256 (closes #422) Replace RSA-PKCS1v15 (RS256) with ECDSA P-256 (ES256) across the entire oidc package: - LocalSigner: ecdsa.GenerateKey(P256) + ecdsa.SignASN1 instead of rsa.GenerateKey + rsa.SignPKCS1v15 - Signer interface: PublicKey() returns crypto.PublicKey (was *rsa.PublicKey) - Algorithm constant: "ES256" (was "RS256") - ComputeKeyID: accepts crypto.PublicKey, hashes uncompressed EC point - JWK: EC fields (kty=EC, crv=P-256, x, y); RSA fields (n, e) removed - AWSKMSSigner: SigningAlgorithmSpecEcdsaSha256 + *ecdsa.PublicKey assertion - AzureKeyVaultSigner: SignatureAlgorithmES256 + EC key (X/Y) extraction - GCPKMSSigner: *ecdsa.PublicKey assertion (digest call is key-type-agnostic) - All tests: positive assertions on ES256 algorithm and EC JWK fields * fix(oidc): emit RFC7518 raw R||S ES256 JWS signatures across all signer backends (refs #422) Mint base64url-encoded the signer's raw output directly into the JWS signature segment, but the Local/AWS/GCP signers return DER/ASN.1 ECDSA signatures (ecdsa.SignASN1, AWS ECDSA_SHA_256, GCP EC sign all yield ASN.1 DER). RFC 7518 section 3.4 requires an ES256 JWS signature to be the raw fixed-length R || S concatenation (32 bytes each = 64 bytes for P-256), NOT DER. As a result AWS/GCP/Local minted tokens that real OIDC consumers (the stated Azure AD target) reject. Azure Key Vault already returns raw R||S, so only Azure was correct, leaving the four backends mutually inconsistent. The Azure Sign comment also wrongly claimed Key Vault returns DER. Contract: Signer.Sign now returns the RFC 7518 raw R||S form. DER backends (Local/AWS/GCP) convert via a single shared derToRawECDSASignature helper; Azure passes through unchanged (no double-conversion). Mint encodes the result directly and defensively rejects any signature that is not 64 bytes. - signer.go: add derToRawECDSASignature; LocalSigner.Sign converts; Mint enforces the 64-byte contract; document the contract on the Signer interface. - aws_signer.go, gcp_signer.go: convert KMS DER output to raw R||S. - azure_signer.go: fix the wrong "DER-encoded" comment; keep passthrough. - tests: add assertRawES256JWS asserting the JWS sig is exactly 64 bytes, splitting R||S for ecdsa.Verify, and parsing with a real golang-jwt ES256 parser. Cover Local, AWS (DER fake), GCP (DER fake) and Azure (raw fake). The DER-path tests fail on the pre-fix code (71/69-byte signatures) and pass after; the Azure raw path stays correct. - go.mod: promote golang-jwt/jwt/v5 to a direct dependency (test use). * fix(oidc): rebase on main, fix test/lint regressions after ES256 migration - Replace TestAzureSigner_ExponentRange (RSA exponent tests) with TestAzureSigner_ECKeyCompleteness: the azure_factory_test.go added on main (#1044) tested RSA exponent validation removed by this PR; new test covers EC key nil-field rejection to keep coverage parity. - Apply fieldalignment ordering (govet) to aws_signer.go, azure_signer.go, gcp_signer.go, and the updated azure_factory_test.go struct literals. - Suppress staticcheck SA1019 on elliptic.Marshal in ComputeKeyID with an inline nolint; elliptic.Marshal is the only stdlib path from *ecdsa.PublicKey to the uncompressed point without converting through crypto/ecdh. - Fix staticcheck QF1008 (remove unnecessary .PublicKey embed selector) in aws_signer_test.go and backend_jws_test.go. - Fix shadow declarations in signer_test.go (json.Unmarshal err vars). - Replace deprecated ecdsa.Sign with ecdsa.SignASN1 + derToRawECDSASignature in the fakeAzureKVClient test stub (backend_jws_test.go). - Fix gofmt import ordering in backend_jws_test.go (cloud.google.com before github.com). * fix(oidc): replace deprecated elliptic.Marshal with ECDH().Bytes() in ComputeKeyID Use (*ecdsa.PublicKey).ECDH() and (*ecdh.PublicKey).Bytes() to obtain the uncompressed EC point, replacing the SA1019-deprecated elliptic.Marshal. The wire format is identical (0x04 || X || Y), so kid stability is preserved. Removes the staticcheck nolint directive. * fix(oidc): update stubOIDCSigner in credentials tests to crypto.PublicKey The oidc.Signer interface PublicKey method was changed from *rsa.PublicKey to crypto.PublicKey as part of the ES256 migration. Update the test stub in internal/credentials to match, fixing the go vet type-assertion failure. * fix(oidc): avoid deprecated ecdsa.PublicKey.X/Y in ES256 tests Rebasing onto main (Go 1.26.5) surfaces staticcheck SA1019: the raw ecdsa.PublicKey.X/Y fields are deprecated since Go 1.26. Replace the two uses introduced by the ES256 test code: - aws_signer_test.go: compare public keys via (*ecdsa.PublicKey).Equal instead of X.Cmp/Y.Cmp. - azure_factory_test.go: derive the fixed-width JWK coordinates from the uncompressed SEC 1 point via crypto/ecdh (ECDH().Bytes()), matching ComputeKeyID and PublicJWK. No behaviour change; the Azure fake now emits left-padded coordinates, which big.Int.SetBytes reconstructs identically. * fix(oidc): replace deprecated ecdsa.PublicKey X/Y fields with ParseUncompressedPublicKey Staticcheck SA1019 flagged direct struct-literal initialization of ecdsa.PublicKey.X and ecdsa.PublicKey.Y (deprecated since Go 1.23). azure_signer.go: build the 65-byte SEC 1 uncompressed point from the JWK X/Y bytes (right-aligned to 32 bytes each, per JWK spec), then call ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), ...) which validates point membership and produces a PublicKey without touching the deprecated fields. Drop the now-unused math/big import. Add a guard for coordinate lengths > 32 bytes. backend_jws_test.go: replace f.key.X.Bytes()/f.key.Y.Bytes() with key.PublicKey.ECDH().Bytes() (uncompressed point), then slice X from [1:33] and Y from [33:65]. Add "fmt" import for the new error path.
