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sec(scripts): git-secrets allowlist matched whole lines and whitelisted most of the repo - #101
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The GCP API-key detector used the bracket range [0-9A-Za-z-_], which BSD regex (Apple git), glibc regex (git 2.43) and GNU grep 3.12 all reject as an invalid character range (the hyphen between z and _ is read as a range boundary). git-secrets joins every registered pattern into a single `git grep -E` call, so once this pattern is registered, every subsequent scan on that clone exits 128, including the pre-commit hook. The range only needs reordering so the hyphen is literal: [0-9A-Za-z_-]. Present since the script was added in c7d3c8c49. Tracked separately as #2080. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
…allowed entries git-secrets applies allowed patterns with `grep -Ev` against the scanner's whole "path:line:content" output line, not just the file content. The 20 keyword entries the setup script registered (var\., resource\s, _test\.go, placeholder, ...) therefore whitelisted every line containing that keyword anywhere in the tree, including a line carrying a real access key. Measured against the tree with the script's own detectors registered, none of the 20 entries suppressed a legitimate false positive; the real false positives were 22 lines mentioning the GCP key-file "type" marker, three lines where the script matches its own detector registrations, and three truncated PEM fixtures in a test file. The GCP marker detector (type.*service_account) is dropped rather than narrowed: the benign literal is byte-identical to the one in a real key file, so no regex can tell them apart. The real secret in a GCP service-account JSON is the private_key PEM, which is now covered by the corrected PEM detector. .gitallowed is now the single allowlist and gets three literal entries: a path-anchored entry for the script matching its own registration lines, a truncated-PEM entry for the test fixtures, and a Go format-string DSN entry (fmt.Sprintf with "%s" in the credential position) guarding a recurring benign idiom that scripts/ test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh exercises directly, even though no current file in the tree matches it literally. Its header is corrected: path-scoping is possible via a "^path:[0-9]+:" anchor, contrary to what it claimed. Closes #1972 Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
Runs the real scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh and .gitallowed in a throwaway repo, through the pre-commit hook scan path, and asserts both directions: fixtures shaped like the #1972 hole (a real access key sitting next to a keyword the old allowlist whitelisted) still get caught, and the tree's known false positives still scan clean. HOME is isolated per case so the AWS credential provider and the developer's global git config never reach the test. Fixtures are assembled at runtime from adjacent string literals so this file's own source never contains a scannable token. Wires a new CI job that runs it, mirroring the existing scripts/test-* self-test jobs. Not added to ci-success yet, so it cannot block unrelated PRs while it beds in. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
The new "git-secrets allowlist self-test" CI job (added on this branch)
fails on ubuntu-latest with:
/usr/local/bin/git-secrets: line 208: say: command not found
Failed to install git hooks
git-secrets 1.3.0's install_hook() writes the hook file, chmods it,
and only then reports success via a bare `say` call it never defines
as a function anywhere in the script (confirmed against the 1.3.0
source; still true on the current release, the latest tag). On macOS
that name resolves to /usr/bin/say, the text-to-speech binary, which
exits 0 and makes `git secrets --install -f` look like a clean success
by accident. On Linux there is no such binary, so it's "command not
found" (exit 127), and that becomes the exit status of
`git secrets --install -f` even though every hook file was already
written and made executable correctly beforehand. Reproduced on both
platforms: the commit-msg, pre-commit, and prepare-commit-msg hook
files exist with correct content after the "failed" Linux install.
Defines `say` as a no-op and exports it before calling
`git secrets --install -f`, so the exported function is visible to
git-secrets' own bash process on both platforms. `say` is used in
exactly this one place upstream, so this can't mask any other
diagnostic. Left `scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh`'s own error message as
the accurate signal it now is: it only fires when hook installation
actually fails.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
… real hook
CodeRabbit found three real problems in the git-secrets allowlist PR.