…are (closes #392) (#837) * sec(auth): constant-time token check after DB fetch (closes #392) SQL equality in PostgreSQL is not constant-time; an attacker on the same VPC can use response-time differences to learn bytes of a SHA-256 hash. The admin API key path already uses subtle.ConstantTimeCompare; align the user API key and password-reset token paths to match. No schema changes: the stored hash format is unchanged. After the DB row is fetched, compare the expected hash against the stored hash via crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare in ValidateUserAPIKey, validateResetToken, and ResetTokenStatus. A mismatch returns the same error as a missing row to avoid timing oracles via differing code paths. Update all test fixtures that set PasswordResetToken to literal stub values to instead use hashSessionToken(token) so they match the hash the service now verifies. Add targeted mismatch test cases to both the API-key and reset-token validation paths. * sec(auth): constant-time session token check (extends #392 PR #837) ValidateSession had the same SQL-equality timing oracle as the user API key and password-reset token paths fixed in this PR: GetSession runs `WHERE token = $1` in PostgreSQL, which short-circuits on first mismatching byte. Session tokens are the hottest auth surface (every authenticated API request hits ValidateSession via handler.go), so the oracle is even more exploitable here than on the API key path. Add a `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` of `session.Token` against the locally-derived `hashedToken` immediately after the store fetch, returning the same "session not found" error to keep the response indistinguishable from a missing-row outcome. `crypto/subtle` is already imported in service.go. Tests: - New `TestService_ValidateSession/constant-time mismatch rejects session even when DB row exists` asserts the guard fires when the stored token differs from the derived hash. - Fix `internal/server/adapter_test.go` fixtures that used literal stub tokens (`"hashed-token"`, `"hashed-session-token"`) to use a local `hashSessionTokenForTest` helper mirroring auth.hashSessionToken (private), so the new guard passes for the positive cases. `go test ./internal/...` -- 4223 passed, 0 failures. * fix(auth): drop stale Role field from Session test literal Session.Role was removed from the base branch; the constant-time mismatch test in service_test.go still referenced it, breaking go vet. Remove the field from the struct literal; the test logic is unaffected (it verifies token-hash rejection, not role checks). * test(auth): set KeyHash in singleflight fixture for constant-time check ValidateUserAPIKey now runs subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(key.KeyHash, keyHash) after the DB fetch. The TestValidateUserAPIKey_LastUsedSingleflight fixture omitted KeyHash, so the empty stored hash failed the compare and the function returned early before the background UpdateAPIKeyLastUsed ran, breaking the mock's Once expectation. Real DB rows always carry KeyHash, so the fixture must set it to represent the actual validated path.
parseMinSavingsParam used strconv.ParseFloat, which accepts "NaN", "Inf", "+Inf" and "Infinity" (case-insensitively), and only rejected v < 0, which is false for NaN. A NaN min_savings_usd bound into "monthly_savings >= $n" excludes every row with HTTP 200, and a NaN min_savings_pct is a silent no-op floor. Reject non-finite values at the input boundary with a 400 client error instead, per the fail-loud policy. Extends TestParseMinSavingsParam with NaN, +Inf, -Inf, bare/word infinity, and pct-path cases; the new cases fail on the pre-fix code. Closes #1183
parseAWSCostDetails silently swallowed strconv.ParseFloat errors for UpfrontCost, EstimatedMonthlyOnDemandCost, and RecurringStandardMonthlyCost, leaving the destination at 0. An unparseable UpfrontCost would surface an all-upfront RI recommendation showing $0 upfront, a wrong money figure feeding effective-savings math and purchase decisions, with no signal. Make a present-but-unparseable cost string a hard error, consistent with parseCostInformation in the same file. The caller chain already handles this: parseRecommendationDetail propagates the error and parseRecommendations logs a warning and skips the recommendation, so a malformed CE response drops that detail loudly instead of fabricating zeros. Regression test covers all three malformed fields and was confirmed failing against the pre-fix code. Closes #1171
* fix(providers/azure): harden Synapse nil HTTP client fallback NewClientWithHTTP in the Synapse client was the only one of the Azure NewClientWithHTTP constructors substituting http.DefaultClient when the injected client is nil, bypassing the SSRF/IMDS-blocking transport from the project httpclient package. Replace the fallback with httpclient.New() to match the production NewClient constructor and the established savingsplans/managedredis pattern, and add a regression test asserting the nil fallback is never http.DefaultClient and rejects IMDS connections. Closes #1143 * fix(lint): correct misspelling unrecognised->unrecognized in synapse comment * fix(lint): close HTTP response body in synapse nil-fallback test Replace nolint:bodyclose with proper deferred body close guarded by nil check, per the no-nolint policy.
…loses #625) (#821) * fix(purchases): cite #625 in cancelled-KPI regression tests summarizePurchaseHistory already excludes cancelled rows from dollar totals (landed in #737 against #736). Issue #625 describes the same bug -- this commit updates the two existing regression-test comments and assertion messages to cite both issues so the PR can formally close #625. Closes #625 * test(purchases): fix misspell/prealloc/govet in handler_history_test - cancelled->canceled, Cancelling->Canceling, cancelling->canceling, synthesised->synthesized, honour->honor in comments/test messages; Status:"cancelled" DB enum values suppressed with //nolint:misspell - prealloc: preallocate baseline slice with cap 4 in TestSummarizePurchaseHistory_CancelPendingDoesNotChangeKPIs - govet fieldalignment: suppress anonymous test-table struct in TestHandler_getHistory_FilterValidation with //nolint:govet * fix(lint): fix govet/misspell nolints in handler_history_test - Remove nolint:govet by reordering test-case struct fields to optimal alignment (map+string+string+int = 40 bytes, down from 48). - Annotate three nolint:misspell directives on "cancelled" with the DB-schema-value exception note referencing migration 000001. - Drop redundant misspell suppress from the append line (nolint:gocritic retained for the appendAssign check added in an earlier pass).
…829) * fix(gcp/computeengine): stamp PaymentOption="monthly" (closes #718) GCP CUDs are billed monthly; there is no upfront billing tier. The "upfront" literal was leftover from AWS-style modelling. Peer services (cloudsql, memorystore, cloudstorage) already emit "monthly". This makes computeengine consistent with them and with ValidPaymentOptionsByProvider["gcp"] = {"monthly"}, silencing the NormalizePaymentOption WARN that fired on every healthy GCP rec. Also adds a PaymentOption assertion to TestComputeEngineClient_ConvertGCPRecommendation to pin the contract. * test(gcp/computeengine): fix godot, misspell, fieldalignment in client_test.go Add period to mock type doc comments (godot); fix British-spelling misspellings in test comments (behaviour->behavior, cancelled->canceled, unrecognised->unrecognized); reorder mock struct fields for optimal alignment (govet/fieldalignment); remove unused index field from MockCommitmentsService. String literal in assert.Contains that matches the production error spelling is nolint-suppressed. * fix(lint): correct spelling of "unrecognised" to "unrecognized" in GCP CUD client US-spelling fix across production error messages and comments in computeengine client; update matching test assertion to "unrecognized". Removes misspell nolint that was suppressing the lint warning.
…chase Term field (#1258) * fix(plans): block past dates in Add Purchases start-date picker (closes #1249) Set `startDateInput.min` to today's ISO date after the default value (tomorrow) is assigned so the browser date-picker rejects past dates while still allowing today as a valid same-day start. Regression test added in plans-range-validation.test.ts: asserts `input.min === today ISO` after `openAddPurchasesModal` returns (FAIL pre-fix, PASS post-fix, 44 tests green). * fix(plans): set Add Purchases start-date min/value via local calendar day `new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]` returns the UTC calendar date, not the user's local one. For any user west of UTC after their local-evening crossover, the prior `min = toISOString().split('T')[0]` would resolve to tomorrow's UTC date and grey out today in the picker, directly contradicting the PR's own claim that "today remains selectable (a same-day start is legitimate)" (QA 5.6). Extract a `toLocalDateInputValue(Date) -> YYYY-MM-DD` helper that builds the ISO string from local year/month/day components (mirrors the local-midnight pattern already used by `isPlanOverdue` above), and use it for both `value` (default tomorrow) and `min` (today) in `openAddPurchasesModal`. Regression test updated in `plans-range-validation.test.ts`: the prior assertion used the same UTC function as production code, so it would have gone green even with the bug present. The replacement asserts both `min` and `value` against the local-component derivation, and adds an explicit "local calendar day, not UTC" case that documents the failure shape.
The admin:* carve-out set is keyed on exact (action, resource) pairs, but enforcement treats a stored resource of "*" as matching every resource. An admin could therefore write execute:*, approve-any:* or retry-any:* onto a group, join it, or mint an API key with it, and every holder then passed the execute / approve-any / retry-any checks for purchases and ri-exchange. Replace the five exact-pair lookups with one predicate, coversCarvedOut, that asks enforcement's own matcher (checkPermissionMatch) whether the permission would satisfy any carved-out pair. The grant ceiling, the self-membership guard, API-key validation, the key/owner intersection and both enforcement matchers now agree on what the set covers. Closes #1901 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Records 545 findings from a sharded review of every package at 3c0f8ac. Each finding was written by one reviewer and checked by an independent verifier that did not write it: 454 confirmed, 46 plausible, 45 rejected. Rejected findings are kept with the verifier's reasoning rather than deleted, so nobody re-raises them. Issues filed from this audit cite finding IDs and this path, so the report needs to exist on main for those references to resolve. Two adjustments were needed to land it: Excludes docs/audits/ from markdownlint. The report quotes code verbatim, and --fix rewrote a git-secrets pattern by stripping the trailing space inside `resource `, which changes what the finding claims. Evidence a formatter can edit is not evidence. Redacts the synthetic AWS key in A14-010's reproduction. The key was always fake and its characters carry no meaning; the finding is about git-secrets matching allowed regexes against whole lines, which the surrounding text still shows. Keeping a key-shaped literal would leave the scanner blocking every future commit that touches this file. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
…ounts (#2072) * fix(purchase): refuse a plan-less execution whose recs span cloud accounts A direct-execute or approved web purchase whose selected recommendations carried two different cloud_account_ids never fanned out: the resolver returned a nil provider config for "more than one account" exactly as it did for "no account at all", the factory built a client from the host's ambient credentials, every commitment was bought in the CUDly host account, and history was stamped with the ambient STS identity. A batch mixing attributed and unattributed recs bought the unattributed ones under the attributed account's credentials. SingleCloudAccountIDFromRecs now scans only the selected recs (the recs the money moves for) and returns errAmbiguousAccountScope for the multi-account and mixed shapes; resolveSingleAccountProvider propagates it so every executor entry point (direct, approval, SQS, retry, scheduled fire, cron, reaper re-drive) fails closed before a provider client exists. The web execute endpoint applies the same rule and returns 400 naming the accounts before an execution row is persisted. Nil config stays legitimate at the provider factory: GCP ADC and the ambient single-account deployment depend on it, so the guard lives at the only resolver that can be ambiguous. Closes #1902 Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC * style(purchase): US spellings and an accurate ambient-fallback header The CI Lint job runs golangci-lint with misspell in US locale, and three new comments used honour and behaviour. The exemption list only covers cancelled and initialised in named files, and the pre-commit hook does not run misspell, so this would have failed only on CI. Also corrects executePurchase's doc header, which still described the non-fan-out branch as falling back to ambient credentials. Since #1902 that branch resolves credentials from the recommendations' own cloud account and refuses a batch spanning more than one; only a batch with no attributed recommendations at all reaches ambient credentials. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC --------- Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
#2073) * fix(api): derive the purchase spend cap from the stored recommendation price POST /api/purchases/execute enforced MaxPurchaseAmount, and stamped the execution row and the approval email, from the upfront_cost, monthly_cost and savings the client sent. A purchaser holding execute:purchases with a $1,000 cap could submit upfront_cost: 1 for 100 three-year m5.24xlarge reservations and the provider bought them at list price (audit A01-001). Every rec in the request is now matched against the stored recommendation set on (provider, account, service, region, resource_type, engine, term, payment). Its id, details and cost fields are replaced by the stored row's values scaled by count before the constraint check, the execution row, the approval email and the idempotency key read them. A rec that matches no stored recommendation, or whose stored row carries no usable price, is refused with 409. Retry re-checks the cap against the persisted row, which is now written only from store-derived values. Closes #1905 Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC * fix(api): close #1905 review gaps - handler test, dup-key guard, doc accuracy An adversarial review of the stored-price purchase-cap fix found three low-severity gaps, all addressed here without changing the fix's behaviour: - The account component of recIdentityKey was only proven by a pure unit test, not by any handler test, so a regression there could still pass end to end through the real request/scope/pricing pipeline. Added TestHandler_executePurchase_CrossAccountMismatchRefused: stored recommendations exist under one cloud account, the request claims the same resource under a different account, and the handler must refuse with 409 before persisting or contacting the provider. - loadStoredRecommendationIndex silently kept whichever stored row won a map-key collision. The comment claimed migration 000043's unique index rules this out, but that index is case-sensitive on provider and payment while recIdentityKey folds their case, so two rows differing only in case would collide (unreachable today since the scheduler always writes lowercase, but not guaranteed by the schema). This is a money path, so a collision is now refused with an error naming the key instead