The .gitallowed entry that suppressed setup-git-secrets.sh's own
self-matching detector registrations was anchored on the command
prefix ("git secrets --add '"), not the full added pattern. That
whitelists a secret appended to ANY registration line in that file,
not just the three lines that legitimately self-match (Azure,
PostgreSQL and MySQL DSN; verified empirically that MongoDB's does
not). That is the exact #1972 hole this allowlist exists to close,
reintroduced at the scale of one file. Replaced the single prefix
entry with three entries anchored on the full literal pattern, added
a negative fixture proving a secret appended to a different
registration line (the GCP one) still gets caught, and verified by
measurement that a whole-tree scan produces byte-identical output
before and after the narrowing (the only residual is the pre-existing,
already-tracked #2030 AWS-secret-key false positive, unrelated to this
change).
Narrowing surfaced a second, self-inflicted problem: .gitallowed's own
three new entries reproduce the literal trigger text they exist to
suppress (e.g. "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https", and a "postgres://...@"
span the DSN detector's permissive character classes still match), so
.gitallowed started failing its own self-scan. The old prefix-only
entry never had this problem because it didn't spell out any trigger
text. Fixed by replacing one letter of each entry's trigger substring
with a single-character bracket expression (e.g. "Protoco[l]"), which
is a no-op for regex matching but breaks the contiguous literal span,
so the entries no longer need to allow-list themselves. The explanatory
comment above them is written to avoid spelling those spans out too,
for the same reason.
The CI install step clones git-secrets by the "1.3.0" tag, which is
mutable. Verified independently via `git ls-remote --tags` against the
upstream repo that it currently resolves to
ad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84, then added a check in both
the new git-secrets-allowlist job and the existing pre-commit.yml
install step (which has the identical unpinned clone) that asserts the
cloned HEAD matches before trusting it enough to `sudo make install`.
scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh called `git secrets --scan
--cached` directly, bypassing the installed pre-commit hook and its own
file-selection logic entirely. Now every case also invokes the
installed hook (which recomputes its file list from the index rather
than accepting args, so it is called with none) and checks its exit
code against the same expectation, so a hook/direct-scan disagreement
surfaces as its own labeled failure instead of going unnoticed.
Verified on macOS (git-secrets via homebrew) and in a Debian bookworm
container (git-secrets built from the pinned SHA the same way CI does):
30 PASS, 0 FAIL on both.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
Adversarial review found the "entry broader than its false positive"
pattern still present twice in the entries the previous commit narrowed,
plus two smaller gaps.
Delete the .gitallowed entry for the Go format-string DSN idiom
(postgres://%s:%s@) and its test fixture. Measured what it actually
suppresses across the whole tree: only the PR's own fixture. The real
idiom in the tree is "postgresql://%s:%s@..." in
internal/testutil/postgres.go, which the postgres:// detector does not
match anyway (the "ql" breaks the required literal). The entry guarded
nothing that exists, and the fixture existed only to justify the entry.
It also widened matching: a real key appended to a line shaped like
"postgres://%s:%s@%s/db", "<key>" scanned clean. If the idiom ever
lands in the tree, a path-anchored entry can be added then.
The three entries narrowed onto scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh's own
self-matching registration lines were anchored on the path and the
added pattern, but not the trailing comment, and had no trailing $.
That leaves the anchor open at the end, so a key appended to the END of
one of those three lines themselves (not a different line) scanned
clean. Pinned the whole line, comment included, with $, for all three
entries. Added a fixture that appends a key to the end of the
PostgreSQL line and confirmed it fails against the pre-fix entries
(exit 0, wrongly clean) and passes against the fix (exit 1, caught).
Added the new git-secrets-allowlist job to ci-success's needs list. All
of its sibling guard self-test jobs were already listed; this one
wasn't, so a regression in it could not block anything. It has already
passed on Linux on this PR, so the "not required while it beds in"
rationale no longer applies.
Corrected the root-cause comment on the `say` shim: `say` was never
git-secrets' own function. git-secrets sources git's git-sh-setup and
relied on `say` being defined there (introduced in git-sh-setup.sh in
2009, in git's own history). Git removed it in commit 5b893f7d81
("git-sh-setup.sh: remove 'say' function, change last users"), first
shipped in Git 2.38 (2022), because it was undocumented and unused
within git's own tree. So this is breakage from a git upgrade, not a
git-secrets regression; a git-secrets install on an older git, or on
macOS where /usr/bin/say happens to answer to the same name, was never
affected. The shim remains the correct fix either way.