of picking a row. TestHandler_executePurchase_Success needed a fixture fix: its two stored rows shared one identity tuple and relied on the prior silent-overwrite behaviour to add up to the right total, which the new guard correctly rejects; giving each row a distinct resource_type keeps the same expected totals under a fixture the real store could actually hold. - The OpenAPI description under-listed the fields replaced from the stored recommendation (missing on_demand_cost, purchased, purchase_id and error), reworded to match what priceFromStored actually does. Closes #1905 Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC * fix(api): address CodeRabbit findings on #2073 CodeRabbit flagged three gaps in the #1905 stored-price purchase cap fix: - TestHandler_executePurchase_NegativeSavings and TestHandler_executePurchase_ExceedsMaxAmount submitted client values that were themselves invalid (negative savings, over-cap upfront cost), so both tests would still pass if the handler validated the client's numbers instead of the stored recommendation's. Making the client's values valid while the stored row keeps the invalid value proves the stored value is what actually governs. - The execute-purchase 409 response referenced the shared Conflict component, which documents only the idempotency-claim case. This PR added four more 409 causes (unmatched recommendation, duplicate identity key, unpriceable stored row, Savings Plan count mismatch), so the operation now gets its own 409 description covering both conflict families. - RecommendationRecord was missing cloud_account_id and recommended_count, both of which the stored-recommendation match now depends on, so a generated client could never construct a valid account-scoped request. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC * docs(api): note that a duplicate stored identity key also returns 409 The 409 description listed duplicate identities in the request but not in the stored set. loadStoredRecommendationIndex refuses two stored rows that share an identity key rather than picking one arbitrarily, and that fires independently of how many recommendations the request carries, including for a single one. The distinction matters to a client: a duplicate in the request is fixed by changing the selection, while a duplicate in the stored set is not the caller's to fix and calls for refreshing the recommendation set or an operator repairing the store. Found by CodeRabbit reviewing 78358f3. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC --------- Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
…emaining (#2074) pricing.FetchAll stopped after maxPages and returned the pages read so far with a nil error, so every Azure GetOfferingDetails consumer read a truncated price list as a complete one and reported a meter as absent when it was on a later page. The self-referential-link guard in the same loop already errors; the cap now does too. The cap stays at 50. Measured on 2026-09-08 the API pages at about 1,000 items, so 50 pages is roughly 50,000; the largest filter any client issues fits in one page and the whole VM catalogue for one region is 16. The DefaultMaxPages comment claimed 100 items per page; corrected. Closes #1963 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
…it as $0 (#2076) * fix(exchange): refuse a quote with no PaymentDue instead of treating it as $0 An ExchangeQuoteSummary whose PaymentDueUSD is nil means the AWS response carried no PaymentDue at all; a zero-cost exchange arrives as an explicit "0.000000" and parses to a non-nil zero. Every cap layer collapsed the two: getValidatedQuote skipped the per-exchange cap, processRecommendation recorded the exchange as costing "0" (so the daily cap added nothing and a manual pending record carried "0"), and resolvePaymentDue substituted a zero inside Execute so both the initial and the pre-accept re-quote checks passed. An unpriced exchange could reach AcceptReservedInstancesExchangeQuote with no effective ceiling. Fail closed at every consumer: - getValidatedQuote skips the recommendation with "quote reported no PaymentDue" before the cap compare; processRecommendation no longer defaults the amount to "0". - requirePaymentDue replaces resolvePaymentDue; checkInitialQuote and checkReQuote return its error before Accept is called. - acceptedAmountFromQuote falls back to the initial quoted amount, never "0", when a fresh quote carries no amount. Regression tests drive RunAutoExchange (auto and manual) and the real executeWithAPI with an unpriced quote and assert nothing executes and nothing is recorded; an explicit zero still proceeds. Closes #1964 Refs #1448 (A09-004) Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC * refactor(api): drop the unreachable zero-substitution in handlerAcceptedAmount The helper returned "0" when a fresh Execute quote carried no payment amount, and its comment explained that as a zero-cost exchange where AWS returned nil. This commit's own change disproves that premise: a genuine zero arrives as an explicit "0.000000" and parses to a non-nil zero, while an absent PaymentDue is now refused by checkInitialQuote and checkReQuote before Accept runs. Execute can therefore no longer return successfully with an empty amount, so the branch is unreachable and its comment asserts something untrue. A future reader would take it as evidence that an empty amount is normal. Now mirrors exchange.acceptedAmountFromQuote and returns the caller's fallback instead of fabricating a figure. Found by adversarial review of the parent commit. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC --------- Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
The GCP API-key detector used the bracket range [0-9A-Za-z-_], which BSD regex (Apple git), glibc regex (git 2.43) and GNU grep 3.12 all reject as an invalid character range (the hyphen between z and _ is read as a range boundary). git-secrets joins every registered pattern into a single `git grep -E` call, so once this pattern is registered, every subsequent scan on that clone exits 128, including the pre-commit hook. The range only needs reordering so the hyphen is literal: [0-9A-Za-z_-]. Present since the script was added in c7d3c8c. Tracked separately as #2080. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
…allowed entries git-secrets applies allowed patterns with `grep -Ev` against the scanner's whole "path:line:content" output line, not just the file content. The 20 keyword entries the setup script registered (var\., resource\s, _test\.go, placeholder, ...) therefore whitelisted every line containing that keyword anywhere in the tree, including a line carrying a real access key. Measured against the tree with the script's own detectors registered, none of the 20 entries suppressed a legitimate false positive; the real false positives were 22 lines mentioning the GCP key-file "type" marker, three lines where the script matches its own detector registrations, and three truncated PEM fixtures in a test file. The GCP marker detector (type.*service_account) is dropped rather than narrowed: the benign literal is byte-identical to the one in a real key file, so no regex can tell them apart. The real secret in a GCP service-account JSON is the private_key PEM, which is now covered by the corrected PEM detector. .gitallowed is now the single allowlist and gets three literal entries: a path-anchored entry for the script matching its own registration lines, a truncated-PEM entry for the test fixtures, and a Go format-string DSN entry (fmt.Sprintf with "%s" in the credential position) guarding a recurring benign idiom that scripts/ test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh exercises directly, even though no current file in the tree matches it literally. Its header is corrected: path-scoping is possible via a "^path:[0-9]+:" anchor, contrary to what it claimed. Closes #1972 Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
Runs the real scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh and .gitallowed in a throwaway repo, through the pre-commit hook scan path, and asserts both directions: fixtures shaped like the #1972 hole (a real access key sitting next to a keyword the old allowlist whitelisted) still get caught, and the tree's known false positives still scan clean. HOME is isolated per case so the AWS credential provider and the developer's global git config never reach the test. Fixtures are assembled at runtime from adjacent string literals so this file's own source never contains a scannable token. Wires a new CI job that runs it, mirroring the existing scripts/test-* self-test jobs. Not added to ci-success yet, so it cannot block unrelated PRs while it beds in. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
cristim
added
priority/p1
Contributor
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe pull request updates git-secrets detection and allowlist rules, removes broad exemptions, adds a temporary-repository self-test, and runs that test in CI with git-secrets 1.3.0. ChangesGit-secrets validation
Priority: ➖ Normal — Impact reflects medium issue severity. Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Severity of issue fixed: Medium Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The change improves secret detection, but its setup-script exception can still hide credentials, its test does not exercise the installed hook, and CI installs privileged code from a mutable tag. These issues should be fixed before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Comment |
The new "git-secrets allowlist self-test" CI job (added on this branch)
fails on ubuntu-latest with:
/usr/local/bin/git-secrets: line 208: say: command not found
Failed to install git hooks
git-secrets 1.3.0's install_hook() writes the hook file, chmods it,
and only then reports success via a bare `say` call it never defines
as a function anywhere in the script (confirmed against the 1.3.0
source; still true on the current release, the latest tag). On macOS
that name resolves to /usr/bin/say, the text-to-speech binary, which
exits 0 and makes `git secrets --install -f` look like a clean success
by accident. On Linux there is no such binary, so it's "command not
found" (exit 127), and that becomes the exit status of
`git secrets --install -f` even though every hook file was already
written and made executable correctly beforehand. Reproduced on both
platforms: the commit-msg, pre-commit, and prepare-commit-msg hook
files exist with correct content after the "failed" Linux install.
Defines `say` as a no-op and exports it before calling
`git secrets --install -f`, so the exported function is visible to
git-secrets' own bash process on both platforms. `say` is used in
exactly this one place upstream, so this can't mask any other
diagnostic. Left `scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh`'s own error message as
the accurate signal it now is: it only fires when hook installation
actually fails.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
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Inline comments:
In @.gitallowed:
- Line 57: Update the .gitallowed rule for scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh to use
three fully anchored patterns matching only the exact Azure, PostgreSQL, and
MySQL detector registration lines, rather than any line sharing the git secrets
--add prefix. Add a negative fixture covering a secret-shaped value appended to
another registration line.
In @.github/workflows/ci.yml:
- Around line 951-952: Update the git-secrets checkout commands in the CI setup
to fetch the verified commit ad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84 instead of
the mutable 1.3.0 tag, then verify the repository HEAD matches that SHA before
invoking sudo make -C /tmp/git-secrets install.
In `@scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh`:
- Line 56: In both helper flows at scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh lines
56 and 73, replace the direct git secrets --scan --cached invocation with
execution of .git/hooks/pre-commit immediately after each git add, while
preserving each helper’s existing success/failure capture and assertions.
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… real hook
CodeRabbit found three real problems in the git-secrets allowlist PR.
The .gitallowed entry that suppressed setup-git-secrets.sh's own
self-matching detector registrations was anchored on the command
prefix ("git secrets --add '"), not the full added pattern. That
whitelists a secret appended to ANY registration line in that file,
not just the three lines that legitimately self-match (Azure,
PostgreSQL and MySQL DSN; verified empirically that MongoDB's does
not). That is the exact #1972 hole this allowlist exists to close,
reintroduced at the scale of one file. Replaced the single prefix
entry with three entries anchored on the full literal pattern, added
a negative fixture proving a secret appended to a different
registration line (the GCP one) still gets caught, and verified by
measurement that a whole-tree scan produces byte-identical output
before and after the narrowing (the only residual is the pre-existing,
already-tracked #2030 AWS-secret-key false positive, unrelated to this
change).
Narrowing surfaced a second, self-inflicted problem: .gitallowed's own
three new entries reproduce the literal trigger text they exist to
suppress (e.g. "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https", and a "postgres://...@"
span the DSN detector's permissive character classes still match), so
.gitallowed started failing its own self-scan. The old prefix-only
entry never had this problem because it didn't spell out any trigger
text. Fixed by replacing one letter of each entry's trigger substring
with a single-character bracket expression (e.g. "Protoco[l]"), which
is a no-op for regex matching but breaks the contiguous literal span,
so the entries no longer need to allow-list themselves. The explanatory
comment above them is written to avoid spelling those spans out too,
for the same reason.
The CI install step clones git-secrets by the "1.3.0" tag, which is
mutable. Verified independently via `git ls-remote --tags` against the
upstream repo that it currently resolves to
ad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84, then added a check in both
the new git-secrets-allowlist job and the existing pre-commit.yml
install step (which has the identical unpinned clone) that asserts the
cloned HEAD matches before trusting it enough to `sudo make install`.
scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh called `git secrets --scan
--cached` directly, bypassing the installed pre-commit hook and its own
file-selection logic entirely. Now every case also invokes the
installed hook (which recomputes its file list from the index rather
than accepting args, so it is called with none) and checks its exit
code against the same expectation, so a hook/direct-scan disagreement
surfaces as its own labeled failure instead of going unnoticed.
Verified on macOS (git-secrets via homebrew) and in a Debian bookworm
container (git-secrets built from the pinned SHA the same way CI does):
30 PASS, 0 FAIL on both.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
Adversarial review found the "entry broader than its false positive"
pattern still present twice in the entries the previous commit narrowed,
plus two smaller gaps.
Delete the .gitallowed entry for the Go format-string DSN idiom
(postgres://%s:%s@) and its test fixture. Measured what it actually
suppresses across the whole tree: only the PR's own fixture. The real
idiom in the tree is "postgresql://%s:%s@..." in
internal/testutil/postgres.go, which the postgres:// detector does not
match anyway (the "ql" breaks the required literal). The entry guarded
nothing that exists, and the fixture existed only to justify the entry.