Verified on macOS (git-secrets via homebrew, shellcheck clean) and in a
Debian bookworm container (git-secrets built from the pinned SHA the
same way CI does, shellcheck clean): 30 PASS, 0 FAIL on both, same
count as before since one case was removed and one was added. Measured
the whole-tree scan before and after these changes: byte-identical
output (the only residual is the pre-existing, already-tracked #2030
AWS-secret-key false positive).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fu9uWjxtDFx5HDKeMRt1jC
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe git-secrets setup now uses updated detection patterns and full-line allowlist entries. A new self-test checks direct scans and the pre-commit hook. CI and pre-commit setup verify the git-secrets commit before installation. ChangesGit-secrets detection and validation
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The new truncated-PEM allowlist entry can hide a real key or credential that appears earlier on the same line as the placeholder. Such a secret would pass both the scan and the pre-commit hook. Anchor the entry to the fixture path and the full line before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @.gitallowed:
- Around line 78-82: Restrict the `PRIVATE KEY-----` allowlist rule to the exact
fixture path and full fixture-line syntax, including an end anchor, so appended
secrets cannot be suppressed. Add a regression case that appends both a PEM key
and an API key to the truncated fixture and verifies the scan rejects it.
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… reopen
CodeRabbit review on this port (cloud-commitments-platform#101): the
truncated-PEM .gitallowed entry was unanchored, so a real secret spliced
onto the same line -- appended after "..." or prepended before
"-----BEGIN" -- still scanned clean, because .gitallowed suppresses the
WHOLE "path:line:content" line if any allowed pattern matches anywhere in
it, regardless of which prohibited pattern actually fired. That is the
exact class of bug this branch exists to close, reintroduced in the one
entry that didn't get the anchoring treatment the three self-matching
script entries already had.
Fixed by requiring the full contiguous header ("-----BEGIN PRIVAT[E]
KEY-----", immediately after the opening quote) and pinning the tail with
$ to only the closing punctuation this repo's own test fixtures use.
Verified directly (real git-secrets binary, throwaway repo): a key
appended after the truncation marker, a key prepended before the header,
a key spliced between "BEGIN" and "PRIVATE KEY-----", and a key spliced
right after "KEY-----" are all now caught (exit 1); both of this repo's
legitimate truncated-PEM fixtures still scan clean (exit 0).
scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh: 30/30 passing after the fix (it
was already 30/30 before, since none of its existing fixtures exercised
this particular splice -- the new coverage above is a manual adversarial
check, not a change to the checked-in self-test).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @.gitallowed:
- Line 91: Update the PEM exception pattern in the allowlist to match the
expected path and complete fixture line from the start of the scanner output, so
preceding content cannot be ignored. Add a negative test proving a line with a
key before the placeholder is not allowlisted.
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CodeRabbit review on this port: defining say() as a no-op (so this script's own error handling, not git-secrets' `say` bug, decides success) also means "git secrets --install -f" returning success no longer proves anything about whether the hook files were actually written -- say() is a no-op that returns success regardless of whether install_hook's write or chmod actually succeeded, so a broken hook (e.g. a permissions error) would be reported as installed. Verify what install_hook was supposed to do instead: after install, check that each of the three hooks git-secrets writes (commit-msg, pre-commit, prepare-commit-msg) exists, is executable, and contains its "git secrets --<cmd> -- \"$@\"" invocation (checking the *.d/git-secrets path when a hooks.d directory is in use, matching install_hook's own destination logic). Fail loudly if any hook fails the check. Verified: a normal install passes; corrupting a hook's content after install (simulating a partial write) is detected and reported. scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh remains 30/30 (it already installs via this same script and would have failed loudly here if the new check had a false positive). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