It also widened matching: a real key appended to a line shaped like
"postgres://%s:%s@%s/db", "<key>" scanned clean. If the idiom ever
lands in the tree, a path-anchored entry can be added then.
The three entries narrowed onto scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh's own
self-matching registration lines were anchored on the path and the
added pattern, but not the trailing comment, and had no trailing $.
That leaves the anchor open at the end, so a key appended to the END of
one of those three lines themselves (not a different line) scanned
clean. Pinned the whole line, comment included, with $, for all three
entries. Added a fixture that appends a key to the end of the
PostgreSQL line and confirmed it fails against the pre-fix entries
(exit 0, wrongly clean) and passes against the fix (exit 1, caught).
Added the new git-secrets-allowlist job to ci-success's needs list. All
of its sibling guard self-test jobs were already listed; this one
wasn't, so a regression in it could not block anything. It has already
passed on Linux on this PR, so the "not required while it beds in"
rationale no longer applies.
Corrected the root-cause comment on the `say` shim: `say` was never
git-secrets' own function. git-secrets sources git's git-sh-setup and
relied on `say` being defined there (introduced in git-sh-setup.sh in
2009, in git's own history). Git removed it in commit 5b893f7d81
("git-sh-setup.sh: remove 'say' function, change last users"), first
shipped in Git 2.38 (2022), because it was undocumented and unused
within git's own tree. So this is breakage from a git upgrade, not a
git-secrets regression; a git-secrets install on an older git, or on
macOS where /usr/bin/say happens to answer to the same name, was never
affected. The shim remains the correct fix either way.
Verified on macOS (git-secrets via homebrew, shellcheck clean) and in a
Debian bookworm container (git-secrets built from the pinned SHA the
same way CI does, shellcheck clean): 30 PASS, 0 FAIL on both, same
count as before since one case was removed and one was added. Measured
the whole-tree scan before and after these changes: byte-identical
output (the only residual is the pre-existing, already-tracked #2030
AWS-secret-key false positive).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
Member
Author
|
Ported to LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#101 after the monorepo split; closing here. |
cristim
added a commit
to LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-go
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 28, 2026
…ed most of the repo This repo's scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh and .gitallowed were copied verbatim from the monorepo split and carried the same #1972 defect fixed in LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-cli#2083 (upstream, now cloud-commitments-platform#101): git-secrets allowed patterns are matched against the scanner's whole "path:line:content" output line, not file content alone, so the script's 20 keyword allowlist entries (var\., resource\s, _test\.go, placeholder, example\.com, ...) whitelisted any line containing one of those tokens, including a line carrying a real access key. The script also never ran to completion on any platform before this fix: the PEM detector's pattern starts with a dash, which git secrets --add rejects, aborting the script under set -e before the allowed block was ever reached; the GCP API-key pattern registered just before that abort was an invalid regex, which (once reached) makes every subsequent scan exit 128; and git-secrets --install's success path calls `say`, removed from git-sh-setup in Git 2.38, so on Linux a successful install reports failure and this script's error handling exited before registering anything. - Delete the allowed-pattern block from scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh. .gitallowed is now the single allowlist. - Fix the GCP API-key regex; broaden the PEM detector to PKCS#8. - Define a no-op say() so hook installation succeeds on Linux. - .gitallowed: rewrite the header to describe path-anchored matching against the whole scanner line, add three path-and-line-anchored entries for the setup script's self-matching detector-registration lines (Azure connection string, PostgreSQL, MySQL), and add the truncated-PEM entry scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh's negative controls need (kept generic since this repo has no cmd/configure_test.go to reference). - scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh: self-test exercising both the direct scan and the installed pre-commit hook, HOME-isolated. - Pin the git-secrets clone in .github/workflows/pre-commit.yml to the verified commit ad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84 (the 1.3.0 tag) instead of the mutable tag, and run the new self-test as a step in the same job. Adapted from the platform port: this repo has no ci.yml job graph to extend, so the self-test runs as a pre-commit.yml step instead of a new ci.yml job. The pre-existing account-ID placeholder section in .gitallowed (entries referencing handler_*_test.go etc. that don't exist in this repo) is left untouched -- out of scope for this fix. Verified in a throwaway repo with the real git-secrets binary: scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh passes 30/30. Direct proof the hole is closed: a Terraform-shaped line with an AKIA-format key scans dirty with this .gitallowed; re-adding the old `resource\s` keyword allowlist makes the identical line scan clean, reproducing the pre-fix bug on demand. git ls-remote confirms the 1.3.0 tag resolves to the pinned SHA. pre-commit (SKIP=hadolint,actionlint; Docker daemon unavailable) passes on all other hooks; actionlint run natively at the pinned v1.7.12 is clean on the changed workflow file. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
cristim
added a commit
to LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-go
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 28, 2026
…ed most of the repo (#86) * sec(scripts): git-secrets allowlist matched whole lines and whitelisted most of the repo This repo's scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh and .gitallowed were copied verbatim from the monorepo split and carried the same #1972 defect fixed in LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-cli#2083 (upstream, now cloud-commitments-platform#101): git-secrets allowed patterns are matched against the scanner's whole "path:line:content" output line, not file content alone, so the script's 20 keyword allowlist entries (var\., resource\s, _test\.go, placeholder, example\.com, ...) whitelisted any line containing one of those tokens, including a line carrying a real access key. The script also never ran to completion on any platform before this fix: the PEM detector's pattern starts with a dash, which git secrets --add rejects, aborting the script under set -e before the allowed block was ever reached; the GCP API-key pattern registered just before that abort was an invalid regex, which (once reached) makes every subsequent scan exit 128; and git-secrets --install's success path calls `say`, removed from git-sh-setup in Git 2.38, so on Linux a successful install reports failure and this script's error handling exited before registering anything. - Delete the allowed-pattern block from scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh. .gitallowed is now the single allowlist. - Fix the GCP API-key regex; broaden the PEM detector to PKCS#8. - Define a no-op say() so hook installation succeeds on Linux. - .gitallowed: rewrite the header to describe path-anchored matching against the whole scanner line, add three path-and-line-anchored entries for the setup script's self-matching detector-registration lines (Azure connection string, PostgreSQL, MySQL), and add the truncated-PEM entry scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh's negative controls need (kept generic since this repo has no cmd/configure_test.go to reference). - scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh: self-test exercising both the direct scan and the installed pre-commit hook, HOME-isolated. - Pin the git-secrets clone in .github/workflows/pre-commit.yml to the verified commit ad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84 (the 1.3.0 tag) instead of the mutable tag, and run the new self-test as a step in the same job. Adapted from the platform port: this repo has no ci.yml job graph to extend, so the self-test runs as a pre-commit.yml step instead of a new ci.yml job. The pre-existing account-ID placeholder section in .gitallowed (entries referencing handler_*_test.go etc. that don't exist in this repo) is left untouched -- out of scope for this fix. Verified in a throwaway repo with the real git-secrets binary: scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh passes 30/30. Direct proof the hole is closed: a Terraform-shaped line with an AKIA-format key scans dirty with this .gitallowed; re-adding the old `resource\s` keyword allowlist makes the identical line scan clean, reproducing the pre-fix bug on demand. git ls-remote confirms the 1.3.0 tag resolves to the pinned SHA. pre-commit (SKIP=hadolint,actionlint; Docker daemon unavailable) passes on all other hooks; actionlint run natively at the pinned v1.7.12 is clean on the changed workflow file. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(scripts): anchor the truncated-PEM allowlist entry, close a #1972 reopen CodeRabbit review on this port (cloud-commitments-platform#101): the truncated-PEM .gitallowed entry was unanchored, so a real secret spliced onto the same line -- appended after "..." or prepended before "-----BEGIN" -- still scanned clean, because .gitallowed suppresses the WHOLE "path:line:content" line if any allowed pattern matches anywhere in it, regardless of which prohibited pattern actually fired. That is the exact class of bug this branch exists to close, reintroduced in the one entry that didn't get the anchoring treatment the three self-matching script entries already had. Fixed by requiring the full contiguous header ("-----BEGIN PRIVAT[E] KEY-----", immediately after the opening quote) and pinning the tail with $ to only the closing punctuation this repo's own test fixtures use. Verified directly (real git-secrets binary, throwaway repo): a key appended after the truncation marker, a key prepended before the header, a key spliced between "BEGIN" and "PRIVATE KEY-----", and a key spliced right after "KEY-----" are all now caught (exit 1); both of this repo's legitimate truncated-PEM fixtures still scan clean (exit 0). scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh: 30/30 passing after the fix (it was already 30/30 before, since none of its existing fixtures exercised this particular splice -- the new coverage above is a manual adversarial check, not a change to the checked-in self-test). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(scripts): verify hook files after install instead of trusting say() CodeRabbit review on this port: defining say() as a no-op (so this script's own error handling, not git-secrets' `say` bug, decides success) also means "git secrets --install -f" returning success no longer proves anything about whether the hook files were actually written -- say() is a no-op that returns success regardless of whether install_hook's write or chmod actually succeeded, so a broken hook (e.g. a permissions error) would be reported as installed. Verify what install_hook was supposed to do instead: after install, check that each of the three hooks git-secrets writes (commit-msg, pre-commit, prepare-commit-msg) exists, is executable, and contains its "git secrets --<cmd> -- \"$@\"" invocation (checking the *.d/git-secrets path when a hooks.d directory is in use, matching install_hook's own destination logic). Fail loudly if any hook fails the check. Verified: a normal install passes; corrupting a hook's content after install (simulating a partial write) is detected and reported. scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh remains 30/30 (it already installs via this same script and would have failed loudly here if the new check had a false positive). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(scripts): whole-line anchor the PEM allowlist entry, fix \s under git grep Independent adversarial review of this port found two further gaps past the previous two fix commits: 1. The truncated-PEM .gitallowed entry, even after being anchored to the quoted value's own start and end, was still only a SUBSTRING match within the scanner's whole "path:line:content" line. .gitallowed suppresses the entire line when ANY allowed pattern matches anywhere in it, regardless of which prohibited pattern fired, so a real secret in an earlier, unrelated statement on the same physical line as the allowed fixture -- `k := "AKIA..."; PrivateKey: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n...",` -- was still suppressed. Fixed by anchoring the whole entry to the start of git-secrets' own "path:line:content" format (^[^:]+:[0-9]+:) so the key assignment must be the first thing on the line, closing the gap in both directions (before AND after the fixture) at once. Also dropped an orphan half-line comment left over from an earlier edit, and fixed the explanatory comment (which illustrated the attack by literally spelling out the PEM trigger, tripping the PEM detector on .gitallowed itself). 2. scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh's password/api_key/secret_key detectors used `\s` for whitespace. BSD/glibc grep's -E accepts `\s` as a GNU extension in some builds, but `git grep -E` (what git-secrets actually invokes to join and run every pattern) does not: `password = "..."` with a real space scanned clean under `git grep -E 'password\s*...'` and only matched once `\s` was replaced with the POSIX class `[[:space:]]`. This is the exact class of "detector never actually ran" bug #1972 already found twice (the PEM `--add` abort, the GCP regex making every scan exit 128); fixed the same way here since it's the same file and the same failure mode. Added three fixtures to scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh exercising both: a real-spaced password/api_key/secret_key line (must be caught), and a real-shaped key spliced before AND after an otherwise-legitimate truncated-PEM fixture on the same physical line (both must be caught). Verified: 36/36 assertions pass (30 previous + 6 new: 3 fixtures x 2 scan paths) against the real git-secrets binary. Filed a follow-up issue for two lower-risk residual items an independent review also raised (the bare numeric/UUID placeholder block's own lack of anchoring, and a dedicated DSN-detector coverage audit), scoped separately since neither has a demonstrated exploit and both need a deliberate design pass. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> --------- Co-authored-by: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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Summary
git-secrets allowed patterns are applied with
grep -Evagainst the scanner's wholepath:line:contentoutput line, not against file content alone.scripts/setup-git-secrets.shregistered 20 keyword entries, among themvar\.,resource\s,_test\.go,placeholderandexample\.com. Any line containing one of those scanned clean, including a line carrying a real access key.Reproduced both directions: with
resource\sallowed, a Terraform line holding a synthetic access key exits 0; with it removed, the same line exits 1.Measured against the tree with the script's own detectors, none of the 20 entries suppressed a legitimate false positive. The real false positives were 22 lines mentioning the GCP key-file
typemarker, the script matching three of its own registration lines, and three truncated PEM fixtures.The script had never actually run to completion
Three independent defects meant this hole was latent rather than live. Each had to be fixed before anything here could be verified, and the third was found by the new CI job on its first run:
git secrets --addputs its value through git's option parser, which rejects a value starting with a dash. The PEM pattern starts with one, so the script aborted there underset -eand never reached the allowed block on any machine.git grep -E, so once registered it makes every scan exit 128, including the pre-commit hook. Filed as fix(scripts): git-secrets GCP API-key pattern is an invalid bracket range, every scan exits 128 cloud-commitments-platform#327 and fixed here as the first commit, since nothing else could be measured until scans ran.say. That function came fromgit-sh-setup, which git-secrets sources, and git removed it in5b893f7d81as undocumented and unused, first shipping in Git 2.38 (September 2022), so this is a git regression git-secrets inherited rather than a defect it ever had alone; older git versions never hit it. On macOS that resolves to/usr/bin/say, the text-to-speech binary, and exits 0 by accident, so the workstation literally speaks the message. On Linux there is no such command, so the install returns non-zero despite every hook being written correctly, and this script trusted that status: it printed a wrong error and exited before reaching pattern registration. The script now defines a no-opsayand exports it, making the real hook-writing status the one that is checked. It is the only call site, so nothing else is masked.Changes
.gitallowedbecomes the single allowlist..gitallowed's header, which claimed path scoping was impossible. It is not, and the file now says what an entry is actually matched against.type.*service_accountmarker detector with PKCS#8 coverage in the PEM detector. The marker cannot be narrowed, since the benign literal is byte-identical to the one in a real key file. The secret in such a file is the private key body, which the old detector missed because it required an algorithm word. Detecting key material beats detecting a marker.scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.shruns the real script in a temporary repository and asserts both directions, through both a direct scan and the installed pre-commit hook, checking the two against the same expectation so a disagreement surfaces as its own failure. A new CI job runs it.pre-commit.ymlstep it was copied from.One entry was still too broad, and it was the same bug again
Review caught that the path-anchored entry for the script's self-matching lines was written as a command prefix, so it covered every registration line in that file, not the three that genuinely self-match. A secret appended to any other one would have been whitelisted. That is precisely the defect this PR exists to close, reintroduced at the scale of a single file.
Which three self-match was then determined by measurement rather than assumption (the Azure connection-string detector and the PostgreSQL and MySQL DSN detectors; MongoDB's does not), and each entry is now anchored on the path, line number and full pattern. A negative fixture covers a key appended to a different registration line, confirmed to pass under the old entry and fail under the new ones.
Narrowing exposed a genuine tension worth recording: spelling out the full pattern means each entry contains the trigger text it exists to suppress, so
.gitallowedbegan matching itself, which the vague entry avoided only by naming no trigger at all. Each entry now replaces one letter of its trigger with a single-character bracket expression, a no-op for matching that breaks the contiguous literal. The comment explaining this is written the same way, for the same reason. Do not tidyProtoco[l]back toProtocol; it will silently reopen the problem.Then it happened twice more, and both were caught only by review. The narrowed entries were anchored on the pattern but left open at the end, so a key appended to the end of one of those three specific lines still scanned clean. The fixture from the first round only covered a key on a different registration line, so it stayed green throughout. All three are now pinned to the entire line including its trailing comment, with a closing anchor and a fixture for exactly that mutation.
The same review found the format-string connection-string entry suppressed nothing in the tree except this PR's own fixture. The idiom it claimed to guard uses a different scheme the detector never matched, so the fixture justified the entry and the entry justified the fixture while neither matched real code. Both are deleted.
The recurring lesson is now written into
.gitalloweditself: a fixture proving one instance of this class says nothing about its siblings, so any future entry in that block needs its own mutation fixture.Verification
Measured in a throwaway shared clone with its own config and an isolated
HOME, never in a real checkout.HOMEisolation is not incidental:--register-awsinstalls a provider that reads the developer's credentials file, and git-secrets echoes its entire joined pattern list on any regex error, so a malformed pattern prints real credentials to the terminal. That was observed while measuring.The location diff between before and after is empty: the only change is the 24 false positives disappearing. No file gains a hit.
The remaining 972 are all separator lines (box drawing and rules) matched by the inverted secret-key pattern on line 52, which is LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#295 and out of scope here. They exist with or without this PR.
On the totals differing from the plan's predicted 966 and 942: that is base drift, attributed rather than assumed, by two independent methods that agree.
Counting the separator pattern alone with
LC_ALL=C git grep -nwHEIgives 942 hits at the commit the plan measured and 972 at this PR's base. Separately, re-running the full before-measurement at the plan's own base reproduces its 966 and 24 exactly, against 996 and 24 here. Both methods give a delta of exactly 30, with no remainder.Those 30 land in 14 files, six of which did not exist at the earlier commit (a scope test, two migration files and three scripts); the rest are existing files that gained separator comments. Every delta line inspected is box drawing or a rule. It also holds algebraically: the false-positive count is 24 in both measurements, so the entire delta is separator noise by construction.
One measurement artefact worth recording, since it looks alarming: comparing
path:linepairs across the two base commits reports 253 locations added and 253 removed. That is line-number churn from unrelated edits shifting existing separator lines within files, netting to zero, not new hits. The comparison that matters is before against after on the same base, and that location diff is empty.Other checks: the self-test passes 30 of 30 assertions on both macOS and Linux, the latter reproduced in a Debian container with git-secrets built from the same pinned tag CI uses; the per-file path used by pre-commit exits 0 on the three formerly-flagged files;
pre-commit runis green on every touched file, includingdetect-private-keyagainst the new test script; the test script is shellcheck-clean.The cross-platform run is not incidental. The Linux defect above was invisible for as long as the script was only ever exercised on macOS, and this job is the first thing to run it on Linux.
For developers who already ran
make setup-git-secretsThe script aborted partway for you, leaving a partial and invalid pattern set, so scans on that clone have been exiting 128. Clear the stale per-clone config before re-running, since a second run otherwise aborts on duplicate patterns (#2031):
Not in this PR
LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#295, the inverted line-52 pattern responsible for every remaining hit. LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#296, a second run aborting on duplicates. LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#328, the connection-string detectors never firing on a real connection string, because the word-boundary flag rejects a match ending before a hostname letter. LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#329, three detectors using a whitespace escape POSIX does not have, which degrades to a literal
son macOS so those detectors silently miss the spaced form.There is no gitleaks job in CI despite a
.gitleaksignoreexisting, so this local gate is currently the only content scanner beyond the AWS patterns that pre-commit registers.Closes LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-platform#255
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