… git grep Independent adversarial review of this port found two further gaps past the previous two fix commits: 1. The truncated-PEM .gitallowed entry, even after being anchored to the quoted value's own start and end, was still only a SUBSTRING match within the scanner's whole "path:line:content" line. .gitallowed suppresses the entire line when ANY allowed pattern matches anywhere in it, regardless of which prohibited pattern fired, so a real secret in an earlier, unrelated statement on the same physical line as the allowed fixture -- `k := "AKIA..."; PrivateKey: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n...",` -- was still suppressed. Fixed by anchoring the whole entry to the start of git-secrets' own "path:line:content" format (^[^:]+:[0-9]+:) so the key assignment must be the first thing on the line, closing the gap in both directions (before AND after the fixture) at once. Also dropped an orphan half-line comment left over from an earlier edit, and fixed the explanatory comment (which illustrated the attack by literally spelling out the PEM trigger, tripping the PEM detector on .gitallowed itself). 2. scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh's password/api_key/secret_key detectors used `\s` for whitespace. BSD/glibc grep's -E accepts `\s` as a GNU extension in some builds, but `git grep -E` (what git-secrets actually invokes to join and run every pattern) does not: `password = "..."` with a real space scanned clean under `git grep -E 'password\s*...'` and only matched once `\s` was replaced with the POSIX class `[[:space:]]`. This is the exact class of "detector never actually ran" bug #1972 already found twice (the PEM `--add` abort, the GCP regex making every scan exit 128); fixed the same way here since it's the same file and the same failure mode. Added three fixtures to scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh exercising both: a real-spaced password/api_key/secret_key line (must be caught), and a real-shaped key spliced before AND after an otherwise-legitimate truncated-PEM fixture on the same physical line (both must be caught). Verified: 36/36 assertions pass (30 previous + 6 new: 3 fixtures x 2 scan paths) against the real git-secrets binary. Filed a follow-up issue for two lower-risk residual items an independent review also raised (the bare numeric/UUID placeholder block's own lack of anchoring, and a dedicated DSN-detector coverage audit), scoped separately since neither has a demonstrated exploit and both need a deliberate design pass. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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Independent adversarial review (two rounds) + local verification: MERGE at 539778d. With real git-secrets 1.3.0: a key before or after an allowed truncated-PEM literal on the same line, and a spaced password assignment, are now caught (exit 1); allowed fixtures still scan clean; self-test 36/36; hook-install verification works against real 1.3.0 output. Pre-existing deferred items (bare account-ID entries, DSN detectors under git grep -w) tracked in #368. |
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Summary
Ported from LeanerCloud/cloud-commitments-cli#2083 (monorepo split); closes reserved-instances-cli#1972 (no equivalent issue exists yet in this repo).
git-secrets allowed patterns are applied with
grep -Evagainst the scanner's wholepath:line:contentoutput line, not against file content alone.scripts/setup-git-secrets.shregistered 20 keyword entries, among themvar\.,resource\s,_test\.go,placeholderandexample\.com. Any line containing one of those scanned clean, including a line carrying a real access key.The script had also never run to completion:
git secrets --addrejects a value starting with a dash (the PEM pattern did, so the script aborted underset -ebefore reaching the allowed block on any machine); the GCP API-key pattern registered just before that was an invalid bracket range under BSD/glibc regex and git-secrets joins every pattern into onegit grep -E, so once registered it made every scan exit 128; and on Linux,git-secrets --install'ssaycall (removed fromgit-sh-setupin Git 2.38) made a successful install report failure, so this script's own error handling exited before registering anything at all.Changes
scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh..gitallowedbecomes the single allowlist, matched against the scanner's wholepath:line:contentline, so entries either describe the benign literal or anchor on the path.BEGIN [ALGO ]PRIVATE KEY-----) instead of a marker-word detector that missed the actual key body.say()so hook installation succeeds on Linux..gitallowedgains three path-and-line-anchored entries for the three detector-registration lines that self-match (Azure connection string, PostgreSQL, MySQL; verified empirically that MongoDB's does not), each anchored on the full line including its trailing comment (not just the command prefix, and not left open at the end), plus a comment recording why a fixture is required for any future entry in that block. Also carries the truncated-PEM allowlist entry the self-test's negative controls need (this repo has nocmd/configure_test.go, so the entry is kept generic rather than referencing a file that doesn't exist here).scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh: runs the real script in a throwaway repo, HOME-isolated (--register-awsreads~/.aws/credentials, and git-secrets echoes its whole pattern list on a regex error), and asserts both directions through both a direct scan and the installed pre-commit hook.ad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84, matching the1.3.0tag) rather than the mutable tag, in.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml, and run the new self-test as a step in the same job right after git-secrets is installed and registered.Adaptations from the original monorepo PR
This repo has no
ci.ymljob graph analogous to the monorepo's (noci-cd-permissions-style Terraform guard suite), so the self-test runs as an added step inside the existingpre-commit.ymljob instead of a newci.ymljob wired intoci-success..gitallowed's pre-existing account-ID placeholder section (entries referencingcmd/helpers_test.go,handler_*_test.go, etc.) was left untouched: those files don't exist in this repo and were already present before this fix, so touching them is a separate cleanup outside this PR's scope.Verification
Measured in a throwaway repo with an isolated
HOME, never in a real checkout, using the actualgit-secretsbinary (not a mock):bash scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh: 30 PASS, 0 FAIL (both the direct-scan and installed-pre-commit-hook path, for every fixture).resource "aws_iam_access_key" "demo" { key = "AKIA0123456789ABCDEF" }) scans dirty (exit 1) with the fixed.gitallowedand script; re-adding the old broadgit secrets --add --allowed 'resource\s'keyword makes the identical line scan clean (exit 0), reproducing the pre-fix hole on demand.git ls-remote https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets.git 'refs/tags/1.3.0^{}'resolves toad82d68ee924906a0401dfd48de5057731a9bc84, matching the pinned SHA.pre-commit run --files .gitallowed .github/workflows/ci.yml .github/workflows/pre-commit.yml CHANGELOG.md scripts/setup-git-secrets.sh scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.sh(withSKIP=hadolint,actionlint, since both aredocker_imagehooks and the local Docker daemon doesn't respond in this environment): every other hook passed, including the AWS-secret scanner, Trivy config scanner, and the GitHub Actions injection audit.actionlintrun natively at the pinned version (v1.7.12, matching the hook's pin) against.github/workflows/ci.ymland.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml: clean. No Dockerfiles changed, sohadolintdoesn't apply to this diff.Review findings from the original PR
All findings were raised and resolved within the original PR's own commit chain, which this port carries in full (all 6 commits, ending at
4726aa4b8):.gitallowedentry for the script's self-matching registration lines was written as a command-prefix anchor, so it whitelisted every line in that file, not just the three that genuinely self-match -- the same bug this PR exists to close, reintroduced at file scale. Fixed indfb9f3766, then found still open at the end (missing a trailing$, so a key appended to the end of one of those three lines still scanned clean) and closed in4726aa4b8.1.3.0tag with no integrity check. Fixed indfb9f3766in bothci.ymlandpre-commit.yml(the latter's copy of the identical unpinned clone was fixed too, not left as an implicit "acceptable" precedent).dfb9f3766: both helpers now run.git/hooks/pre-commitin addition to the direct scan and compare both exit codes through a shared assertion.Nothing was deferred; the head commit (
4726aa4b8in the original, carried here) is the state all reviewers signed off on.Summary by CodeRabbit
Update: independent review found two further gaps, both fixed
An independent adversarial review of this port (beyond the CodeRabbit pass above) found the truncated-PEM
.gitallowedentry was still only tail-anchored even after the CodeRabbit-driven fix: a real secret in an earlier, unrelated statement on the same physical line as the allowed fixture still leaked through, since.gitallowedsuppresses the whole scanner line if any allowed pattern matches anywhere in it. Fixed by anchoring the entry to the start of git-secrets' ownpath:line:contentformat (^[^:]+:[0-9]+:), closing both directions. It also found the pre-existing password/api_key/secret_key detectors inscripts/setup-git-secrets.shused\s, whichgit grep -E(what git-secrets actually invokes) does not support the same way BSD/GNUgrep -Edo locally -- a spacedpassword = "..."" scanned clean. Fixed by switching to[[:space:]]`.Added three fixtures (a real-spaced password line, and a key spliced before/after the PEM fixture on the same line) —
bash scripts/test-git-secrets-allowlist.shis now 36/36 against the real git-secrets binary. Filed #368 for two lower-risk residual items (the bare account-ID/UUID placeholder block's own lack of anchoring, and a DSN-detector coverage audit), scoped separately since neither has a demonstrated exploit.